Asian Development Outlook 2016: Asia\u27s Potential Growth by Asian Development Bank
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
International Publications Key Workplace Documents 
2016 
Asian Development Outlook 2016: Asia's Potential Growth 
Asian Development Bank 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Key Workplace Documents at DigitalCommons@ILR. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in International Publications by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Asian Development Outlook 2016: Asia's Potential Growth 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Global headwinds notwithstanding, developing Asia will continue to contribute 60% of world 
growth. Weighing sluggish growth in the United States and the euro area, the transition of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) to an economy led by consumption and services, and India’s ongoing structural 
reform, Asian Development Outlook 2016 forecasts 5.7% growth for developing Asia in 2016 and 2017. 
Most subregions of developing Asia will see growth slow in 2016 before rebounding in 2017. Growth in 
South Asia, whose expansion was the highest of any subregion in 2015, is expected at 6.9% in 2016, 
accelerating to 7.3% in 2017 as reforms are implemented in India’s financial sector. East Asia will see 
growth moderate in both years in tandem with the PRC, whose growth is expected to slow to 6.5% this 
year and 6.3% in 2017 as it contends with reduced investment among other factors. 
Economic performance is poised to improve in Southeast Asia as the large economies of Indonesia and 
the Philippines ramp up investment, Viet Nam sustains its expansion, and Thailand gathers momentum, 
though Malaysia will slow further with weak oil prices. Meanwhile, low commodity prices will curb growth 
prospects in Central Asia and the Pacific, in part by constraining fiscal spending. 
Regional inflation has been favorable to Asian economies, as low international food and fuel prices 
helped cut average inflation to 2.2% in 2015 from 3.0% in 2014. Inflation is likely to pick up to 2.5% in 2016 
as domestic demand strengthens and to 2.7% in 2017 as global commodity prices recover slightly. 
Uncertainties abound in the global economic environment, and risks to developing Asia’s growth are 
mostly on the downside. This publication examines the implications of an unexpectedly sharp slowdown 
in the PRC, which could cut both global and regional growth by nearly 1.8 percentage points. The impact 
in the region would be mainly on trade volumes and commodity prices, the severity felt by each neighbor 
economy depending on its ability to accommodate and adapt to the changes. 
Producer price deflation is associated with lower investment and lower economic growth and has 
become an emerging concern for many Asian economies. Thus, policy makers are advised to pay 
attention to falling producer prices because they compound producers’ debt burdens and weigh on their 
investment decisions. 
Asian Development Outlook 2016 examines in detail how the growth slowdown in Asia since the global 
financial crisis of 2008–2009 has affected the region’s potential growth. Defined as the maximum growth 
rate associated with the full employment of productive resources, potential growth is determined by 
changing demographics and labor productivity. 
Potential growth in the region has fallen by 2 percentage points since the global financial crisis. Absent 
structural reform, many economies in the region will see a further decrease because of unfavorable 
demographics, convergence with advanced economies, and spillover from growth moderation in the PRC. 
To invigorate potential growth, policy reforms are needed. On top of promoting sound macroeconomic 
management, reform should offset the impact of less-favorable demographics by increasing female 
participation in the workforce, extending the working age, and raising labor productivity through capital 
investment and measures to reduce factor misallocation. Policies such as these can help sustain growth, 
thereby raising living standards and further reducing poverty in Asia. 
Keywords 
Asia, development, economic growth, industrial economies 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Asian Development Bank. (2016). Asian development outlook 2016: Asia's potential growth. Manila: 
Author. 
Required Publisher's Statement 
© Asian Development Back. Available at ADB’s Open Access Repository under a Creative Commons 
Attribution license (CC BY 3.0 IGO). 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl/510 
A
SIA
N
 D
EVELO
PM
EN
T O
U
TLO
O
K 2016 
Asia’s Potential G
row
th
Asian Development Outlook 2016
Asia’s Potential Growth
The annual Asian Development Outlook analyzes economic performance in the past year and offers forecasts 
for the next 2 years for the 45 economies in Asia and the Pacific that make up developing Asia.
Global headwinds notwithstanding, developing Asia will continue to contribute 60% of world growth. Modest 
recovery in Southeast Asia and sustained growth in India will partly offset continued moderation in the 
People’s Republic of China and associated spillover into neighboring economies. Risks to the growth outlook 
tilt to the downside: future US interest rate hikes that may intensify global financial volatility, a sharper-than-
forecast growth slowdown in the People’s Republic of China that would hurt regional exports and growth, 
emerging producer price deflation that may undermine growth in some economies, tepid prices for oil and 
other commodities, and El Niño.  
This edition highlights the need to invigorate developing Asia’s potential growth, whose decline since its 2007 
peak explains much of the region’s growth slowdown since the global financial crisis. To ensure a healthy future 
for potential growth, Asia must employ the full range of policy responses to augment labor supply, improve 
labor productivity, enhance institutional quality, and maintain macroeconomic stability. 
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Foreword
Global headwinds notwithstanding, developing Asia will continue to 
contribute 60% of world growth. Weighing sluggish growth in the 
United States and the euro area, the transition of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) to an economy led by consumption and services, and 
India’s ongoing structural reform, Asian Development Outlook 2016
forecasts 5.7% growth for developing Asia in 2016 and 2017. 
Most subregions of developing Asia will see growth slow in 2016 
before rebounding in 2017. Growth in South Asia, whose expansion 
was the highest of any subregion in 2015, is expected at 6.9% in 2016, 
accelerating to 7.3% in 2017 as reforms are implemented in India’s 
financial sector. East Asia will see growth moderate in both years in 
tandem with the PRC, whose growth is expected to slow to 6.5% this 
year and 6.3% in 2017 as it contends with reduced investment among 
other factors. 
Economic performance is poised to improve in Southeast Asia as the 
large economies of Indonesia and the Philippines ramp up investment, 
Viet Nam sustains its expansion, and Thailand gathers momentum, 
though Malaysia will slow further with weak oil prices. Meanwhile, 
low commodity prices will curb growth prospects in Central Asia and 
the Pacific, in part by constraining fiscal spending. 
Regional inflation has been favorable to Asian economies, as low 
international food and fuel prices helped cut average inflation to 2.2% in 
2015 from 3.0% in 2014. Inflation is likely to pick up to 2.5% in 2016 as 
domestic demand strengthens and to 2.7% in 2017 as global commodity 
prices recover slightly.
Uncertainties abound in the global economic environment, and 
risks to developing Asia’s growth are mostly on the downside. This 
publication examines the implications of an unexpectedly sharp 
slowdown in the PRC, which could cut both global and regional growth 
by nearly 1.8 percentage points. The impact in the region would be 
mainly on trade volumes and commodity prices, the severity felt by each 
neighbor economy depending on its ability to accommodate and adapt to 
the changes. 
Producer price deflation is associated with lower investment and 
lower economic growth and has become an emerging concern for many 
Asian economies. Thus, policy makers are advised to pay attention to 
falling producer prices because they compound producers’ debt burdens 
and weigh on their investment decisions. 
Asian Development Outlook 2016 examines in detail how the growth 
slowdown in Asia since the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 has 
affected the region’s potential growth. Defined as the maximum growth 
rate associated with the full employment of productive resources, 
potential growth is determined by changing demographics and labor 
productivity.
Potential growth in the region has fallen by 2 percentage points 
since the global financial crisis. Absent structural reform, many 
economies in the region will see a further decrease because of 
unfavorable demographics, convergence with advanced economies, and 
spillover from growth moderation in the PRC. 
To invigorate potential growth, policy reforms are needed. On top of 
promoting sound macroeconomic management, reform should offset the 
impact of less-favorable demographics by increasing female participation 
in the workforce, extending the working age, and raising labor 
productivity through capital investment and measures to reduce factor 
misallocation. Policies such as these can help sustain growth, thereby 
raising living standards and further reducing poverty in Asia. 
TAKEHIKO NAKAO 
President 
Asian Development Bank
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Definitions
The economies discussed in Asian Development Outlook 2016 (ADO 2016) are 
classified by major analytic or geographic group. For the purposes of this 
publication, the following apply:
• Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) comprises Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
• Developing Asia comprises the 45 members of the Asian Development Bank 
listed below. 
• Central Asia comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
• East Asia comprises the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; 
the Republic of Korea; Mongolia; and Taipei,China.
• South Asia comprises Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, 
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
• Southeast Asia comprises Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
• The Pacific comprises the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, 
the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Palau, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
Unless otherwise specified, the symbol “$” and the word “dollar” refer to 
US dollars. ADO 2016 is generally based on data available up to 9 March 2016.
Abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank
ADO Asian Development Outlook
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CPI consumer price index
FDI foreign direct investment
FSM Federated States of Micronesia
FY fiscal year
GDP gross domestic product
GFC global financial crisis
GVC global value chain
ICT information and communication technology
IMF International Monetary Fund
Lao PDR Lao People’s Democratic Republic
M1 money that includes cash and checking accounts
M2 broad money that adds highly liquid accounts to M1
M3 broad money that adds time accounts to M2
NPL nonperforming loan
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PNG Papua New Guinea
PPI producer price index
PRC People’s Republic of China
RMI Republic of the Marshall Islands
saar seasonally adjusted annualized rate
SMEs small and medium-sized enterprises
SOE state-owned enterprise
US United States of America
VAT value-added tax

Developing Asia is projected to grow at 5.7% in both 2016 and 2017, down
slightly from 5.9% in 2015, due chiefly to considerable global headwinds and
moderating growth in the People’s Republic of China.
Commodity price declines dragged inflation down to 2.2% in 2015. Regional 
inflation will revive to 2.5% in 2016 as domestic demand strengthens, and rise 
further to 2.7% in 2017 as global commodity prices recover.
Risks are tilted to the downside as tightening US monetary policy may heighten 
financial volatility, further moderation in the People’s Republic of China could 
spill over into its neighbors, and producer price deflation may undermine 
growth in some economies.
Reform to raise labor productivity can invigorate developing Asia’s potential 
growth. 
Shang-Jin Wei
Chief Economist
Asian Development Bank
ADO 2016—Highlights
xii  Asian Development Outlook 2016
Rescuing growth in uncertain times
Slow going in a tough global environment
box Growth in developing Asia is forecast to dip slightly. Gross domestic product (GDP) 
in the region will expand by 5.7% in 2016 and 2017, decelerating from 5.9% in 2015 
in a di­cult and uncertain global environment. Solid growth in India and a pickup in 
aggregate growth in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will help 
balance continued growth moderation in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Despite 
the slight dip, the region will contribute around 60% of global growth in the next 2 years, 
close to its contribution in the past 5 years.
» Growth in the industrial economies is unlikely to pick up this year. Aggregate 
growth in the major industrial economies—the United States (US), the euro area, 
and Japan—will stay at 1.8% in 2016 before inching up to 1.9% in 2017. In the US, 
expanding private consumption and investment will be tempered by weak external 
demand. While recovery in the euro area is gradually gaining ground, domestic and 
external risks abound, keeping growth from breaking out of its slow 2015 pace. 
Japan’s growth will improve slightly, helped by a pickup in private consumption this 
year in anticipation of a value-added tax increase next year.
» The PRC continues to shift away from its reliance on investment and exports.
Growth slowed further last year as exports faltered, labor shortages began to bite, 
and the short-term adverse impact of supply-side reform took its toll. Reduced 
investment in industries with excess capacity will be another factor moderating 
growth still further to 6.5% (within the government’s target range of 6.5%–7.0%) and 
to 6.3% next year. 
» Strong public investment boosted growth in India despite weak exports. Reform 
geared to attract more foreign direct investment progressed, and the authorities 
worked to repair corporate and bank balance sheets. While macroeconomic 
fundamentals are strong, progress on major structural reform is expected to be 
gradual. Growth momentum will be sustained at 7.4% in 2016 before picking up to 
7.8% in 2017 with measures to fund stalled projects and an uptick in bank credit. 
» Stronger growth is seen for ASEAN. Aggregate growth in the 10 ASEAN economies 
is forecast to accelerate steadily from 4.4% in 2015 to 4.5% in 2016 and 4.8% in 
2017. Growth will be led by Indonesia as it ramps up investment in infrastructure 
and implements policy reform that spurs private investment. Solid consumption 
and investment will provide a lift to the Philippine economy. Thailand’s recovery 
is expected to gather momentum, and Viet Nam will sustain vigorous expansion. 
In contrast, Malaysian growth will slip further with low oil prices and weak external 
demand. 
» Low commodity prices weigh on growth prospects in Central Asia and 
the Pacific. Continued low oil prices are exerting pressure on fiscal spending in 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Papua New Guinea, and Timor-Leste, slowing subregional 
growth in Central Asia and the Pacific. While the expected pickup in oil prices will 
bring some relief in 2017, growth is expected to remain below the 5-year average 
pace to the forecast horizon.
Highlights  xiii
box Most Asian economies benefit from low international food and fuel prices. The 
large fall in oil and food prices tempered inflation. The regional rate eased from 3.0% 
in 2014 to 2.2% in 2015 as global oil prices fell by 47% and average food prices by 15%. 
Regional inflation will revive to 2.5% in 2016 as domestic demand strengthens and rise 
further to 2.7% in 2017 as global commodity prices recover. 
box The regional current account surplus will narrow this year and next. Subdued 
demand for manufacturing exports and continued low commodity prices will trim 
developing Asia’s current account surplus from the equivalent of 2.9% of regional GDP 
in 2015 to 2.6% in 2016 and further to 2.4% in 2017. Yet the region’s increasing global 
economic weight means its surplus will widen slightly to 0.7% of world GDP in 2016, 
up 0.1 percentage points from last year. 
box Risks to the regional growth forecast remain tilted to the downside. Future interest 
rate hikes by the US Federal Reserve may tighten global financing conditions. This, 
combined with broader weakness in emerging markets, could heighten investors’ risk 
aversion and intensify global financial market volatility. A sharper-than-forecast growth 
slowdown in the PRC would further dim the global outlook and directly hurt regional 
exports and growth. Tepid prices for oil and other commodities cast a shadow over the 
prospects of Asia’s commodity-dependent economies. Finally, El Niño looms as a major 
weather risk for economies that rely on agriculture. While consumer price inflation is 
generally low but positive, producer price deflation has emerged as a new spoiler in the 
PRC and other Asian economies. 
Spillover from the People’s Republic of China
box Growth moderation in the PRC weighs on regional growth. Simulations estimate 
that the drop in PRC growth may have shaved as much as 0.3 percentage points from 
developing Asia’s outlook. The PRC e¨ect is largely centered on Asia, reflecting strong 
regional trade and production links. In contrast, the impact on the US and the euro area 
through trade is largely o¨set by the benefit of lower commodity prices. The unlikely 
event of a sharp growth decline in the PRC triggered by some type of financial shock 
would be significant, however, lopping nearly 1.8 percentage points o¨ global growth. 
Simulations of such a scenario show oil prices down by 10%–25% relative to the baseline, 
while growth in Japan would lose 1.5 percentage points and in developing Asia 1.8 points. 
box Ongoing structural change in the PRC is aecting its import structure. Contributing 
to its growth moderation, the PRC is currently undergoing a structural transformation from 
growth led by exports and investment to growth grounded on domestic consumption. 
As a result, while investment has been the main growth driver since 2001—peaking at 
an 86% contribution to growth in 2009—consumption now contributes more than half. 
The PRC role in global value chains is also changing as rising wages shunt some activities 
to lower-cost economies and technological upgrades shift the PRC into activities that add 
more value. These structural changes are reflected in the sharp drop in the share of parts 
and components in PRC imports since the mid-2000s and a slight rise in the share of 
consumer goods.
box How PRC structural change aects an economy depends on the relationship. 
Spillover from PRC restructuring into particular economies will di¨er depending on 
whether they are exporters of consumer goods, parts of the same production chain, or 
xiv  Asian Development Outlook 2016
competitors, either current or potential. For example, the Republic of Korea has lost 
market share as the PRC increasingly mastered high technology, but Viet Nam has 
increased its share of parts and components in PRC imports as it has taken over from the 
PRC lower-skilled tasks within production chains. Other Asian economies may benefit 
too as the PRC withdraws from labor-intensive pursuits. Bangladesh, for one, has taken 
up garment manufacturing to become the world’s second-largest garment exporter.
Emergent producer price deflation 
box The PRC and some other Asian economies recently experienced producer price 
deflation. Slowing economic growth has combined with sharply lower oil prices to 
push producer price inflation into negative territory, though consumer price inflation 
remains mostly positive. In 2015, the PRC saw producer prices contract by 5.2% and, 
by February 2016, it had endured 48 consecutive months of producer price deflation. 
Deflation in the PRC may be transmitted to its neighbors through lower export prices, 
especially if the renminbi depreciates. In fact, producer prices fell in 2015 by 9.1% in 
Singapore, 6.7% in the Philippines, and 4.8% in Malaysia—and by smaller margins in 
India, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Hong Kong, China. 
box Commodity price shocks get diluted along distribution chains before aecting 
consumers. The pass-through of oil and food prices thus tends to be lower for consumer 
prices than for producer prices. In the PRC, for example, the cumulative pass-through of 
a 1% drop in global oil prices after 4 quarters reached 14 basis points for producer prices 
but only 3 basis points for consumer prices. In Thailand, the cumulative pass-through 
of a 1% drop in global food prices reached 21 basis points for producer prices but only 
7 basis points for consumer prices. The lower rate of consumer price pass-through may 
explain why episodes of producer price deflation are less rare. 
box Historically, falling producer prices are more common than declines in consumer 
prices. An empirical study of 38 economies found 389 episodes of producer price 
deflation from 1947 to 2014 but only 145 episodes of consumer price deflation. In 
theory, deflation can spark a vicious cycle of weakening demand and falling prices, but 
evidence from episodes of declining consumer prices is mixed. Deflation in the postwar 
era cannot be accurately assessed by looking only at consumer prices because they may 
not adequately capture the pressures on firms.
box Producer price deflation is associated with lower economic growth. Average GDP 
growth per capita was lower in an 1870–2014 study sample during deflationary episodes 
than during inflationary ones. This held whether producer or consumer prices were 
considered, but regression analysis found stronger evidence of an inverse association for 
producer prices than for consumer prices. While the correlation of growth with consumer 
price deflation held only during the Great Depression, significant growth associations 
with producer price deflation held up for the full sample period, including the postwar 
subperiod 1947–2014. Income grew 1.4 percentage points faster during moderate 
producer price inflation than during producer price deflation in 1870–2014.
box Restrained investment is one channel by which producer price deflation hampers 
growth. The producer price index measures price changes from the viewpoint 
of producers and thus a¨ects producer decisions such as on investment. In fact, 
producer price deflation tended to be followed by investment contractions, as 71% 
of economies that experienced significant deflation su¨ered investment decline. 
Highlights  xv
Deflation can compound producers’ debt burdens and thus discourage investment. 
A mix of higher debt and lower prices reduced investment in 45% of economies that 
experienced both.
box Policy makers should be aware of deflation’s potential to harm economic growth. 
Long-run historical comparisons do not rule out the possibility that deflation, especially 
producer price deflation, is negatively associated with growth. The data clearly show 
that high inflation as well as deflation can adversely a¨ect growth. Because producer 
prices tend to be more volatile than consumer prices, and producer price deflation may 
therefore inflict greater damage on the economy, policy makers should monitor not only 
the consumer price index but also the producer price index. 
Outlook by subregion
box Slowing growth is widespread across developing Asia. Weak recovery in the major 
industrial economies, moderating growth in the PRC, and recession in the Russian 
Federation are hampering growth in other economies with strong ties to them through 
trade, investment, and remittances. Meanwhile, sharply lower global commodity prices 
are undermining growth in the region’s oil producers, even as a presumed reciprocal 
boost to growth in oil importers remains elusive. Only Southeast Asia is forecast to see 
growth pick up in 2016, however modestly. The expected easing of these impediments to 
growth within the forecast horizon points to general improvement in 2017.
box East Asia will see growth drift lower as growth in the PRC moderates further. 
Subregional growth slowed to 6.0% in 2015—a 0.6 percentage point drop from the 
previous year—as all economies slowed. The rate is expected to decline further to 5.7% 
in 2016. In the PRC, e¨orts to rein in debt accumulation, adverse short-term e¨ects 
from supply-side reform, and emerging labor shortages will tamp down growth from 
6.9% in 2015 to 6.5% this year and 6.3% in 2017. The Republic of Korea will have stable 
growth this year, and Taipei,China will accelerate on higher government investment. 
Meanwhile, declines in mining output will push growth in Mongolia below 1%, and lower 
tourism flows will slow growth in Hong Kong, China. Although rising domestic demand 
and an improving global economy will lift growth rates slightly higher in 2017 across most 
of the subregion, continued moderation in the PRC will weigh down the subregional 
average to 5.6% in 2017. Inflation fell to 1.3% last year with lower prices for oil and other 
commodities but will rise moderately to 1.6% this year and 2.0% in 2017 as domestic 
demand rebounds and commodity prices recover. 
box South Asia is forecast to post the most rapid growth in developing Asia. Growth in 
the subregion accelerated to 7.0% in 2015 and will accelerate further to 7.3% in 2017 
after a hesitation at 6.9% this year. The subregion’s prospects reflect heavy weighting for 
India, where growth is expected to dip marginally to 7.4% in 2016 as exports decline and 
both public and private investment slows, and then pick up to 7.8% in 2017 as investment 
revives. Apart from weakness in export demand, other economies in the subregion face 
unique challenges to growth: a devastating earthquake and a political stando¨ in Nepal, 
a drop in high-end tourism in the Maldives, and much-needed fiscal reform to deal with 
a buildup of excessive debt in Sri Lanka. Both Bangladesh and Pakistan see continued 
moderate growth benefitting from sustained progress toward macroeconomic and 
structural reform. Subregional inflation fell to 5.0% in 2015, benefitting from low oil and 
commodity prices, but is projected to revive to 5.2% in 2016 and 5.7% in 2017. 
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box Southeast Asia is seen reversing its growth slowdown in the next 2 years.
Growth slowed in 7 of the 10 ASEAN economies, edging down the subregional average 
to 4.4% in 2015. In Indonesia, growth moderated for a fourth year in a row. In Malaysia, 
soft global demand and low oil prices cut growth by a full percentage point. Thailand’s 
recovery from a slump in 2014 was sluggish, while bad weather hurt agriculture in 
many economies. In contrast, foreign direct investment in manufacturing and robust 
construction propelled Viet Nam to its strongest expansion in 7 years. Aggregate growth 
is forecast to pick up to 4.5% in 2016 and 4.8% in 2017. Infrastructure investment is seen 
boosting growth in Indonesia, while Myanmar rebounds from devastating floods in 2015. 
Malaysia, on the other hand, faces another year of decelerating growth. Southeast Asia’s 
aggregate inflation rate eased to 2.7% in 2015 in line with lower food and fuel prices. 
Inflation is forecast to edge higher in most economies this year and next, but decelerating 
inflation in Indonesia will hold the ASEAN average to 2.6% in 2016 and 2.9% in 2017.
box Central Asia’s growth slowdown is forecast to deepen this year. Plunging petroleum 
prices, recession in the Russian Federation, and weakness in other trading partners took 
their toll on Central Asia, where average growth plummeted to 2.9% in 2015 from 5.3% 
a year earlier. Forecasts of even lower petroleum prices and continued recession in the 
Russian Federation prompt a projection that average growth in the subregion will slow 
further in 2016 to 2.1%, with contraction forecast for Azerbaijan and growth at only 
0.7% for Kazakhstan. Growth is projected to recover somewhat to 2.8% in 2017 on 
the strength of an improved external outlook and somewhat higher petroleum prices. 
Steep currency depreciation in several economies helped push average inflation to 
6.2% in 2015 from 5.7% last year. The lagged inflation e¨ects of depreciation in 2015 
and possible further currency weakness in some economies are projected to propel 
average inflation to 10.8% in 2016 as acceleration occurs in all economies, with inflation 
reaching double digits in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan. 
Expected exchange rate stabilization should help rein in average inflation in the subregion 
to 5.9% in 2017.
box The Pacific is poised for lower growth as the economy slows in Papua New Guinea. 
Growth in the Pacific held strong at 7.0% in 2015. This was largely attributable to 
developments in Papua New Guinea, the predominant economy in the subregion, 
where new liquefied natural gas production and exports powered high growth. The only 
other economy to achieve high growth was Palau, where tourism drove expansion. 
GDP contracted in Nauru because of damage to port facilities and in Vanuatu because 
of a severe cyclone early in the year, while in energy-exporting Timor-Leste growth 
plunged as oil and gas prices fell. Average growth across the subregion is expected to 
fall to 3.8% in 2016 and further to 3.1% in 2017. In Fiji, cyclone damage is dragging 
growth down to 2.7% in 2016, but the economy should rebound to 4.5% growth in 2017. 
Inflation remained steady in 2015 at 3.4%, though Nauru experienced high inflation as 
problems at the port a¨ected trade. Inflation is expected to rise slightly to 4.5% in 2016 
and 4.7% in 2017.
Highlights  xvii
Asia’s potential growth
Understanding the growth slowdown
 box Growth momentum has flagged in developing Asia since the global financial crisis. 
From an average of 8.3% during 2006–2010, GDP growth in the region fell to 5.9% in 
2015. This decline is likely to have repercussions for the region and the rest of the world. 
Developing Asia’s success in lifting 1 billion individuals out of poverty during 1990–2012 
hinged on its ability to sustain high rates of economic growth. Moreover, since the region 
currently accounts for more than a quarter of world GDP as valued at market exchange 
rates, a persistent slowdown in developing Asia threatens to undermine the fragile 
global recovery.
 box The right policy response depends on the nature of the region’s slowdown. Is it 
a temporary—albeit prolonged—e¨ect of the business cycle? Or are more persistent 
changes under way? If weaker growth reflects slack demand such as softening export 
orders or a downturn in private investment, then fiscal or monetary stimulus may be 
needed for temporary support. But if supply-side factors are at play, and the growth 
moderation stems from slowing expansion of the region’s productive capacity, then any 
revival of growth prospects may depend on structural policy reform.
 box Distinguishing temporary from persistent eects depends on gauging “potential 
growth.” Potential growth is the pace at which an economy is deemed able to expand 
with full employment and stable inflation—that is, when it is operating at its productive 
capacity. The idea of potential growth is not immutable, as it is influenced by the policies 
and institutions that characterize the particular economy.
 » Deviations from potential come at the cost of macroeconomic stability. 
Operating above potential stokes inflation, while producing below potential generates 
unemployment. Economies tend toward their potential in the long run, making 
potential growth essentially a speed limit on the pace of long-term poverty reduction.
 » Structural reform can yield higher potential growth from given resources. 
“Frontier potential growth” is the rate above potential growth that an economy 
could achieve if global best-practice policies and institutions prevailed. By lowering 
barriers to e­cient labor and capital allocation, an economy can move closer to this 
conceptual maximum while maintaining macroeconomic stability.
 box Falling potential growth explains much of the region’s post-crisis growth slowdown. 
Estimated average potential growth for a sample of 22 Asian economies, which 
accounted for 98% of GDP in developing Asia in 2014, fell by almost 2.0 percentage 
points from its 2007 peak of 8.4%. Falling potential growth accounts for about 40% of 
the moderation in actual growth since the global financial crisis.
 » Falling potential growth is widespread in the region. When compared with 
average potential growth in 2000–2007, the post-crisis period 2008–2014 saw 
declines in 14 of the economies sampled, down by 1.1 percentage points in the PRC 
and by 2.1 points in the Republic of Korea. 
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» Yet some economies sustained or improved their potential growth. From the 
2000–2007 average, potential growth in 2008–2014 picked up in economies as 
diverse as Indonesia (by 0.9 percentage points), Pakistan (0.9), the Philippines (0.5), 
and Uzbekistan (2.2). Bangladesh, Fiji, and India have maintained pre-crisis potential 
growth into the post-crisis period.
box Future gains in living standards and poverty elimination rest on a grasp of potential 
growth. Identifying the institutional and policy constraints that keep an economy from 
achieving its frontier potential growth will be critical to counteract the current slowdown. 
Knowing which factors have driven potential growth in the past can guide policy makers’ 
e¨orts to meet today’s growth challenge.
Determinants of potential growth
box Shifting demographics and labor productivity growth determine potential growth. 
Potential growth is the sum of growth in the labor force plus growth in potential labor 
productivity, or output per worker. Of these two factors, labor productivity growth 
accounted for about 80% of average potential growth from 2000 to 2014 in the 
22 Asian economies studied. However, demographic changes have had significant e¨ects 
in some economies. For example, working-age population growth explains about 50% of 
potential growth in Malaysia, 64% in Pakistan, and 47% in Singapore. Empirical estimates 
show that taking 1 percentage point o¨ working-age population growth shaves 
1 percentage point from potential growth. With demographic changes turning less 
favorable in most Asian economies, understanding what determines labor productivity 
growth is paramount to boosting future potential growth. 
box Capital accumulation aects potential growth by lifting labor productivity. 
Low-income economies can grow faster during the transition to their long-run potential 
growth rate by upgrading their equipment and infrastructure and by adopting existing 
technologies. However, this “advantage of backwardness” fades over the course of 
development as economies gain on their more advanced peers and eventually converge. 
Estimates indicate that an additional $1,000 dollars of initial income per capita lowers 
potential growth by 0.3 percentage points.
box A range of productivity-enhancing factors are amenable to policy interventions.
Estimates show that gains in tertiary education enrollment and trade openness can 
boost potential growth—especially in economies with the most room for improvement. 
Integrating into international financial markets can be beneficial, but the relationship 
depends on the economy’s regulatory quality. Improvements to a range of institutional 
variables, which proxy for such things as government e¨ectiveness and labor market 
flexibility, can also lift potential growth.
box Potential growth depends on a stable macro economy. A volatile gap between actual 
growth and potential growth has, with consequent bouts of rising inflation or deepening 
unemployment, a significantly negative e¨ect on potential growth. Reducing this volatility 
by 1.0 percentage point is estimated to pay a potential growth dividend of nearly 0.2 
percentage points. Policies to push actual growth persistently above its potential have 
only a temporary e¨ect on the economy’s productive capacity.
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box Removing obstacles to ecient factor allocation supports economic dynamism. 
An economy’s frontier potential growth can be realized only when capital and labor are 
allocated to the most productive firms. Analysis of over 10,000 firms in 13 developing 
economies in Asia confirms that obstacles like judicial bias, unequal access to finance, 
excessive labor regulation, poor electricity supply, and corruption impede the e­cient 
allocation of factors across firms, which makes them too large or too small, or too labor 
or capital intensive. Reform to remove these obstacles can enhance firms’ e­ciency, thus 
moving economies toward their frontier potential growth.
A “new normal” for potential growth?
box Potential growth since the global financial crisis diers sharply from before it. 
After accounting for changes in the determinants of potential growth, developing Asia’s 
average potential growth still declined by 2.2 percentage points in 2008–2014 from 
its historical trend. Is this a new normal for Asia? It is true that the decline is slightly 
smaller than the 2.7 percentage point drop in global potential growth. However, without 
structural reform, potential growth in many countries in the region will slide further due 
to unfavorable demographics, convergence with advanced economies, and spillover from 
growth moderation in the PRC.
box The demographic drag on developing Asia’s potential growth will intensify. 
The region previously benefited from a favorable age structure—the so-called 
demographic dividend—but slowing population growth and aging populations are 
turning this dividend into a burden. The United Nations projects that growth in the 
region’s working-age population will be lower in 2015–2020 than in 2008–2014; this 
demographic e¨ect alone could depress developing Asia’s potential growth by 0.4 
percentage points. Less favorable demographics span the region, with working-age 
population growth forecast higher among the sample economies only in Sri Lanka.
box Developing Asia’s past success has narrowed the gap with the advanced economies. 
The advantage of backwardness, which allowed developing economies in Asia to grow 
by adopting existing technologies, is fading as they converge in sophistication with the 
advanced economies. Less scope for playing catch-up with the advanced economies 
will make some other determinants of potential growth, such as tertiary education and 
trade, more important to future growth. On the other hand, low- and middle-income 
economies still have scope to benefit from the convergence e¨ect.
box Moderating growth in the PRC is spilling over to other economies. Ripples from 
slower growth in the PRC, one of the largest economies in the world, are spreading 
globally, and strong trade and investment ties with close neighbors make the regional 
impact much more pronounced. Empirical analysis controlling for other determinants of 
potential growth shows a 1.0 percentage point decline in the actual growth rate in the 
PRC associated with a 0.2 percentage point reduction in potential growth worldwide 
and a 0.5 point decline in other Asian economies. As the PRC rebalances toward a more 
sustainable, consumption-driven growth model, its pace of expansion is forecast to ease 
further. However, if other economies can lift their potential growth, they can counteract 
some of the e¨ect of PRC growth moderation.
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Policies to invigorate potential growth
box Policy changes can partly oset the labor squeeze. Measures to increase female 
participation rates and extend the working age can boost the share of workers in the 
population. Especially for economies facing the most severe demographic changes, 
more flexible immigration policies may help firms that struggle to attract skilled labor.
box The recipe for higher labor productivity has three ingredients. They are a mix of 
public and private investment, policy and institutional reform, and sound macroeconomic 
management.
» Capital investment is crucial to catch up with the advanced economies. High on
the list is government investment in infrastructure, an important public good. As the 
needs are large, governments must find creative financing solutions such as public–
private partnership. To facilitate private investment, policy can incentivize companies 
to purchase new assets by, for example, accelerating depreciation.
» Reform can move current potential toward the frontier. E¨ective policy and 
higher-quality institutions can shore up Asia’s long-term growth. If, over the next 
decade, the 22 sampled economies lifted their current scores on productivity-
enhancing factors enough to close half of the gap to the best possible scores, their 
average annual potential growth could increase by almost 1.0 percentage point. 
Reforms that, for example, rationalize financial and labor markets, render rules that 
govern access to land more transparent, and improve governance and the business 
environment can boost potential growth by making firms more dynamic over time.
» Sound macroeconomic management is the foundation for growth. Implementing 
policies that lower the volatility of actual growth with respect to potential growth by 
25% can add 0.1 percentage points to the region’s potential growth. 
box The new normal today need not be developing Asia’s future normal. To ensure a 
healthy future for potential growth, Asia must employ the full range of policy responses 
to augment labor supply, improve labor productivity, enhance institutional quality, and 
maintain macroeconomic stability.
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GDP growth rate and inflation, % per year
Growth rate of GDP Inflation 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Central Asia 6.6 5.3 2.9 2.1 2.8 5.8 5.7 6.2 10.8 5.9
Armenia 3.3 3.5 3.0 2.0 2.3 5.8 3.0 3.7 3.8 4.0
Azerbaijan 5.8 2.8 1.1 –1.0 1.0 2.4 1.4 4.0 12.0 5.2
Georgia 3.3 4.6 2.8 2.5 3.5 –0.5 3.1 4.0 5.0 4.0
Kazakhstan 6.0 4.3 1.0 0.7 1.0 5.8 6.7 6.6 12.6 4.6
Kyrgyz Republic 10.9 4.0 3.5 1.0 2.0 6.6 7.5 6.5 10.0 8.0
Tajikistan 7.4 6.7 6.0 3.8 4.0 5.0 6.1 5.1 8.5 7.5
Turkmenistan 10.2 10.3 6.5 6.5 7.0 6.8 6.0 6.0 6.6 6.0
Uzbekistan 8.0 8.1 8.0 6.9 7.3 11.2 8.4 9.0 10.0 11.0
East Asia 6.8 6.6 6.0 5.7 5.6 2.4 1.9 1.3 1.6 2.0
China, People’s Rep. of 7.7 7.3 6.9 6.5 6.3 2.6 2.0 1.4 1.7 2.0
Hong Kong, China 3.1 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.2 4.4 4.4 3.0 2.5 2.7
Korea, Rep. of 2.9 3.3 2.6 2.6 2.8 1.3 1.3 0.7 1.4 2.0
Mongolia 11.6 7.9 2.3 0.1 0.5 9.9 12.8 6.6 3.0 7.0
Taipei,China 2.2 3.9 0.7 1.6 1.8 0.8 1.2 –0.3 0.7 1.2
South Asia 6.2 6.7 7.0 6.9 7.3 9.3 6.8 5.0 5.2 5.7
Afghanistan 3.7 1.3 1.5 2.0 3.0 7.4 4.6 –1.5 3.0 3.5
Bangladesh 6.0 6.1 6.6 6.7 6.9 6.8 7.3 6.4 6.2 6.5
Bhutan 3.6 3.8 5.9 6.4 6.1 8.8 9.6 6.6 4.0 5.0
India 6.6 7.2 7.6 7.4 7.8 9.8 6.7 5.0 5.4 5.8
Maldives 4.7 6.5 1.5 3.5 3.9 2.3 2.1 1.0 1.2 1.4
Nepal 3.8 5.1 3.0 1.5 4.8 9.8 9.1 7.2 10.5 8.2
Pakistan 3.7 4.0 4.2 4.5 4.8 7.4 8.6 4.5 3.2 4.5
Sri Lanka 3.4 4.9 4.8 5.3 5.8 6.9 3.2 3.8 4.5 5.0
Southeast Asia 5.0 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.8 4.2 4.1 2.7 2.6 2.9
Brunei Darussalam –2.1 –2.3 –1.1 1.0 2.5 0.4 –0.2 –0.4 0.2 0.4
Cambodia 7.4 7.1 7.0 7.0 7.1 3.0 3.9 1.2 2.5 3.0
Indonesia 5.6 5.0 4.8 5.2 5.5 6.4 6.4 6.4 4.5 4.2
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 7.8 7.5 6.7 6.8 7.0 6.4 4.2 1.3 1.8 2.5
Malaysia 4.7 6.0 5.0 4.2 4.4 2.1 3.1 2.1 2.7 2.5
Myanmar 8.4 8.7 7.2 8.4 8.3 5.7 5.9 11.0 9.5 8.5
Philippines 7.1 6.1 5.8 6.0 6.1 3.0 4.1 1.4 2.3 2.7
Singapore 4.7 3.3 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.4 1.0 –0.5 –0.6 0.4
Thailand 2.7 0.8 2.8 3.0 3.5 2.2 1.9 –0.9 0.6 2.0
Viet Nam 5.4 6.0 6.7 6.7 6.5 6.6 4.1 0.6 3.0 4.0
The Pacific 3.8 9.4 7.0 3.8 3.1 4.9 3.5 3.4 4.5 4.7
Cook Islands –1.7 –1.2 –0.5 0.0 0.2 2.6 1.6 3.0 1.8 2.0
Fiji 4.7 5.3 4.0 2.7 4.5 2.9 0.6 1.4 3.0 3.0
Kiribati 2.4 3.8 3.0 1.8 2.0 –1.5 2.1 1.4 0.3 0.8
Marshall Islands 1.9 –1.0 –0.5 1.5 2.0 1.9 1.1 0.5 2.0 2.5
Micronesia, Fed. States of –3.6 –3.4 –1.5 2.5 3.5 2.2 0.7 –1.1 –0.3 0.3
Nauru 15.4 17.5 –10.0 3.0 15.0 0.5 3.0 11.4 6.6 1.7
Palau –1.7 4.7 6.7 3.0 7.0 2.8 4.0 2.2 1.5 2.5
Papua New Guinea 5.0 13.3 9.9 4.3 2.4 5.0 5.2 5.1 6.0 6.0
Samoa –1.9 1.2 1.4 2.0 0.5 –0.2 –1.2 1.9 2.0 2.0
Solomon Islands 2.8 2.0 3.2 3.0 2.8 5.4 5.2 –0.3 4.4 5.7
Timor-Leste 2.8 6.0 4.1 4.5 5.5 9.5 0.7 0.6 2.0 3.0
Tonga –3.1 2.0 3.4 2.8 2.7 0.8 2.1 –0.7 –0.3 0.5
Tuvalu 1.3 2.0 2.0 3.5 3.0 2.0 1.1 2.0 3.5 2.0
Vanuatu 2.0 2.3 –1.0 2.5 3.8 1.4 1.0 2.5 1.9 2.4
Developing Asia 6.4 6.3 5.9 5.7 5.7 3.8 3.0 2.2 2.5 2.7
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Developing Asia faces a challenging global environment. Since the global 
financial crisis of 2008–2009, global economic expansion has consistently 
underperformed expectations (Figure 1.0.1). Lower international 
prices for oil and other commodities were supposed to be a boon to 
most economies, but the benefits have been slow to come even as the 
shock to commodity-dependent emerging economies has been immediate. 
Less-than-robust recovery in the industrial economies and slowing 
growth in emerging markets weigh on growth prospects everywhere. 
Volatility in global financial markets that stems from weakness in 
emerging markets and monetary tightening in the United States (US) 
is deepening the uncertainty stirred by the global slowdown.
Growth in developing Asia is thus expected to decelerate 
marginally from 5.9% in 2015 to 5.7% in both 2016 and 
2017. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India, the 
two largest economies, will strongly influence the region’s 
growth outcome. Growth in the PRC will continue to 
decelerate during that economy’s deliberate transition to a 
more balanced and sustainable growth paradigm. Somewhat 
stronger growth in India and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) will help deflect the resulting 
headwinds. 
Persistent sluggishness in the world economy underlines 
the importance of structural reform in developing Asia. 
The authorities must redouble their eorts to reform their 
domestic economies to boost potential growth. Broad diversity 
in the region means that reform objectives and priorities dier 
from country to country. Whether reform aims to make labor 
markets more flexible in the PRC, streamline procedures to accelerate 
public infrastructure investment in India, or improve the business 
environment to facilitate diversification away from oil dependence in 
Azerbaijan, it needs to be tailored to country circumstances. 
Even as policy makers seek to improve productivity over the 
long run, they must remain vigilant against short-term risks posed by 
future US interest rate hikes that could worsen global financial market 
volatility, sharper-than-forecast growth moderation in the PRC, tepid 
commodity prices undermining growth in producer countries, and 
severe weather dampening agricultural production. The authorities may 
also be challenged by heretofore unfamiliar risks such as producer price 
deflation, which has recently emerged in some economies in the region.
Rescuing growth in uncertain times
This chapter was written by Donghyun Park, Gemma Esther Estrada, Arief Ramayandi, 
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1.0.1  World growth and forecasts 
%
0
2
4
6
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
World Economic Outlook April forecasts
Actual growth
Note: Data for 2015 growth is an estimate as of January 2016. The forecasts are 
from the previous year’s April issue of the World Economic Outlook.
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2007–2014, 
October 2015, and January 2016.
Click here for figure data
4  Asian Development Outlook 2016
Slow going in a tough 
global environment
Growth in developing Asia is forecast to dip as the region 
faces dicult and uncertain times. Aggregate gross domestic 
product (GDP) in the region will expand by 5.7% in 2016, 
decelerating from 5.9% in 2015 (Figure 1.1.1). This slower 
expansion mirrors moderating growth in the PRC as it 
continues its shift toward a new normal with less dependence 
on investment and manufacturing for export. In 2017, growth 
in the region will remain steady, as continued growth 
moderation in the PRC will be counterbalanced by solid 
growth in India and a pickup in other larger economies, 
notably members of ASEAN. Average inflation in the region 
will rise from 2.2% in 2015 to 2.5% in 2016 on strengthening 
domestic demand and further to 2.7% in 2017, following an 
expected recovery in global commodity prices (Figure 1.1.2). 
The region’s aggregate current account surplus will narrow 
from 2.9% in 2015 to 2.6% in 2016 and further to 2.4% 
in 2017, as exports are unlikely to rebound strongly for lack 
of external demand (Figure 1.1.3). Further, recovery in the 
industrial economies has been slow (Box 1.1.1).
Growth stymied in 2015
The growth slowdown in developing Asia in 2015 was widespread, 
aecting most economies in the region, including all of East Asia and 
Central Asia and most of Southeast Asia. The region’s deceleration 
mirrors continued growth moderation in the PRC. The average pace 
slipped from 6.3% in 2014 to 5.9% in 2015.
Growth in East Asia decelerated to 6.0% in 2015 from 
6.6% in 2014 as exports withered. A large drag on growth 
across East Asia was growth moderation in the PRC. 
In Mongolia, growth dipped by 5.6 percentage points, and 
in Taipei,China by 3.2 points. Growth slipped by less than 
a percentage point in the subregion’s two other economies, 
the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, China, where strong 
domestic demand countered feeble exports.
In Central Asia, growth weakened to 2.9% in 2015 
from 5.3% in 2014 as all eight economies posted slower 
growth on account of the huge drop in global oil prices and 
recession in the Russian Federation, a key trade partner 
and source of remittances. Growth in oil-dependent 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan decelerated the most, by over 
3 percentage points. In Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, growth slowed less 
despite large falls in remittances and the return of migrant workers, 
thanks to timely and robust expansion in public investment.
1.1.1  GDP growth outlook in developing Asia
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1.1.2  Inflation in developing Asia
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1.1.1 Meager progress in the industrial economies
Lower prices for oil and other commodities are expected 
to persist during the forecast period, but they will not 
provide uplift in the major industrial economies: the US, 
the euro area, and Japan. While the negative output gap 
will gradually narrow, hardly any growth acceleration 
is expected in the major industrial economies as their 
combined economies grow by 1.8% in 2016 (as in 2015) and 
1.9% in 2017 (box table). 
The US economy expanded by 2.4% in 2015 with 
private consumption as a main source of growth, 
contributing 2.1 percentage points. Government investment 
added to private investment, and collectively they 
contributed roughly 0.9 percentage points to growth last 
year. The stronger US dollar has again worked against 
recovery momentum by slashing the contribution of 
net foreign trade and services by 0.6 percentage points. 
Inflation, both headline and core, remained muted as 
US dollar appreciation and low energy prices kept price 
pressures in check. 
In December 2015, the Federal Reserve raised the federal 
funds rate for the first time since the global financial crisis 
began in 2008. The target range has been maintained since 
then on the expectation of low inflation and a slow pickup 
in economic activity in the near term. The US policy rate is 
forecast to average 0.6% in 2016 before increasing to around 
1.8% by the end of 2017. While overall liquidity should 
remain loose in 2016, the strong dollar is still expected to 
drag on GDP growth by restraining net external demand 
throughout the year. As the private sector spends more 
on both consumption and investment, GDP in the US is 
projected to grow by 2.3% in 2016, modestly picking up to 
2.5% next year. 
Recovery in the euro area that began in 2014 failed to 
pick up momentum as growth leveled off toward the end 
of 2015. Business and consumer confidence dropped to 
a 1 year low as the region dove back into deflation at the 
turn of 2016. Labor markets improved throughout 2015, but 
demand was insufficient to generate inflation. A breakdown 
of regional GDP growth by component showed that 
private consumption contributed a relatively strong 
0.9 percentage points in 2015, followed by fixed investment 
at 0.5 percentage points. Government consumption added 
0.3 percentage points, but net exports dragged down growth 
as imports outpaced exports. 
The European Central Bank announced further steps 
in March of this year toward expansive monetary policy to 
ease the cost of finance, spur growth, and counter deflation. 
It cut all the main interest rates and increased its monthly 
asset purchases by €20 billion. The composite purchasing 
managers’ index is still above 50, indicating expansion, 
but it has steadily declined since December, which does 
not bode well for the strength of recovery hinted at the 
start of 2016. Consumption demand, which was the main 
driver of growth in 2015, lost steam toward the end of 2015. 
Weak global demand exacerbated by slower growth 
prospects in emerging economies may continue to dampen 
the external sector. In the absence of a strong catalyst, 
the euro area is expected to just about maintain the pace, 
expanding by 1.5% in 2016 and 1.6% in 2017. 
Japan grew by a mere 0.5% in 2015, which nevertheless 
improved on zero growth in 2014 despite the lack of a 
strong growth engine. Private consumption dropped by 1.3% 
in the whole year as an unseasonably cool summer in the 
second quarter and an unseasonably warm winter in the 
fourth quarter dampened demand for indoor climate control 
and new apparel. Public works orders steadily declined last 
year as the government continued its fiscal consolidation. 
Trade activity, both exports and imports, shrank in 2015, but 
imports dropped much more than exports. Meanwhile, the 
labor market has become tighter with the unemployment 
rate falling to 3.2% in January 2016. While real wages are 
rising as the baby boom cohort reaches retirement, the slow 
pace of improvement is insufficient to stave off the threat of 
a return to deflation.
In response to sharper-than-expected drops in industrial 
production and soft inflation in December 2015, the Bank 
of Japan adopted negative interest rates in January 2016. 
Assuming that the value-added tax rate increase from 
8% to 10% goes ahead as scheduled in April 2017, private 
consumption of durable goods and housing investment are 
expected to pick up in late 2016. However, there is some 
discussion that the tax increase should be further delayed if 
the economy continues to be weak. Growth will have to rely 
on domestic demand while demand for imported capital 
goods wanes in Japan’s main trading partners, particularly 
the PRC. The purchasing managers’ index is slightly 
above 50 but has dipped since December 2015, suggesting 
no strong recovery on the horizon. Japan’s GDP is expected 
to grow by 0.6% in 2016 and, because of drag from the 
tax increase, by a slightly weaker 0.5% in 2017.
GDP growth in the major industrial economies (%)
Area
2014 2015 2016 2017
Actual ADO projection
Major industrial economies 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.9
United States 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.5
Euro area 0.9 1.6 1.5 1.6
Japan 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.5
ADO = Asian Development Outlook.
Notes: Average growth rates are weighted by gross national income, Atlas method. 
More details in Table A1.1 on page 29. 
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,  
http://www.bea.gov; Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat; Economic and 
Social Research Institute of Japan, http://www.esri.cao.go.jp; Consensus Forecasts; 
Bloomberg; CEIC Data Company; Haver; World Bank, Global Commodity 
Markets, http://www.worldbank.org; ADB estimates.
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In Southeast Asia, growth slipped in aggregate only 
from 4.5% in 2014 to 4.4% in 2015 but declined in 7 of the 
10 economies. In Indonesia, the largest ASEAN economy, 
growth decelerated for a fourth year in a row. In Malaysia, 
growth dipped as global demand weakened and hydrocarbon 
prices fell. In Thailand, growth picked up from a slump 
in 2014 but remained weak. Viet Nam was the only other 
economy with accelerating growth, driven by robust 
expansion in manufacturing and construction. The impact 
on agriculture of El Niño, a periodic weather event caused by 
temperature changes in the Pacific Ocean, partly accounted 
for growth slipping in the Philippines and other economies.
In contrast with slower growth elsewhere, growth in 
South Asia edged up from 6.7% in 2014 to 7.0% in 2015 as 
five of the eight economies posted higher growth. The improvement 
was led by India, where growth quickened to 7.6% in 2015 from 7.2% 
in 2014 on account of healthy expansion in private consumption and 
fixed investment, as well as robust growth in manufacturing. Steady 
growth in the rest of the South Asian economies, except Nepal and the 
Maldives, was buoyed by higher consumption and remittances, and by 
continued high growth in the region’s biggest economy, India, which 
sustained subregional trade. Meanwhile, growth in Nepal was scaled 
down by an earthquake in April and a political stando, and in the 
Maldives by a decline in high-end tourism. 
In the Pacific, aggregate growth eased to 7.0% in 2015 from 9.4% 
in 2014 as growth slowed in the larger island economies. In the past, 
strong global commodity prices and large private investments in the 
mineral sector boosted growth in Papua New Guinea (PNG), but recent 
headwinds from low commodity prices and soft global 
demand have caused growth to falter. In Fiji, growth eased 
as activity slowed in sugar, fisheries, and timber, partly 
from unfavorable weather under El Niño, while in Timor-
Leste contraction in public spending contributed to slower 
expansion of GDP measured without reference to the large 
oshore petroleum sector.
External demand dragged down growth in several large 
economies. In 6 of the 10 regional economies with data 
on contributions to growth, net exports subtracted from 
growth in 2015 (Figure 1.1.4). Domestic demand from private 
and government consumption was the dominant source of 
growth. Private consumption alone accounted for over half 
of growth in most of these economies. 
In the first half of 2015, consumer confidence was bleak 
across most large economies (Figure 1.1.5). Confidence 
gradually picked up in the second half in Indonesia, the 
Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. In the 
Philippines, a better outlook for business activity, jobs, and 
incomes has improved consumer sentiment. In the PRC, 
consumer sentiment fell on waning prospects for income 
growth against a backdrop of slower GDP growth overall. 
In Taipei,China, consumer confidence steadily weakened 
1.1.3  Current account balance in developing Asia
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1.1.4  Demand-side contributions to growth, 
selected economies
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Sources: Haver Analytics; CEIC Data Company (both accessed 5 March 2016).
Click here for figure data
Rescuing growth in uncertain times  7
from May to December in line with fragile growth in the 
first half that sank into contraction in the second half, 
further dimming prospects for employment and income. 
In Hong Kong, China, consumer confidence fluctuated, 
rising in the first half along with modest economic growth 
but slipping in the second half as declines hit tourist 
arrivals, particularly from the PRC, which accounted for 
over 70% of the total. Faced with sluggish economic growth 
and downbeat consumer sentiment, the authorities in 
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand 
announced stimulus measures in the second half to bolster 
economic growth. However, consumer confidence in 
Malaysia continued to deteriorate until the fourth quarter 
of 2015, hitting a record low 63.8. Consumer confidence 
also weakened in the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, and 
Thailand at the start of this year. In Taipei,China, confidence 
deteriorated once again in January but picked up in February.
The drop in consumer sentiment took its toll on retailing. 
In Taipei,China, retail sales tumbled in the second half of 
last year but began to recover gradually in the last quarter 
(Figure 1.1.6). Retail sales in Hong Kong, China likewise 
dropped in most months of 2015, reflecting lower tourism 
spending and, to some extent, volatility in the equity market. 
In Thailand, retail sales continued to contract in most 
months of 2015 but recovered toward the end. In Indonesia, 
they expanded in August at the weakest rate in 8 months, 
then picked up as a series of stimulus measures boosted 
consumer sentiment. In contrast with softness in most large 
economies, retail sales in the PRC held up well last year, 
thus advancing the country’s structural shift toward 
consumption despite slipping consumer sentiment. Viet Nam 
continued to post high growth in retail sales that held steady, 
sustained by rising incomes. 
1.1.5  Consumer confidence and expectations, 
selected developing Asia
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1.1.6 Retail sales, selected developing Asia
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1.1.7 Industrial production index
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Trends in industrial production reflect tepid economic expansion 
in export-oriented economies. In East Asia, industrial production 
contracted by 1.0% in the Republic of Korea, 1.7% in Taipei,China, and 
1.5% in Hong Kong, China (Figure 1.1.7). Industrial production fell 
in Taipei,China as a wide array of manufacturing industries such as 
computers, telephones and mobile phones, audio and video products, 
and iron and steel registered declines. In Southeast Asia, industrial 
production expanded at a steady pace in Indonesia and Malaysia; 
in Thailand, it mildly recovered after a 5.2% plunge in the previous year. 
After posting modest gains in the past year, the Philippines 
and Singapore saw declines in industrial production for the 
first time since 2009. Singapore suered a steep drop, by 
5.1%, as production fell across several industries including 
machinery and equipment, metals, computers and electronic 
products, and pharmaceutical and related products.
Uncertainty in both the domestic and the external 
environment weakened investment. Singapore and 
Hong Kong, China suered declines in gross investment, 
while the PRC, Indonesia, and Taipei,China saw investment 
expand at a slower pace (Figure 1.1.8). The slowdown in 
investment in the PRC continued in 2015 as real estate 
suered a large housing overhang and manufacturing 
faced an uncertain business outlook and high corporate 
debt. In contrast, investment expanded at a faster pace 
in the Republic of Korea and the Philippines with good 
performances in both construction and investment in 
durable equipment. In Thailand, investment surged from 
contraction in the previous year, supporting recovery in the 
broader economy.
1.1.8  Contributions to investment growth in developing Asia
Percentage points
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Diverging paths for India and the PRC
The region’s two giants are headed in opposing directions, 
with the PRC slowing down as growth in India picks up. 
The PRC is in the midst of a structural shift toward more 
sustainable growth, while India, where income remains 
at a modest level long since vacated by the PRC, has more 
scope for rapid growth. As PRC policy makers pursue a 
smooth transition to more moderate growth, their Indian 
counterparts strive to maximize growth. 
In the PRC, policy makers continued last year to focus 
more on growth quality than growth quantity, and on 
rebalancing the economy and eliminating excess capacity 
to target growth at about 7% (emphatically not a more 
precise figure) through fiscal stimulus and monetary easing. 
Growth in the PRC decelerated from 7.3% in 2014 to 6.9% 
in 2015, but it continued to account for about a third of 
global growth. In India, structural reform intended to attract 
more foreign direct investment is gradually moving forward, 
but further reform is needed to raise private investment 
and lift potential growth. Strong public investment helped 
India’s economy accelerate growth from 7.2% in 2014 
to an estimated 7.6% in 2015, the fastest rate among the 
region’s larger economies. However, a challenging external 
environment is likely to moderate growth in both India and 
the PRC this year. 
The diculty of sustaining high growth in industrial 
production is manifest as the eorts of the PRC to rein 
in excess capacity are bedeviled by soft global demand. 
Further, production has been kept in check by an uncertain 
business outlook, especially for heavy industry. Growth in 
industrial production slowed to 6.1% in 2015 from 8.3% 
in 2014 (Figure 1.1.9). Production was held down by less 
upbeat business sentiment as, from August to December 
last year, the purchasing managers’ index (PMI) languished below 50 
(Figure 1.1.10). Meanwhile, growth in industrial production decelerated 
in most months in tandem with declining manufacturing exports. 
The continuing slowdown in industrial production reflects deep 
corrections in traditional heavy industries. In January and February 
this year, the PMI continued to linger below 50 as growth in industrial 
production further weakened to 5.4%. The expected slackening of 
manufacturing growth will be pronounced in heavy industry, while 
growth in consumer-oriented manufacturing is likely to hold up 
better. The government will continue to eliminate excess capacity in 
manufacturing as part of its structural reform. The likely moderating 
impact of reform and the weakening of growth momentum overall are 
forecast to bring gradual deceleration over the next 2 years.
In India, growth in industrial production accelerated in 2015, 
boosted by robust domestic demand. Industrial production expanded 
by 3.2%, up from 1.9% in 2014. The PMI registered a solid reading 
in most months, but business sentiment waned by year-end, when a 
PMI drop to 49.1 marked the first time since October 2013 that it fell 
1.1.9 Production indicators
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1.1.10 Merchandise exports and purchasing managers’ index
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below 50. A slide in the manufacturing PMI in December reflected a 
less favorable outlook on domestic demand exacerbated by floods in 
the southern part of the country, which aected a major automobile 
manufacturing hub. A decline in merchandise exports also worsened 
during the final quarter of 2015, further undermining business 
sentiment. The PMI recovered to 51.1 in January and February this 
year, along with expectations of an improvement in domestic demand. 
However, data on industrial production produced a contrasting picture, 
as it showed contraction in January for the third consecutive month. 
In sum, GDP growth in India is expected to dip marginally this year 
as expansion in public investment weakens under fiscal constraints, 
private corporations continue to deleverage, and external demand 
remains anemic. 
Inflation broadly in retreat
Inflation was further subdued in developing Asia in 2015, 
falling to 2.2% from 3.0% in 2014. The deceleration partly 
tracked slowing economic growth across the region and the 
consequent weakening of demand-side inflationary pressures. 
Supply-side factors, in particular feeble global oil and food 
prices, also helped to tame inflation. Average Brent crude 
prices fell to $52/barrel in 2015 from $99/barrel in 2014, 
a 47% drop that was fivefold the 9% fall in average prices 
in 2014. Agricultural commodity prices also continued to 
decline, with the overall index falling by 13.1% and food 
prices by 15.4%, mainly from favorable supply conditions and 
soft energy prices. While the drop in prices has been largely 
due to supply factors, subdued demand has contributed.
The decline in developing Asia is part of the global trend 
toward lower inflation, which mirrors the global commodity 
slump and the fragility that besets the global economic 
outlook. For the major industrial economies—the US, the 
euro area, and Japan—aggregate inflation fell from 1.3% 
in 2014 to 0.2% in 2015, barely clinging to positive territory. 
Low inflation gave policy makers in many Asian economies 
the option to keep interest rates low to support demand and 
growth. While consumer prices rose in most economies, some 
of them, including the PRC and India, saw producer prices 
fall in 2015 (Figure 1.1.11). Asia has long been preoccupied 
with inflation, but deflation can present problems of its own 
by, for example, raising the real value of debt.
While inflation remained subdued in developing Asia as 
a whole, there were substantial dierences across subregions 
(Figure 1.1.12). Inflation was lowest in East Asia, easing in 
aggregate to 1.3% in 2015 from 1.9% in 2014 as inflation in 
the PRC and the Republic of Korea hovered at only around 
1% and Taipei,China experienced deflation. The PRC is of 
particular interest in light of substantial moderation in its 
growth momentum over the past few years. In tandem with 
its slowing economy, inflation fell from 5.4% in 2011 to 2.6% 
1.1.11  Consumer and producer prices, 2015
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in 2012 and 2013, and further to 1.4% in 2015 (Figure 1.1.13). 
In South Asia, inflation dipped to 5.0% from 6.8% in 2014 
as all subregional economies except Sri Lanka saw lower 
inflation. Inflation eased to 2.7% from 4.1% in Southeast 
Asia, as Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam all saw inflation 
drop by around 3 percentage points. In the Pacific, inflation 
slid only marginally to 3.4% from 3.5%. Central Asia was 
the only subregion where inflation nudged up. Widespread 
currency depreciation in this subregion helped push average 
inflation to 6.2% from 5.7% in 2014; accelerating inflation in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan outweighed 
deceleration in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and 
Tajikistan.
Trade vitality tested
Merchandise exports from developing Asia declined by 
8.1% in 2015, the first drop since 2009, as shipments from 
Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia fell by double 
digits in aggregate (Figure 1.1.14). Modest recovery in the 
industrial economies has not boosted export momentum. 
Instead, exports fell sharply owing to a combination of lower 
commodity prices and subdued global demand. The exports 
of oil-producing Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan fell by 
more than a third, dragging down aggregate Central Asian 
exports to about the same rate. Every East Asian economy 
saw its merchandise exports decline. PRC exports 
fell by 4.4%, largely because of smaller shipments to 
Japan, the Russian Federation, and Hong Kong, China. 
In Southeast Asia, exports fell in aggregate mainly because 
of steep declines in shipments from Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Singapore. In the Pacific, aggregate exports 
increased by 34.4% on a surge recorded by PNG and Timor-
Leste. Across the region, only 11 of 45 economies diverged 
from the trend and saw exports rise in 2015.
Growth moderation and structural shift in the PRC 
had a substantial impact on other economies’ exports, 
considering the high portion of total exports that go to the 
PRC. In 2015, half of exports from Hong Kong, China went to 
the PRC, while in the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China the 
figure was about one-fourth. All economies in Figure 1.1.15 
experienced a drop in total exports, with the decline in 
exports to the PRC greater than 10% for Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Taipei,China. The fall in exports to the PRC 
was greater than the decline in exports to other markets in 
the case of the Philippines and Hong Kong, China. 
Merchandise imports fell by 13.4%, nearly twice as 
much as exports (Figure 1.1.16). The trend was led by the 
heavily weighted PRC, which saw imports fall by 13.4%, 
an outcome from lower commodity prices and demand for 
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1.1.15  Change in exports to the People’s Republic of China 
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construction materials and energy, as well as from rising 
import substitution using local manufactures. The drop in 
imports occurred across all subregions but was particularly 
pronounced—and larger than the dive in exports—in 
East Asia and Southeast Asia. In Central Asia, the uniquely 
steep drop in imports, by one-fifth, was still less than the 
plunge in exports. Twelve economies across the region 
posted increases in imports, four of them in South Asia.
Feeble merchandise exports are expected to continue. 
Export growth is forecast to be flat this year as uncertainty 
persists. The decline in exports continued into the first 
2 months of this year, dimming export prospects for the year. 
Only around 40% of regional economies are likely to see 
exports increase this year. This portion is projected to rise 
to over half next year as export growth accelerates to 2.8% 
on recovery in shipments from Central Asia and higher 
commodity prices, and as the region as a whole benefits 
from strengthening in global demand.
Imports are forecast to contract this year by 2.4%, 
and investment is expected to be less robust. Imports of 
intermediate goods and machinery are not likely to 
grow, as the PRC is seen reducing its total imports and 
other economies face lackluster external demand, and 
business sentiment has yet to pick up. Growth in imports 
to South Asia, projected at 4.3% in aggregate, will reflect 
import growth in more than half of the subregion’s 
economies.
The regional current account surplus widened to 
equal 2.9% of combined GDP in 2015 from 2.3% in 2014 as 
imports shrank more sharply than exports (Figure 1.1.17). 
This year, the regional current account surplus will 
shrink to 2.6% of GDP with continuing declines in global 
oil prices, tight external demand, worsening current 
account deficits in oil-exporting countries, and narrowing 
surpluses in the larger Asian economies on account of weak 
manufacturing exports. Next year, the expected rebound in 
global commodity prices will narrow the aggregate deficit 
in Central Asia, but the larger East and Southeast Asian 
subregions are likely to post lower surpluses, thus further 
narrowing the region-wide aggregate current account 
surplus to 2.4% of GDP.
The declining trend in developing Asia’s current 
account surplus parallels the global picture. The global 
current account surplus narrowed marginally from 1.1% of 
world GDP in 2014 to 1.0% in 2015 (Figure 1.1.18). Despite 
this, developing Asia’s surplus relative to world GDP rose to 
0.7% from 0.6% in the same period (as the PRC surplus rose 
to 0.4% from 0.3%), carrying forward a trend since 2011 and 
illustrating the region’s mounting economic importance.
1.1.16 Import growth by subregion
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1.1.17 Current account balance by subregion
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1.1.18 World current account balance
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Growth prospects tempered
GDP growth in developing Asia will slip to 5.7% in 2016 
from 5.9% in 2015 as growth slows in 19 of the region’s 
45 economies and in four of its five subregions (Figure 1.1.19). 
Only Southeast Asia will post higher growth this year. 
Next year, growth will remain steady at 5.7% as further 
moderation in East Asia and the Pacific is oset by improved 
prospects in Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. 
In 2017, 80% of regional economies are expected to post 
higher growth on the back of a recovery in external demand 
and further pickup in domestic demand. Despite growth 
slippage and stagnation over the next 2 years, the region 
will continue to account for a huge share of global growth, 
at 60%, close to its average share over the past 5 years.
Soft global demand and restructuring in the PRC will 
temper growth in East Asia from 6.0% in 2015 to 5.7% 
in 2016. The Republic of Korea will record steady growth this year, 
accelerating next year in tandem with improving global demand. 
Growth in Taipei,China will edge up this year and next, supported by 
rising government investment. Both Mongolia and Hong Kong, China 
will see growth slow this year and pick up only mildly next year, as 
deceleration in the PRC weighs heavily on their prospects. 
Growth in Southeast Asia will accelerate to 4.5% this year and 
4.8% next. The trend will be led by Indonesia as it raises investment 
and undertakes policy reform. Economic recovery in Thailand will 
gradually move forward over the next 2 years, bolstered by public 
investment. In the Philippines, solid growth will come from both 
private consumption and investment. As growth strengthens in the 
subregion, half of its economies are forecast to expand by at least 6.0% 
over the next 2 years. 
South Asia will continue to see robust growth this year and next. 
As in the past year, this subregion will be the fastest-growing in Asia 
in the next 2 years. Despite the unfavorable external environment, 
growth will slip only mildly to 6.9% in 2016 as India enjoys solid 
though moderating growth and as expansion gains speed in six other 
subregional economies. Next year, growth in the subregion will surge 
to 7.3% as it quickens to 7.8% in India and accelerates in all other 
subregional economies except Bhutan.
The expected further drop in oil and gas prices will, along with 
lower remittances from a Russian Federation still mired in recession, 
drag down growth in Central Asia to 2.1% this year from 2.9% last year. 
Growth will slow in all economies except Turkmenistan, where it is 
expected to hold steady. Subregional growth will bounce back next year 
to 2.8% along with a recovery in global commodity prices.
In the Pacific, growth will plunge by almost half this year, dragged 
down by abrupt deceleration in the heavily weighted PNG from 9.9% in 
2015 to 4.3% as prospects are further dampened by falling commodity 
prices. Growth in Fiji is poised to be lower this year following the 
devastating Tropical Cyclone Winston this February. By contrast, 
eight other subregional economies are expected to have faster growth 
this year.
1.1.19 GDP growth by subregion
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Regional inflation is forecast to step up from 2.2% in 2015 
to 2.5% in 2016 and 2.7% in 2017 (Figure 1.1.20). Inflation will 
rise this year on account of strengthening domestic demand 
and next year on recovery for global commodity prices. 
In the PRC, further price deregulation will help drive 
inflation higher to the forecast horizon. Aggregate inflation in 
East Asia will rise steadily in both years but remain benign. 
In South and Southeast Asia, inflation will hold somewhat 
steady in 2016 but accelerate in 2017. In Central Asia, elevated 
inflation this year will come partly from higher prices for 
imported goods following widespread currency depreciation, 
but inflationary pressures will ease in 2017. Higher inflation 
in the Pacific is forecast in light of the risk of currency 
depreciation in PNG and the expectation of strong domestic 
demand in the other economies.
Risks to the outlook 
Against the backdrop of a dicult and uncertain global environment, 
risks to the outlook for this year clearly tilt toward the downside. 
While growth may still pleasantly surprise, upside risks to the forecast 
are few. On the other hand, the downside risks are formidable: slower 
PRC growth, higher US interest rates, volatile global financial markets, 
sharp slowdowns in commodity-producing economies, and general 
sluggishness in emerging markets.
Further US interest rate hikes may heighten global risk aversion, 
especially when viewing emerging markets in light of their slower 
growth. Heightened risk aversion may trigger in turn large and volatile 
capital flow reversals from emerging markets. Global financial markets 
have shown a great deal of volatility since the beginning of the year. 
Although the US Federal Reserve has refrained from further interest 
rate hikes since December 2015, chances are that further rate hikes will 
come this year. Tightening global liquidity could conspire with a broader 
emerging market slowdown to produce febrile and tense conditions in 
global financial markets. Further, higher US rates may cause an already 
strong US dollar to appreciate even more. This would raise the value 
of foreign debt in local currency terms, posing risks to economies with 
large debts.
An unexpectedly sharp growth slowdown in the PRC could have 
major implications for the regional outlook. The PRC is now the 
world’s second largest economy, which means that its growth rate 
matters not only to the region—especially to the East and Southeast 
Asian economies that have close economic links with the PRC—but 
also to the world. Indeed, before the current slowdown, robust growth 
in the PRC had been a major positive factor in the global economy. 
The slowdown is not a major concern in and of itself, as it derives partly 
from a natural, healthy, and welcome transition to more sustainable and 
balanced growth rates. However, if the transition is poorly managed and 
deceleration starts to spiral, the adverse impact will be substantial. 
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As developing Asia as a whole is a major net importer of 
oil and other commodities, it should benefit from current 
weakness in global commodity prices. However, oil- and 
commodity-dependent economies in the region, especially 
in Central Asia and the Pacific, are hurt by the global 
commodity slump. In addition, Asian economies that export 
a lot to commodity-dependent countries such as oil-exporters 
in the Middle East, or depend on them for workers’ 
remittances, will suer losses. So the slump is not confined 
to commodity producers. The broad slowdown of emerging 
markets may harm the region’s export and growth prospects 
(Figure 1.1.21). 
The economic eects of El Niño are unpredictable. 
While they vary by country, and with each occurrence of 
El Niño, they may be substantially negative for some Asian 
economies. El Niño often significantly lowers rainfall in 
Asia and sometimes causes severe drought. As such, it poses 
greater risks to economies with relatively large primary 
sectors—agriculture, fishing, and mining—and to economies 
that are less diversified.
Producer price deflation is emerging as a new threat in some 
Asian economies. Developing Asia’s growth slowdown since the 
global financial crisis has subdued inflationary pressures, which are 
even weaker with the recent slide in global prices for oil and other 
commodities. While low inflation gives Asian central banks greater 
scope for countercyclical monetary expansion designed to boost growth, 
it raises concerns about crossing the line into deflation. In fact, while 
consumer prices are still rising, albeit more slowly, producer prices are 
actually falling in some Asian economies. As of February 2016, producer 
prices had declined for 48 consecutive months in the PRC. Empirical 
analysis suggests that a negative relationship may hold between 
producer price deflation and economic growth. To avoid sliding into a 
low-growth trap, Asian policy makers would do well to monitor not only 
consumer prices but also producer prices. 
1.1.21 GDP growth, developing economies
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Spillover from the 
People’s Republic of China
The analysis above identifies economic slowdown in the PRC as a major 
downside risk to developing Asia’s outlook. The magnitude of the risk 
depends critically on how much growth moderates, as the analysis 
below shows. In addition to slowing down, the PRC is undergoing a 
structural transformation with significant external eects. While the 
eect on other economies is likely negative in the immediate future, 
economies that adapt quickly to the new circumstances can reap future 
growth dividends. 
E¬ects of growth moderation in the PRC
Growth in the PRC has been slowing and is expected to 
continue to slow over the medium term. The PRC growth 
rate was only 6.9% in 2015, almost half a percentage point 
below 2014 and, for the first time in a quarter of a century, 
lower than 7.0% on an annual basis. Moderation has been a 
continuous downward drift by a total of 2.6 percentage points 
since 2011. A slowdown was expected, but its extent keeps 
surprising, as seen in repeated downward revisions to growth 
forecasts (Figure 1.2.1). 
A recent study examines the external impact of 
slowdown in the PRC (Abiad et al. 2016). It reflects several 
fluid structural factors. First, the PRC working-age 
population aged 15–59 started to shrink in 2012, and this 
demographic shift will drag on growth increasingly in the 
years to come. Second, the PRC economy is shifting away 
from industry and toward services on the supply side, and 
away from investment and toward consumption on the 
demand side. The decline in the contributions to growth 
from industry and investment is under way, but the rise in 
contributions from services and consumption growth has not yet fully 
oset the decline. Third, a natural process of convergence predicts 
that growth will slow as per capita income rises and as return on 
investment diminishes. The PRC has converged quickly in the past 
quarter century, with real GDP per capita rising ninefold since 1990. 
As labor costs have soared, the PRC has lost some of its attraction as a 
base for low-cost manufacturing. Wage costs are now almost four times 
higher than in Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, and Myanmar. 
Cyclical factors play a role in growth moderation. External demand 
has been weaker than expected because recovery in the advanced 
economies has been lackluster following the global financial crisis 
of 2008–2009, and more recently emerging markets have faltered. 
These developments have dragged on PRC exports.
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Eorts to maintain high growth after the global financial crisis 
exacerbated imbalances. PRC expansionary policy after 2010 increased 
investment and spending on infrastructure and substantially eased 
credit conditions to support growth. Partly because of this, debt 
has risen substantially since 2008, much of it channeled through 
unregulated shadow banks. This debt helped fuel overinvestment 
and excess capacity in certain sectors such as steel, as well as sharp 
increases in asset values. To contain these vulnerabilities, PRC 
authorities began paring back investment and tightening credit in 
mid-2013, which contributed to the slowdown. They reversed course in 
mid-2015, however, when growth seemed to be slowing more sharply 
than anticipated or desired. 
Growth moderation has real eects on the rest of Asia but 
only modest impact on the US and Europe. Using the Global 
Projection Model, which models multiple blocks of economies 
to comprehensively and coherently generate global forecasts, 
Abiad et al. (2016) assessed the eects of the current PRC 
slowdown using “no slowdown” as the counterfactual 
scenario for comparison. Weaker PRC growth shaved almost 
a third of a percentage point o developing Asia’s growth 
each year and a fifth of a percentage point o Japan’s 
(Figure 1.2.2). This reflected strong intraregional trade and 
production linkages involving the PRC. In contrast, the 
impact on the US and Europe was modest, as their relatively 
small trade exposure to the PRC was oset by a boost from 
lower commodity prices. Global growth was almost a third 
of a percentage point lower than it would have been had the 
PRC economy not slowed. 
Current worries that a sharp slowdown could strike in 
the near term are exaggerated, as the PRC has substantial 
policy buers to respond to adverse shocks. Unlikely as such 
a scenario is even in the medium term, it is nevertheless 
useful to look at how it might aect Asia and the rest of the 
world. A sharp growth slowdown could materialize after 
one of the following events or, more likely, a combination of 
them: an unwinding of the credit boom, the bursting of asset 
market bubbles in real estate or financial markets, a sharp and sustained 
drop in investment, and worsening financial fragilities snowballing into 
a full-blown financial crisis. 
Records of historical events from around the world show disorderly 
slowdowns from credit booms going bust, housing downturns, and 
financial crises slashing investment by about 10 percentage points 
as imbalances unwind (Table 1.2.1). Private and public consumption 
growth tends to decelerate as well, private by about 2 percentage points 
and public by 1 point. The typical decline in GDP growth during such 
disorderly slowdowns is by about 2–3 percentage points. However, 
because investment is a much larger share of GDP in the PRC than 
in most other economies, a decline in investment and consumption 
growth similar in size to past episodes in other economies would 
have larger eects in the PRC, taking about 4.5 percentage points o 
growth. The sheer size of the PRC and its contribution to global growth 
1.2.2 Effects of the PRC growth moderation
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suggest a disorderly slowdown would, combined with the 
current fragile recovery in the advanced economies, cause a 
substantial tightening of global financial conditions.
A sharp PRC slowdown would have significant adverse 
eects in all regions and on global growth (Figure 1.2.3). 
The sharper the slowdown in PRC demand, the larger the 
eects on trade and commodity prices, with oil prices falling 
by 10%–25% relative to the baseline. These two forces—the 
PRC slowdown and the resulting lower commodity prices—
would tend to oset each other in both the US and Europe. 
But the additional negative shock from tightening global 
financial conditions would slow growth in these two regions 
by 0.60–0.65 percentage points relative to the baseline. 
The eects on Asia would be larger, with Japan’s growth 
dropping by 1.50 percentage points and emerging Asia’s by 
1.80 percentage points. On the whole, global growth would be 
1.75 percentage points lower.
E¬ects of structural change in the PRC
Attention has been duly paid to potential spillover into other 
economies from PRC growth moderation, but the cross-border 
implications of PRC structural transformation are often 
overlooked. As a result of its shift from investment-led growth 
to consumption-led growth, the PRC may import more consumption 
goods such as cosmetics, for example, and fewer investment goods such 
as machinery. Moreover, the PRC role in global value chains is changing. 
Rising wages have shifted some activities to lower-cost economies, and 
technological upgrades have and will move the PRC into activities that 
add more value. This transformation aects the types of intermediate 
goods imported into the PRC for further processing. And, as the PRC 
shifts growth away from exports to domestic demand, its role as an 
importer and assembler will decline and, with it, its imports of parts 
and components.
The rapid integration of the PRC into global value chains (GVCs) 
linking it to other East and Southeast Asian economies has bolstered its 
export success. The economy has positioned itself at the downstream 
end of the value chain, importing intermediate goods to assemble final 
products specifically for export to the US and elsewhere. Traditionally, 
1.2.3 Effects of a sharp PRC slowdown
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1.2.1  Magnitude of growth deceleration during disorderly slowdowns (percentage points)
Real GDP
Government 
consumption Investment
Private 
consumption Imports Exports
Credit boom to bust –3.4 –1.0 –11.7 –2.8  –7.9 –3.1
Banking crisis –2.0 –1.0  –8.0 –2.0  –6.3 –1.5
Housing downturn –2.1 –0.2  –7.8 –2.2  –6.4 –3.0
Note: The growth deceleration is in the first 2 years after the event, relative to growth in the previous 5 years. 
Source: Abiad et al. 2016.
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economies that are technologically more advanced, such 
as Japan and the Republic of Korea, design the final goods 
and produce the more exacting parts and components that 
less advanced economies like the PRC then assemble into 
final goods for export. But the role of the PRC in GVCs is 
changing, as its growing technological capacity increasingly 
enables it to produce more parts and components itself, 
reducing its dependence on imports from neighboring 
countries. 
At the same time, the PRC is rebalancing from investment 
toward consumption. The contributions of consumption, 
investment, government spending, and net exports to 
economic growth are considered here toward determining 
if the contribution of investment has been declining while 
the contributions of other components such as consumption 
have been rising. Figure 1.2.4 presents the contributions of 
consumption, investment, and net exports to GDP growth. 
Investment made the biggest contribution in most years from 
2001, until it peaked at 86% in 2009. The contribution of total 
consumption, both public and private, has been rising since 
a dip in 2006 and has overtaken investment to contribute 
more than half of GDP growth. This supports the notion of 
a structural transformation in the PRC from an economy led 
by investment to one led by consumption. 
Structural change has altered the position of the 
PRC in GVCs, as quantified by its GVC participation rate. 
This measure has two parts: the backward participation 
rate, which gauges the extent of foreign value added in a 
particular economy’s exports, and the forward participation 
rate, which measures how much of the economy’s domestic 
value added is included in the exports of other economies. 
As shown in Table 1.2.2, the share of foreign value added 
in PRC exports was 33.3% in 1995, increasing to 37.4% in 
2005, but then falling back to 32.1% in 2011 as the share 
of imported intermediate goods in PRC exports declined. 
Meanwhile, PRC value added embodied in foreign exports 
has steadily risen from 9.5% in 1995 to 15.6% in 2011 as the 
PRC increasingly supplied intermediate products. 
Structural transformation is reflected in the types of 
goods the PRC imports. Figure 1.2.5 plots the share of 
consumption goods versus parts and components in total 
imports of the PRC from 1995 to 2014. The share of parts and 
components in total imports shows an inverted U pattern 
with its peak at 39% in 2006 before falling o to 29% in 2014. 
This pattern is consistent with the timing of the rise and fall 
of GVC backward linkages detailed in Table 1.2.2. In contrast, 
the share of consumption goods in imports has stayed 
relatively flat, though there has been a slight uptick from its 
3.2% trough in 2004 to 4.9% in 2014. 
Spillover from structural transformation in the PRC into 
particular economies depends on whether they are exporters 
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1.2.5  Share of consumption goods versus parts 
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1.2.2 PRC trade in value added in all industries
Year Backward linkages (%) Forward linkages (%)
1995 33.3  9.5
2000 37.2 10.8
2005 37.4 13.3
2011 32.1 15.6
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Note: Backward linkages are foreign value added as a percentage of PRC 
total exports. Forward linkages are the share of PRC domestic value 
added embodied in the exports of other economies.
Source: Trade in Value Added Database of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development and the World Trade Organization.
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of consumer goods, part of the same production chain, 
or competitors, either current or potential. At this stage, 
the shift to a larger contribution to growth from consumption 
has not translated into a marked increase in the import of 
consumption goods. While domestic producers can still 
largely meet demand from PRC consumers, there may be 
opportunities for lower-cost producers to make inroads into 
the PRC, likely initially in the market for lower-end goods 
where there is more price sensitivity. 
The share of parts and components in PRC imports began 
decline in 2006. Figure 1.2.6 plots the change in import share 
against the change in parts and components share from 2006 
to 2014 for eight major economies in East and Southeast 
Asia. Each selected economy provided more than 1% of PRC 
imports in 2014. Viet Nam appears to be gaining market share 
as a GVC partner. This may be related to PRC firms moving 
oshore in line with the structural changes at home, as the 
execution of lower-skill production activities is increasingly 
moving to sites with lower labor costs. At the other end of 
the scale, advanced economies like the Republic of Korea 
and Hong Kong, China have seen their market shares eroded. 
This is consistent with the PRC shifting toward the high end 
of the GVC and its burgeoning role as a producer of parts and 
components.
A major catalyst of structural change in the PRC is a labor 
force that is shrinking and becoming more costly. The loss 
of the economy’s competitive advantage in labor-intensive 
industries presents opportunities for economies that compete 
with the PRC primarily in third markets (Figure 1.2.7). 
These competitors can increase market share as the PRC 
withdraws. Bangladesh is already gaining market share as 
the PRC withdraws from low-end garment manufacturing, 
for example, and is now the world’s second-largest garment 
exporter, after the PRC.
Concluding observations on PRC e¬ects
Structural adjustment in the PRC has a short-term impact 
on the region that is negative. Simulations show that growth 
moderation in the PRC is expected to shave 0.3 percentage 
points from developing Asia’s growth. Structural change will 
magnify the short-term impacts that growth moderation has 
on the exports of neighboring economies. However, in the 
medium term, structural transformation in the PRC may 
open up new export opportunities for economies in Asia and 
around the world. The economies that are better at catering 
to growing consumption and domestic demand in the PRC 
will enjoy more success in exporting to that market.
1.2.6  Change in parts and components share versus change 
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1.2.7  Developing Asia index of competition with the PRC, 2014
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Emergent producer price deflation
Deflation has emerged as a relatively new macroeconomic risk in 
developing Asia. Once confined in Asia to Japan, deflation has spread to 
other East and Southeast Asian economies, as well as to India. The recent 
decline in global oil prices and slower economic growth have subdued 
inflationary pressures to the point that producer prices began to fall 
in some economies. As of February 2016, the PRC had experienced 
48 consecutive months of producer price deflation. Fears are growing 
that deflation in PRC will be transmitted to its neighbors through lower 
prices for PRC exports. Already in 2015, producer price deflation was 
evident in the region, even though consumer price inflation remained 
largely positive (Table 1.3.1). Further, external demand for the region’s 
products remains subdued, exerting further downward pressure on 
prices. All this raises the possibility that additional deflation could be 
in the pipeline. 
1.3.1 CPI and PPI inflation rates, selected Asian economies
Economy
CPI inflation (%) PPI inflation (%)
2015
December 
2015 2015
December 
2015
People’s Republic of China  1.4  1.6 –5.2 –5.9
Hong Kong, China  3.0  2.5 –2.7 –3.2
India  5.0  5.6 –2.7 –0.7
Indonesia  6.4  3.4  5.8  5.2
Republic of Korea  0.7  1.3 –4.0 –4.0
Malaysia  2.1  2.7 –4.8 –1.6
Philippines  1.4  1.5 –6.7 –7.2
Singapore –0.5 –0.6 –9.1 –7.7
Thailand –0.9 –0.9 –4.1 –2.7
Viet Nam  0.6  0.6 –0.6 –1.3
CPI = consumer price index, PPI = producer price index.
Notes: The latest PPI inflation rate for Hong Kong, China is the fourth quarter of 2015, instead of December, 
for lack of published monthly data. For India, PPI refers to the wholesale price index.
Sources: CEIC Data Company (accessed 15 March 2016); Asian Development Outlook database.
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Is deflation bad? Theory and evidence
The traditional view is that deflation is a danger to be avoided at 
all costs (e.g., Fisher 1933, Friedman and Schwartz 1963). Deflation 
makes domestic currency debts that are not indexed to prices, which in 
practice means most domestic currency debts, more dicult to service 
and repay. These diculties create in turn balance sheet problems 
and losses for creditors, especially banks and other institutional 
investors. As debtors tighten their belts to avoid costly default, 
firms curtail investment projects, and households limit their spending. 
The expectation of falling prices tempts even financially healthy firms 
and households to delay investment and consumption in anticipation of 
still lower prices in the future. For all these reasons, deflation threatens 
to persist and gather momentum from the moment it emerges. 
However, prices can decline not just because of negative demand 
shocks but also because of positive supply shocks. Indeed, benign 
positive supply shock was the dominant explanation for producer price 
deflation in the PRC for as long as that economy was growing strongly. 
Empirical estimates in Borio et al. (2015) support the benign view. 
Looking at the association between the consumer price index (CPI) 
and the rate of GDP growth per capita since 1870 in a wide range of 
economies, the study found few significant dierences in the rate of 
GDP growth between periods of inflation and deflation, the notable 
exception being the decade of the Great Depression starting in 1929, 
when both output and prices collapsed. The implication is that 
researchers have inappropriately generalized the experience of an 
exceptional period when deflation was extremely rapid and persistent to 
other circumstances where it is not applicable.
But the CPI may be less relevant to the decision making and 
behavior of producers than is the producer price index (PPI). 
By definition, the CPI measures price changes from the vantage of the 
buyer, while the PPI measures them from the vantage of the seller. 
This distinction may cause the two price indexes to behave dierently. 
Seller and purchaser prices will dier because of government subsidies, 
sales and excise taxes, and distribution costs. Insofar as taxes, subsidies, 
and perhaps also distribution costs are slow to change, consumer prices 
may exhibit less volatility and more persistence than producer prices. 
Changes in international commodity prices also seem to aect producer 
prices and consumer prices dierently, with a greater rate of pass-
through to producers (Box 1.3.1).
If one is interested in the impact of deflation on production 
decisions, it makes sense to focus on producer prices. If one is interested 
in spending decisions, it makes sense to consider consumer prices and 
producer prices in combination, because, while consumer prices are the 
most relevant to the spending decisions of households, both are relevant 
to the spending decisions of firms. It is therefore worthwhile to revisit 
the association between deflation and economic growth using producer 
prices rather than consumer prices to see if the benign supply-shock 
view still holds.
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1.3.1 Higher commodity price pass-through for producer prices 
It is widely believed that the recent weakness in global oil 
and food prices helped contain inflationary pressures in 
Asian countries. Yet the effect of global commodity prices 
may differ for domestic producer prices, which are more 
relevant for producers, and consumer prices, which are 
more relevant for consumers. For both kinds of prices, 
the effect is determined by the extent of pass-through, or 
what portion of a rise or fall in global prices is eventually 
reflected in domestic prices.
Jongwanich, Wongcharoen, and Park (forthcoming) 
empirically analyzed the relationship between global oil 
and food prices and domestic producer and consumer prices 
in a sample of developing economies in Asia. The analysis 
is based on quarterly data, and it yields some interesting 
insights into the pass-through of global oil and food prices 
in the region.
The impact of global oil price changes on domestic prices 
is diluted along the distribution chain. The pass-through 
tends to be smaller for consumer prices than for producer 
prices. For example, in the PRC, the cumulative pass-through 
of a 1% drop in global oil prices after 4 quarters reached 
14 basis points for producer prices but only 3 basis points for 
consumer prices (box figure). 
Part of the difference in the reaction between consumer 
and producer prices could arise from the different weight 
each index places on oil-derived products. The share of 
fuel and related petroleum products is generally more than 
50% in producer prices but only around 30% in consumer 
prices. More generally, the share of tradable products is 
noticeably higher in producer prices. The gap between 
these two price indexes in each economy depends on 
the ability of firms to pass higher costs on to consumers. 
For example, private producers facing intense market 
competition may decide to cut their profit margins rather 
than try to charge consumers higher prices in the short 
term. Government policy measures such as fuel subsidies 
designed to help consumer pocketbooks may reduce or 
delay the pass-through of oil price changes to consumer 
price inflation, thereby widening the gap between producer 
and consumer prices. 
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Source: Jongwanich, Wongcharoen, and Park, forthcoming.
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1.3.1 Continued 
The pass-through of oil prices to producer prices 
tends to be higher in oil-exporting economies than in oil 
importers. In Malaysia, an oil exporter, the pass-through 
of a 1% change in global oil prices to producers gradually 
increases from 12 basis points in the first quarter to reach 
a cumulative total of 21 basis points in the fourth quarter. 
For oil-importing economies, the cumulative annual pass-
through of oil prices to producer prices is somewhat 
smaller. Singapore is an exceptional case in which the 
pass-through to producer prices is high because of the high 
intensity of oil use in total energy consumption, and possibly 
because Singapore re-exports a lot of refined oil products. 
Although Indonesia, the PRC, and Thailand import less 
than the Republic of Korea or Hong Kong, China, their 
pass-through of world oil prices to producer prices tends 
to be higher. This could reflect superior energy efficiency 
in the Republic of Korea, where the ratio of total energy 
consumption to GDP in 2011 was 10.7%, and in Hong Kong, 
China, where the ratio was 5.7%. 
As in the case of world oil prices, the impact of world 
food price changes on domestic prices is diluted along the 
distribution chain. The pass-through tends to be lower for 
consumer prices than for producer prices. Significantly, 
the gap between the two price indexes tends to be higher 
for food prices than for oil prices. That is, the relatively 
larger impact of global prices on domestic producer prices 
is more pronounced for food than for oil. For example, in 
Thailand, the cumulative pass-through in 4 quarters of a 1% 
increase in global food prices is 21 basis points for producer 
prices but only 7 basis points for consumer prices. Many 
Asian governments still impose price controls and provide 
subsidies for households, which constrain the ability of 
producers to pass costs on to consumers. 
In sum, the analysis indicates that the pass-through 
of global oil and food prices is higher for producer prices 
than for consumer prices. This supports the notion that 
the two prices behave differently and are determined by 
different factors. In addition, the higher pass-through for 
producer prices in developing Asia raises the possibility that 
the recent decline in global oil and food prices has a bigger 
effect on producer prices than on consumer prices, which 
is consistent with the higher incidence of producer price 
deflation than consumer price deflation currently besetting 
the region.
Reference
Jongwanich, J., P. Wongcharoen, and D. Park. Forthcoming. 
Determinants of Consumer Price Inflation versus Producer Price 
Inflation in Asia. Asian Development Bank.
Empirical findings on deflation
Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (forthcoming) updates the analysis of 
Borio et al. (2015) by enlarging the dataset with data on producer price 
indexes. Table 1.3.2 shows summary statistics for both CPI and PPI 
inflation and deflation in dierent eras and under dierent monetary 
regimes. Following Borio et al., the more recent study excludes 
observations from the war years 1914–1918 and 1939–1945 and, in the case 
of Spain, observations from the civil war years 1936–1939. It also excludes 
observations from years with extreme inflation higher than 100%. 
The correlation between the change in the PPI and the CPI, at 0.88, 
is relatively high. There are well more than twice as many years of PPI 
as CPI deflation after World War II, while the number of years of PPI 
and CPI inflation in earlier periods is much more similar. This suggests 
that looking solely at CPI is likely to be especially problematic when 
analyzing the years since World War II.
Persistent deflation is defined, following Borio et al., as a period 
following a price peak when prices fail to recover to the peak for at least 
5 years. More years of deflation of this persistent type were identified 
using the PPI rather than the CPI. In the postwar period, there are only 
5 instances of persistent CPI deflation in the 38 economies in the sample 
but 29 instances of PPI deflation. Again, this encourages looking at both 
the PPI and the CPI, especially in the period following World War II.
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1.3.2 Overview of periods of consumer and producer price index deflation
Full sample 
(1870–2014)
Postwar 
(1947–2014)
All deflation
Consumer
Number of inflation years 2,940 2,332
Number of deflation years 658 145
Producer
Number of inflation years 2,443 1,914
Number of deflation years 921 389
Persistent deflation
Consumer Number of episodes 76 5
Producer Number of episodes 92 29
Correlation All 0.88 0.92
Note: The 38 economies in the sample are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
the People’s Republic of China, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, 
Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Hong Kong, China. The full sample excludes observations 
from the war years 1914–1918 and 1939–1945 and, in the case of Spain, observations from the civil war 
in 1936–1939. Also excluded are observations from years with inflation higher than 100%. Persistent 
deflation is defined as a period following a price peak when prices fail to recover to the peak for at least 
5 years. The duration of persistent deflation is calculated from peak to trough. Eichengreen, Park, and Shin 
(forthcoming) has figures for other periods. 
Source: Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (forthcoming) based on consumer and producer price indexes from 
Global Financial Database, International Historical Statistics 1750–2010 and International Financial 
Statistics, and per capita real GDP, from the Maddison Project and World Development Indicators.
Table 1.3.3 tabulates the GDP growth rate per capita in inflationary 
and deflationary years using both the CPI and the PPI. The inflationary 
years are divided into years of high and low inflation, greater or less 
than 10%, on the grounds that the disruptive eects of inflation are 
likely to be more pronounced when price increases are relatively rapid.
1.3.3 Consumer and producer price index deflation and per capita real GDP growth
Average per capita real GDP growth
Full sample 
(1870–2014)
Great 
Depression 
(1930–1933)
Postwar  
(1947–2014)
Consumer price index High inflation 2.31 –2.90 2.28
Low inflation 2.74  2.46 2.83
Deflation 1.17 –3.03 2.55
Producer price index High inflation 2.42  3.47 2.28
Low inflation 2.75 –1.82 2.84
Deflation 1.40 –3.36 2.10
Note: The 38 economies in the sample are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
the People’s Republic of China, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, 
Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Hong Kong, China. High inflation is higher than 10% and 
low inflation less than 10%. Persistent deflation is defined as a period following a price peak when prices 
fail to recover to the peak for at least 5 years. Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (forthcoming) has figures for 
other periods. 
Source: Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (forthcoming) based on consumer and producer price indexes from 
Global Financial Database, International Historical Statistics 1750–2010 and International Financial 
Statistics, and per capita real GDP, from the Maddison Project and World Development Indicators.
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Growth is slower on average in years of high inflation than in years 
of low inflation. Over the full sample, growth is significantly slower 
in periods of deflation than in periods of either high or low inflation, 
whether inflation is measured using the PPI or the CPI.
Table 1.3.4 uses regression analysis to relate inflation and deflation 
to economic growth. Following Borio et al. (2015), panel regressions 
are estimated with country fixed eects to allow dierences across 
economies. Changes in equity prices are included, as in Borio et al., 
to capture and control for the separate eects of asset price deflation. 
In the full sample, the coecients on the change in both the CPI and 
the PPI are positive and highly significant, which is consistent with 
the idea that deflation is bad for economic growth. But for the CPI, 
all the explanatory power derives from the association of deflation 
with recession in the interwar period. This suggests that CPI deflation 
depressed growth only during the Great Depression. This is consistent 
with the findings of Borio et al.
The picture is dierent, however, for the PPI. Changes in the PPI 
are significantly related to growth, not just in the interwar period 
but also under the classical gold standard and since World War II. 
This result suggests that the harmful eect of deflation on growth was 
not confined to the Great Depression.
Restricting the sample to include only years with low inflation at less 
than 1% does not change the results materially. Why is producer price 
deflation potentially harmful? One possibility is that it compounds the 
debt burden on producers and thus discourages investment. 
One of the most important decisions facing producers is investment. 
One can expect producer prices to aect producers’ decision making and 
1.3.4  Output growth and consumer and producer price index deflation: regression correlations, with equity prices
Full sample (1870–2014) Postwar (1947–2014)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ CPI 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.03 0.04
[0.024] [0.023] [0.029] [0.028]
∆ PPI 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.05** 0.06**
[0.017] [0.017] [0.022] [0.021]
∆ EP 0.01*** –0.00 0.01*** –0.01 0.00 –0.01 0.00 –0.01
[0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006] [0.003] [0.006] [0.003] [0.006]
∆ EPdef 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.03**
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Observations 2,311 2,311 2,217 2,217 1,645 1,645 1,592 1,592
R2 0.044 0.053 0.069 0.078 0.005 0.013 0.017 0.025
Number of countries in sample 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Note: The dependent variable is the log change of real GDP per capita. ∆ CPI, ∆ PPI, and ∆ EP are, respectively, the log change in the consumer price index, the producer price 
index, and stock prices. ∆ EPdef is the log change interacted with a dummy variable that is equal to one when the price index declines and zero otherwise. Country fixed effects 
allow differences across economies. Numbers in brackets are cluster-robust standard errors, and ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Eichengreen, 
Park, and Shin (forthcoming) has results for other periods. 
Source: Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (forthcoming) based on consumer and producer price indexes from Global Financial Database, International Historical Statistics 
1750–2010 and International Financial Statistics, and per capita real GDP, from the Maddison Project and World Development Indicators. The stock price data are from the 
Global Financial Database, Bloomberg, and Schularick and Taylor (2012).
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behavior, including those pertaining to investment. Han and 
Wei (forthcoming) explored the relationship between 
producer price deflation and investment. Figure 1.3.1 plots the 
quarterly changes in the PPI against changes in investment in 
the following quarter. In deflationary periods when the PPI 
fell, there is a clear positive relationship between changes in 
the PPI and changes in investment. That is, contraction in 
investment followed PPI deflation. 
Han and Wei (forthcoming) examined whether 
PPI deflation causes investment contraction, using an 
autoregressive model (the change in investment being the 
dependent variable, and lagged changes in investment and 
the PPI the independent variables) with quarterly panel 
data from 1966 to 2014. PPI deflation was found to cause 
significant changes in investment. Among economies 
in which the PPI significantly aected investment, 71% 
experienced investment declines following PPI deflation. 
During inflationary periods, the impact of inflation on 
investment was much weaker. Only 42% of economies 
showing significant eects experienced investment expansion 
during PPI inflation. When considering persistence—defined 
as the PPI declining for at least 4 consecutive quarters—an additional 
5% of countries were significantly aected. Persistent deflation was thus 
more damaging for investment.
Debts are an additional concern. Fisher (1933) pioneered the 
argument that debt and deflation were the major causes of economic 
depressions. Deflation raises the real value of debt, forcing debt 
liquidation that generates pessimism that feeds back into more deflation. 
The vicious spiral of deflation and debt liquidation may suppress 
investment, output, trade, and employment. 
Introducing changes in the ratio of debt to GDP into the analysis, 
Han and Wei (forthcoming) found that investments were significantly 
aected by the joint eect of deflation and debt. The mix of higher debt 
and deflation reduced investment in 45% of the economies. The current 
wave of PPI deflation may depress or postpone investment, all the more 
so if debts also rise. Therefore, some grounds exist for concern over 
economies facing deflation and rising debt. 
Concluding observations on deflation
The analysis suggests that policy makers in developing Asia should 
be aware of the potential harm to economic growth from deflation. 
Long-run historical data show deflation being negatively associated 
with economic growth. More in-depth regression analysis confirms 
the association between deflation and growth, which is stronger for 
producer price deflation than for consumer price deflation. 
Changes in the CPI are more relevant to consumers, but changes 
in the PPI are more relevant to producers, so it is best to consider both 
when assessing the eect of deflation on growth. Interestingly, there 
are more episodes of persistent deflation, including since the middle 
of the 20th century, when viewed using the PPI rather than the CPI. 
1.3.1  Relationship between changes in the PPI  
and changes in investment 
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Source: Han and Wei, forthcoming.
Click here for figure data
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Further, producer prices tend to be more volatile than consumer prices. 
The present analysis shows that changes in the PPI are significantly and 
inversely related to growth, in both the full sample period 1870–2014 
and the postwar period 1947–2014. Controlling for asset price booms 
and busts does not alter the conclusions about the potential dangers of 
deflation.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that high inflation as well 
as deflation can have negative impact on economic growth, as this 
result comes through clearly in the data. In fact, inflation was the 
much larger concern in developing Asia until the recent emergence of 
deflation, mostly producer price deflation, in some regional economies. 
The evidence, while far from definitive, suggests that it would be 
prudent for the region’s monetary authorities to keep an eye on deflation 
as well as inflation, and on producer prices as well as consumer prices. 
Empirical analysis of the deflation–growth nexus is a relatively new 
line of inquiry. The preliminary nature of the analysis calls for caution 
in interpreting the findings, but the findings suggest fertile ground for 
further research.
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Annex:  A challenging and 
uncertain global outlook
Growth in the major industrial economies of the United States (US), the 
euro area, and Japan is not likely to pick up this year. These economies 
are forecast to expand in aggregate by 1.8% in 2016, the same rate as in 
2015, before inching up to 1.9% in 2017. Despite continued private sector 
expansion in the US, feeble global prospects point to US growth mildly 
slowing this year. While recovery in the euro area is gradually gaining 
ground, domestic and external risks abound and therefore argue for 
a growth forecast unchanged from last year. Japanese growth will 
improve slightly, helped by a pickup in private consumption this 
year in anticipation of a value-added tax (VAT) increase next year. 
Further declines in food and fuel prices in 2016 and a mild rebound in 
2017 will keep inflationary pressures low and challenge central bankers 
in the euro area and Japan to avoid deflation (Table A1.1). 
A1.1 Baseline assumptions on the international economy
2014 2015 2016 2017
Actual Estimate
ADO 2016 
Projection
GDP growth (%)
Major industrial economiesa  1.5   1.8  1.8  1.9
United States  2.4   2.4  2.3  2.5
Euro area  0.9   1.6  1.5  1.6
Japan  0.0   0.5  0.6  0.5
Prices and inflation
Brent crude spot prices (average, $ per barrel) 98.9  52.3 38.0 45.0
Food index (2010 = 100, % change) –7.2 –15.4 –1.0  1.0
Consumer price index inflation  
(major industrial economies’ average, %)
 1.3   0.2  1.1  2.0
Interest rates
United States federal funds rate (average, %)  0.1   0.1  0.6  1.4
European Central Bank refinancing rate (average, %)  0.2   0.1  0.0  0.0
Bank of Japan overnight call rate (average, %)  0.1   0.1  0.0  0.0
$ Liborb (%)  0.2   0.2  0.6  1.4
ADO = Asian Development Outlook, GDP = gross domestic product.
a Average growth rates are weighted by gross national income, Atlas method.
b Average London interbank oËered rate quotations on 1-month loans.
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov; Eurostat,  
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat; Economic and Social Research Institute of Japan, http://www.esri.cao.
go.jp; Consensus Forecasts; Bloomberg; CEIC Data Company; Haver Analytics; and the World Bank, 
Global Commodity Markets, http://www.worldbank.org; ADB estimates.
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Recent developments in the  
major industrial economies
United States
The US economy expanded by 2.4% in 2015. Private consumption 
remains the main source of growth, contributing 2.1 percentage points to 
the annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate. Private investment 
provided 0.8 points to growth last year, slightly less than its contribution 
of 0.9 points in 2014. The government sector contributed 0.1 points, after 
having acted as a drag since 2011. The stronger US dollar again hurt 
export momentum, causing net foreign trade to subtract 0.6 percentage 
points from growth.
US economic activity in 2015 had a weak start, with 
growth at a seasonally adjusted annualized rate (saar) of 0.6% 
in the first quarter due to the harsh winter and a West Coast 
ports dispute. While GDP growth recovered strongly to 3.9% 
in the second quarter, growth in the remainder of the year 
was tepid, with all demand components soft in the fourth 
quarter (Figure A1.1). 
After revival in the second quarter, growth in private 
consumption slowed for the rest of 2015 from a saar of 3.6% 
in the second quarter to 3.0% in the third and 2.0% in the 
fourth. The slowdown in the final quarter disappointed in 
light of an improvement in wages, albeit slight, and a further 
decline in gasoline prices. Retail sales remained flat in the 
second half of the year, and consumer confidence slipped 
below the pre-recession level from February 2015 onward, 
despite rising toward the end of the year (Figure A1.2). 
These trends suggest that private consumption, while not 
providing strong support for growth, will continue to be an 
important driver and likely remain relatively stable.
Investment increased in the first half of 2015 but receded 
in the second, constrained by inventory accumulation and 
slowing fixed investment outside of housing. The purchasing 
managers’ index declined during the second half of the year 
to end at 54.9, which was still high enough to suggest further 
expansion in manufacturing. The industrial production index 
remained above the pre-crisis level throughout 2015 despite 
ending somewhat lower at 101.4 in December (2007 = 100). 
Trends in manufacturing and industrial production indicated 
continuing but slow gains in investment. 
The labor market strengthened steadily during 2015. 
The unemployment rate improved rapidly, falling from 5.7% 
in January 2015 to 5.0% in December and 4.9% at the 
beginning of 2016. The average duration of unemployment 
also shortened, from 32 weeks at the beginning of the 
year to 28 weeks by the end of the year, though it edged 
up to 29 weeks at the beginning of 2016 (Figure A1.3). 
However, the improved employment situation did not bring 
much increase in average earnings, as weekly earnings 
A1.1  Demand-side contributions to growth, United States
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A1.2  Business activity and consumer confidence indicators, 
United States
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increased by only 2.4% annually. This mixed picture was 
broadly consistent with the slow improvement observed in 
manufacturing, which remained sluggish but continued to 
add jobs. 
Inflation was muted, as both headline and core inflation 
were contained by US dollar appreciation and low energy 
prices. The fall in energy prices substantially reduced 
headline inflation early in 2015 and kept it low for almost 
the entire year (Figure A1.4). Headline inflation started 
to rise only toward the end of the year as the decline 
in energy prices slowed. Core inflation rose slowly but 
steadily throughout the year, consistent with a steady rise 
in consumption. The same trend continued through the 
beginning of 2016, when the combination of steady core 
inflation and slower declines in the energy prices raised 
headline inflation to an annual rate of 1.4%.
In December 2015, the Federal Reserve Board raised the 
target range of the federal funds rate for the first time since 
the beginning of the global financial crisis. The rate remained 
constant in January 2016, however, to keep monetary policy 
accommodative, with inflation projected to stay low in the 
near term and economic activity progressing only moderately. 
The board is monitoring global economic and financial 
developments closely to inform its future monetary policy. 
Conditions suggest that, unless US economic performance 
shows indisputable improvement, the policy rate is likely 
to remain unchanged for at least the first half of 2016. 
The policy rate is projected to average 0.6% in 2016 before 
rising to about 1.8% by the end of 2017. Thus, liquidity should 
remain loose in 2016.
The decision to maintain the policy rate and the resulting 
change in market expectations seem to have eased some 
of the pressure for the US dollar to appreciate. However, the strong 
dollar is still expected to drag on GDP growth by curbing net external 
demand throughout the year. The private sector is expected to continue 
expanding but not strongly enough to substantially raise the economy’s 
growth rate. The US economy is therefore projected to grow moderately, 
by 2.3% in 2016 and 2.5% in 2017. 
Euro area 
Recovery in the euro area, which began in 2014, failed to gain 
momentum as growth leveled o toward the end of 2015. Business 
and consumer confidence dropped to a 1 year low even as deflation 
reappeared, signaling a slow start to 2016. Labor markets have 
improved, but demand is insu¡cient to generate inflation. The region 
faces a number of downside risks, both domestic and external, that 
could derail recovery, thus introducing an element of caution to the 
growth outlook. 
GDP in the fourth quarter of 2015 grew by a saar of 1.3%, bringing 
annual growth for the year to 1.6%, the highest since 2011 (Figure A1.5). 
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Quarter over quarter, growth in the fourth quarter remained 
at 1.1% in Germany, and France recorded a slight rise by 0.1%, 
while economic activity slowed by 0.4% in Italy and 0.1% 
in Spain.
An examination of components showed that in the 
last quarter of 2015 fixed investment growth contributed 
a relatively strong 1.1 percentage points, while private 
consumption added only 0.5 points. Government 
consumption also contributed 0.5 points, an improvement 
over the previous quarter that probably reflected aid to 
immigrants. While domestic demand supported growth, net 
exports subtracted 1.2 percentage points from growth, as 
imports outpaced exports. The negative contribution from 
the external sector during 2 consecutive quarters suggests 
that the boost from a weaker euro may be fading.
Although investment rose, industry remained weak as 
the production index declined by 0.2% in the last quarter of 
2015, after a minimal rise of 0.1% in the third (Figure A1.6). 
The composite purchasing managers’ index exceeded 50, 
showing expanded activity, but the decline from 54.3 in 
December to 53.6 in January, and to a 13-month low of 53.0 in 
February, did not signal a strong recovery at the start of 2016. 
The European Commission’s economic sentiment indicator 
also declined during the first 2 months of 2016. 
Economic sentiment declined partly because of lower 
consumer confidence, which fell in February to its lowest 
since December 2014. It appears that consumption, the main 
driver of growth in 2015, lost steam toward the end of the 
year, as reflected in average growth of only 0.1% in retail 
sales in the last quarter of 2015. However, a pickup to 0.4% in 
January provided some cause for optimism. Going forward, 
growth in private consumption may benefit somewhat from 
low oil prices, easier credit, and falling unemployment. 
The labor market has improved in the euro area, with the 
seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment rate declining 
steadily to 10.3% in January, the lowest since August 2011. 
However, the rate remains historically high and masks wide 
variation in joblessness across countries. Germany, which has 
the lowest unemployment rate in the region, saw a further 
drop from 4.4% in December to 4.3% in January. Spain and 
Italy, which have relatively high rates, also recorded declines, 
from 20.7% to 20.5% in Spain and from 11.6% to 11.5% 
in Italy. France, by contrast, saw an increase from 10.1% to 
10.2% over the month. A number of other countries still face 
double-digit unemployment rates, including Croatia, Cyprus, 
Greece, Latvia, Portugal, and Slovakia, suggesting that there 
is plenty of excess capacity to restrain inflation. 
The threat of deflation resurfaced, with the harmonized 
index of consumer prices dipping from 0.3% in January to 
–0.2% in February, dragged down partly by low energy prices 
(Figure A1.7). Core inflation, which excludes more volatile 
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components such as energy and food, fell from 1.0% to a 10-month low 
of 0.8%. This has worried the European Central Bank, which has a 
target rate of close to 2% for headline inflation over the medium term. 
In March 2016, the bank announced an expansion of its monetary easing 
policy package. Accordingly, all its main interest rates were cut: the 
refinancing rate from 0.05% to zero, the bank deposit rate from –0.30% 
to –0.40%, and the marginal lending facility rate from 0.30% to 0.25%. 
Monthly purchases under the asset purchase program will be increased 
from €60 billion currently to €80 billion every month, continuing 
at least until March 2017. Other expansionary measures include adding 
investment-grade bonds issued by nonbank corporations to the assets 
eligible for purchase and launching a new series of targeted refinancing 
operations for the longer term.
Recovery in the euro area lacks vigor, and recent survey data 
show signs of a drop in domestic economic activity at the beginning 
of the year. Weak global demand that is further compounded by 
slower growth prospects in emerging economies, particularly the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), may continue to constrain the 
external sector as well. Other risks to the outlook are global and 
regional financial volatility, fiscal pressures in some countries, the 
uncertain eects of immigration, and geopolitical tensions. A cautious 
outlook guides a forecast for moderate growth in 2016 at 1.5% and, 
in the absence of a strong catalyst, growth edging up to 1.6% in 2017.
Japan 
The economy grew by only 0.5% in 2015. While this 
improved zero growth in 2014, Japan still lacked real growth 
momentum. Relatively strong growth in the first quarter 
was followed by contraction in the second and fourth. A fall 
in public investment and private consumption contributed 
to the weakness (Figure A1.8). As a result, the economy is 
operating below potential, with the cabinet o¡ce estimating 
the shortfall at the end of 2015 at 1.6% of GDP. Meanwhile, 
the labor market has tightened, with the unemployment rate 
declining by 0.3 percentage points from the start of 2015 to 
3.2% by February 2016, while real wages rose. This probably 
reflects a labor shortage as the baby boom generation reaches 
age 65 and retires—a shortage exacerbated by economic 
recovery since 2013 being driven by labor-intensive sectors 
outside of manufacturing.
Weak private consumption and public investment were the 
major drags on growth in 2015. An unusually cold summer in 
the second quarter and warm winter in the fourth contributed 
to the 1.3% decline in private consumption. Orders for public 
works steadily decreased over the year as the government continued its 
fiscal consolidation. Industrial production has been adjusted downward 
in line with disappointing demand, and sales have risen too slowly to 
take up inventories. Private investment contributed 0.7 percentage points 
to growth despite continued sluggishness. Building starts and housing 
construction both started to slow toward the end of 2015, to reach 
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only 204 million square meters for the year as a whole. 
This was the second consecutive year of decline since 2013, 
when construction was strong before the VAT hike in 2014. 
With growth in the fourth quarter weaker than expected, 
US expansion slowing down, and global risk aversion rising, 
the Japanese yen reversed course and began appreciating 
last year, rising by 9% in both nominal and real terms from 
July 2015 to the end of February 2016. Exports shrank in 
2015, but imports shrank much more (Figure A1.9), causing 
the trade deficit in goods and services to narrow substantially 
from $128.6 billion in 2014 to $18.4 billion last year. 
While exports of consumer goods held up well, those of 
capital goods fell sharply by 10.3%, mainly due to weaker 
demand in the PRC. Overall, the external sector contributed 
0.4 percentage points to growth in 2015. Primary income 
from foreign financial assets oset the trade deficit, and the 
current account registered a surplus equal to 3.3% GDP.
After the eects of the VAT increase in April 2014 faded, 
consumer inflation dropped from 2.3% in the first quarter 
of 2015 to 0.4% in the second. With continued weakening 
in oil prices in the second half of last year, inflation slowed 
steadily to average 0.8% in all of 2015, before turning 
negative in January 2016 (Figure A1.10). The Bank of Japan 
estimated that energy prices subtracted about 0.9 percentage 
points from core consumer inflation during the fiscal year 
(ending 31 March 2016), and this trend is expected to continue 
in 2016, although to a lesser degree if global oil prices recover 
somewhat. The rise in the GDP deflator remained positive at 
an average of 2.0% in 2015, up slightly from 1.7% in 2014. 
Japan’s economy will have to rely on domestic demand 
for growth as its main trading partners, particularly the 
PRC, demand fewer capital goods imports. Forward-looking 
indicators suggest that the real sector will also remain 
weak in the near term. The purchasing managers’ index is 
above 50, indicating expansion, but it moderated slightly to 
52.3 in January 2016 from 52.6 in December 2015. The Tankan survey of 
business conditions slowed in the fourth quarter of 2015 after picking up 
in the third quarter. Consumer confidence improved somewhat in 2015, 
but weakness emerged this year as the consumer confidence index 
fell for a second straight month in February to 40.1, the lowest since 
February 2015.
The Bank of Japan adopted negative interest rates in January 2016 in 
response to a sharper-than-expected drop in industrial production and 
weak inflation in December 2015. Delaying the VAT hike is on the table 
given the weakness in the economy, but this baseline assumes the VAT 
increase as scheduled with some fiscal stimulus. Private consumption 
of durable goods and housing investment are expected to pick up in 
2016 in anticipation of a scheduled VAT hike in April 2017 from 8% to 
10% in 2017 (Figure A1.11). In 2016, external demand is expected to 
improve but only gradually. GDP is expected to grow by 0.6%. In 2017, 
growth is expected to slow marginally to 0.5% with the VAT hike. 
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Assuming that global oil prices rise only gradually in 2017 
and output remains below potential, consumer inflation is 
likely to remain below 1.0% in 2016 before the VAT lifts it to 
2.7% in 2017. 
Australia and New Zealand
Australia is expected to grow moderately in 2016 and 2017. 
In the fourth quarter of 2015, its economy expanded by a 
saar of 2.6%, slower than growth at 4.4% in the previous 
quarter. Consumption remained the principal driver of 
growth, contributing 2.2 percentage points, with fixed capital 
subtracting 0.6 percentage points, and net exports of goods 
and services contributing almost nothing (Figure A1.12). 
Seasonally adjusted retail sales grew by 0.3% in January 2016, 
better than 0.02% growth in December. Consumer sentiment 
returned to positive territory in February 2016, rising to 
101.3 points from January’s 97.3 points. The seasonally 
adjusted unemployment rate rose marginally to 6.0% in 
January from 5.8% in the previous month. The Australian 
Industry Group’s performance of manufacturing index, for 
which 50 is the threshold for growth, rose to 53.5 in February 
from 51.5 in January, better than the 49.5 average in 2015 
and indicating expansion in manufacturing. Inflation was a 
seasonally adjusted 1.7% in the fourth quarter, slightly above 
the previous quarter’s 1.5% and less than the Reserve Bank 
of Australia target of 2.0%–3.0%. Australia’s economy is 
aected by moderating growth in the PRC, its largest trading 
partner, with mining particularly hard hit. Panelists for the 
FocusEconomics Consensus Forecast predict GDP to grow 
by 2.6% in 2016 and 2.9% in 2017, above the estimated 2.4% 
in 2015.
New Zealand’s GDP growth accelerated from a saar 
of 2.9% in the second quarter of 2015 to 5.0% in the third, 
propelled by expanding net exports that contributed 
6.2 percentage points. While fixed capital and private 
consumption also bolstered growth, adding 2.7 and 
1.5 percentage points respectively, their contribution was 
more than oset by a decline in inventories (Figure A1.13). 
In the third quarter, seasonally adjusted retail sales rose by 
1.4%, better than the previous quarter’s 0.3%. The index of 
manufacturing performance increased to 57.9 in January from 
57.0 in December 2015, indicating expansion as the index 
remained above the threshold of 50. The business confidence 
index plunged to 7.1 in February from 23.0 in December. 
However, consumer confidence remained upbeat, staying 
above 100 and increasing by 4.7 points to 110.7 in December. 
Inflation stayed far below the central bank’s target range 
of 1.0%–3.0%, dropping to 0.1% in the last quarter of 2015 
from 0.4% in the previous quarter. The seasonally adjusted 
unemployment rate improved marginally to 5.3% in the 
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fourth quarter from 6.0% of the previous quarter. With anticipated 
recovery in the global market for dairy products and a dynamic 
labor market—but with the PRC slowdown as a downside risk—
FocusEconomics Consensus Forecast panelists project GDP growth in 
2016 that matches the estimate for 2015 at 2.4%, increasing slightly to 
2.6% in 2017. 
Commodity prices
Commodity prices have declined over the past 4 years. 
While supply factors have largely explained the drop in 
prices, subdued demand has also played a role. Oil prices 
are expected to fall slightly in 2016 but will gradually 
recover during the year as supply from producers outside the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
declines and global demand strengthens. With oil prices 
remaining low and food commodity markets well supplied, 
food prices should stabilize during the forecast period.
Oil price movements
Compared with the decline by more than 50% in the 
price of the international benchmark Brent crude in the 
second half of 2014—from a peak of $115/barrel on 19 June 
to $56/barrel at the end of the year—the drop in 2015 was 
more moderate. Brent crude finished 2015 at $36/barrel, 
down by 36%. The average price of oil, however, reveals a 
dierent story: While a barrel of oil averaged $99/barrel in 
2014, or 9% below the 2013 average, the average price in 2015 
was $52/barrel, or 47% below the 2014 average and almost 
half the average price in the period 2010–2014 (Figure A1.14). 
The last time Brent crude prices stayed in the $40–$50 range 
was from late 2008 to early 2009. Hopes of a price recovery 
during 2015 supported a rally from about $40 in the early 
months of 2015 to about $60 in April. But the rally proved 
short-lived, and prices remained below $50/barrel in the last 
quarter of the year, languishing in the $30s in December. 
Low crude prices in 2015 reflected a confluence of factors, 
including continued abundant supply from non-OPEC 
producers, unrelenting resolve within OPEC to defend market 
share, receding concerns over supply disruptions, subdued global growth 
prospects, and the strengthening US dollar. After increasing by 2.4 million 
barrels per day (mbd) in 2014, the global oil supply grew in 2015 by 2.8%, 
or an additional 2.6 mbd, with non-OPEC producers contributing 1.4 
mbd of the increase, or 53% (Figure A1.15). The US led non-OPEC oil 
production. US output of crude oil rose by more than 8% in 2015, with 
the production of light tight oil contributing the most. Although on a 
declining trend since the middle of 2015, light tight oil accounted for more 
than 40% of growth in non-OPEC supply. 
OPEC, on the other hand, maintained its strategy to protect market 
share and raised crude oil production to 31.3 mbd. Most of the increase 
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came from Iraq and Saudi Arabia, whose combined additional output 
accounted for 87% of the rise in OPEC production. Outside the Gulf, 
OPEC production was fairly steady at around 8.0 mbd. Although 
volatility did ensue due to supply disruptions arising from geopolitical 
tensions, internal conflicts, and unplanned production outages—the US 
Energy Information Administration estimates that disruptions in 2015 
removed an average of 2.8 mbd from global markets—the supply glut 
tempered the upward pressures, and oil prices remained low.
With global GDP growth remaining low and dollar appreciation 
tamping down any demand boost from low oil prices, growth in the 
world oil supply again outpaced demand growth. World oil demand 
increased by 1.6 mbd in 2015, or 1.7%. Although this was the highest in 
5 years, it was not enough to keep oil prices from falling. Consequently, 
global oil inventories increased for the second consecutive year, by about 
2 mbd in 2015, or more than twice the inventory buildup in 2014.
Price weakening has persisted in 2016. With the market 
oversupplied, market sentiment has played a key role in price 
determination. Following failure in OPEC to reach an o¡cial decision 
about oil production on 4 December 2015, Brent crude oil prices tumbled 
from $42/barrel to as low as $26/barrel by the third week of January 
2016. News of OPEC members coordinating output cuts set o a price 
rally, but it was short-lived as the market sensed that a cut in production 
was unlikely. Lately, oil prices have been rising because of renewed 
talks in which a larger group of oil producers aim to freeze production, 
as well as because of a continuing decline in the number of active 
drilling rigs in the US, production outages in Nigeria and Kurdistan, 
and increased demand from the PRC. As of mid-March, Brent crude was 
trading in the range of $36–$40/barrel.
Oil price prospects
In its Medium-Term Oil Market Report 2015, the International 
Energy Agency concluded that oil supply will again exceed 
demand. However, the agency maintained that the 2015 
volume increase, one of the highest in recent history, cannot be 
repeated in 2016. Low oil prices have prompted oil companies 
to scale back investment and production spending, and to 
defer exploration, restricting potential growth in oil supply. 
Supply from outside OPEC is forecast to decline by 0.6 mbd 
in 2016 and by 0.02 mbd in 2017. Most of the forecast decline 
is expected to be in the US, which largely reflects changes 
in light tight oil production, which is forecast to decline 
by nearly 0.6 mbd in 2016 and 0.2 mbd in 2017. Although 
non-OPEC supply is forecast to fall, this will be oset by 
higher production within OPEC, primarily from Iran, Iraq, and 
the United Arab Emirates. Although production freezes have 
been discussed, there has been no sign that OPEC will change 
its current stance, as some key members continue to oer price 
discounts to defend market share (Figure A1.16).
Supply disruptions will still aect oil prices, but oversupply has 
increased the market’s tolerance for disruption. The Energy Information 
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Administration estimates that 2.7 mbd were removed from oil 
markets in February 2015. Conflicts in Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, 
South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen continue to pose 
downside risks to supply.
Price recovery during the forecast period will be smaller 
than previously expected, owing to substantial inventory 
overhang, the prospect of additional supply from OPEC, 
the continuing strength of the US dollar, and weak demand. 
Growth in global oil demand is projected to be lower than 
in 2015, rising by 1.2 mbd in 2016 and 1.3 mbd in 2017. 
Factors holding down demand growth include lukewarm 
global industrial activity, slower growth in the PRC, and the 
waning boost to demand from low oil prices. In addition, 
weaker prices have spurred improved operating e¡ciency 
in the US shale oil industry, whose production declines have 
been smaller than earlier anticipated. Although a number 
of shale oil producers have scaled down operations, higher 
oil prices will encourage them to reenter the market, thereby exerting 
downward pressure on prices. Moreover, futures markets still signal 
a modest recovery in prices over the next 2 years (Figure A1.17). 
Barring large and sharp changes in global oil supply and demand, 
Brent crude prices are forecast to average $38 in 2016 and $45 in 2017.
Food price movements and prospects 
Agricultural prices continued their decline for the fourth 
consecutive year, with the overall index falling by 13.1% 
in 2015. All sub-indexes decreased, with food prices showing 
the largest drop of 15.4%. The decline in prices came mainly 
from favorable supply conditions and low energy prices. 
All food sub-indexes declined, with edible oils falling 
by 22% and grains by 15% (Figure A1.18). Every component 
of the price index for edible oils and meals declined in 
2015. In particular, prices for three key components—
palm oil, soybean meal, and soybeans—fell by more than 
20%. Large soybean yields and stockpiles of soybean meal 
exerted downward pressure on prices. At the same time, the 
continued slump in oil prices depressed demand for palm oil 
and soybeans to make biodiesel fuel. Prices for wheat, maize, 
and rice also declined in 2015, reflecting ample supply from 
good crop yields. After rising in 2014, the “other food” index 
fell by 7.5% in 2015. Lower beef prices oset higher prices for chicken, 
and sugar prices continued to fall because of large accumulated stocks.
The decline in food prices has continued in 2016, with the index 
down by 12.7% in the first 2 months of the year. Global prices for 
wheat and maize declined as abundant wheat supplies and subdued 
international demand exerted downward pressure. However, prices 
for rice rose in February, owing to production pressures and increased 
demand from key importers such as Indonesia and the Philippines. 
The Agricultural Market Information System of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization reported in March 2016 that the current 
A1.17 Brent crude futures and spot price
$/barrel
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
4 Mar 2016
Asian Development Outlook 2015 (10 Mar 2015)
Average spot price
Jan
2013
Jan
2014
Jan
2015
Jan
2016
Jan
2018
Jan
2017
Jan
2019
Jan
2020
Source: Bloomberg (accessed 7 March 2016).
Click here for figure data
A1.18 Food commodity price indexes
2010 = 100
70
100
130
160
Jan
2013
Jul Jan
2014
Jul Jan
2015
Jul Jan
2016
Other food
Grains
Edible oils
Food
Source: World Bank. Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheet).  
http://www.worldbank.org (accessed 4 March 2016).
Click here for figure data
Rescuing growth in uncertain times  39
El Niño peaked in November 2015 but remains strong and will 
fade to neutral only in June. However, global supplies (stocks 
plus production) of the three major grains remain healthy. 
The latest prospects from the March 2016 report of the US 
Department of Agriculture show global supplies of these three 
crops reaching 2.70 billion tons in the 2015/16 crop year, 0.2% 
higher than the previous year. Global production of wheat in 
2015/16 is expected to be 0.9% higher, resulting in a 14-year 
high in the stock-to-use ratio (Figure A1.19). On the other 
hand, the market for maize is forecast to be tight, as global 
production in 2015/16 is seen declining by 4.0% on account 
of severe drought attributed to El Niño. Despite these cuts in 
production, the stock-to-use ratio will rise slightly on lower 
consumption and higher stock carryover. 
Also aected by El Niño, global rice production is 
expected to fall by 1.6%. Production by major rice exporters 
India, Pakistan, Thailand, and Viet Nam is forecast to drop 
by 3.4%, but the stock-to-use ratio will remain close to its 
10-year average at 18.7%. 
The outlook for edible oils remains positive. Production of 
the 10 major edible oils is projected to rise by 1.3%. Supplies 
are expected to remain high because of elevated stock 
carryover, especially for soybeans, for which production 
increased by almost 30% from 2013/14.
Recent weather forecasts suggest that the current El Niño 
could be one of the strongest on record. However, it is unlikely 
to cause a spike in global agricultural prices because supplies 
of major agricultural commodities are ample and energy 
prices low. Current and past periods of El Niño show the weak 
link between El Niño episodes and global food prices, during 
which food price indexes either declined or changed very little 
(Figure A1.20). Regarding La Niña, a weather disruption that 
can follow El Niño, the March report of the Agricultural Market 
Information System of the Food and Agriculture Organization 
puts the probability of experiencing La Niña in the latter part of 
2016 at 50%. In view of well-supplied markets for most grains, 
oilseeds, and edible oils, the food commodity price index is expected to 
decline a further 1% in 2016 before rebounding by 1% in 2017.
External environment in sum
The much-anticipated improvement in the global outlook has yet to 
materialize. In particular, despite some promising signs from the US, 
growth in the industrial economies will remain flat. As such, they 
cannot provide a fillip for developing Asia’s exports and growth. The US 
Federal Reserve is likely to raise interest rates further, but the cautious 
and gradual nature of the hikes will cushion the adverse eect on the 
region’s financial stability. Subdued oil prices will contain inflationary 
pressures but are unlikely to boost growth, as they partly reflect weak 
global demand. In sum, developing Asia must navigate a challenging and 
uncertain external environment, looking to itself to reignite growth.
A1.20 Change in price indexes during El Niño peak periods
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A1.19 Stock-to-use ratio
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Many Asian economies have registered remarkably high output growth 
rates in the past 3 decades. This achievement came about despite 
disruptions caused by economic crises. Arguably, the most serious 
downturn was the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, which severely 
aected Southeast Asia and the Republic of Korea. By comparison, 
the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008–2009 has had much less 
impact on Asia. The main reason why the region’s economies were not 
directly aected was their low exposure to United States (US) subprime 
mortgages. The region was nevertheless aected indirectly as demand 
for its exports from its main trading partners contracted significantly.
This was enough to disrupt growth momentum in Asia, and 
as a result economic growth in Asia slowed in the aftermath 
of the GFC. From an average of 8.3% during 2006–2010, 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the region fell to 
5.9% in 2015 (Figure 2.1.1). This downward trend in regional 
growth follows 6 years of accelerating growth in the interval 
2001–2007. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), which 
accounts for a large share of the region’s GDP, has been the 
main driver of regional economic growth. Given the recent 
slowdown in the PRC, some observers have started talking 
about a “new normal” of substantially lower growth in 
the region.
While developing Asia is not alone in this regard—growth 
also declined in Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe—
its slowdown is likely to have repercussions for the region 
and the rest of the world. Developing Asia’s success in lifting 
1 billion individuals out of poverty during 1990–2012 hinged on 
its ability to sustain high rates of economic growth. Moreover, 
as the region currently accounts for more than a quarter of 
world GDP as valued at market exchange rates, a persistent slowdown in 
developing Asia threatens to undermine the fragile global recovery. 
This theme chapter aims to reveal the factors underlying the growth 
slowdown and the extent to which the slowdown reflects changes in 
the region’s productive capacity. What has happened to developing 
Asia’s productive capacity—its so-called potential growth—and how can 
policy makers respond? 
Asia’s potential growth
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Understanding the 
growth slowdown
The issues posed by the decline in Asia’s growth rate, and the nature 
of that decline, are important from a policy perspective. The right 
policy response depends on the nature of the region’s slowdown. Is it a 
temporary—albeit prolonged—eect of the business cycle? Or are more 
persistent changes under way? If weaker growth reflects slack demand 
such as softening export orders or a downturn in private investment, 
then fiscal or monetary stimulus may be needed for temporary support. 
But if supply-side factors are at play, and growth moderation stems from 
slowing expansion of the region’s productive capacity, then any revival 
of growth prospects may depend on structural policy reform. 
The concepts of potential GDP and potential growth, which 
are grounded in a view of an economy’s productive capacity under 
conditions of stable inflation and full employment, can be used to 
distinguish temporary deviations from the underlying trend in actual 
GDP growth. This chapter provides the theoretical foundation for 
potential growth, develops a simple framework to estimate it from 
readily available macroeconomic indicators, and applies the framework 
to a sample of developing economies in Asia. 
Conceptualizing potential growth
Standard economic theory assumes that transitory shocks to the actual 
growth rate do not significantly aect the dynamics of the underlying 
trend or the potential growth rate. Several studies have recently 
challenged this view, however, and have proposed arguments and 
provided empirical evidence that support the hypothesis that there 
is a significant relationship between the short-run cyclical behavior 
of economic growth and long-term performance (e.g., Stiglitz 1993, 
Cerra and Saxena 2008). This suggests that the GFC may indeed have 
a significant impact on the future growth trajectory of individual 
economies.
The possibility of a permanent downward shift aects prospects 
for sustained increases in output. This is an important medium-term 
concern for policy makers, particularly in less developed countries 
where intense pressure exists to deliver sustained increases in living 
standards. Rodrik (2009), for example, argued that the world after the 
2008–2009 crisis would be significantly dierent from its pre-crisis 
incarnation, in particular as a milieu for East Asian economies 
thriving as they did in the 20th century. This is because the crisis has 
permanently reduced growth in both productivity and the labor force.1 
Likewise, Pritchett and Summers (2014) argued that the days of fast 
growth in Asia might be numbered because regression to the mean is 
empirically the most robust feature of economic growth. The statistical 
analysis showed that rapid growth episodes in developing countries are 
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frequently followed by significant slowdowns. Moreover, the historical 
distribution of growth has an average of 2% with a standard deviation 
that is also 2%.
One approach to addressing the main issues is to examine the supply 
side of the economy through the concept of potential or natural output 
growth. The notion of potential output was initially formulated to 
quantify the ability of an economy to produce output, i.e., its productive 
capacity. “Potential output” is therefore the highest level of real GDP 
that can be attained over the long term. By translating levels to growth 
rates, one obtains the rate of growth of potential output. A limit to 
output growth exists because of technical, natural, and institutional 
constraints on the ability to produce. 
Growth theory indicates that in the long run economies tend to grow 
at a rate consistent with the full utilization of productive resources, 
i.e., the natural or potential growth rate. Short-term shocks can induce 
temporary deviations from potential growth rate, which give rise to 
changes in unemployment and inflation, but over time these changes 
are corrected by price adjustments and growth returns to its potential. 
What this means is that the high growth rates enjoyed by Asian 
economies reflected their high potential growth rates. Nevertheless, 
the precise meaning of this term has evolved over time (Box 2.1.1).
The approach followed in this chapter is consistent with Harrod’s 
definition of potential growth—the sum of the growth rates of labor 
productivity and of the labor force—and with Okun’s concept of 
potential output (Harrod 1939, Okun 1962). Hence, potential output 
growth is defined as the maximum rate of growth that an economy can 
achieve consistent with macroeconomic stability, in which there are 
neither inflationary nor deflationary pressures.
There is broad agreement that Asia’s spectacular growth in 
recent decades was enabled by its rapid structural transformation, 
i.e., its capacity to shift resources out of agriculture into sectors of 
higher productivity (ADB 2013). The speed of an economy’s structural 
transformation depends largely on institutional barriers that aect, 
among other things, the reallocation of factors of production, e.g., 
restrictive labor laws. Given that these barriers are pervasive in many 
Asian countries and that agriculture is still a large employer (employing 
50% of all workers in India and about 30% in the PRC), Asia’s prospects 
to reengineer high growth will depend largely on eliminating these 
barriers. Arguably, a significant share of the high growth registered 
by the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China from the mid-1960s to 
the mid-1990s, and in the PRC after 1980, is accounted for by the 
weakening of these barriers, which facilitated the absorption of labor 
by the manufacturing and service sectors. But most Asian economies 
still have significant barriers that prevent the development of modern 
manufacturing and services. Moreover, there are important obstacles 
that make it di¨cult to e¨ciently reallocate factors across firms.
This leads to the important point that potential growth consistent 
with stable inflation as used in this chapter is conditional on the 
economy’s institutions and economic structure. Suppose that one 
could measure additional growth over and above this potential growth 
that could be achieved with the removal of all institutional barriers 
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2.1.1 Evolving notions of potential output growth
The idea of potential output has evolved historically. 
There are four main stages in the progression. 
First stage. When Harrod (1939) discussed the 
“natural growth rate,” this was probably the first formal 
reference in the literature to the idea of an economy’s full-
employment growth rate. Harrod defined an economy’s 
natural growth rate (gˆN) as the sum of the growth rates 
of labor productivity (yˆN) and of the labor force (nˆN), i.e., 
gˆN = yˆN + nˆN. It represents the maximum sustainable rate 
of growth that technical conditions make available to the 
economic system. At any particular time, actual growth can 
diverge from the natural growth rate because of various 
restrictions, rigidities, and constraints, as well as the effect 
of positive and negative transitory shocks. Nonetheless, 
actual growth cannot persistently exceed gˆN as this would 
eventually create inflationary pressures, including an 
excessively tight labor market. With wages rising relative to 
the price of capital, the economy would adopt more capital-
intensive techniques, unemployment would rise again to a 
comfortable approximation of full employment, and growth 
would converge on the natural rate. On the other hand, 
if actual growth were consistently lower than the natural 
growth rate, the resulting rise in unemployment would 
trigger the opposite price adjustment process, and falling 
wages would in due course restore higher employment 
through the adoption of more labor-intensive production 
techniques until equilibrium in the labor market was 
achieved, and actual and natural growth rates were brought 
into line.
Second stage. It was not until the 1960s that these 
ideas gave rise to an active body of empirical work around 
the idea of potential output. Since then, there have been 
essentially two concepts of potential output in the literature. 
The first is based on Okun (1962), and the second on 
Friedman (1968). Okun was interested in the question how 
much output the economy could produce under conditions 
of full employment and answered it by introducing the 
concept of potential gross national product. Okun’s work 
harked back to Harrod but also accommodated Keynes 
and the Phillips curve. He argued that potential output 
is a supply concept of the level of output under the full 
utilization of factor inputs. However, Okun stressed that the 
social target of maximum production and employment is 
constrained by a social desire for price stability. This did not 
imply, however, that inflation had to be stabilized at a low 
rate. Okun’s aim was to specify the appropriate fiscal policy 
to maximize employment subject to the constraint that 
inflation should not be excessive. The implied relationship—
referred to as Okun’s Law—had practical policy implications 
under conditions of a stable trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment (the Phillips curve) and the direct 
responsiveness of employment to demand (as explored by 
Keynes).
Third stage. Okun was seriously questioned in the 
1970s. The reason was not his concept of potential output. 
Rather, the rise of inflation during that decade caused 
disappointment with full employment policies. Friedman 
(1968) and Phelps (1967) questioned the stability of the 
inflation–unemployment trade-off embodied in the Phillips 
curve. They argued that the rate of wage increases was 
stable at only one rate of unemployment, which was termed 
its “natural rate” or the “nonaccelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment.” If unemployment were beneath this natural 
rate, expectations of rising wages would cause inflation to 
accelerate without limit. The Friedman–Phelps critique 
of the Phillips curve had clear significance for the labor 
market and cast doubt on the feasibility of full employment, 
which was the touchstone of Okun’s work.
Fourth stage. The result was a radical shift in thinking 
in the 1980s and 1990s about the relationship between 
demand pressure and inflation. The outcome was Okun’s 
concept of the output gap being superseded by variants 
of Friedman’s natural rate hypothesis. The central bank 
reaction function presented in Taylor (1993), for example, 
became a rule observed by many central banks when 
setting interest rates. This work led by the end of the 
1990s and early 2000s to the so-called New Consensus 
Macroeconomics, also referred to as the New Keynesian 
Perspective. Essentially, this is a three-equation model 
consisting of (i) the relationship between interest rates and 
the output gap, (ii) the Phillips curve relationship between 
inflation and the output gap, and (iii) the so-called Taylor 
Rule, which sets interest rates according to the output gap 
and the difference between actual and targeted inflation. 
In these models, prices or real wages adjust toward their 
long-run equilibrium values but do so slowly, with the 
result that actual output may deviate from the short-term 
measure of potential output. Consequently, the output gap 
measures the deviation of actual from potential output 
that arises as a result of rigidities in prices and wages that 
prevent them from responding freely to changes in demand 
and supply. 
and distortions in the economy: market imperfections, collusion, 
rent-seeking, externalities, and government policies that obstruct the 
mobility of factors, both capital and labor. This would then be the 
true maximum rate at which the economy can grow. This concept is 
referred to as the economy’s frontier potential growth. It cannot be 
quantified, but the idea is clear and useful for developing economies. 
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2.1.2 Sample economies 
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Cambodia
People’s Republic  
¬of China
Fiji
Hong Kong, China
India
Indonesia
Kazakhstan
Republic of Korea
Malaysia
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Taipei,China
Tajikistan
Thailand
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Viet Nam
While the dierence between potential growth and frontier potential 
growth is not large in advanced economies, the distinction is important 
for economies riddled with ine¨ciencies. Policies and reforms that 
ease some of these constraints in the latter group can have salutary 
eects on potential growth, especially if it languishes far from the 
frontier. Understanding these constraints can help policy makers propel 
their economies closer to their true limit.
Estimating potential growth
Potential output is not directly observed. As such, the first 
step in analyzing developing Asia’s potential is to develop an 
empirical model. This section develops a simple empirical 
model and applies it to a sample of 22 developing economies 
in Asia (Box 2.1.2). While limited data availability constrained 
selection for the sample, the group includes the three 
largest economies—the PRC, India, and Indonesia—and 
representatives of all subregions in developing Asia. As the 
sample accounts for more than 98% of GDP in the region 
in 2014, the aggregate results should broadly represent the 
region’s experience.
At present, most economists view economic growth as 
the sum of a cyclical component and a permanent component. 
The former captures the business cycle or demand 
fluctuations and the latter the long-run trajectory of growth. 
This is the “natural” or potential growth rate of the economy, consistent 
with the full utilization of productive resources—in particular full 
employment of the labor force accompanied by stable inflation. There 
are various methods to estimate the potential growth rate, which are 
summarized in Box 2.1.3.
From the methods listed in the box, this chapter uses a multivariate 
estimate that relies on information on GDP growth and inflation. This is 
obviously an improvement over the univariate filters. Unlike the growth 
accounting approach, it does not require a series of capital stock, which 
is lacking in most Asian economies. And, unlike the output identity 
approach, the method employed in this chapter provides an explicit link 
with concepts of macroeconomic stability. Before the model is estimated, 
univariate filters are applied to the data series to extract the underlying 
trends of each variable.
As noted above, deviations of actual growth from the potential rate 
cause resources to be either overutilized or underutilized, giving rise 
to changes in the unemployment rate and, consequently, to inflationary 
or deflationary pressures. Consequently, potential output growth 
is associated with a stable inflation environment. The framework 
used in this chapter to estimate the potential growth rate of the 
Asian economies builds on this intuition. 
Potential growth as modeled in this chapter is consistent with 
the Harrod (1939) concept of the natural rate of growth. The natural 
rate of growth is described as both the potential growth rate toward 
which the economy tends in the long-run and the short-term upward 
limit to growth, which turns cyclical expansions into recessions. 
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Since by definition it is the sum of the growth rates of labor productivity 
and the labor force, potential growth can be usefully decomposed into 
these two elements once it is estimated. Note that when actual growth is 
equal to potential, employment grows at the same rate as the labor force, 
keeping the unemployment rate constant. As such, when actual growth 
is consistently slower than the natural rate, unemployment will rise, 
and vice versa. 
As a consequence, a convenient method to estimate the natural 
growth rate relies on the relationship between unemployment and 
output growth formalized in Okun’s Law (e.g., León-Ledesma and 
Thirlwall 2002). Such a choice is complicated, however, by the lack 
or unreliability of labor market data for many Asian economies. This 
problem is addressed by noting that a natural extension of the concept 
of the natural growth rate is the link with the relationship between 
unemployment and inflation typified in the Phillips curve. The process, 
as described in Box 2.1.4, is to estimate the relationship of the gap 
between actual and expected inflation to the gap between actual growth 
and its natural rate. The model that relates output growth and inflation 
generates annual estimates of the potential growth rate.
Potential growth trends in developing Asia
When applied to developing economies with significant surplus 
labor, the model suggests that they can grow fast until the surplus is 
eliminated. Economies with surplus labor have relatively high labor 
force growth rates, many unemployed and underemployed workers, 
and low wages. Under these circumstances, there is room to grow 
2.1.3 Methods to estimate potential growth
Potential growth, unlike actual growth, is not directly 
observable and hence has to be estimated. Some of the most 
widely used methods are as follows:
Univariate filters. These are statistical procedures that 
are not based on any underlying economic theory and use 
information only on GDP. Their objective is to statistically 
remove the cyclical component of a series from the raw 
data. The most widely used is the Hodrick–Prescott, 
but some other filters are the Baxter–King, Christiano–
Fitzgerald, Beveridge–Nelson, and Corbae–Ouliaris. 
Multivariate estimates. These approaches use 
information from several economic series to obtain 
estimates of potential output. The models are typically 
based on a structural theory. For example, they estimate the 
rate of economic growth consistent with “macroeconomic 
stability.” One simple model is a bivariate structural time 
series linking temporary fluctuations in output to inflation, 
and postulating that the output gap is positively related 
to inflation pressures. An extended version could add an 
Okun’s Law equation relating unemployment and output 
growth.
Growth accounting approach. This is also a multivariate 
approach in that it uses information on variables related 
through an aggregate production function: output, 
employment, capital, and residually measured total factor 
productivity. Typically, authors derive a decomposition of 
the sources of growth using a Cobb–Douglas production 
function such as (1 )( )t t t t tY A K L H
α α−
= . In most cases it 
is not estimated econometrically; rather, factor markets 
are assumed to be competitive, so the labor and capital 
elasticities equal the factor shares in national income, and 
these are imposed to derive total factor productivity growth. 
Output identity. This approach decomposes output (Y) 
multiplicatively as the product of a series of terms, e.g., 
labor productivity in hours (Y/H), hours per employee 
(H/L), the employment rate (L/P), and working-age 
population (P), such that      * * *Y H LH L PY P . These 
series can also be filtered to calculate their trend, which is 
then interpreted as the potential level. Like the production 
function approach, this method does not explicitly link the 
estimation of trend growth to the estimation of the output 
gap and inflation.
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2.1.4 Multivariate estimates of potential growth
The model used for estimation has three underlying pillars: 
(i) Harrod’s notion of the natural growth rate, (ii) Okun’s 
Law relating unemployment to output, and (iii) the Phillips’ 
curve relating inflation to output.
Since the natural growth rate is defined as the sum of 
the growth rates of labor productivity and the labor force, 
unemployment will rise whenever the actual rate of growth 
(gˆt) falls below the natural rate ˆ( )
N
tg , and it will fall when 
gˆt rises above ˆ
N
tg . This yields the following specification of 
Okun’s Law:
ˆt tU gσ ς∆ = −  (1) 
where ∆Ut is the percentage change in the unemployment 
rate and the natural growth rate given by (σ/ς). This 
specification and its variants have been widely used in the 
literature to estimate ˆ Ntg  for countries and regions and also 
to investigate its possible endogeneity (e.g., León-Ledesma 
and Thirlwall 2002, Lanzafame 2010). The specification in 
equation (1) presents two issues that are addressed in this 
chapter. First, the model produces only a single estimate 
of the potential growth rate for the time period under 
analysis. Since its evolution over time is what is important, 
a time-varying parameter approach is applied to estimate 
a time series for ˆ Ntg . Second, the unemployment rate and, 
more generally, labor market data are notoriously unreliable 
for some of the economies in the sample. 
To deal with this data problem, Harrod’s definition of 
ˆ Ntg  is linked to the relationship between unemployment and 
growth. The potential growth rates of the Asian economies 
are then estimated based on an aggregate supply model. 
In the long run, unemployment will be constant when it is 
equal to the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment 
(NAIRU). Therefore, the potential growth rate can be 
defined as that growth rate consistent with Nt tU U= , which 
implies ∆Ut = 0. Okun’s relation in terms of the NAIRU can 
be rewritten as follows:
ˆ ˆ( )N Nt t t t tU U g gβ= − −  (2) 
where the Okun coefficient ( )t  and the NAIRU ( )NtU  are 
assumed to vary over time.
The relationship between inflation and unemployment is 
given by the following Phillips curve: 
( )e Nt t t t tU U      (3)
where ( )e Nt t t t tU U     and ( )e Nt t t t tU U     are, respectively, the actual and expected 
inflation rates, while ( )e Nt t t t tU U     is a time-varying parameter. 
By substituting (3) into (2), the following equation is 
obtained:
ˆ ˆ( )e Nt t t t tg g      (4)
where t t t   . The specification in (4) formalizes an 
aggregate supply model with time-varying parameters. 
To estimate the model in (4), an estimate of the expected 
inflation rate ( )e Nt t t t tU U     is required. Because of limited data for 
expected inflation, ( )e Nt t t t tU U     is modeled as a function of the 
actual inflation rate ( )e Nt t t t tU U     with two possible specifications. 
One specification, expected inflation in time t, is a time-
varying function of actual inflation in t plus a random shock:
e
t t t t      (5)
The estimated model in this case is as follows:
(1 )ˆ ˆ N tt t t t
t
g g   
    (6)
The second specification assumes an extreme form of 
adaptive expectations (a random walk), with expected 
inflation in t equal to actual inflation in t–1 plus a random 
shock:
1
e
t t t     (7)
The second model is as follows:
1ˆ ˆ Nt t t t
t
g g       (8)
The constant term 
1ˆ ˆ Nt t t t
t
g g      in equations (6) and (8) provides an estimate of potential growth over time. To take account 
of the possible effects of the degree of openness on the 
slope of the Phillips curve, equations (6) and (8) are 
augmented with the share of imports in GDP. These 
equations are specified in state-space form, and the Kalman 
filter is used for estimation. This is a statistical procedure 
that can produce time-varying coefficients (Harvey 1989).
faster without stoking inflationary pressures. When surplus labor is 
eliminated, wages and possibly inflation start increasing. That is when 
growth is at its potential. It is true that a country with surplus labor 
can have rising inflation, but the likely explanation in such a situation is 
that constraints are creating bottlenecks that hamper the reallocation 
of labor. This implies that an economy’s potential growth rate could be 
higher if such bottlenecks were eased or eliminated.
Meanwhile, in the case of the Central Asian economies, their 
dependence on natural resources can aect the estimates through the 
eect of commodity price shocks on domestic inflation. However, it is 
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di¨cult to state a priori the sign of this relation, which possibly should 
be stronger in more open economies. This can be controlled for, if 
only indirectly, by including in the model the share of imports in GDP 
(Romer 1993). The problem is the lack of su¨ciently long time series, 
with the consequence that meaningful results are di¨cult to obtain. 
The model being estimated is therefore based on certain assumptions 
that may not exactly fit oil-dependent economies. Box 2.1.5 discusses 
how well the model performs with the given sample.
Graphs of estimated potential growth rates and actual growth rates 
are presented in Figure 2.1.2. These are for 12 of the 22 developing 
economies in Asia under consideration.2
These graphs show that the potential growth rate was more stable 
than actual growth, and that it was fairly high and/or increasing 
in the 1980s and 1990s in most economies. The pattern aligns with 
expectations. The graphs also suggest that, in most cases, the 
estimated potential growth rate was higher in 2000 than in 2014. 
Moreover, the trend was either stable or declining during 2008–2014. 
Figure 2.1.3 shows the dierence between the period average rates for 
potential growth and actual growth between 2000–2007 (pre-crisis) 
and 2008–2014 (post-crisis).
It is worth noting that during 2008–2014, potential growth declined 
in Asia’s advanced economies as well as in some of the major economies, 
including the PRC and the Republic of Korea. Thailand suered a 
significant decline in its potential growth rate, which is the lowest in 
Southeast Asia. Potential growth increased, however, in Indonesia, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, and Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, Bangladesh, 
Fiji, and India maintained the same pace in both subperiods. Overall, 
comparing pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, the decline in potential 
growth accounts for 39.6% of the decline in actual growth.3 This implies 
that about 60% of the decline appears to be a temporary eect of the 
business cycle.
2.1.5 How well does the aggregate supply model of potential growth perform?
To gauge whether the model produces sensible estimates 
of potential output growth, test its key insight: Inflationary 
pressures should arise when the gap between actual and 
potential growth rates widens. The test is carried by pooling 
all data. The following regression is estimated using a fixed 
effects model:
ˆ ˆ( )Nit i it it itg g       
where ˆ ˆ( )Nit i it it itg g        is the change in the inflation rate and ˆ ˆ( )Nit i it it itg g        
is the difference between actual and potential growth rates. 
The expectation is that ˆ ˆ( )Nit i it it itg g        > 0 and statistically significant. 
The model is first estimated for a large sample of 71 
economies across the world, and then for the sample of 22 
developing Asian economies plus Japan. Results confirm 
the hypothesis that, when the gap between actual and 
potential growth widens, inflationary pressures emerge. 
In the larger sample, results confirm that, where inflation 
rates are below 25%, for each percentage point of 
actual growth in excess of the natural growth rate, the 
inflation rate increases by about 0.12 percentage points. 
Where inflation is above 25%, the relationship breaks 
down. Meanwhile, in the sample of Asian economies, 
results show that, where inflation rates are below 45%, 
for each percentage point of actual growth in excess of the 
natural growth rate, the inflation rate increases by about 
0.2 percentage points.
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2.1.2  Potential growth rate estimates and actual growth rates
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Key features of potential growth trends in the four largest 
economies in the sample, which accounted for about 80% of 
developing Asia’s actual GDP in 2014, were as follows:
People’s Republic of China. During the expansionary 
phase up to 2007, before the GFC, the PRC economy operated 
at potential or slightly above it. From 2008, a gradual decline 
in potential growth is observed to be about 7.9% in 2014, 
just slightly above actual growth at 7.4%. Post-crisis average 
potential growth declined by 1.11 percentage points relative 
to the pre-crisis average. During 2008–2014, inflation slowed 
as the deviation of actual growth from potential growth was 
only slightly negative. This is consistent with the theoretical 
framework underlying the model, which states that a decline 
in the inflation rate is associated with the actual growth rate 
being below potential.4
India. For most of the estimation period, India’s potential 
growth rate was quite stable.5 A substantial increase starting 
in the early 2000s is observed, with potential growth peaking 
in 2007 at 8.6%. As with the PRC, potential growth declined 
in the aftermath of the GFC, falling to 6.3% in 2014. However, 
the average in 2008–2014 was only 0.06 percentage points 
lower than in 2000–2007. The average deviation of actual 
from potential growth was slightly negative. Also as with 
the PRC, this indicates that India’s economy grew at close to 
its potential during this period.
Republic of Korea. The economy’s potential growth rate 
has been declining for quite some time. It experienced a 
significant decline during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–
1998, after which it recovered slightly. However, the broader 
trend since 2001 has been negative. The 2008–2014 average 
was 2.09 percentage points lower than in 2000–2007. The 
2008–2014 averages of actual and potential growth were also 
very close to each other, the deviation being slightly negative. 
This is consistent with a slightly declining inflation rate. 
In 2014, the Republic of Korea’s potential growth rate was 
estimated at 3.3%, very close to actual growth.
Indonesia. For most of the estimation period, Indonesia’s 
potential growth rate was stable. However, its potential 
growth rate declined during the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997–1998 to 3% from a peak of 8.4% in 1995. It then 
recovered to an average of almost 5% in 2000–2007 and 
increased to 5.8% during 2008–2014. During this period, 
actual and potential growth rates were close, so that the 
average change in inflation was stable. Among developing 
Asia’s four largest economies, only Indonesia registered a significant 
increase in potential growth during 2008–2014, rising 0.86 percentage 
points higher than the 2000–2007 average.
In Figure 2.1.4, the weighted average of the estimated potential 
growth rates of 13 Asian economies (Asia-13) for which consistent 
estimates since 1988 are available is calculated. These economies—
Bangladesh, Fiji, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
2.1.3  Differences in average actual and potential 
growth rates, 2000–2007 versus 2008–2014
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Pakistan, the Philippines, the PRC, Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, China—represent almost 
94% of developing Asia’s actual GDP in both 1988 and 2014. 
The weighted average provides a more aggregate picture of 
these growth dynamics and will help answer the question 
whether there is evidence that Asia is entering a new normal 
of lower potential growth. Average potential growth for 
two other subgroups is also plotted: One is the same group 
of economies but excluding the PRC (Asia-12) and the other 
includes only the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taipei,China, 
and Hong Kong, China (Asia-4). A comparison of Asia-13 and 
Asia-12 averages allows the assessment of the influence of 
the PRC on the potential growth performance of the region 
as a whole.
In the case of Asia-4, potential growth declined 
from an average of about 9% in 1988 to just over 3% in 
2014. The aggregate behavior of Asia-13 provides a more 
complex and nuanced view of Asia’s potential growth. 
First, potential growth increased prior to the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997–1998. The series peaked at a range of 7.3%–7.4% 
in 1994–1996. Potential growth declined during the crisis 
and bottomed out in 1998 at 5.36%. It then recovered and 
increased from 1999 to 2007, peaking at 8.45%. After the 
GFC in 2008, potential growth started declining, falling to 
6.7% in 2014, almost 2 percentage points below the peak. 
The significant decline from the peak indicates that the 
region may have entered a new normal of lower potential 
growth, an issue that will be explored further in the third 
section of this theme chapter.
It is also important to note that developing Asia’s 
dynamics of potential growth are increasingly determined 
by the growth performance of the PRC. The PRC share in 
regional GDP increased to almost 55% in 2014 from only 
25% in 1988. In this context, the surge in regional potential 
growth between 1998 and 2007 was mostly the result of the 
phenomenal growth performance by the PRC (Figure 2.1.5). 
The consequence was that the PRC contributed about three-
quarters of the overall rise in potential output growth during 
this period. Specifically, the PRC contributed 2.31 percentage 
points out of the total increase of 3.09 percentage points. 
Of that 2.31 percentage points, 1.09 is derived from its rising 
potential growth rate, and 1.22 can be attributed to the 
growing PRC share in developing Asia’s GDP. Most of the 
remaining increase in potential growth was contributed by 
India and the Republic of Korea, while several economies 
made negative contributions to the regional average.
In the same vein, the decline from the onset of the GFC 
to 2014 was determined primarily by events in the PRC, 
India, and the Republic of Korea. However, the latter two 
economies played a bigger role in this episode. Specifically, 
about one-third of the 1.78 percentage point fall in average 
2.1.5  Contributions to change in potential growth
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2.1.4  Estimates of average potential growth rate
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potential growth can be attributed to the Republic of Korea, which 
experienced a large fall in both potential growth and GDP share—
nearly 7 percentage points—from 2007 to 2014. India’s GDP share and 
potential growth rate also declined, by 2 and 2.3 percentage points, 
respectively. As a result, its contribution to the aggregate decline was 
also approximately a third. Meanwhile, the decline in potential growth 
in the PRC was oset by the rise in its regional share of GDP, so that its 
net contribution to the regional decline was only 0.24 percentage points, 
or 13% of the total.
The picture without the PRC (Asia-12) is very similar to that of the 
Asian-13 but, as expected, potential growth without the PRC is lower 
both before and after the GFC. As with Asia-13, the decline during 
2008–2014 was significant. The substantial decline in Asia-12 average 
potential growth with respect to the earlier part of the 1990s is also 
noted. Another common feature is that Asia-12 average potential growth 
during the Asian financial crisis was lower than during the GFC. With 
or without the PRC, the behavior of potential growth clearly shows a 
turning point after the GFC. 
The question remains whether this slowdown in potential growth 
is a new normal for the region—and what, if anything, policy makers 
can do to counteract this trend. Future gains in living standards and 
poverty elimination rest on a grasp of potential growth. Identifying 
the institutional and policy constraints that keep an economy from 
achieving its frontier potential growth will be critical to counteract the 
current slowdown. Knowing which factors have driven potential growth 
in the past can guide policy makers’ eorts to meet today’s growth 
challenge.
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Determinants of potential growth
Several approaches are used to tease out what is behind the recent 
slowdown in potential growth. First, the time-series estimates of 
potential growth for the 22 developing economies in Asia can be 
decomposed using a set of simple techniques that stem from the 
definitions of the key concepts. From the Harrod (1939) concept of 
the natural growth rate, potential growth is the sum of labor force 
growth and potential labor productivity growth—that is, growth in 
potential output per worker. Potential labor productivity growth itself 
can be decomposed to show it driven by such factors as within-sector 
productivity growth, the eect of employment reallocation across 
sectors, capital accumulation, and total factor productivity growth. 
Second, an econometric model is estimated using cross-country 
data for a larger sample of countries including those outside of Asia 
to establish the determinants of potential growth. The objective is to 
obtain robust and reliable estimates of variables significantly correlated 
with the potential growth rate. 
Finally, firm-level data are used to study the role of institutional 
obstacles in generating distortions that cause resource misallocation. 
This exercise can help shed light on policies that could help shift an 
economy closer to its frontier potential growth.
Potential labor productivity growth
Following Harrod’s definition of the natural growth rate, potential labor 
productivity growth is potential growth less the growth rate of the 
labor force. Because labor market data in many developing economies 
in Asia are unreliable, working-age population, which is the population 
aged 15–64, is used as a proxy for the labor force. These data are filtered 
using appropriate statistical techniques to purge short-term variability, 
which is caused largely by transitory migration flows.
Figure 2.2.1 shows both potential and actual labor productivity 
growth rates for the 12 Asian economies whose potential growth was 
graphed in the previous section. The PRC displays a high potential 
labor productivity growth rate—significantly higher than that of India. 
This explains a large part of the dierence in potential output growth 
between these two economies. Consistent with their transition into 
high-income economies, the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China show 
marked declines in potential labor productivity growth. This is less 
obvious in Singapore. Actual and potential labor productivity growth 
tend to track each other quite closely in most economies. However, the 
Philippines is a notable exception, with actual labor productivity growth 
lagging potential for most of the period. 
Figure 2.2.2 reports the breakdown of potential output growth into 
potential labor productivity growth and filtered labor force growth 
for the periods 2000–2007 and 2008–2013. With a few exceptions—
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Singapore—potential labor productivity growth 
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2.2.1  Potential and actual labor productivity growth rates
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was the main contributor to potential output growth. 
On average, potential labor productivity growth accounted 
for 78% of potential output growth during 2000–2007 and 
86% during 2008–2013. 
Meanwhile, Figure 2.2.3 shows the change in annual 
average potential output growth between the periods 
2000–2007 and 2008–2013. There is a decline in most 
economies. The figure also shows in each bar the change in 
the two components. In the PRC, potential output growth 
declined by about 1 percentage point between the two 
subperiods. Most of the decline is accounted for by the 
slowing of working-age population growth, with potential 
labor productivity growth actually increasing slightly. On the 
other hand, India saw a very small increase in potential 
output growth between the two periods. This was accounted 
for by the increase in potential labor productivity growth, 
which was slightly larger than the decline in working-age 
population growth. In the Republic of Korea, most of the 
decline in potential growth is accounted for by the decline in 
potential labor productivity growth. And, in Indonesia, most 
of the increase in potential output growth was accounted for 
by the increase in potential labor productivity growth.
Decomposition of potential labor 
productivity growth
Using shift-share analysis, the estimates of labor productivity 
growth are decomposed into productivity growth within the 
sector, changes in the employment structure, slack in the 
economy, capital deepening, and total factor productivity 
growth (Foster-McGregor and Verspagen 2016). This provides 
a simple but very useful way to assess which component 
of potential labor productivity growth is the largest and 
matters the most in explaining labor productivity growth. 
Box 2.2.1 shows how these decompositions are interpreted.
Equation (3) in Box 2.2.1 shows that potential labor 
productivity growth can be decomposed into the sum of 
the within, static, and dynamic eects, plus two terms that 
capture an output gap and a labor gap. This decomposition 
allows the comparison of the changes in the two gaps 
with the three structural eects. Results are presented 
in Figure 2.2.4 along with the average potential labor 
productivity growth for 1990–2011.
In most economies, the contribution of the combined 
gaps to potential labor productivity growth is relatively 
small compared to those of the structural eects. 
Kazakhstan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka are the main 
exceptions, all with gaps making positive contributions. 
The positive contribution means that potential labor 
productivity growth has been faster than actual labor 
productivity growth. 
2.2.2  Contributions to potential output growth
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2.2.3  Change in potential output growth and its 
components between 2000–2007 and 2008–2013
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2.2.1  Decomposition of labor productivity growth, potential labor productivity growth,  
and total factor productivity growth
The procedure for decomposing potential labor productivity 
growth can be depicted in stages: 
1. Decomposition of actual labor productivity growth. 
A well-known structural decomposition of labor 
productivity growth is given by the following equation 
(omitting the subscript ‘t’ for time):
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 0
0 0 0
( ) ( ) ( )( )ˆˆ ˆ i i i i i i i ii i i i i
y y s s y y s sg l y S y
y y y
          (1)
where gˆ is the growth rate of GDP, 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 0
0 0 0
( ) ( ) ( )( )ˆˆ ˆ i i i i i i i ii i i i i
y y s s y y s sg l y S y
y y y
         is the growth rate of 
aggregate labor input, y is labor productivity and yˆ denotes 
actual labor productivity growth, and si denotes the share 
of industry i in aggregate employment. The three terms on 
the right hand side are the within effect, or the contribution 
of productivity growth rates within each sector i; the static 
effect, or the productivity effect of relocating labor that 
results from differences in productivity levels at the start 
of the period; and the dynamic effect, or the productivity 
effect that results from relocating labor from one sector to 
another, at the same time taking into account the change 
in the productivity growth rate over the period. The sum 
of the last two is equal to the effect of employment 
reallocation across sectors. The symbol Σ denotes 
summation with this operation carried out for each of the 
three effects across the nine sectors for which data are 
available: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, 
utilities, trade, transport and commerce, the public sector, 
and finance, insurance, and real estate.
2. Potential labor productivity growth and the output and 
labor gaps. The same structural decomposition of labor 
productivity growth is applied to the potential rate of labor 
productivity growth (yˆN) by rewriting the definition of 
potential growth rate (gN) as follows:
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ),N N N N Ny g n g l g g l n         (2)
where nˆN is the growth rate of potential labor force, 
ˆˆ ˆ( )g l y   is the growth rate of actual labor productivity, 
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ),N N N N Ny g n g l g g l n        is the difference between the actual rate of 
output growth and the potential rate (or the output gap), 
and ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ),N N N N Ny g n g l g g l n         is the difference between actual employment 
growth and the growth rate of the potential labor force (and 
equal to the growth rate of the participation rate). This is 
called the labor gap. These last two terms reflect slack in an 
economy that is not operating at its potential. 
Substituting equation (1) into equation (2), yields a 
decomposition of potential labor productivity growth:
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The first three terms have the same interpretation as 
in equation (1), while the last two are the output and labor 
gaps. A negative output gap and a positive labor gap add to 
potential labor productivity growth.
3. Total factor productivity growth. Total factor productivity 
(TFP) is often used as a measure of the efficiency with 
which both labor and capital are used and is sometimes 
preferred to labor productivity. The growth rate of TFP 
can be decomposed into the same three terms as labor 
productivity growth by replacing labor productivity in 
equation (1) with TFP (). The resulting decomposition is as 
follows:
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 0
0 0 0
( ) ( ) ( )( )ˆ i i i i i i i i
i i i i i
s s s sS      
        (4)
The same three terms representing the within, static, and 
dynamic contributions to TFP growth ˆ( )  in this case are 
present.
4. Extended decomposition of potential labor productivity 
growth: the role of TFP growth and of capital deepening. 
Combining TFP growth decomposition with decomposition 
of potential labor productivity growth provides a more 
detailed decomposition of the latter that allows an 
estimation of the effects of both capital deepening and TFP 
growth. From a production function that assumes perfectly 
competitive factor markets, actual labor productivity growth 
can be written as follows:
ˆ ˆ ˆˆˆ( ) (1 )( )g l k l       (5)
where ˆ ˆ ˆˆˆ( ) (1 )( )g l k l      is the growth rate of aggregate capital, (1 – ) is 
the share of capital in GDP, and ˆ ˆ ˆˆˆ( ) (1 )( )g l k l      is the growth rate of 
TFP. This equation states that the growth rate of actual 
labor productivity is equal to TFP growth plus the weighted 
growth rate of the ratio of capital over labor, with the 
weight being the share of capital in GDP. Replacing ˆ ˆ ˆˆˆ( ) (1 )( )g l k l      
in equation (5) with the expression in equation (4) and 
inserting this into equation (2) results in the following 
decomposition of potential labor productivity growth:
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(6)
This relates potential labor productivity growth to the 
within, static, and dynamic contributions to TFP growth, 
capital deepening, and the output and labor gaps. 
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The analysis implies that, on average, the within eect 
accounts for 91% percent of potential labor productivity 
growth, and the static eect for 15%. Meanwhile, the dynamic 
eect is small, and the contribution of the two gaps is 
negative. It can therefore be concluded that the failure to 
realize potential because of the two gaps has a minimal role 
in explaining potential labor productivity growth.
Subsequent decomposition accounts for capital deepening 
and TFP growth (Figure 2.2.5). As shown in Box 2.2.1, the 
contribution of TFP growth is equal to the sum of the within, 
static, and dynamic eects. Interestingly, the contribution of 
capital deepening is always positive and high in many countries. 
Hence, a significant portion of overall labor productivity growth 
comes from capital deepening rather than from pure e¨ciency 
improvements. This also implies that actual labor productivity 
growth is higher than TFP growth in all cases. As in the 
previous decomposition, the within eect is found to make the 
dominant contribution to potential labor productivity growth. 
Factors aecting structural transformation
The findings show that the structural transformation eects 
(that is, the static and dynamic eects) contributed much 
less than the within eect. This raises the question what has 
prevented the faster reallocation of labor. Felipe et al. (2014) 
documented that the share of agricultural employment in the 
Republic of Korea recorded a 1.23 percentage point decline per 
annum during 1962–2013, falling from 69% to 6%. Meanwhile, 
the corresponding decline for the PRC was 1 percentage point 
per annum, from a share of 82% to 31%, and for Taipei,China 
0.88 points, from a share of 50% to 5%. These are among 
the fastest declines in history, even faster than the declines 
experienced by the advanced economies in the 19th and 
20th centuries. Meanwhile, India, Pakistan, and many other 
economies still have very high agricultural employment 
shares, which are declining very slowly.
Figure 2.2.6 shows the employment structure of typical 
low-, middle-, and high-income country. Probably, the most 
salient feature is the dierent shares of agriculture: 39% of 
total employment in low-income economies, 17% in middle-
income economies, and 2% in high-income economies. 
The flip side of this is the share of services.
Structural transformation has been much faster in 
some Asian economies than in others. Dierential paces 
of economic growth can, by themselves, generate dierent speeds 
of structural change that reflect the relative productivity growth of 
dierent sectors, or changes in the composition of demand (Herrendorf, 
Rogerson, and Valentinyi 2014). Impediments to the reallocation of 
factors of production are also important. These can be related to 
government failure or market failure caused by coordination problems 
and underdeveloped financial markets (Sen 2016). 
2.2.4  Structural decomposition of potential labor 
productivity growth, 1990–2011
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2.2.5  Extended decomposition of potential labor 
productivity growth, 1990–2011
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Government failures that slow down the rate of structural 
transformation often occur in four policy areas. First, land reform 
and land-use policies aect the reallocation of labor resources from 
low- to high-productivity sectors, albeit indirectly. Widespread 
land reform through the fair redistribution of agricultural land 
can boost agricultural productivity and provide surplus labor that 
may be reallocated to industry. Agrarian reform can also eect 
income redistribution that encourages the formation of human 
capital and increase aggregate demand. The Republic of Korea and 
Taipei,China successfully implemented widespread land reform prior to 
industrialization, allowing their economies to undergo rapid structural 
transformation from the 1970s to the 1990s. Other economies in Asia 
attempted to implement land reform but with few tangible results. 
Second, labor policies that are geared toward protecting labor 
welfare impose rigidities in nominal wages and introduce barriers to 
labor reallocation. These regulations provide incentive to substitute 
capital for labor and can slow down the pace of investment. As such, 
labor market regulations potentially impede structural transformation 
when they are overly rigid. One problem partly responsible for India’s 
slow pace of structural transformation is its rigid labor market as 
stipulated in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
A third government failure is migration policy that restricts worker 
mobility. Limiting the mobility of labor directly aects the availability 
of this resource and can create geographic imbalance between the 
availability of qualified workers and demand for them. An example of 
a restrictive migration policy is the hukou system of residency permits 
in the PRC, which constrains the free flow of labor between urban and 
rural areas and consequently slows the pace of structural transformation.
Lastly, governments inadvertently raise the cost of business by 
imposing product and market regulations. These slow structural 
transformation through their negative eects on investment and, 
consequently, firms’ scale of operations. While governments often 
2.2.6  Typical employment structures by type of economy
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impose labor market and product market regulations to mitigate market 
failures, the failure of regulatory reform to keep pace with economic 
development can introduce barriers to structural transformation.
The other set of determinants involve market failures such as 
coordination problems that result from the high cost of collating and 
processing information on new products, technologies, and industries, 
and credit market failures. Both of these market failures involve 
externalities and information asymmetries.
Coordination problems typically arise when externalities create 
significantly large dierences between private and social returns. 
In particular, a problem arises when externalities depress private 
returns. Investment in new technology, for example, is risky, with 
the first mover typically bearing the brunt of the risk. Meanwhile, 
successful investment invites the entry of other investors and undercuts 
the first mover’s eective rate of return on the investment. To avoid 
exposure to this risk, the investor may forego the investment unless it 
is possible to prevent or delay the entry of competition, even though 
society would view competition as beneficial. This state of aairs 
discourages investment in new technology and the adoption of new 
production processes unless governments intervene. 
Credit market failures often stem from bad choices and moral 
hazards in the allocation of loans. Developing economies typically 
have underdeveloped financial markets and suer severe information 
asymmetries. In addition, misguided government policies can force 
the misallocation of credit, making it di¨cult to obtain financing 
for new projects with promise and to scale up operations that have 
already proven their worth (León-Ledesma and Christopoulos 2016). 
The resulting low rate of investment and small scale of operations in 
high-productivity sectors slows the pace of structural transformation. 
To overcome credit market failures, governments can implement 
selective credit policies by providing credit directly to targeted sectors 
and indirectly through loan guarantees.
Macroeconomic determinants 
of potential growth
The panel of Asian countries under study is augmented by including 
other economies, both emerging and advanced, to arrive at a total of 
69 economies studied over the period 1960–2014 (the list is reported 
in Table 2.2.1). As potential growth is the sum of the growth rates of 
potential labor productivity and the labor force, the analysis needs to 
account for both components. Moreover, the decomposition analysis 
indicates that potential labor productivity growth is attributed mostly to 
productivity growth within sectors.
The search for the determinants of productivity growth is complex 
because the literature provides a long list. To overcome this di¨culty, 
various procedures for model selection were devised with the objective 
of determining which variables robustly correlate with economic 
growth (e.g., Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller 2004). One such 
methodology is applied in this chapter: the Bayesian model-averaging 
2.2.1 Economies included in the analysis
Developing 
Asia
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, the People’s 
Republic of China, Fiji, India, 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the 
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, 
the Philippines, Singapore, 
Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
Viet Nam, Taipei,China, and 
Hong Kong, China
Other 
emerging 
economies
Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Hungary, Mexico, 
Morocco, Panama, Peru, Poland, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, Turkey, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela
Advanced 
economies
Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, the Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States
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approach to estimating classical linear regression models when 
uncertain about the choice of the explanatory variables (e.g., Magnus, 
Powell, and Prüfer 2010). Of the long list of 35 possible determinants, 
details of which are in Lanzafame et al. (2016), the process identified 
nine robust variables. Two other important institutional variables are 
included, but only as interactions with two of the robust variables. 
The definitions and sources of the variables are in Table 2.2.2.
2.2.2 List of variables
Variable name Definition and explanation Source
Robust variables
Working-age population 
growth rate
This is the trend growth rate of the working-age population aged 15–64, 
obtained by filtering the data with the Corbae–Ouliaris filter.
Calculations using World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators data
Initial GDP per capita The value of GDP per capita in the initial period is used to test for convergence. World Bank’s World Development Indicators
Technological gap 
with the  
United States
This variable captures the advantage enjoyed by the country that introduces 
new goods into a market. It is computed as 1 minus the ratio of the level 
of productivity to that of the United States in purchasing power parity. 
Closing the gap—that is, taking the variable toward zero—is a sign of progress 
and catch-up with the frontier. The expected impact is positive since the 
advantage of backwardness dissipates as the gap closes.
Calculations using Penn World Tables 8.1 data
Gross enrollment ratio 
in tertiary education
This is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the 
age group that officially corresponds to the tertiary level.
CANA Database for cross-country analyses of 
national systems, growth, and development 
(v. Jan 2011). Original source: United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization
Index of labor  
market rigidity
This index varies from 0 (most flexible) to 3.5 (most rigid). It has four 
components that are equally weighted: minimum wage, rigidity of hours, 
the difficulty of laying off redundant workers, and the cost of laying off 
redundant workers.
World Bank’s Doing Business database; 
LAMRIG database by Campos and Nugent 
(2012)
Voice and  
accountability  
index
This index reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are 
able to participate in selecting their government. It incorporates freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and freedom in the media. The index 
ranges from –2.5 (low) to +2.5 (high).
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, 2014 Update
Government 
effectiveness index
This index reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service, and the degree of civil service independence from political 
pressures; the quality of policy formulation and implementation; and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. The index ranges 
from –2.5 (low) to +2.5 (high).
World Bank’s The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, 2014 Update
Trade ratio This is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a percentage 
of GDP.
World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
national accounts data; Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
national accounts data
Financial capital 
integration Index
This is the sum of total foreign assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP. Updated and extended version of data set 
constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2007)
Supplementary interaction variables
Regulatory quality This index reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. It varies from –2.5 (low) to 2.5 (high). The variable 
interacts with financial capital integration.
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, 2014 Update
Political stability This index reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically motivated violence and terrorism. It varies from –2.5 (low) to 2.5 
(high). This variable interacts with the technology gap with the United States. 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, 2014 Update
Source: ADB.
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The working-age population growth rate is a proxy for the growth 
rate of the labor force. As the estimates control for labor force growth, 
the other independent variables are essentially determinants of potential 
labor productivity growth. A model with country fixed eects is 
estimated to quantify the eect of these variables on potential growth. 
Results of the benchmark model estimates are in line with expectations 
(Table 2.2.3).
2.2.3 Model estimates
Variable Benchmark Macro stability
Initial GDP per capita –0.00033** –0.00033**
Working-age population growth 1.15725** 1.22262**
Gap with the US 0.07306* 0.07345*
Gap with the US × political stability –0.00613* –0.00759*
Tertiary enrollment ratio 0.16284** .122695**
Tertiary enrollment squared –0.00160** –0.00140**
Labor market rigidity –2.92375** –2.76644**
Voice and accountability 1.65097^ 2.0438*
Government effectiveness 1.36106** 1.15356**
Trade ratio 0.06488** 0.08178**
Trade ratio squared –0.00007** –0.000097**
Financial capital integration 0.00452* 0.00415*
Financial capital × regulatory quality –0.00313** –0.00289**
Break in 2008–2014 –2.72717** –2.82251**
Actual–potential growth gap 0.05946
Growth gap volatility –0.19208**
Number of economies 61 61
Number of observations 425 421
Notes: ** indicates significance at the 1% level, * at 5%, and ^ at 10%. Variables instrumented with first lag. 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors. Fiji and Papua New Guinea were not included in the regression 
analysis for lack of data, but the model estimates include the other 20 developing economies in Asia.
Source: ADB estimates.
Benchmark model results
The coe¨cient of working-age population growth is the elasticity 
of potential output with respect to that variable. It is statistically 
significant and at the same time not significantly dierent from 1. 
This is consistent with the definition of the natural or potential growth 
rate used in this chapter. The results also indicate that working age is a 
good proxy for the potential growth rate of the labor force.
The process of capital accumulation has as its proxy initial income 
per capita. The rationale is that a poor country has a low ratio of 
capital to labor, which translates into potential to grow quickly. 
This is driven primarily by the greater opportunity to accumulate capital. 
The coe¨cient in the benchmark model implies that an additional 
$1,000 of initial income per capita lowers potential output growth by 
0.33 percentage points.
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Using the preferred specification shown in the left column of 
Table 2.2.3, it is determined that the gross enrollment ratio in tertiary 
education and an economy’s openness to international flows of goods and 
services have quadratic eects. This means that the eect of these two 
variables on potential growth increases but only up to a limit.
Meanwhile, coe¨cients on the technology gap and the three proxies 
for institutional quality are statistically significant. The positive sign of 
the technology gap variable is consistent with the observation that the 
advantage of backwardness dissipates as the gap narrows. The possibility 
that institutional quality may also aect potential growth indirectly is 
also considered. For example, Kose et al. (2009) suggested that the eect 
of integration on international financial markets may be dependent upon 
institutional quality. To explore this possibility, interaction variables 
are specified involving the technological gap with the US and political 
stability, and financial capital integration and regulatory quality. If the 
impacts of the technological gap and of the integration index depend on 
institutional quality, then the interaction terms should turn out to be 
significant. 
The empirical results show that the gap with the US has a positive 
and significant impact on potential growth for the entire range of values 
of the index of political stability, and its eect is smaller for countries 
with greater political stability. A 1 percentage point reduction in the gap 
with the US raises potential output growth by 0.085 percentage points for 
the least politically stable countries and 0.055 percentage points for the 
most politically stable.6 This means that economies that are far from their 
productivity frontiers and that also have lower political stability can be 
expected to reap larger benefits from technological spillovers.
Institutional quality also aects the impact of financial integration. 
Moreover, the eect becomes higher for small values of regulatory quality, 
with a maximum of 0.0115 percentage points for countries with the lowest 
regulatory quality.7 This result may seem counterintuitive at first. From 
a policy viewpoint, however, it means that financial integration acts as 
a substitute for high-quality institutions. For emerging economies with 
low-quality institutions, including some in Asia, the implication is that 
successful integration into international financial markets may bring about 
significant long-term growth benefits by raising the potential growth rate.
Incorporating macro stability
The benchmark model is extended by including two variables that capture 
business cycle features. The first is the actual–potential growth gap, the 
average of the deviation between an economy’s actual growth rate and 
its potential in the previous 5 years. This variable measures the average 
distance between actual and potential growth rates. A statistically 
significant coe¨cient implies that expansionary or recessionary phases 
aect the potential growth rate.8 The second is growth gap volatility, 
measured as the standard deviation of the actual–potential growth gap 
during the previous 5 years. This variable measures the volatility of actual 
growth with respect to the potential growth rate. This captures the 
possible eects of business cycle features, such as growth volatility, on 
potential growth. 
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The coe¨cient on growth gap volatility is significant with the 
expected negative sign. The results suggest that reducing volatility by 
1 percentage point brings about an increase in potential growth of about 
0.193 percentage points. This outcome is in line with other evidence in 
the literature (e.g., Ramey and Ramey 1995) and indicates that higher 
growth volatility may harm the potential growth rate and, consequently, 
that demand-management policies aiming to stabilize actual growth 
near potential growth can benefit the economy’s long-term performance.
Potential growth, misallocation,  
and institutional obstacles
The impact of reducing or eliminating institutional barriers to factor 
mobility is examined in this section. The analysis considers the factors 
that aect structural transformation. The concept of frontier potential 
growth is related to activities and operations at the level of the firm 
that misallocate factors of production. This analysis complements the 
results on determinants of potential growth, particularly the importance 
of institutional variables. Better institutions facilitate the e¨cient 
allocation of productive resources, bringing potential growth closer to 
the frontier and pushing up the frontier itself.
A further motivation for the firm-level analysis is that dierences in 
income per capita across economies are explained mostly by dierences 
in productivity (Caselli 2005). According to the recent literature, 
dierences in productivity and their persistence are attributed in turn 
to resource misallocation (Kalemli-Ozcan and Sorensen 2012). Factors 
of production are said to be misallocated if a dierent allocation of the 
current aggregate endowment of capital and labor across firms would 
increase the economy’s aggregate productivity.
Misallocation is generated by obstacles. These create in turn 
distortions or wedges in the marginal products of capital and labor 
across firms. For example, subsidized credit makes the marginal product 
of capital artificially low for firms receiving the subsidy and artificially 
high for other firms. The result is that subsidized firms are more capital 
intensive than they otherwise would be, and unsubsidized firms are 
more labor intensive. The outcome is a misallocation of resources. 
Eliminating the credit subsidy and other distortions allows resources to 
be better allocated, resulting in faster productivity growth.
Surveys reveal a list of issues that firms consider to be important 
for them: inspection rules, access to credit, corruption, and labor 
regulations, among others. The implication is that an economy’s 
potential rate of growth is not independent of policy. Understanding 
the role of these obstacles is therefore important from a policy and 
institutional perspective. 
Two types of wedges or distortions on the marginal product of 
capital and labor across firms are calculated by comparing each firm’s 
factor shares of labor and capital with the average of the economy. 
The measures are explained in more detail in Box 2.2.2. The first is a 
measure of output distortion, wherein the marginal products of capital 
and labor increase by the same proportion. An example is inspection 
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rules that aect firms beyond a certain size. If there are no distortions, 
the share of labor in total value added is equal across all firms. However, 
if a firm avoids inspection rules by being smaller than the optimal size, 
it will employ fewer workers and hence the labor share will be smaller 
than the average. Therefore, the ratio of the firm’s labor share to the 
average of the economy is a useful measure of output distortion.
The second is a measure of factor market distortion. These distortions 
alter the use of capital relative to labor, making the ratio dierent from 
what is optimal. As noted above, lack of access to credit reduces firms’ 
use of capital, making them more labor intensive than they would 
otherwise be. Note that, if there were no distortions, the ratio of the 
shares of capital and labor would be the same across firms. Factor 
market distortion is therefore measured by comparing the firm’s labor to 
capital ratio with the average ratio in the economy. 
Firm-level data for 62 developing economies obtained from 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys data—the Standardized Data for 
2006–2014—are used for empirical analysis. This is a stratified survey 
of firms that contains financial and business environment information. 
The original data set contains 134 surveys that cover a total of 61,669 
firms. However, the sample is considerably reduced when the data 
are cleaned. Since multiple cross-sectional surveys are available for 
some economies, only those with the largest number of firms are kept, 
such that every economy is represented only once. The final sample is 
made up of 62 economies and a maximum of 21,539 firms. Details are 
provided in León-Ledesma (2016). The empirical analysis will determine 
to what extent certain obstacles to a firm’s operations explain the 
two distortions.
Since the distortion is measured as the dierence from the country 
mean, the average distortion within an economy is zero by construction. 
Therefore, to see how distortions dier across economies, one needs 
to look at some other aspect of the distribution such as the standard 
deviation. The standard deviation, a measure of how dispersed the 
distortion is within an economy, is calculated using the sample of firms 
within each economy. As shown in Table 2.2.4, the output distortion 
is more dispersed on average than the factor market distortion in the 
full sample of 62 economies and in the subsample of 13 Asian ones. Also, 
the dispersion of both distortions is slightly wider in the Asian economies.
2.2.4 Within-economy dispersion of the misallocation measures
Mean Min Max
All 62 economies (21,539 firms)
Output distortion 1.6288 0.7257 2.3836
Factor distortion 1.3958 0.8579 3.0764
13 Asian economies (10,593 firms)
Output distortion 1.7110 1.3639 2.2137
Factor distortion 1.4966 1.0342 2.1345
Note: Within-economy dispersion is the standard deviation of the distortion across the sample firms within 
each economy.
Source: ADB estimates based on data from the Standardized Data 2006–2014, World Bank Enterprise Survey.
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2.2.2 Distortion measures and misallocation
Measures of distortion are derived from the Hsieh and 
Klenow (2009) theoretical framework. The framework 
proposes a model with heterogeneous firm productivity 
and two types of distortions: output distortions (y) and 
factor market distortions (k). Output distortions increase 
the marginal products of capital and labor by the same 
proportion, and factor market distortions raise the marginal 
product of capital relative to that of labor. Because these 
distortions are specific to individual firms and different for 
each one, they introduce dispersion in firms’ incentives to 
employ factors of production.
The framework assumes that output (Y) is produced 
using labor (L) and capital (K) with a Cobb–Douglas 
technology as 1i i i iY A K L
  , where Ai is firm-specific 
total factor productivity (TFP). With competitive markets, 
 and (1 – ) are the aggregate capital and labor shares, 
respectively, in total value added (or total costs). Firms 
maximize profits (subject to this production technology):a
, ,,
max (1 ) (1 ) ,i y i i i i k i iK L PY wL rK          (1)
where w and r are the wage rate and the rental price of 
capital, respectively, and they are assumed to be equal 
across firms since factor markets are competitive. Note that 
the output distortion y,i affects output, while factor-market 
distortion k,i affects the cost of capital. Also note that TFP 
and the two distortions are firm-specific, thus causing 
misallocation as explained in the main text. To obtain 
measures of the two distortions with a counterpart in 
the data, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) uses the first order 
conditions of the maximization problem. After a few 
transformations, they are as follows:
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where (1 + k,i) and (1 – y,i) are the measures of the two 
distortions. Equation (2) indicates that if k,i = 0, i.e., if 
there is no misallocation, the left-hand side equals 1, 
which implies that ,1 (1 )
i
k i
i
wL
rK
     (the firm’s relative share) is equal  
to  (1 )
 , or the economy’s relative share; that is, 
in the absence of distortions, all firms have the same 
relative factor share. On the other hand, when there is 
a factor market distortion, the ratio of labor to capital 
compensation is higher if the distortion is positive, or 
smaller if the distortion is negative, than the ratio of the 
aggregate shares, and the firm is more labor intensive 
or capital intensive than would be otherwise be optimal. 
For example, k,i will be high for firms with problems 
accessing credit, and low otherwise. Likewise, equation (3) 
indicates that if y,i = 0, i.e., if there is no misallocation, all 
firms should have the same labor share, (1 – ) ( is a term 
that captures the effect of the price elasticity of demand). 
On the other hand, when there is an output distortion, the 
firm’s labor share is higher if the distortion is negative, 
or smaller if the distortion is positive, than the aggregate 
labor share, so the firm will be either larger or smaller 
than is optimal. For example, y,i will be high for firms that 
face restrictions on size, and low for firms that benefit 
from output subsidies.
At the level of the individual economy, the dispersion of 
the distortions, as measured by the standard deviation, is 
an index of misallocation. This is because, as noted above, 
in the absence of distortions all firms have the same shares 
and hence the dispersion is zero.
The empirical strategy follows from the framework. 
The logarithms of the two distortions (1 + k,i) and (1 – y,i) 
are regressed on 15 obstacles that are declared by firms 
to affect their operations. To quantify the effect of the 
obstacles, a dichotomous or dummy variable is created; it 
takes a value of 1 if a firm answered that the obstacle was 
“major” or “very severe,” and otherwise it takes 0 (i.e., it 
was “no obstacle,” “minor,” or “moderate”). This is done 
separately for the large sample containing 21,539 firms and 
for the reduced sample of 10,593 Asian firms (the exact 
number of firms varies depending on whether all firms 
replied or not). The regressions take the form 
15
1
 i i iilog Distortion a X Firm size country dummies     
for each of the two distortions, and for the firms in the 
complete sample of countries and for the firms in the 
sample of Asian countries (i.e., a total of four regressions). 
Xi denotes the 15 obstacles considered, and the proxy for 
firm size is the number of employees, full-time equivalent. 
The complete sample includes 62 country dummies 
(fixed effects) and the Asian sample 13 country dummies. 
Of interest would be whether the coefficients i are 
statistically significant or not. Note that, in the absence of 
misallocation, all factor shares should be equal and so the 
obstacles should not be good predictors of the distortions. 
If, on the other hand, there is misallocation and it relates 
to firms’ declared obstacles, then the latter should be good 
predictors of the distortions.
a The model assumes that all firms use the same Cobb–Douglas 
production function. Therefore, in equilibrium,  is the 
“average” capital share in the economy. In practice, Hsieh and 
Klenow (2009) allow for  to differ across sectors.
Reference:
Hsieh and Klenow 2009.
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Measures of institutional obstacles are also obtained from 
the same database. Fifteen such obstacles to firms’ operations are 
considered. Firms are asked whether a specific obstacle is important 
for their operations. Table 2.2.5 presents the list of 15 obstacles and 
their prevalence in the data set for all economies and for the 13 in the 
Asian subsample. Generally, Asian firms declare that they face lower 
obstacles than their counterparts in other regions, especially in terms of 
informal competitors, corruption, and access to finance. The exceptions 
are in customs regulations and access to land. 
2.2.5 Institutional obstacles by firm
Description % of firms declaring an obstaclea
How much of an obstacle are the following? All Asia
Electricity supply 38.7 35.3
Transportation of goods, supplies, and inputs 17.1 13.8
Customs and trade regulations 11.4 13.3
Informal competitors 24.4 17.4
Access to land 17.0 19.2
Theft and other crime 16.5  9.6
Tax rates 31.5 24.2
Tax administration 20.8 15.3
Business licensing and permits 14.6 11.1
Political instability 30.2 26.6
Corruption 36.5 25.6
Courts 12.2 10.8
Access to finance 24.9 19.8
Labor regulations 12.8  8.1
Inadequately educated workforce 19.9 16.7
a  Percentage of firms that declare that the obstacle is “major” or “severe.” The total number of firms is 
21,539, of which 10,593 are in Asia.
Source: ADB estimates based on data from the Standardized Data 2006–2014, World Bank Enterprise Survey.
Do these declared obstacles explain output distortion, factor market 
distortion, or both? Are there dierences between the firms that declare 
these obstacles to be major or severe and those that declare them only 
moderate or minor? To answer these questions, the empirical strategy 
summarized in Box 2.2.2 is carried out.
Regression coe¨cients of the obstacle dummy variables, together 
with their 95% confidence intervals, are plotted for each of the 
15 obstacles in Figures 2.2.7 and 2.2.8. Results in blue correspond to 
the regressions using firms in all economies, and results in orange 
refer to Asian firms. Each regression coe¨cient times 100 indicates the 
dierential, as percentage change in the distortion, between a firm that 
declares that an obstacle is major or very severe and a firm that declares 
that it is not important, minor, or moderate. A statistically insignificant 
coe¨cient should be interpreted as evidence that the obstacle is not 
a significant determinant of misallocation. Conversely, a statistically 
significant coe¨cient on a given obstacle means that firms that declare it 
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as major or severe are dierent from those that do not. 
In other words, the obstacle is a good predictor of distortion. 
A positive coe¨cient in the regressions for the output 
distortion implies that firms that declare the obstacle as 
serious have a larger labor share than the average. Therefore, 
these firms are larger than they would be if both factors were 
not misallocated. This is the case for infrastructure obstacles 
such as poor electricity and transportation, and for customs 
and trade regulations. This indicates that firms are forced 
to grow beyond their optimal size to overcome the negative 
eects of lack of infrastructure. A similar result was obtained 
for tax rates, the e¨ciency of tax administration, corruption, 
and labor regulations. Overall, the largest coe¨cients 
are those of customs and trade and labor regulations, at 
approximately 0.2. This can be interpreted to mean that firms 
that declare these two obstacles as major or severe have a 
labor share that is 20% higher than firms that declare these 
two obstacles not important.
Meanwhile, a negative coe¨cient in these regressions 
indicates that the labor share of the firms that declare an 
obstacle as major or severe is smaller than the average. 
Therefore, these firms are smaller than they would be 
without the distortion. This is the case for informal sector 
competitors, access to land, theft and other crime, courts, 
access to finance, and poor education. These obstacles act as 
a tax that holds firm size below optimal. Firms that declare 
these two obstacles to be major or severe have a labor share 
20%–30% less than those firms that declare that these 
obstacles are not important.
For the factor market distortion regressions, a positive 
coe¨cient implies that the share of labor relative to capital 
is higher than the economy average and that firms are 
therefore more labor intensive than they would be without the 
distortion. This is the case for courts, access to finance, labor 
regulations, and inadequate education. For these obstacles, 
the dierence in the share of labor relative to capital between 
firms that are aected and those that are not is approximately 
10%. On the other hand, a negative coe¨cient implies that 
the share of labor relative to capital is lower than the average 
and that firms are therefore more capital intensive than 
they would be without the distortion. This is the case for 
electricity and corruption, with coe¨cients also at about 10%. 
These results lead to the conclusion that the institutional 
obstacles predict both output and factor market distortions. 
In aggregate, these factors are key determinants of 
productivity dierences across economies. The evidence 
shows clear dispersion in the distortions faced by firms in the sample 
of 62 developing economies. These distortions strongly correlate with 
institutional obstacles that prevent the e¨cient allocation of resources 
between firms. Removing these obstacles would facilitate substantial 
factor reallocation at the micro level.
2.2.7  Coefficients of output distortion regressions
Electricity
Transportation
Customs and trade
Informal competitors
Access to land
Theft and other crime
Tax rates
Tax administration
Business licensing
Political instability
Corruption
Courts
Access to finance
Labor regulations
Inadequate education
−0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Asian countries
All countries
Note: Estimated coe©cients on the horizontal axis show the diËerential as 
a percentage change in the distortion between a firm that declares that an 
obstacle is major or very severe and one that declares it not important, a minor 
obstacle, or moderate. Statistically significant coe©cients are good predictors 
of the output distortion.
Source: ADB estimates.
Click here for figure data
2.2.8  Coefficients of the factor market distortions 
regressions
Asian countries
All countries
Electricity
Transportation
Customs and trade
Informal competitors
Access to land
Theft and other crime
Tax rates
Tax administration
Business licensing
Political instability
Corruption
Courts
Access to finance
Labor regulations
Inadequate education
−0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Note: Estimated coe©cients on the horizontal axis show the diËerential as 
a percentage change in the distortion between a firm that declares that an 
obstacle is major or very severe and one that declares it not important, a minor 
obstacle, or moderate. Statistically significant coe©cients are good predictors 
of the factor-market distortion.
Source: ADB estimates.
Click here for figure data
70  Asian Development Outlook 2016
The analysis indicates that most of the 15 obstacles appear to aect 
distortions that influence the optimal size of firms. On the other hand, 
many of the obstacles appear to be statistically insignificant in the 
analysis of factor market distortions. Only courts, access to finance, 
labor regulations, inadequate education, electricity, and corruption are 
significant. 
The top three obstacles mentioned by the Asian firms are generally 
significant determinants of distortions in the regressions discussed 
above. Electricity, corruption, labor laws, access to finance, education, 
and courts are significant drivers of distortions aecting both output 
and factor markets. Policy aiming to alleviate misallocation should 
prioritize addressing these obstacles. For instance, infrastructure 
obstacles such as electricity appear to be very important drivers of 
misallocation in the poorest countries. In the PRC, fewer obstacles are 
declared major or severe. However, tax rates appear to be an important 
determinant of misallocation by acting as a subsidy on size. In Indonesia, 
Bangladesh, and Pakistan, access to electricity, which distorts both 
output and factor markets, is a priority area to reduce misallocation and 
enhance potential growth through productivity gains.
Asia’s aggregate productivity growth would increase through 
the e¨cient reallocation of resources at the firm level. This could be 
achieved through reform to policy on financial and labor markets and on 
land access, as well as from infrastructure improvements. Such reform 
could oset part of the natural decline in potential growth that arises as 
Asian economies become more developed.
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A “new normal” for 
potential growth?
Potential growth since the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 diers 
sharply from before it. Is this a new normal for Asia? The macro model 
in the previous section (Table 2.2.2) gives some indication that the period 
since the global financial crisis has turned less favorable for potential 
growth. The model includes a binary variable equal to 1 for the period 
2008–2014 and 0 otherwise. The statistically significant coe¨cient 
on this variable in both the benchmark model and the macro stability 
model indicates that potential growth in the global sample was lower 
in the post-crisis period than its historical trend. Even after controlling 
for changes in the other determinants of potential growth, it was down 
2.7 percentage points in the benchmark model. The decline is less for 
Asia at about 2.2 percentage points, but this too is a sizeable drop.9
While the region’s potential remains above the trough hit during 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, internal factors suggest that the 
current moderation has yet to run its course. An important implication 
drawn from the analysis of the determinants of potential growth is that 
the region’s potential has started to decline because the factors that 
allowed Asia to grow quickly in earlier decades have started to fade. 
This is true of both the demographic dividend (at least in 
some economies) and factors that aect labor productivity, 
such as education, trade, and financial capital integration. 
As a result, without structural reform, potential growth 
in many regional economies will slide further because of 
unfavorable demographics, convergence with advanced 
economies, and spillover from growth moderation in the PRC.
The fading demographic dividend
Economic theory and the evidence presented in this chapter 
indicate that the growth rate of the working-age population 
has a direct proportional impact on the potential growth 
rate. Recalling the definition of the potential growth rate 
as the sum of labor productivity growth and labor force 
growth, and using World Bank projections of the growth 
rate of the Asian working-age population in 2015–2020, 
the contribution of this element of potential growth can be 
assessed as either increasing or decreasing relative to 2008–
2014. Figure 2.3.1 shows that, in most Asian economies under 
consideration, working-age population growth is projected 
to be lower in 2015–2020 than in 2008–2014. The average 
annual decline between the two periods is projected at 
0.43 percentage points.10
These growth forecasts of working-age population can 
be used to forecast potential output growth. The potential 
2.3.1 Working-age population growth rates (%)
2015–2020
2008–2014
–2 –1 0 1 2 3
Viet Nam
Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
Thailand
Tajikistan
Taipei,China
Sri Lanka
Singapore
Republic of Korea
Philippines
Papua New Guinea
Pakistan
Malaysia
Kazakhstan
Indonesia
India
Hong Kong, China
Fiji
People’s Republic of China
Cambodia
Bangladesh
Azerbaijan
%
Source: ADB estimates based on World Bank, World Development Indicators 
online database. Data for Taipei,China are from http://eng.stat.gov.tw/lp.asp?ct
Node=2265&CtUnit=1072&BaseDSD=36
Click here for figure data
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2.3.1  Annual potential growth rate in 2015–2020 adjusted for  
the effects of working-age population trends
Forecast based on the  
2008–2014 average
Forecast based on the 
2014 estimate
Azerbaijan  3.25 1.02
Bangladesh  5.96 6.11
Cambodia  6.81 6.48
People’s Republic of China  8.11 7.23
Fiji  1.25 3.27
Hong Kong, China  1.84 1.08
India  6.72 6.04
Indonesia  5.59 4.79
Kazakhstan  5.56 3.80
Republic of Korea  2.68 2.52
Malaysia  4.27 5.06
Pakistan  4.53 5.00
Papua New Guinea  7.14 5.74
Philippines  6.55 7.39
Singapore  3.25 2.24
Sri Lanka  5.96 7.22
Taipei,China  2.04 1.76
Tajikistan  6.06 5.88
Thailand  2.62 2.25
Turkmenistan 10.40 9.65
Uzbekistan  6.60 6.40
Viet Nam  4.81 4.86
Average  6.40 6.01
Note: The first estimate is the sum of each economy’s estimated average potential growth rate in 
2008–2014 plus the change in working-age population growth rate between 2015–2020 and 2008–2014. 
The second estimate is the sum of each country’s estimated average potential growth rate in 2014 plus the 
change in working-age population growth rate between 2008–2014 and 2015–2020.
Source: ADB estimates.
growth rate projections are shown economy-by-economy in Table 2.3.1. 
Two forecasts of potential output growth are constructed: one based on 
the estimated potential growth rate over 2008–2014 and the other based 
on the estimated potential growth rate in 2014. Both can be considered 
good proxies for the current potential growth rate. The impact of 
the projected change in working-age population growth between 
2008–2014 and 2015–2020 is then incorporated by adding the change 
in working-age population growth to the current potential growth rate. 
Depending on the assumption made about the starting potential output 
growth value, developing Asia’s 2015–2020 potential output growth 
varies from 6.01% to 6.40%.
To evaluate how this average decline in potential growth will 
aect living standards in Asia, measures of potential growth per 
capita for 2015–2020 are calculated, relying on the potential growth 
rate estimates and World Bank projections for population growth. 
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2.3.2 Potential growth per capita estimated for 2015–2020
Economy
(1)
Population growth rate 
di¬erence between 2015–2020 
and 2008–2014
(2)
Potential growth per 
capita in 2008–2014
(3)
Based on the  
2008–2014 average
(4)
(3) – (2)
(5)
Based on 
the 2014 
estimate
(6)
(5) – (2)
Azerbaijan –0.72 3.74 2.45 –1.29 0.22 –3.52
Bangladesh –0.02 4.80 4.80  0.01 4.95  0.16
Cambodia –0.04 5.83 5.26 –0.57 4.93 –0.90
People’s Republic of China –0.08 8.30 7.70 –0.61 6.82 –1.49
Hong Kong, China –0.33 2.35 1.28 –1.07 0.52 –1.83
Fiji –0.10 0.85 0.72 –0.13 2.74  1.89
India –0.18 5.63 5.55 –0.07 4.87 –0.75
Indonesia –0.20 4.50 4.48 –0.02 3.68 –0.82
Kazakhstan –0.64 5.22 4.61 –0.61 2.85 –2.37
Republic of Korea –0.13 2.96 2.28 –0.68 2.12 –0.84
Malaysia –0.28 3.41 2.94 –0.47 3.73  0.32
Pakistan –0.12 2.81 2.53 –0.28 3.00  0.19
Papua New Guinea –0.23 5.06 5.12  0.06 3.72 –1.34
Philippines –0.05 5.50 5.04 –0.46 5.88  0.38
Singapore –1.15 2.56 1.85 –0.71 0.84 –1.72
Sri Lanka 0.20 5.15 5.33  0.18 6.59  1.44
Taipei,China –0.19 3.05 1.94 –1.11 1.66 –1.39
Tajikistan –0.11 4.68 3.92 –0.76 3.74 –0.94
Thailand –0.08 2.98 2.41 –0.57 2.04 –0.94
Turkmenistan –0.12 9.76 9.25 –0.51 8.50 –1.26
Uzbekistan –0.76 6.40 5.42 –0.98 5.22 –1.18
Viet Nam –0.32 4.94 4.06 –0.88 4.11 –0.83
Average –0.24 5.89 5.72 –0.17 5.31 –0.58
Source: ADB estimates.
Column 1 of Table 2.3.2 reports the population growth rate dierential 
between 2015–2020 and 2008–2014. It shows that, with the exception 
of Sri Lanka, average population growth is expected to be lower in 
2015–2020 than in 2008–2014 in all developing economies in Asia.
Also reported in Table 2.3.2 are estimates of potential growth 
per capita for 2015–2020. Using the estimated average potential 
growth rate and actual population growth in 2008–2014, an estimate 
of potential growth per capita in this period is first constructed and 
shown in column 2. Next, based on the two projected estimates of 
potential growth in 2015–2020 combined with population growth 
projections, measures of potential growth rate per capita in 2015–2020 
are constructed. These estimates are based on the 2008–2014 average 
value of the estimated potential growth rate (column 3) and on the 
2014 estimated potential growth rate (column 5). Results indicate that 
the average potential growth rate per capita will be between 5.31% and 
5.72%. Columns 4 and 6 show the dierence with respect to average 
potential growth in 2008–2014, with negative values indicating that 
annual potential growth per capita is projected to be lower in 2015–2020 
than in 2008–2014.
74  Asian Development Outlook 2016
The results in Table 2.3.2 suggest that, notwithstanding the 
projected slowing of population growth in 2015–2020, potential growth 
per capita in Asia is expected to fall relative to 2008–2014 by an average 
of 0.17–0.58 percentage points annually. This is because the fall in 
working-age population growth over the period outstrips the fall in total 
population growth. Living standards will rise more slowly over the next 
few years than in 2008–2014.
Fading advantage of backwardness
Developing Asia’s past success has narrowed the gap with the advanced 
economies. The econometric results in the previous section show that 
a smaller technological gap relative to the US will reduce potential 
growth. The so-called advantage of backwardness, which allowed 
developing economies in Asia to grow by adopting existing technologies, 
is fading as they converge in sophistication with the advanced 
economies. With less scope for playing catch-up with the advanced 
economies, growth in many Asian economies will depend more on some 
other determinants of potential growth, such as tertiary education and 
trade. On the other hand, low- and middle-income economies still have 
scope to benefit from the convergence eect.
Spillover from PRC growth moderation
Actual growth in the PRC is forecast to moderate further, from 6.9% in 
2015 to 6.5% in 2016 and 6.3% the year after. The trend is an adjustment 
to several important structural changes, notably the end of the stage 
in development during which less productive labor can be drawn from 
rural areas into more productive manufacturing. This kept wages 
down in the past and helped the PRC attract considerable foreign 
direct investment, but now wages have begun to rise. A legacy of past 
population policies is particularly unfavorable demographics, as the 
benefits from a relatively youthful population turn rapidly into a burden 
as the population ages. Moreover, the economy is shifting its growth 
model from a heavy reliance on investment to one in which consumption 
is the primary driver.
As Asia’s largest economy, and the second largest in the world, 
the PRC exerts a significant role as an engine of global growth, 
so concerns about slowdown in the PRC are certainly warranted. 
However, whether the consequences of the slowdown persist for years 
or decades will depend critically on its relationship with potential 
output growth and, in particular, with productivity growth in other 
economies. It is thus important to understand whether natural rates 
of growth in other Asian economies move significantly in tandem with 
the PRC. Theoretically, there are several possible channels that can 
underpin such a relationship. Trade relations with the PRC could foster 
productivity-enhancing structural change in other economies, accelerate 
technological transfer, and foster competition-driven e¨ciency gains, 
for example. Change could also reflect the global demand eects. 
The benchmark model is augmented to test whether actual growth 
in the PRC has an eect on potential growth in the global sample. 
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Similarly, actual growth in the US is included as the world’s 
largest economy may have an even bigger impact on growth 
than the PRC. The estimate of the model including these 
spillovers is shown in Table 2.3.3.
The results shown in Table 2.3.3 can be interpreted as 
estimates of the degree of co-movement between actual 
growth rates in the PRC and the US and potential growth 
rates in the rest of the world.11 PRC and US growth rates 
both turn out to be positive and significant. Results from 
the model indicate that each 1 percent of actual growth in 
the PRC is associated with a rise of about 0.2 percentage 
points in average potential growth in the global sample. 
The corresponding eect from the US is nearly twice as 
great, at 0.39 percentage points. 
Concluding remarks
It is important to emphasize that the natural rate of growth 
is contingent on policies that aect the mobilization and 
reallocation of resources in the economy. As the regression 
results show, policies can change an economy’s potential 
growth rate, possibly counterbalancing the eects of factors 
that lead to a decline in equilibrium growth. Thus, the “new 
normal” should not be taken as a natural constant but one 
that can reflect policy decisions, for better or worse. As the 
organization of markets and governments changes over time, 
potential growth may move closer to the frontier potential 
growth rate.
The empirical evidence shows, however, that deviations 
of actual from potential growth do not significantly aect the 
latter. This implies that policies that aim to raise the actual growth rate 
above the potential have only a temporary eect. Demand-side policies 
are less eective than supply-side policies in restoring potential output. 
Policy decisions that aect factor reallocation and productivity gains 
can reactivate growth for long periods, thus osetting any potential 
growth losses from the exhaustion of growth patterns typical of the 
initial stages of economic development.
2.3.3  Modeling the impact of slower growth in the PRC 
and the US
Spillover
Initial GDP per capita –0.00034
Working-age population growth 1.0228**
Gap with the US 0.081924^
US gap x political stability –0.00395
Tertiary enrollment ratio 0.08522
Tertiary enrollment squared –0.00109^
Labor market rigidity –3.0915**
Voice and accountability 1.6002
Government effectiveness 1.55105**
Trade ratio 0.057578**
Trade ratio squared –0.00005*
Financial capital integration 0.00099
Financial capital x regulatory quality –0.00206^
Break in 2008–2014 –1.93914**
PRC growth 0.20185**
US growth 0.39016*
Number of economies 59
Number of observations 411
PRC = People’s Republic of China, US = United States.
Notes: ** indicates significance at 1%, * at 5%, and ^ at 10%. The PRC 
and the US are excluded from the panel used for the estimations. 
Variables, including the PRC and US growth, instrumented with first lag. 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors.
Source: ADB estimates.
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Policies to invigorate 
potential growth
Simulations to evaluate the implications of changes in the determinants 
of potential growth can provide a quantitative basis for policy 
recommendations. In the previous section, the eect of demographics 
on potential output growth was calculated (Table 2.3.2). The eects of 
the other determinants are assessed by way of a simulation that uses the 
estimates of the determinants of potential output growth reported in the 
two models in Table 2.2.2. 
Future potential growth: a simulation
This section builds on the intuition that, for most of the determinants of 
potential growth that were found to be significant, it is possible to define a 
frontier value—that is, a particular value for which the impact on potential 
growth is maximized or, as in the case of the technological gap, has been 
completely exhausted.12 Building on this and a number of additional 
assumptions, a scenario for a 10-year period is considered over which the 
eects of the assumed changes in the determinants of potential growth are 
evaluated. Specifically, for each one of the relevant variables included in the 
exercise, the frontier values and specific assumptions are as follows:
Initial income per capita. This variable remains constant.
Gap with the US. The technological gap with respect to the US is 
assumed to remain stable over the period considered. This is consistent 
with a scenario in which the pace of technological innovation in the 
US is fairly similar to the rate of technological spillover into Asian 
economies.13
Tertiary enrollment ratio. The frontier value is a ratio of 51%, i.e., 
the threshold beyond which any additional increase in the share of 
population with tertiary education has a negative eect on potential 
growth. 
Labor market rigidity. The frontier value of this index is 0, which 
corresponds to the most flexible labor market regulatory framework.
Voice and accountability. The frontier value of this index is 2.5, at 
which people’s perceptions about political freedoms and accountability 
are most favorable. 
Government e¬ectiveness. The frontier value for this index is 2.5, at 
which people’s perceptions about the quality and eectiveness of the 
public sector are most favorable. 
Trade ratio. The frontier value is 443%, beyond which the eects of 
trade on potential growth become negative. It is assumed that the 
value of the trade ratio increases by 25 percentage points over 10 years.
Integration index. Because of the interaction with regulatory quality, 
the frontier value of the integration index cannot be uniquely defined. 
It is assumed that the value of the financial integration index increases 
by 25 percentage points over 10 years. 
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Based on these assumptions and definitions, the simulation is 
conducted as follows:
1. For each variable the dierence between the latest available value 
and the respective frontier value as defined above is calculated, and 
the distance from the frontier (DfF) is calculated.
2. It is assumed that countries close half of the DfF for each variable 
over a 10-year period.
3. For the tertiary enrollment ratio, labor market rigidity, voice and 
accountability, government eectiveness, and the trade ratio, 
the impact on potential growth is constructed as the product of 
the respective values of half of the DfF times the corresponding 
coe¨cients in the benchmark model (Table 2.2.2). For the tertiary 
enrollment ratio and the trade ratio, nonlinearities are taken into 
account by setting to zero the potential gain if the economy has 
already achieved the frontier value.
4. As mentioned above, it is assumed that the gap with the US remains 
constant for the 10-year period, so its impact in the simulation is set 
at zero.
5. For the trade ratio and the integration index, the assumption is 
a 25% increase over the initial value. The impact of this change 
on potential growth is calculated using the relevant coe¨cient 
estimates from the benchmark model (Table 2.2.2), holding constant 
the regulatory quality indicator for the integration index and taking 
into account nonlinearities in the case of trade.
Two additional channels are considered, through which 
policy intervention can aect the potential growth rate. 
The first is the possible eects of policies to counteract 
the slowdown in working-age population growth, such 
as postponing retirement age and relaxing immigration 
restrictions. Specifically, a scenario is considered in 
which policy is able to halve the projected annual decline 
in working-age population growth. The eect of this is 
reported in the line labeled “Demographics” in Table 2.4.1. 
(Among the sampled Asian economies, only Sri Lanka shows 
positive demographic changes.)
The other channel incorporates the expected gains 
from macroeconomic stabilization policies, the proxy for 
which in the framework is lower volatility of actual growth 
with respect to potential growth. Specifically, it is assumed that 
the 5-year standard deviation of actual growth with respect to the 
potential growth rate (i.e., variable growth gap volatility introduced 
in the macro stability model) declines by 25% with respect to its mean 
value over the 1960–2014 period, as a consequence of better macro-
management policies. The impact of this change is reported in the line 
labeled “Stable macroeconomy” in Table 2.4.1, and for each economy is 
constructed as the product of the 25% fall in growth gap volatility times 
the relevant coe¨cient in the macro stability model in Table 2.2.3.14
The simulation is conducted to answer this question: By how much 
would potential output growth increase over the 10-year period if 
economies could close through reform half of the distance between their 
2.4.1  Simulated future contributions to potential growth, 
percentage points
Item Contribution
Demographics –0.33
Reform  0.98
Stable macroeconomy  0.09
Total  0.73
Note: The table shows the weighted average annual contribution of 
each determinant of potential growth to the increase in potential growth 
over a decade, as calculated in a simulation for 22 Asian economies 
in the sample. 
Source: ADB estimates.
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current values for each determinant and the highest possible 
value, and thereby reduce macroeconomic volatility? It is 
assumed that governments introduce policies that mitigate 
the negative eect of lower working-age population growth. 
Simulation results are shown in Table 2.4.1, which provides 
the results of the three eects discussed earlier: the eect 
of reducing the negative impact of working-age population 
growth by half, the positive eect of supply-side reform, and 
the positive eect of demand-management policies to stabilize 
actual growth around potential, eectively reducing volatility. 
If governments manage to successfully introduce policies that 
reduce the projected decline in working-age population, then 
the negative impact of this eect could be as small as –0.33 
percentage points on average.15
Reform could add about 0.98 percentage points per 
annum to developing Asia’s growth. The largest increases—
experienced by Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Cambodia—
exceed 1.2 percentage point per annum (Figure 2.4.1). 
The reforms that seem to provide the largest boost to 
potential output growth address the labor market and 
institutional quality. 
Finally, demand-management policies could reduce 
the volatility of actual versus potential growth and boost 
developing Asia’s potential growth by about 0.1 percentage 
points per annum on average. The sum of all these reforms 
and policies is shown in Table 2.4.1 in the line “Total.” 
The average estimated impact on developing Asia’s potential 
growth is 0.73 percentage points per annum.
Policy implications
Economies with a particularly negative demographic outlook should 
aim to enlarge their labor force and working-age population by adopting 
more flexible immigration policies or incentives to increase the fertility 
rate. In the short to medium term, measures to increase female 
participation in the workforce and to postpone retirement age can be 
eective as well.
Since the long-term growth rate of the labor force is largely 
determined by demographic factors, the focus of policy interventions 
to increase potential growth should be on productivity enhancement. 
Indeed, the evidence presented in this chapter indicates that whether 
the projected decline in potential growth actually materializes 
hinges not alone on working-age population growth, but also on 
the implementation of eective economic policies and institutional 
transformation, as well as on changes to other determinants of potential 
growth that aect potential labor productivity growth. 
The estimates of the determinants of potential output growth 
indicate that closing the technological gap with respect to the US, 
boosting the gross enrollment ratio in tertiary education up to 
about 51%, raising labor market flexibility, strengthening voice and 
accountability and government eectiveness, opening up to trade 
2.4.1 Impact on potential growth
Impact of demographics
Impact of reform Weighted average
−1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Percentage points per annum
Azerbaijan
Singapore
Uzbekistan
Taipei,China
Kazakhstan
Viet Nam
Hong Kong, China
Tajikistan
Republic of Korea
Malaysia
People’s Republic of China
Thailand
Turkmenistan
Cambodia
Philippines
Pakistan
India
Indonesia
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Source: ADB estimates.
Click here for figure data
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to about 443% of GDP, and advancing financial integration into the 
world economy can raise potential growth. These are fundamental 
pillars of a successful growth strategy. Naturally, larger improvements 
in these factors will support more substantial positive eects, 
so the straightforward policy recommendation for Asian economies 
is to focus on devising the most e¨cient and eective measures 
to bring about economic and institutional change that enhances 
potential growth. 
As stated in the first section of this chapter, the estimate of an 
economy’s potential growth depends on its institutions and structure. 
Frontier potential growth was defined as the growth rate that the 
economy could achieve if all institutional barriers and distortions that 
obstruct factor mobility were removed. The analysis indicates that the 
removal of firm-level obstacles that aect firm size and the e¨cient 
allocation of capital and labor can move developing Asia’s economies 
closer to their frontier potential growth. Particular attention should be 
paid to correcting deficient judicial systems, unequal access to finance, 
excessive labor regulation, inadequate education, poor electricity supply, 
and corruption, which can cause distortions within firms and in factor 
markets. For example, tax system reform that is neutral with respect 
to firm size can improve productivity. Deepening the development 
and outreach of the financial system can advance productivity growth 
through the e¨cient allocation of capital. 
During the transition to improved allocation, economies will already 
enjoy a higher potential growth rate. Benefits will derive from structural 
reforms to financial and labor markets, policies to improve access to 
land, strengthened governance, an improved business environment, and 
significant infrastructure investments to secure basic needs such as 
electricity and water supply.
Infrastructure should remain a priority for Asian policy makers. 
As the needs are large, governments must find creative financing 
solutions such as public–private partnership. Toward facilitating private 
investment, policy can incentivize companies to purchase new assets by, 
for example, accelerating depreciation.
Likewise, higher potential and frontier potential growth can be 
achieved by relaxing government policies and addressing market 
imperfections that impede the more e¨cient allocation of labor, 
especially where agricultural employment remains above a high 30%: 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, the PRC, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
While increasing potential growth might seem to be an objective 
exclusive to economic policy, an appropriate policy mix can be 
deployed to correct imbalances between actual and potential growth, 
and to avoid them where they threaten to emerge. The existence 
of a significant gap between actual and potential growth, and the 
resulting economic performance that is other than optimal, create 
either inflationary pressures or unemployment. Indeed, inappropriate 
policy interventions may widen gaps or make them more persistent, 
exacerbating the associated problems. Moreover, wider gaps are bound 
to bring about greater growth volatility that, as indicated by empirical 
evidence presented in this chapter, negatively aects potential growth. 
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This reinforces the view that eective demand management and 
stabilization policies may have significant positive eects. 
The analysis indicates that such measures, and economic policy 
more generally, can play a growing role in boosting long-term growth 
in developing Asia. As developing Asia continues its convergence with 
the advanced economies, the advantages of backwardness will fade 
until they are finally extinguished. The potential for technological 
spillover from economies on the technological frontier will decline as 
the technology gap narrows, and the demographic dividend will turn 
into a demographic debt as growth in working-age population slows. 
For long-term growth to continue in Asia, and for living standards 
to improve at rates similar to the past, eective policy measures and 
improvements in the quality of institutions will have to compensate 
for the lost advantages of yesterday. In the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, developing Asia’s progress toward high-income status 
will increasingly depend on how fast it can close the gap in policy and 
institutions with respect to the advanced economies.
Asia’s new normal today need not be its future normal. To ensure a 
healthy future for potential growth, Asia must employ the full range of 
policy responses to augment labor supply, improve labor productivity, 
and maintain macroeconomic stability.
Endnotes
1 A first reason, Rodrik argued, was that industrialization in the style 
of the Republic of Korea seemed to be impossible in today’s world 
because technological change was rendering manufacturing more 
capital and skill intensive. Second, some Asian economies would 
experience declining labor force growth rates (e.g., the PRC and 
Japan), though others would still enjoy a demographic dividend 
(e.g., India). In the former group, productivity growth would have to 
accelerate to compensate for the shift in demographics (McKinsey 
Global Institute 2015). Third, the World Trade Organization has 
begun to disallow many industrial policies widely used in the past to 
push growth (Felipe 2015), and developed countries would not be as 
willing in the years ahead to run current account deficits so that the 
developing world could run surpluses. In the Asian context, Lin and 
Zhang (2015) has argued in reference to the PRC that the GFC would 
not have long-lasting effects and that the decline in growth was only 
transitory.
2 Two versions of the model are available: closed economy and 
open economy augmented with the ratio of imports to GDP, the 
latter following Romer (1993). In total, three different versions are 
estimated: (i) actual inflation (equation [6]) and closed economy 
for the PRC, Fiji, Japan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam; 
(ii) adaptive expectations (equation [8]) and open economy 
augmented for Azerbaijan, India, and Taipei,China; and (iii) adaptive 
expectations (equation [8]) and closed economy for Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
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Viet Nam, and Hong Kong, China. The model with actual inflation and 
open economy did not fit any of the economies well. The results shown 
for Singapore and Thailand are derived from a different model that 
includes financial factors (Felipe et al. 2015).
3 This estimate is derived by dividing the percentage point change in 
potential growth by the percentage point change in actual growth for 
the 22 developing Asian economies, and then taking the average.
4 It should be noted that the statistical procedure used to generate 
a time-varying estimate of potential output growth (the Kalman 
smoother) updates the complete series every time a new estimate is 
added—see details in Lanzafame et al. (2016). After adding the PRC 
growth rate estimate for 2015, which is 6.9%, the estimates since 2010 
become lower, with a potential growth rate of 7.69% for 2014 (instead 
of 7.91%) and 7.29% for 2015.
5 India released an updated GDP series that contains very few years, so 
the old series was used in the model estimates. Adjusting up the growth 
rate based on the years where the two series overlap (2012–2014) yields 
a slightly higher potential growth rate of 6.94% in 2014.
6 The direct impact of reducing the gap with the US, as indicated by 
the coefficient of this variable, shows that a country with a gap that 
is narrower by 1 percentage point has potential growth that is slower 
by 0.07 percentage points. However, the gap with the US is also 
interacted with the index of political stability in the model, and this 
interaction term needs to be taken into account to fully quantify the 
impact of the gap on potential growth. Ignoring the effects of all other 
variables in the model, potential output growth is computed as gn = 
0.07 × gap – 0.006 × gap × political stability. Recall that the index of 
political stability ranges from –2.5 to 2.5, with higher positive numbers 
indicating greater political stability. The total effect of reducing the 
gap by 1 percentage point is therefore calculated as 0.07 + (0.006 × 
2.5) = 0.085 percentage points for the least politically stable and 0.07 
– (0.006 × 2.5) = 0.055 percentage points for the most politically stable 
economies.
7 This is calculated as 0.004 + (0.003 × 2.5) = 0.0115 for the lowest 
regulatory quality. For values of regulatory quality above –0.41 the 
impact is not statistically significant. Note that this is the impact of 
financial integration through regulatory quality. The direct impact of 
financial capital integration is simply given by the coefficient of this 
variable (0.004), which means that countries with financial integration 
1 percentage point higher will have potential growth higher by 
0.004 percentage points.
8 This is approach is similar to that of León-Ledesma and Thirlwall 
(2002).
9 Regressions for the Asian economies alone (not shown for reasons of 
space) are less reliable since the sample size is significantly smaller. 
Nevertheless, the Asian dummy for the 2008–2014 structural break is 
always negative, with values that oscillate between –2.0 and –2.3.
10 This is the difference between the average growth rate of the actual 
working-age population growth rate in 2008–2014 and the projected 
growth rate for 2015–2020. This weighted average is computed using 
population shares as weights.
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11 The spillover model for the subpanel of Asian economies is 
estimated as well, but the results are not as reliable because the 
sample size is small.
12 The methodology and terminology employed in this section are akin 
to those used by the World Bank in its Distance to Frontier exercise  
(http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/distance-to-frontier).
13 This is a plausible assumption for the purposes of this simulation. 
Obviously, it cannot be assumed for the longer term, over which 
many Asian economies should continue to enjoy the so-called 
advantage of backwardness.
14 This means that coefficients from two different regressions are 
being used. Even if all coefficients from the macro stability model 
were used, results would be very similar.
15 This is the reduction in the region’s potential output growth 
solely due to a lower projected trend growth rate in working-age 
population growth during 2015–2020, and assuming that countries 
implement measures (e.g., increase fertility rates, increase females 
labor participation, etc.) to reduce the negative impact of declining 
working-age population growth rates by 50%. It is computed using 
individual countries’ trend growth rates of working-age population 
(not actual growth rates as in endnote 10), weighted by their 
respective GDP shares.
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Armenia
Despite an unfavorable external environment, the economy managed to grow by 3.0% in 2015. 
Weak domestic demand helped contain inflation and improve external accounts but exacerbated 
the budget deficit. Demand will likely remain sluggish in 2016 and 2017, reducing growth and 
inflation and moderately widening the current account deficit. The challenge is to make growth 
inclusive across regions.
Economic performance 
The economy grew by 3.0% in 2015, down from 3.5% in 2014. On the 
supply side, growth was driven by agriculture and industry as expansion 
in services moderated (Figure 3.1.1).
Agriculture grew by 11.4%, aided by favorable weather and continued 
government support to farmers that provided preferential loans, diesel 
fuel, seeds, and fertilizers, as well as by expansion of the cultivated area. 
Industry excluding construction grew by 6.3%. Much of this growth 
came from export-oriented mining and metallurgy, reflecting expansion 
in late 2014 at the Teghut copper mine, the country’s second largest 
mine. Construction contracted by 4.2% following the 4.6% decline 
in 2014. 
The expansion in services, which generate about half of GDP, slowed 
sharply to 1.1% from 5.8% a year earlier, reflecting a 7.1% slump in the 
remittance-supported trade subsector. Growth in services came mainly 
from higher growth in information technology, finance, insurance, and 
recreation.
On the demand side, most of the expansion stemmed from a narrower 
deficit in net exports of goods and services. Public consumption 
improved by an estimated 5.4% in 2015 on higher government spending. 
However, total consumption declined as private consumption contracted, 
for the first time since 2009, by an estimated 5.0%. This reflected a 35.8% 
fall in remittances, mainly from the Russian Federation, from which 
remittances plunged by 42.2% (Figure 3.1.2). Total investment decreased 
by an estimated 6.4% in 2015, exceeding the 2.6% decline in 2014.
Inflation was subdued in 2015 as private consumption contracted, 
agricultural output rose, global commodity prices fell, the exchange rate 
remained relatively stable, and the Central Bank of Armenia tightened 
monetary policy in the first half of the year. For the first time since 
2005, deflation was recorded at the end of 2015 as the 12-month inflation 
rate December over December fell to –0.1%, well below the inflation 
target band of 2.5%–5.5% set by the central bank. Average annual 
inflation nevertheless rose slightly to 3.7% from 3.0% in 2014, reflecting 
larger increases for food and other goods (Figure 3.1.3). 
3.1.1 Supply-side contributions to growth
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3.1.2 Sources of remittances
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Monetary policy helped not only to contain inflation but also to 
limit the decline in the Armenian dram as the ruble depreciated, 
with the central bank intervening only to avoid disorderly exchange 
rate movements. In line with price and market developments, it 
adjusted policy rates periodically throughout the year. With inflation 
expectations well anchored, it gradually eased its policy rate from 
10.50% in February 2015 to 8.75% by year-end, and to 8.50% in 
February 2016. Low inflation and only mild depreciation of the 
Armenian dram against the US dollar, by less than 2% in 2015, caused 
the dram to appreciate during the year against the currencies of 
Armenia’s leading trade partners by 2.8% in nominal eective terms and 
2.9% in real eective terms (Figure 3.1.4). 
Strong inflows of foreign financing helped, along with higher 
exports, to raise foreign exchange reserves and oset the drop in 
remittance inflows. Foreign exchange reserves rose by 19% to $1.8 
billion at the end of 2015, estimated to equal 4.4 months of imports, 
versus 3.3 months at the end of 2014. 
Fiscal policy was mildly expansionary in 2015, supporting growth 
through public consumption. The ratio of revenue to GDP declined to 
22.7% in 2015 from 23.6% in 2014 as economic growth and transfers 
from the Eurasian Economic Union customs pool disappointed and as 
domestic and external trade slipped. Expenditure rose to 27.3% of GDP 
from 25.5% a year earlier, mainly reflecting higher capital spending 
(Figure 3.1.5). The fiscal deficit rose from 1.9% of GDP in 2014 to 4.6%, 
double the budget target of 2.3%. 
Higher borrowing for infrastructure development and to cover the 
budget deficit raised the ratio of public debt to GDP from 43.6% in 2014 
to 48.6% at the end of 2015 (Figure 3.1.6). Heavy reliance on external 
financing saw external public debt climb in nominal terms by more 
than $0.5 billion to $4.3 billion, or 41.3% of GDP. Domestic public debt 
increased by more than $100 million to $762 million.
As exports rose and weak domestic demand slowed import growth, 
the current account deficit narrowed to an estimated 4.6% of GDP in 
2015 from 7.3% a year earlier (Figure 3.1.7). 
The trade deficit shrank to an estimated 13.3% of GDP from 17.7% in 
2014. Imports of goods plummeted by an estimated 15.5%, while exports 
held steady and export destinations diversified somewhat. The services 
account continued to improve, reflecting gains in construction, 
telecommunications, and travel.
Economic prospects 
Although economic performance in 2015 beat expectations, the outlook 
remains very uncertain. Armenia is highly vulnerable to exogenous 
shocks, particularly from the Russian Federation, its main trading 
partner. With continued recession there during 2016, growth is projected 
to slow to 2.0% in 2016 before recovering slightly to 2.3% in 2017 
(Figure 3.1.8). 
The growth outlook will worsen if the economy in the Russian 
Federation deteriorates further. No consensus exists on how the lifting 
of international sanctions against Iran will aect Armenia.
3.1.3 Inflation
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Agriculture is expected to remain the key supply-side driver of 
growth, followed by moderate expansion in services and industry. 
If the weather remains favorable, agriculture should continue to 
grow over the forecast period, though more slowly than in 2015. 
Government support for such inputs as seed, fuel, and fertilizer should 
spur expansion, as should subsidized credit and measures to promote 
the development of value chains and enhance the productivity and 
e¤ciency of farming, such as establishing cooperatives. Also promoting 
growth will be greater interest from the private sector in agriculture 
using greenhouses. 
Growth in industry is expected to remain sluggish, reflecting 
subdued domestic and external demand. The government’s renewed 
emphasis on stimulating exports will provide further impetus for 
industry, which will also benefit from moderate growth in construction, 
mostly from progress in externally financed infrastructure projects for 
roads, water supply, and school rehabilitation.
A projected decline in retail trade will likely slow the rise in services, 
in which most growth is expected to come from gains in tourism, 
finance, information, and communications. 
On the demand side, investment and private consumption are both 
projected to contract, though less than in 2015, with growth coming 
from a further narrowing of the deficit in net exports. 
Fiscal policy will be tightened gradually in the medium term, 
following the fiscal slippage and rise in external debt during 2015. 
The government projects the fiscal deficit at 3.5% of GDP in 2016, with 
expenditure remaining unchanged to accommodate lower revenue 
from weaker economic activity. The volume of transfers from the 
Eurasian Economic Union customs pool will likely be unchanged 
in 2016. Moreover, high and rising public debt will require further fiscal 
consolidation to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio and contain external 
imbalances.
Monetary policy will likely support growth. Average annual 
inflation is projected to remain subdued, at 3.8% in 2016 and 4.0% in 
2017, reflecting slow growth and output below potential. While modest 
growth should put downward pressure on prices, inflation would likely 
be higher if external developments cause significant dram depreciation. 
The current account deficit is projected to widen to 5.2% of GDP in 
2016 and then narrow to 5.0% in 2017 (Figure 3.1.9). The trade deficit 
is forecast to continue narrowing, while the income deficit will remain 
small. Exports are forecast to expand by only 0.2% in 2016 and then 
by 1.0% in 2017 as eorts to diversify markets largely oset drag from 
recession in the Russian Federation. Imports are projected to decline 
by 1.5% in 2016, reflecting the lagged eect of smaller remittances, and 
then rise by 2.0% in 2017 as lower fuel and commodity prices support 
consumption. Renewed trade with Iran could mean more trade overall, 
in particular higher exports. 
An uncertain external environment will require using domestic 
measures to sustain growth, in particular rebuilding fiscal and external 
buers, and implementing structural reforms to further enhance the 
business environment, boost competitiveness, diversify exports and 
markets, and improve governance and transparency. 
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Policy challenge—attaining balanced 
regional development
Widening disparity between the capital city and the regions is a major 
threat to inclusive growth over the long term. Economic activity is 
heavily concentrated in the capital, Yerevan, which accounts for more 
than 40% of industrial production and more than 80% of trade and 
services but has only a third of the country’s population and a quarter 
of its poor. By contrast, the regions enjoy little economic opportunity or 
diversification and endure much worse poverty, dependence on worker 
remittances, and physical infrastructure. 
The government recognizes that the high concentration of wealth 
in Yerevan hampers economic and human development and exacerbates 
large and persistent regional disparities. The Armenia Development 
Strategy to 2025, approved in 2014, aims to overcome regional disparity 
in development and prioritize over the medium and long term regionally 
targeted development policies. The resulting programs should ensure 
faster economic development in the most depressed regions, enabling 
them to largely close their development gaps with national norms. 
A development initiative approved in 2011 emphasizes the creation, 
rehabilitation, and development of economic infrastructure and the 
improvement at the regional and community level of the quality and 
accessibility of public social services for education, health care, cultural 
enrichment, and environmental protection. 
Scaling up targeted economic development initiatives that build on 
each locality’s comparative advantages, and therefore oer potential 
for longer-term impact, is critical for diversifying rural households’ 
sources of income and enhancing the structure of regional economies. 
Along with measures to promote private sector development, especially 
through small and medium-sized enterprises, such development 
initiatives can promote job creation and thereby raise living standards 
toward levels enjoyed in the capital. 
Investing in social and economic infrastructure, including health 
and education facilities and transport, can also promote more uniform 
growth across the regions. Programs to improve access to markets and 
social services in poor regions can serve this objective, as can incentives 
for private firms to invest in these areas. 
Public–private partnership in infrastructure can be pursued to 
reduce government expenditure while allowing more projects that 
promote equity across regions.
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Azerbaijan
Plunging oil prices in 2015 cut export earnings, and sharp currency depreciation reduced household 
consumption and public investment, slowing growth to 1.1%. Continued weakness in oil prices is 
projected to cause GDP to contract by 1.0% in 2016 before recovering to 1.0% growth in 2017 as 
oil prices revive. Only by financing the expansion of diverse sectors can Azerbaijan move away 
from heavy dependence on hydrocarbons. 
Economic performance 
Economic growth slowed to 1.1% from 2.8% in 2014 as oil prices 
plummeted and a 50% depreciation of the Azerbaijan manat reduced 
nominal GDP by 8.0% (Figure 3.2.1). The oil sector is reported to have 
expanded by 1.2%, following a 3.7% contraction in 2014, while cuts 
in public investment constrained the economy outside the oil sector, 
which expanded by only 1.1%, down from 7.0% in 2014. 
On the supply side, industry shrank by 1.9%, versus 0.5% growth 
in 2014, as a decline in construction outweighed improvements in 
mining and manufacturing (Figure 3.2.2). Cuts in public investment and 
lower demand for real estate reversed 9.1% expansion in construction 
in 2014 to 13.4% contraction. Growth in services decelerated to 4.5% 
from 7.4% in 2014, owing to a slowdown in social and other services. 
Agriculture had the strongest increase, as government concessions on 
inputs contributed to 6.6% growth following 2.6% decline in 2014.
On the demand side, private and public consumption are believed 
to have declined because of currency depreciation and some tightening 
of lending later in the year, even as household savings grew by 31.7% 
in 2015, more than double the 12.4% growth rate in 2014. Net exports 
fell sharply because of lower oil prices, as hydrocarbons constitute 
more than 90% of exports.
Declining energy prices and the drop in export earnings forced the 
central bank to devalue the manat by 25% on 21 February 2015 and then, 
on 21 December, abandon the peg to the US dollar, which precipitated 
another plunge. The manat ended the year down by half against the 
US dollar after repeated interventions cost the central bank more than 
two-thirds of its foreign exchange reserves, which stood at $4.4 billion 
at the end of January 2016, down from $13.8 billion a year earlier. 
Ocial reports suggest that average annual inflation accelerated 
to 4.0% from 1.4% in 2014, reflecting devaluation in February 2015 
and higher inflation in trading partners, and despite a decline in 
global food prices. The inflation rate month on month reached 7.7% 
in December, when the manat peg was abandoned (Figure 3.2.3). 
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Food prices rose by 6.1% over the whole of 2015, while prices for other 
goods increased by 3.8%. 
Plunging oil prices forced a tightening of fiscal policy. Despite 
rising as a share of GDP because of the decline in nominal GDP, both 
revenue and expenditure fell in nominal terms. Revenue, including 
from the state oil company, dropped by 6.7% to the equivalent of 31.5% 
of GDP, slightly above 31.2% in 2014 (Figure 3.2.4). Receipts were 
mainly transfers from the sovereign wealth fund, whose assets 
fell by $3.5 billion to $33.6 billion at the end of 2015 (Figure 3.2.5). 
Total expenditure declined by 4.9% as the government deferred some 
investment projects but still rose as a percentage of GDP to 32.7%, from 
31.7% in 2014. The budget recorded a deficit equal to 1.1% of GDP, less 
than the 3.0% budgeted. Total government and government-guaranteed 
debt more than doubled to 28.1% of GDP from 11.2% at the end of 2014, 
largely because of depreciation. 
Monetary policy aimed to stabilize the exchange rate for most of 
the year while supporting growth. In July, the central bank cut its 
policy rate from 3.5% to 3.0%, where it stayed for the rest of the year, to 
boost investment in the non-oil economy. This helped maintain credit 
growth at 20.5%, with lending rates unchanged. However, the drop in 
international reserves caused broad money to contract by 1.1% after 
having grown by 11.8% in 2014 (Figure 3.2.6). As almost half of the loan 
portfolio is denominated in foreign currencies, depreciation caused 
nonperforming loans to rise to 6.9% of all loans in 2015 from 5.2% 
a year earlier. 
Dollarization increased as foreign exchange deposits reached 82.5% 
of all deposits in January 2016, against 51.6% a year earlier. Moreover, 
banks have come under severe pressure from depreciation and the 
resulting sharp increase in their foreign currency liabilities. Fraud was 
alleged at the country’s largest bank, and the authorities announced the 
creation of a new supervisory body for the financial sector. As part of 
an announced consolidation, six banks were closed in early 2016 for not 
meeting capital requirements.
Lower oil prices slashed the current account surplus to an estimated 
0.4% of GDP from 13.9% in 2014, with exports falling by more than 40%. 
According to the State Statistical Committee, the trade surplus narrowed 
by 65.2%, or $13.7 billion, as the February 2015 devaluation did little 
to boost exports other than oil. Imports, 40% of them electronics and 
vehicles, grew by 0.4%, reversing a 14.2% decline in 2014. 
Economic prospects 
Without strong fiscal stimulus, the economy is projected to contract 
by 1.0% in 2016 because of continued low oil prices, followed by 
1.0% growth in 2017 as an expected revival in oil prices facilitates 
economic recovery (Figure 3.2.7). Higher social spending should limit 
the downturn in 2016. Despite a 10% salary increase for civil servants 
introduced in early 2016, real household spending is expected to slow 
as sharply higher inflation, at 12%, reduces real incomes.
On the supply side, industry is forecast to contract in 2016 because 
of slowing oil production, but it could improve in 2017 and raise incomes 
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if oil prices rebound. Public investment, including assistance from 
development partners for infrastructure, should stabilize construction 
in both years. Some growth in agriculture is also anticipated each 
year with continued government support for farmers, including the 
anticipated completion of reservoir and irrigation networks.
On the demand side, private consumption and investment, both 
public and private, will be the main sources of growth. Net exports 
should narrow in 2016 and recover in 2017 along with oil prices, but the 
growth outlook remains vulnerable to any further energy price shock. 
A projected inflation spike to 12.0% in 2016 reflects the impact 
of currency depreciation on imports, which supply nearly half of 
consumption. A projected decline in global food prices, slower income 
growth, and the waning e£ects of the currency realignment are 
projected to slow inflation to 5.2% in 2017 (Figure 3.2.8). However, 
inflation will likely be higher if the manat depreciates further. 
Weak oil prices pose a severe challenge to fiscal policy, as revenues 
depend heavily on oil taxes and transfers from the state oil fund. 
Revenue as a percentage of GDP is projected to decline to 30.2% 
in 2016. However, the budget aims to support the economy with 
higher social spending on pensions, targeted social assistance, and 
stipends, raising expenditure to 33.3% of GDP and the deficit to 3.1%. 
Following amendment of the legal ceiling on external debt, total 
government and government-guaranteed debt is projected to climb to 
40.9% of GDP in 2016 with investment in the Southern Gas Corridor, 
other power-related infrastructure, and transport. 
The uncertain outlook for oil prices also a£ects the current account, 
which is projected to run a small deficit equal to 0.6% of GDP in 2016 as 
exports decline by 12.2%, outpacing the decline in imports. The current 
account is forecast to return in 2017 to a surplus of 1.5%, with some 
recovery of oil prices and exports rising by 7.0% while imports decline 
again, by 1.5% (Figure 3.2.9). The trade surplus is likely to remain small 
over the medium term until oil prices recover significantly.
Policy challenge—diversification through 
a stronger financial sector
The economic repercussions of declining oil prices underscore 
Azerbaijan’s vulnerability as it continues to depend mainly on 
hydrocarbon revenues. With oil prices projected to remain low for 
some time and oil production already likely at its maximum, 
sustainable growth is possible only through significant economic 
diversification.
Diversification will require, among other things, greater access to 
credit from a more resilient financial sector. Small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in particular need financing if they are to contribute 
to higher growth outside of the oil sector. Credit expansion requires 
stronger financial institutions, financial markets that are deeper and 
more liquid and ecient and thus able to handle larger volumes, 
broader domestic sources of finance, and better access for more users of 
banking and other financial services. In tandem with greater financial 
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intermediation, Azerbaijan needs stronger competition among financial 
institutions and closer regulation of their activities. 
Persistent dollarization has greatly squeezed liquidity in local 
currency. As the share of loans and deposits in foreign currency rises, 
so does the risk posed to banks by their foreign exchange liabilities 
and nonperforming loans. Poor banking practices and the proliferation 
of nonperforming loans challenge the soundness of banks and their 
e£orts to maintain market liquidity. Moreover, the central bank’s lack of 
sucient refinancing facilities undercuts commercial banks’ ability to 
provide loans, particularly to SMEs, as does the weakness of bankruptcy 
law and other protections for creditors. Access to finance is particularly 
constrained outside of the capital. 
The decision in January 2016 to provide full deposit insurance will 
likely boost confidence in the banking system. Capping interest rates 
on foreign currency deposits at 3% while retaining a higher ceiling 
of 12% on manat deposits should encourage the holding and use of 
manat, as should the government’s recent issue of local currency bonds. 
The central bank’s lengthening of secured loans to banks from 1 to 7 
days and the reduction in reserve requirements for local currency 
deposits from 2.0% to 0.5% ought to enhance local currency liquidity 
while easing banks’ liquidity management. These moves, together with 
the central bank’s direct provision of finance to SMEs, should make 
financing more available, especially in manat, thereby promoting the use 
of the local currency. 
The government’s decision to close inadequately capitalized banks 
and to encourage bank consolidation could strengthen the banking 
system by simultaneously raising capitalization and reducing costs, 
thereby enabling narrower spreads between deposit and lending 
rates. If the emergence of several stronger and more e£ective banks 
ensues, the sector could become more competitive. Steps to reduce the 
government’s presence in the sector could also help if implemented in a 
way that augments rather than inhibits competition. 
The authorities have decided to introduce a single overarching 
financial market supervisor to regulate banks, insurers, other lenders 
including microfinance institutions, and the capital market. The new 
regulator can strengthen the financial sector if it proves e£ective 
at supervising a wide array of financial institutions with diverse 
characteristics. 
Other measures worth pursuing would be to reform the bankruptcy 
law and reinforce creditors’ rights, making banks more willing to lend 
and thus broadening access to finance. The authorities should avoid 
any measures that would unduly constrain lending, especially by the 
microfinance institutions that provide services in remote areas. 
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Georgia
Growth slowed to 2.8% as a weak external environment curbed investment, exports, and 
remittances. Currency depreciation fueled inflation. With continued external weakness, growth is 
expected to remain low in 2016 before recovering in 2017 on stronger global expansion. Inflation 
is expected to rise in 2016 before reverting, while the current account deficit should narrow in 
both years.
Economic performance 
GDP grew by an estimated 2.8% in 2015, down from 4.6% in 2014, 
as recession in the Russian Federation and weakness in other trading 
partners slowed investment growth and reduced manufacturing, 
exports, and remittances. 
On the supply side, growth was driven by increases of 12.4% 
in construction and 13.7% in mining that oset a 2.8% decline in 
manufacturing (Figure 3.3.1). Industry overall rose by 3.3%. Services 
expanded by 3.0%, reflecting strong performance in finance and 
tourism, and agriculture grew by 2.8%. 
On the demand side, domestic demand was the main driver, with 
private consumption rising by an estimated 11.9%. Investment growth 
halved to 13.7% from nearly 28.0% a year earlier, reflecting in part 
a decline in foreign direct investment from the record set in 2014. 
With weak external demand and continued sluggishness in regional 
growth, the net exports deficit worsened by 15.4%.
Inflation accelerated again in 2015, particularly during the 
second half, to 4.0% (Figure 3.3.2). Higher import prices resulted from 
a 27.3% depreciation in the Georgian lari vis-à-vis the US dollar in 
2015 that more than oset declines in global food and energy prices. 
Price increases for alcoholic beverages and tobacco (11.0%), health care 
(10.5%), and furnishings, household equipment, and maintenance (9.2%), 
and a one-time rise in electricity taris, were partly mitigated by lower 
transport prices from cheaper fuel. 
The budget deficit is estimated to have reached 3.7% of GDP in 2015, 
above the 2.9% recorded in 2014 (Figure 3.3.3). Revenues increased by 
10.1% to equal 28.4% of GDP as both tax and nontax revenue rose, while 
only modest growth in spending on goods and services, and a similarly 
modest rise in social spending despite significant health care outlays, held 
public expenditure to 32.1% of GDP. Total public debt rose to 45.4% of 
GDP from 34.8% in 2014, reflecting in part the impact of lari depreciation. 
External debt amounted to 78% of all debt, comprising concessional 
multilateral or bilateral loans with an average interest rate of 1.9% in 2015. 
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Monetary policy was tightened in response to depreciation and 
rising inflationary expectations. The National Bank of Georgia, the 
central bank, raised the policy rate in several steps from 4% in January 
to 8% at year-end (Figure 3.3.4). Interest rates on domestic government 
debt rose, and average rates on lari loans increased by 2.9 percentage 
points to 20.4%, while those in foreign currency decreased slightly to 
10.3%. Deposit interest rates followed a similar trend. Dollarization, 
as measured by the share of foreign currency deposits in the banking 
system, rose by 9.6 percentage points to 66.7%. Broad money (M3) grew 
by 19.3%, more than in 2014, as foreign currency deposits expanded by 
some 44% while domestic currency deposits contracted (Figure 3.3.5). 
Credit to the economy grew by 19.4%. The share of nonperforming loans 
in all loans remained virtually unchanged at 2.7%. Although banks’ 
prudential ratios remained comfortable, sector growth in profits slowed 
to 13% from 22% in 2014. 
Recession in Georgia’s main trading partners, including the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine, has seriously aected external trade. 
The current account deficit remained sizeable at an estimated 10.5% 
of GDP, down slightly from 10.6% in 2014, as a 20.9% drop in exports 
widened the trade deficit. Exports to the Russian Federation in 
particular fell by 40.7%, while vehicle re-exports plunged by nearly 65%. 
Meanwhile, exports to the European Union rose by 3.6%. Imports fell 
by 15.2%, as the lari depreciated against some trading partners’ 
currencies (while appreciating by 11.0% against the ruble). Recession 
in the Russian Federation and Ukraine contributed to a 25% decline 
in remittances. A rise in transit tourists including transit tra¢c raised 
tourism receipts. 
The current account deficit was financed mainly by foreign direct 
investment, which nevertheless fell by some 23.2% to about $1.35 billion. 
To smooth exchange rate fluctuations, the central bank sold during the 
year $287 million in foreign exchange, up from $100 million in 2014. 
Gross international reserves declined by 6.6% to $2.5 billion, equivalent 
to 3.4 months of imports. 
Economic prospects 
Growth is expected to remain near 2.5% in 2016 before rising to 3.5% in 
2017 (Figure 3.3.6). Domestic demand is expected to be the main source 
of growth, reflecting fiscal support for consumption and investment. 
Anticipated hikes in social expenditure and capital outlays are likely to 
support expansion in 2016 and beyond, thereby aiding growth prospects. 
A projected 16.5% yearly rise in credit should also promote growth.
On the supply side, industry is forecast to expand by 2.1% in 2016 
and 4.0% in 2017, as the government is considering further tax measures 
to support business, such as a zero tax on reinvested profit. Services 
are projected to grow by 2.6% in 2016 and 3.4% in 2017 on continued 
expansion in tourism. Agriculture is expected to grow modestly, by 2.4% 
in 2016 and 3.4% in 2017, assuming favorable weather and continued 
government support. 
External demand is expected to improve only modestly in 2016. 
Recovery is projected to be slow in Georgia’s main trading partners as 
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recession persists in the Russian Federation. Growth should strengthen 
in 2017 with a pickup in global expansion, including stronger recovery 
in the euro area, as Georgia stands to benefit from its 2014 Association 
Agreement with the European Union to create an extensive free trade 
area with that market. 
Average annual inflation is projected to reach 5.0% in 2016 as 
the lari continues to depreciate against a strong US dollar on global 
currency markets and further declines in global prices for food and 
energy limit the impact of depreciation. Inflation should slow to 4.0% 
in 2017 as the eect of a one-time rise in utility taris wanes. It will 
be greater than forecast if foreign prices are higher than expected, 
lari depreciation steeper, or economic growth stronger. The central 
bank is likely to continue raising the refinancing rate, albeit gradually. 
Broad money growth is forecast to decelerate to 14.5% in 2016 as 
private credit growth slows, and then rebound to 19.0% in 2017 on 
further government eorts to improve firms’ access to long-term 
finance in local currency. 
The upcoming cut in profits tax will likely keep the budget deficit 
above 4.0% of GDP in 2016, despite strong revenue performance that 
should oset higher spending for pensions and other social programs. 
The deficit is expected to fall slightly in 2017 as revenue is boosted by 
higher excise taxes on tobacco and alcoholic beverages, by reform to 
customs duties, and by improvements in tax administration. Public debt 
is expected to increase to 45.8% of GDP in 2016 before easing to 44.8% 
in 2017 as foreign debt decreases (Figure 3.3.7). 
The current account deficit is expected to narrow to 9.5% of GDP 
in 2016 and 9.2% in 2017, reflecting higher exports and remittances 
(Figure 3.3.8). Exports are expected to rise by 8.5% in 2016 and 14.3% in 
2017 as vehicle re-exports and service exports accelerate. Imports are 
projected to grow at a lower rate than exports, by 4.6% as depreciation 
depresses imports and then by 11.6% in 2017. Net services should rise by 
10.9% in 2016 and 15.8% in 2017. However, the trade balance will remain 
negative because of a high import bill and weak external demand. 
Assuming careful debt management and limited volatility in foreign 
inflows, gross reserves are projected to stay at $2.5 billion in 2016 before 
rising to $2.6 billion in 2017 (Figure 3.3.9). 
The forecast above is subject to downside risks. Weaker-than-
expected recovery among trading partners would reduce exports, and 
further lari depreciation would stien inflationary pressures.
Policy challenge—raising productivity  
to boost growth
Georgia’s economy operated below potential in 2015, reflecting the 
di¢cult external environment. A key challenge is to reignite growth and 
restore economic output to its potential. 
Boosting growth will depend mainly on improving productivity 
through structural reform, given Georgia’s aging population and the 
limited scope for countercyclical stimulus. Raising investment remains 
critical, especially in the context of low oil prices and dampening 
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investor appetite in the oil-exporting countries that provide most of 
Georgia’s foreign direct investment. 
Structural transformation to boost research and development 
(R&D) and innovation, aided by declining commodity prices, can 
help the economy return to trend growth. International assessments 
have highlighted Georgia’s need to improve R&D and education. 
Georgia ranked 101 out of 140 economies in the quality of higher 
education and 128 for university–industry collaboration in the 
Global Competitiveness Report 2015–2016 of the World Economic Forum. 
Moreover, education expenditure remains low, at under 3% of GDP, 
despite high enrollment. Low spending constrains educational 
attainment, hampering eorts to develop a workforce with the skills 
needed for a dynamic economy. Besides gradually raising education 
expenditure, the government plans to prioritize job growth and increase 
investment in R&D. Doing so would raise productivity while making 
growth more inclusive.
To narrow rural–urban disparities, the government has adopted a 
more proactive strategy to promote rural growth through investment 
in agriculture and to make reform more inclusive by targeting 
smallholder farmers and industrial startups with concessional funds. 
Specialized agencies have been created to facilitate exports and upgrade 
entrepreneurial skills, bolster production capacity through job creation, 
support innovation and technology transfer, and promote the application 
of new technologies in business to help commercialize innovative R&D 
for a knowledge-based economy. 
To strengthen governance, quality assurance, and finance for 
professional education, the government has established a framework 
for professional competence in line with market trends and demand 
for professional qualifications. To smooth the transition from training 
to work, it has strengthened employment policies and introduced an 
integrated information portal for labor market management that helps 
identify mismatches between employable skills and available labor, 
thereby helping educational institutions expand training for professions 
in greater demand.
A shrinking and aging population limits the size of the workforce, 
constraining growth. Providing education and training to enhance older 
workers’ facility with information technology and communications 
could help. The government’s new Solidarity Fund encourages voluntary 
contributions to aid older people, particularly those in need. 
Productivity could be further enhanced by improving e¢ciency in 
both rural and urban areas. The government’s development strategy 
helps enterprises and farmers with innovative financial products that 
include preferential credit and leasing programs. 
Continued productivity improvements will depend on structural, 
policy, and institutional reforms to encourage investment in export-
oriented activities. Government initiatives in these areas would help 
accelerate productivity growth and harness the potential of the 
export sector.
3.3.8 Current account components
$ billion % of GDP
–14
–7
0
7
14
–10
–5
0
5
10
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Imports
Net services
Net income
Current transfers
Exports
Current account balance
2011
Forecast
Sources: National Bank of Georgia. https://www.nbg.gov.ge 
(accessed 3 March 2016); ADB estimates.
Click here for figure data
3.3.9 Gross international reserves
$ billion
0
1
2
3
4
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Forecast
Sources: National Bank of Georgia. https://www.nbg.gov.ge 
(accessed 3 March 2016); ADB estimates.
Click here for figure data
This chapter was written by staË of the Central and West Asia Department.
Kazakhstan
Continued weak oil prices slashed growth and pushed the current account into deficit for the first 
time since 2009. Growth is expected to remain low at 0.7% in 2016 but recover slightly to 1.0% 
in 2017, reflecting higher countercyclical outlays. Policy must address financial vulnerabilities that 
stem from low oil prices, persistent problems with nonperforming loans, and further dollarization.
Economic performance 
Growth slowed sharply to 1.0% from 4.3% in 2014 on low prices for 
oil, the economy’s main export. On the supply side, data for the first 9 
months show that industry contracted by 0.6%, reversing 0.1% growth 
during the same period in 2014, as utilities and mining declined. 
Agriculture expanded by 2.9%, doubling from 1.4% in the same 
period in 2014 on increases of 5.6% for crops and 3.2% for livestock. 
Growth in services slowed to 2.4% from 5.8% a year earlier because of 
lower growth in trade, transport, and real estate. 
On the demand side, during the first 9 months of 2015 consumption 
expanded by 2.8%, slightly above the 2.5% recorded during the 
same period of 2014 (Figure 3.4.1). This reflected a jump in private 
consumption in the first half, as consumers rushed to buy imported 
goods in anticipation of a sharply lower Kazakh tenge, which came in 
August as the authorities abruptly abandoned an exchange rate band for 
a floating rate. Growth in public consumption in the first 9 months of 
2015 slowed to 2.5% from 11.2% a year earlier, as lower oil-based revenue 
restrained expansion of current expenditure. Expansion of investment, 
however, rose to 5.0% from 0.2%, as higher public investment more than 
oset a slowing in private investment associated with lower oil prices. 
Net exports fell by 1.5%, versus a 7.5% increase in the same period of 
2014, as exports fell more than imports (8.2% versus 6.7%).
Average annual inflation eased to 6.6% from 6.7% in 2014. However, 
sharp depreciation of the tenge fueled inflation in the last quarter of 
the year, driving the 12 month inflation rate December over December 
to 13.6% from 7.4% in 2014. Goods other than food, mainly imports, 
were the primary source of inflation, rising by 8.2% over the year, as 
price controls for utilities and some food items constrained other price 
increases (Figure 3.4.2). 
Lower revenue attributable to weak oil prices forced cuts in 
planned spending, as the republican budget deficit narrowed to 2.2% 
of GDP from 2.7% in 2014. Revenue, which included transfers of oil 
earnings from the National Fund for the Republic of Kazakhstan 
amounting to 6.3% of GDP, rose to 14.8% of GDP from 14.5% in 2014. 
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Reduced economic activity and lower prices for commodity exports 
constrained tax yields, though the sharp depreciation of the currency 
boosted receipts somewhat during the last quarter. The budget was 
amended several times during 2015 in light of the plunge in oil prices, 
combining cuts in certain spending categories with countercyclical 
government programs that included a post-devaluation pay rise, 
higher pensions and social transfers, price adjustments for government 
programs, and preparations for Expo 2017. Total expenditure was 16.3% 
of GDP, up from 15.9% in 2014 (Figure 3.4.3). 
Monetary policy during 2015 tried to strike a balance between 
stemming the decline in growth attributable to low oil prices and 
curbing the inflation that followed the adoption of a floating exchange 
rate and the resulting plunge in the value of the currency. On 19 August 
2015, Kazakhstan announced a move from a tightly managed exchange 
rate band of T155–T188 per $1 to a floating rate regime. This triggered 
an immediate plunge to T252 per $1 and a subsequent depreciation to 
T340 by the end of the year, despite an eort to stem the decline that 
contributed to a net reduction of $1.2 billion in international reserves 
from August to December (Figure 3.4.4). To contain inflation, the 
National Bank of Kazakhstan, the central bank, introduced a base 
interest rate of 12% on 2 September 2015 and raised it to 16% a month 
later and to 17% in February 2016. However, extensive dollarization, 
with more than 65% of bank deposits in foreign currency, limits the 
eectiveness of monetary policy (Figure 3.4.5). The growth of broad 
money tripled to 34.3% from 10.5% in 2014, in part because currency 
depreciation raised the domestic currency value of foreign exchange 
deposits. Local currency deposits grew by only 7.9%. Nonperforming 
loans (NPLs) remain a significant issue facing banks, though the ratio of 
NPLs to all loans was reined in to below 10% by the end of 2015.
For the first time since 2009, Kazakhstan’s current account turned 
negative in 2015, with an estimated deficit equal to 2.8% of GDP 
following a surplus of 2.6% in 2014. Exports plunged by 42.4%, far more 
than the 6.2% decline in 2014. This largely reflected low oil prices, 
which fell still further in the last quarter of the year, but slow growth 
in trading partners hurt other exports as well. Imports fell by 22.9%, 
more than the 14.2% drop in 2014, as slow growth and the sharp rise in 
domestic prices for imported consumer goods curbed demand. Imports 
of services fell by 8.5%, versus an increase by 5.8% in 2014, as demand 
from mining and related activities decreased. However, the deficit in the 
income account narrowed by 50.6% as foreign investors’ earnings from 
oil exports declined sharply. The year saw the assets of the National 
Fund for the Republic of Kazakhstan fall by 13.3%, and international 
reserves by 4.6% (Figure 3.4.6). 
Economic prospects 
Growth is forecast to remain subdued at 0.7% in 2016 and 1.0% in 2017. 
Higher countercyclical expenditure, the Expo 2017 in Astana, and the 
anticipated entry into production of the long-delayed Kashagan oilfield 
mitigate the prospective drop in private consumption. With commodity 
prices expected to show little improvement, however, growth could be 
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lower than forecast if oil prices fall further or expansion in regional 
trading partners disappoints. 
On the supply side, construction and industry are forecast to expand 
by 1.4% in 2016 and 4.2% in 2017, as construction should benefit from 
public contracts, and higher oil production should boost industry 
in 2017 (Figure 3.4.7). With depreciation raising the competitiveness 
of agricultural exports and reducing demand for imported food, 
agricultural production can expect to grow by 3.0% in both 2016 and 
2017. Services, the driver of economic growth during the past 5 years, 
are projected to grow by only 0.9% in 2016 and contract by 1.0% in 2017, 
as the slump in trade from declining domestic demand osets expected 
growth in transport. 
On the demand side, private consumption should contract by 4.0% 
in 2016 and another 3.7% in 2017 in response to high prices, particularly 
for imports. Public consumption is forecast to grow by 4.0% in 2016 and 
5.0% in 2017, reflecting higher general service outlays to prepare for 
Expo 2017 and the implementation of countercyclical projects. Together, 
public and private investment are projected to expand by 7.3% in 2016 
and 6.1% in 2017 as public projects are used to oset sluggish private 
investment in extractive industries and low growth elsewhere in the 
economy. Net export volumes are forecast to rise by 2.0% in 2016 and 
5.0% in 2017 as volumes of mostly commodity exports contract less than 
imports, which are mainly price-sensitive consumer goods. In 2017, 
a rise in oil production attributable to the Kashagan oilfield should also 
boost exports. 
Average annual inflation is projected to accelerate to 12.6% in 2016, 
reflecting the impact of currency depreciation and a low base during the 
first 3 quarters of 2015, and then slow to 4.6% in 2017 as higher interest 
rates, weak domestic demand, and price controls restrain further 
increases. Imports other than food are expected to remain the main 
source of inflation. 
Over the next 2 years, fiscal policy is expected to support growth. 
The republican budget is projected to record a deficit equal to 1.8% of 
GDP in 2016 and 1.2% in 2017, after accounting for expected income 
transfers of 8.1% of GDP in 2016 and 8.0% in 2017 from the National 
Fund for the Republic of Kazakhstan. Tax receipts are projected to 
decline from the equivalent of 8.0% of GDP in 2015 to 6.9% in 2016, and 
then rebound to 7.4% in 2017 as higher prices add to value-added tax 
collections (though revenue may suer from possible corporate tax rate 
cuts). Expenditure is forecast equaling 16.9% of GDP in 2016 and 18.0% 
in 2017 with planned outlays for countercyclical projects and Expo 2017 
preparations. Total public and publicly guaranteed debt is projected 
to rise from 17.4% of GDP in 2015 to 17.8% in 2016 and 19.9% in 2017 
with projected borrowing from multilateral development banks and the 
impact of tenge depreciation on external public debt.
Over the next 2 years, monetary policy is expected to focus on 
containing inflation, though high dollarization and a shallow financial 
system will limit its eectiveness. Broad money growth is projected to 
rise by 33.5% in 2016, assuming an average exchange rate of T350 per $1, 
and by 7.5% in 2017, assuming an average rate of T370. These projections 
assume a small rise in local currency deposits and, as a result of 
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depreciation, a much larger increase in the local currency value of 
foreign currency deposits. 
The current account is forecast to record deficits equal to 3.5% 
of GDP in 2016 and 3.1% in 2017, mainly reflecting continued weak 
oil prices (Figure 3.4.8). Exports are projected to decline by 24.5% 
in 2016 and then rise by 10.4% in 2017 as international oil prices 
recover somewhat and the Kashagan oilfield starts producing in 2017. 
Imports are expected to fall by 23.3% in 2016 and, with some increase in 
imports for Expo 2017, rise by 3.5% in that year. Trade in services should 
record a deficit equal to 2.6% of GDP 2016 and 3.2% in 2017 because 
of some substitution of domestic for imported services to avoid higher 
costs from tenge depreciation. The deficit in the income account should 
move in line with oil price developments. 
Public and publicly guaranteed external debt is projected to rise 
slightly, from the equivalent of 10.3% of GDP at the end of 2015 and 2016 
to 10.6% at the end of 2017, reflecting planned loans from multilateral 
development banks and the impact of depreciation. Total external debt 
is expected to increase from 84.6% of GDP at the end of 2015 to well 
above 100.0% at the end of 2016.
Policy challenge—strengthening  
a weak financial system
The sudden move to a floating exchange rate from a tightly managed 
band revealed financial vulnerabilities that stem not only from 
persistently high NPLs but also from high and growing dollarization 
and much lower oil prices. Since the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, 
old and new NPLs attributable to construction and real estate have 
inhibited private sector lending, with NPLs reaching 37.6% of total 
lending in 2012. By 1 January 2016, NPLs had fallen to 8.0%, meeting 
a central bank target of less than 10% after it took on some NPLs and 
eased writing them o. Besides NPLs, the country also suers from a 
highly concentrated financial sector in which banks held more than half 
of sector assets at the end of 2015, and the top five banks held nearly 
60% of all banking assets.
Currency depreciation has further increased the cost in tenge of 
foreign currency borrowing, undercut bank capitalization, worsened 
the risk of borrower default, and consequently hurt the market value 
of banks’ equity and deterred their lending. Depreciation has greatly 
increased the tenge value of private external debt, which totaled 
$8.6 billion for banks and $54.2 billion for other private firms at the 
end of September 2015. In addition, refinancing has become di¥cult. 
Possibilities for foreign refinancing suered from a downgrade in the 
country’s sovereign credit rating to BBB–, the lowest investment grade. 
Moreover, a 17% central bank policy rate and shallow interbank and 
bond markets make domestic refinancing very costly. As a result, there 
has been no new lending in real terms. Loans as a percentage of GDP 
hardly changed during 2014 and 2015 (Figure 3.4.9). To provide finance 
to small and medium-sized enterprises, the consolidated pension fund 
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started making loans at concessional rates as part of a T600 billion 
injection into banks and national companies to stimulate retail lending. 
The government and the central bank have taken some steps to 
address these problems. The government helped reduce NPLs by 
introducing the prudential requirement that NPLs cannot exceed 10% 
of all loans, legal amendments to facilitate writing o NPLs, and special 
purpose vehicles to shift NPLs from bank balance sheets to the central 
bank. In 2015, the capital adequacy ratio was raised slightly. All banks 
must now measure credit risk by external ratings, while market risk and 
operational risks are assigned by set formulas. 
Beyond these measures, the financial system requires considerable 
support. To provide it, the central bank needs credibility, autonomy, 
and the resources to fill this role, especially as high dollarization 
hinders its ability to serve as a lender of last resort in foreign currency. 
As of 1 January 2016, four of the country’s 35 banks failed to comply 
with central bank prudential requirements. Banks may still overstate 
NPL provisions, which are based partly on collateral that has not been 
revalued since 2008. Moreover, most banks serve only small customer 
bases, and the loan portfolios of the smaller banks in particular are 
concentrated in a few sectors. As a result, the banking system suers 
from highly concentrated lending, with individual banks’ exposure to 
their single largest borrower averaging 19.6% in January 2016. This is 
worryingly close to the 25% prudential norm in Kazakhstan, which is 
higher than in some other countries. 
Further, the banks’ net open foreign exchange positions (foreign 
exchange liabilities exceeding assets) rose dramatically during 2015 
(Figure 3.4.10), and prudential requirements current in 2014 were 
relaxed for 2015 but not for 2016. Recapitalizing much of the banking 
system, both in tenge and foreign currency, might become necessary as 
risk-weighted provisions against unhedged foreign currency loans to 
corporations are often inadequate. 
To stabilize the banking system, the government plans as medium-
term measures to further develop noncash payments, reduce turnover 
in lightly regulated shadow banks, and ban foreign currency pricing. 
To achieve stability in the long run, the government will try to 
accelerate economic diversification and increase the local content of 
goods and services as far as possible under World Trade Organization 
regulations. In the short run, the size of guaranteed tenge deposits 
will be doubled from T5 million to T10 million, while interest rates on 
foreign currency deposits will be cut to 3%. The central bank also plans 
to provide more liquidity and continue to implement reforms to improve 
supervision and comply fully with Basel III requirements. A program 
to consolidate banks could minimize fiscal costs if banks require 
recapitalization. In addition, reining in dollarization is crucial to make 
both tenge intermediation and monetary policy more eective.
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This chapter was written by Gulkayr Tentieva of the Kyrgyz Resident Mission, ADB, Bishkek.
Kyrgyz Republic
Growth declined to 3.5% from 4.0% in 2014 as slower expansion in industry offset gains in 
agriculture and services. Growth is projected to plunge to 1.0% in 2016 as the external environment 
weakens before recovering to 2.0% in 2017 with some improvement in the Russian Federation and 
other trade partners. Currency depreciation is fueling inflation and exacerbating a debt problem 
that needs urgent attention.
Economic performance 
Continued recession in the Russian Federation and a slowdown 
in neighboring Kazakhstan weighed heavily on the economy. 
Growth slowed to 3.5% from 4.0% in 2014. Outside the troubled 
gold sector, growth was 4.5%, reflecting strong performance in 
agriculture and services. 
On the supply side, growth in industry slowed to 1.4% from 5.7% in 
2014 as gold production halved and output fell in textiles and electricity 
(Figure 3.5.1). Expansion in construction halved to 13.9% from 27.1% in 
2014 with less growth in investment, and growth in services declined 
to 3.7% from 4.6%, reflecting slowdowns in transport and retail trade. 
Agriculture grew by 6.2% after a 0.5% decline in 2014.
On the demand side, private consumption is estimated to have grown 
by 6.9%, down from 7.7% in 2014, as currency depreciation and lower 
remittances hurt retail trade. The same factors slashed capital investment 
growth to 8.0% from 24.9%. 
Average annual inflation slowed to 6.5% from 7.5% in 2014 despite 
currency depreciation, while the 12 month inflation rate December 
over December dropped to 3.4% from 10.5% as food prices fell by 4.2% 
(Figure 3.5.2). Inflation came mainly from increases of 50.0% for 
electricity, 26.0% for thermal energy, and 12.3% for goods other than food. 
The fiscal deficit declined to the equivalent of 3.0% of GDP from 3.9% 
in 2014 as about half of expected capital projects did not materialize. 
Revenues reached 37.4% of GDP, up from 35.9% in 2014, mainly on 
the sale of a mining license. Meanwhile, underspending on goods and 
services and delays in implementing public investment projects limited 
expenditure. Public debt nevertheless climbed to an estimated 68.8% 
of GDP, as external public debt expanded to 63.0% of GDP with sharp 
depreciation of the Kyrgyz som. 
Monetary policy remained cautious as the central bank intervened to 
stabilize the local currency. The som depreciated by a modest 5.4% during 
the first half of 2015 but became highly volatile after the 20 August float 
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of the Kazakh tenge. By the end of the year, the som had depreciated 
by 28.9% (Figure 3.5.3). The central bank intervened repeatedly 
in 2015 to stabilize the som, at a cost of $261 million. The policy rate 
was reduced slightly to 10.0% at year-end from 10.5% a year earlier. 
However, monetary policy can do little under extensive dollarization, 
and 55.2% of loans and 68.3% of deposits were in foreign currency at the 
end of 2015. The average deposit interest rate increased marginally to 
4.95% from 4.84% in 2014, while the average lending rate increased to 
18.61% from 17.58%. Deposits rose by 16.1%, and credit by 18.9%, while 
broad money grew by 14.9%, up from 3% in 2014. At the end of December, 
nonperforming loans reached 7.1%, up from 4.5% in 2014.
The 2015 current account deficit is estimated to equal 17.0% of GDP, 
up from 16.8% in 2014. The trade deficit narrowed to $2.4 billion from 
$2.9 billion as imports plunged by 29.0% and exports fell less sharply, 
by 11.0%. Remittances declined by 25.8% (Figure 3.5.4). At the end of 2015, 
international reserves were $1.78 billion, cover for 3.7 months of imports, 
down from $1.96 billion at the end of 2014.
External public debt as a percentage of GDP is estimated to have 
risen sharply to 63.0% from 51.0% at the end of 2014, mainly reflecting 
the depreciation of the som (Figure 3.5.5).
Economic prospects 
Growth is expected to slow to 1.0% in 2016, with continued weakness in 
the external environment, and recover slightly to 2.0% in 2017, assuming 
some improvement in the Russian Federation and other trade partners 
(Figure 3.5.6). However, the economy remains vulnerable to shocks from 
its largest enterprise, the Kumtor gold mine, where a drop in output 
cut 1% from growth in 2015 and disputed mine ownership could disrupt 
production in 2016.
On the supply side, processing, light industry, and to some extent 
construction should lift the economy. In addition, accession to the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) may boost trade and transportation, 
though demand in the EEU is weakening and the need to raise taris 
to EEU levels may shrink trade with economies outside the union 
(Box 3.5.1). On the demand side, lower remittances may further reduce 
household incomes and private consumption in 2016, though remittances 
should eventually rise with recovery in the Russian Federation and 
other trade partners.
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3.5.1 The impact of economic union
The Kyrgyz Republic joined the EEU in 2014, and the borders with 
Kazakhstan have been open since 12 August 2015. Accession has clouded 
the country’s growth prospects. While the country may ultimately benefit 
from higher trade, more e¡cient flows of labor and capital, and a decline in 
nontari trade barriers, its average taris will likely rise toward the common 
external tari of the EEU. Moreover, inflation may rise because of the large 
import content of intermediate and final consumer goods. The government 
is working to implement challenging reforms to comply with EEU technical 
regulations on plant diseases, pest control, and veterinary requirements, 
to boost opportunities for exporters of agricultural products.
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Inflation could jump in 2016 to 10.0% because further som 
depreciation is expected in response to weakness in the tenge and the 
ruble, and because taris on imported goods must rise to EEU levels. 
Inflation should ease to 8.0% in 2017 in line with smaller exchange rate 
and tari adjustments.
Monetary policy will remain cautious in 2016 as the central bank 
aims to stabilize the local currency and contain inflation, probably 
raising the policy interest rate if inflation accelerates. Interest rates 
would rise more with further depreciation of the som. 
The fiscal deficit is projected to equal 9.1% of GDP in 2016 and 4.1% 
in 2017. The government aims to limit the deficit by restraining 
expenditure. With slow growth, revenue is projected at around 35.0% of 
GDP in 2016 and 2017, while expenditure is forecast at 40.2% or more, 
pending cuts. Tax revenue could be higher if EEU accession yields more 
customs revenue than now forecast. However, the ratio of public debt 
to GDP will likely increase in 2016, possibly to the brink of high debt 
distress as defined by the International Monetary Fund.
The current account deficit is forecast to remain near 17.0% in 
2016 but ease to 15.0% in 2017 with some improvement in the external 
environment (Figure 3.5.7). Exports are forecast to grow by 5%–9% 
in both 2016 and 2017, mainly from gains in agricultural products 
and textiles. However, weaker consumer demand in 2016 in the EEU 
could worsen the trade outlook. The government, using $1 billion from 
the Russian Kyrgyz Development Fund, is working to restructure the 
economy by supporting export-oriented industries and taking other 
measures to smooth entry into the EEU. Imports are expected to grow 
by about 5% in both 2016 and 2017 because of planned infrastructure 
projects. Remittances will likely fall another 10% in 2016 with continued 
recession in the Russian Federation, where nearly all Kyrgyz migrants 
work, and possible further ruble depreciation. 
Policy challenge—achieving fiscal and debt 
sustainability
The public debt situation worsened notably in 2015 as further sharp 
depreciation of the som raised the ratio of external public debt to GDP 
to an estimated 63.8% by year-end, well above the current legal ceiling 
of 60.0% (Figure 3.5.8). Moreover, slowing growth, rising inflation, and 
reserve depletion threaten to exacerbate the debt problem.
Although the government has introduced amendments to raise 
the public debt ceiling, its goal is to bring the ratio of debt to GDP 
below 65% in the medium term. Reducing the debt ratio will require 
prioritizing and rescheduling public investment, cutting the wage bill 
and other spending, and better managing debt. 
Besides these measures, greater care when contracting and 
guaranteeing new debt would require a moratorium on commercial 
borrowing and improved debt monitoring to minimize risks from 
public enterprises.
Fiscal consolidation is essential to restore debt sustainability 
while funding programs that address poverty and boost growth. 
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The government is developing measures—held back in 2015 because 
of parliamentary elections—for fiscal consolidation in 2016, to be 
accelerated in 2017 and 2018.
 Tax revenue should be raised by improving tax administration and 
widening the tax base by removing exemptions and simplifying tax 
procedures. On the revenue side, the government plans to (i) strengthen 
the administration of value-added taxes, (ii) let exemptions expire on 
schedule while eliminating other exemptions and avoiding new ones, 
(iii) raise excise rates on alcohol and tobacco, (iv) introduce stamp duties 
on some domestic goods, and (v) enact a luxury tax on high-value real 
estate. On the expenditure side, it plans to (i) refrain from ad hoc wage 
increases and prepare a plan to gradually reduce the wage bill to 8% 
of GDP by 2018, (ii) streamline purchases of goods and services while 
keeping outlays at the 2015 level in som terms, (iii) rationalize and better 
target existing subsidies, (iv) review electricity taris to ensure sector 
sustainability, (v) reduce duplication in social benefits and improve their 
targeting, and (vi) keep domestically financed public investment below 
3% of GDP. 
 If these measures are implemented, public and publicly guaranteed 
debt is projected to peak at 66% of GDP in 2017, then fall below 65% 
by 2018. However, as the risks to debt sustainability remain high, it is 
critical to improve debt management and mobilize domestic sources 
of financing. Measures to stimulate growth include using the Russian 
Kyrgyz Development Fund to support export-oriented industries and 
improving the business environment to attract investments.
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Tajikistan
Reported growth slowed to 6.0% and trade declined, reflecting lower commodity prices, weak 
private investment, and remittance shortfalls. Growth is projected to fall to 3.8% in 2016 as 
recession continues in the Russian Federation and activity remains weak in other trading partners, 
then recover slightly to 4.0% in 2017. A better business environment would boost local production 
and employment, alleviating excessive dependence on remittances.
Economic performance 
Growth decelerated to 6.0% in 2015 from 6.7% a year earlier as 
recession in the Russian Federation and a plunge in the ruble caused 
remittances, Tajikistan’s main source of income, to fall by a third 
(Figure 3.6.1). About 135,000 Tajik migrant workers returned home as 
a result of tightened immigration control in the Russian Federation. 
Other constraints on growth were lower prices for primary Tajik 
exports aluminum and cotton, weak private investment, and the 
depreciation of the Tajik somoni by nearly a third. 
On the supply side, a 21.2% rise in construction fueled by public 
investment was the main driver, osetting a 7.0% decline in services 
due mainly to the drop in remittances (Figure 3.6.2). Growth in 
industry slowed to 11.2% from 13.3% in 2014 despite significant gains in 
electricity generation and mining. Growth in agriculture slowed to 3.2% 
from 4.5% in 2014 as late spring frosts reduced exports of dried fruit. 
On the demand side, low remittances and currency depreciation 
constrained private consumption. Higher investment from the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) partly oset lower private consumption.
Inflation slowed, despite the depreciation, to 5.1% from 6.1% in 
2014, reflecting the drop in private consumption, lower global prices for 
petroleum and wheat, and currency depreciation in Tajikistan’s main 
trade partners. Prices rose by 4.3% for food, 7.8% for other goods, and 
2.3% for services.
Fiscal policy was generally expansionary over the year, though 
lower private consumption and a 20% drop in imports constrained 
tax revenue. In response, the government deferred a salary increase 
but maintained social spending. Despite the slowdown, total revenue 
including grants rose from the equivalent of 28.4% of GDP in 2014 to 
an estimated 30.1%, reflecting better tax administration (Figure 3.6.3). 
Expenditure also rose, to 32.4% from 29.0% in 2014, as capital spending 
was expanded to maintain economic activity. The overall budget deficit 
reached 2.3% of GDP. Public and publicly guaranteed debt (all external) 
rose to 27.8% of GDP at the end of 2015 from 22.7% a year earlier as the 
somoni depreciated.
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This chapter was written by Muhammadi Boboev of the Tajikistan Resident Mission, ADB, 
Dushanbe.
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Monetary policy aimed to ensure macroeconomic stability and 
rein in inflation. To facilitate lending, reserve requirements were 
cut for financial institutions that met capital adequacy standards: 
by 0.5 percentage points to 1.5% for local currency deposits, and by 
1.0 percentage point to 7.0% for foreign. In response, broad money grew 
by 18.7% during the year, up from 7.1% in 2014 (Figure 3.6.4). At the 
same time, the National Bank of Tajikistan, the central bank, used 
open market operations to reduce liquidity. In March 2016, it raised the 
refinancing rate by 1.0 percentage point to 9.0% to dampen inflation. 
Depreciation intensified financial sector problems because of 
extensive dollarization. Nonperforming loans reached 30%, while average 
bank capital fell to 12% of assets. Eorts to consolidate microfinance 
organizations by raising their minimum capital requirements induced 
some to merge or close when their licenses were withdrawn. 
Lower remittances and export receipts, along with currency 
depreciation in Tajikistan’s main trade partners, caused the somoni to 
depreciate, despite sizable interventions to stabilize exchange rates, 
by 31.7% against the dollar and 16.1% against the ruble (Figure 3.6.5). 
At the end of 2015, reserves totaled $494.3 million, covering only about 
1.6 months of imports, which is well below prudential norms and 
constrains the central bank’s ability to defend the currency against any 
further depreciation (Figure 3.6.6).
To ease currency pressures, foreign exchange control was 
strengthened. In April 2015, the operations of private exchange oces 
were brought under the control of banks. In September, the central bank 
signed a $500 million currency swap agreement with its counterpart in 
the PRC. In December, authorization for foreign exchange operations 
was restricted to financial institutions. In February 2016, the central 
bank sought to shield the currency from ruble fluctuation by asking all 
financial institutions to convert incoming ruble remittances into somoni. 
The current account deficit narrowed from the equivalent of 9.1% 
of GDP in 2014 to an estimated 5.9% despite the plunge in remittances. 
Exports fell by 8.9%, mainly because of weak demand and lower world 
prices for the country’s main exports, while imports dropped by 20.1% 
due to lower private consumption. External debt equaled 27.8% of GDP 
at the end of 2015, mainly because of depreciation.
Economic prospects 
Growth is forecast to slow to 3.8% in 2016, reflecting the continuing 
recession in the Russian Federation, before recovering to 4.0% in 2017 
with some recovery in the external outlook. Second-round eects 
of developments in 2015, along with weaker economic performance 
in Tajikistan’s other main trade partners (the PRC, Kazakhstan, 
and Turkey) and continued low global commodity prices, will limit 
remittances and foreign investment, constraining demand and 
consumption in 2016. Expected recovery in the Russian Federation and 
better performance in other regional partners in 2017 should improve 
growth prospects. 
On the supply side, industry is forecast to grow moderately in 2016 
as construction picks up and to accelerate in 2017 on increases in mining 
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and processing, as well as the opening of Tajikistan’s segment of a 
regional high-voltage power line and a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan 
to the PRC. Agriculture should grow modestly as repatriating migrants 
return to their farms. However, services are projected to contract 
further as weak remittances hold down household income. 
On the demand side, weak remittances, low foreign exchange 
earnings, and likely continued depreciation of the currency will limit 
gains in private consumption and investment, though a possible hike 
in civil service salaries during 2016 would support consumption. 
With private investment shrinking, the government is likely to expand 
public investment. 
Inflation is projected to accelerate to 8.5% in 2016 and slow to 7.5% 
in 2017, reflecting the lagged eect on import prices of depreciation 
in 2015 and somewhat less depreciation in 2016 (Figure 3.6.7). 
Weak demand should limit price hikes in services. Higher inflation 
could result if foreign exchange restrictions are further tightened, or 
if depreciation exceeds expectations. 
Fiscal policy is expected to be expansionary over the next 2 years 
given the challenges facing the economy. The budget is projected to 
record deficits equal to 2.5% of GDP in 2016 and 1.5% in 2017, but 
deficits could be higher with further depreciation or pressure to clear 
arrears at public enterprises. The projected growth slowdown is 
expected to limit revenues despite ongoing reform to tax administration. 
Revenue is forecast equal to 29.0% of GDP in 2016 and 30.5% in 2017. 
Total expenditure is forecast at 31.5% of GDP in 2016 and 32.0% in 2017, 
with increases for capital investment but not current outlays. Higher 
public investment should raise public debt above 35% of GDP.
Monetary policy will likely aim to curb inflation while preventing 
recession. Broad money growth will rise mainly as foreign exchange 
deposits gain value in local currency terms. Exchange rate policy is 
expected to move gradually to a floating rate regime because of limited 
reserves. Banks face serious risks from ongoing depreciation, tightened 
foreign exchange regulations, and stagnant retail trade and services. 
The current account deficit is forecast to narrow to 4.8% of GDP 
in 2016 and then widen to 5.5% in 2017 (Figure 3.6.8). Exports are 
projected to rise by 5% in 2016 and 7% in 2017 as depreciation boosts 
competitiveness. Imports are expected to contract by 7% in 2016 in 
tandem with lower demand before rising by 5% in 2017 with higher 
capital spending and some growth in remittances with recovery in the 
Russian Federation.
Policy challenge—developing a new growth model
Tajikistan is highly vulnerable to external shocks, particularly from 
commodity prices and remittances (Figure 3.6.9). Output and exports 
are constrained by limited production and low value added. This leaves 
remittance-financed consumption as the main source of growth. 
Tajikistan needs a new growth model based more on domestic 
production and exports. Research suggests that the economy’s potential 
growth rate has fallen by 2 percentage points since 2007, raising 
concerns about growth prospects over the medium to long term. 
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While stimulating demand may help in the short run, sustained growth 
will require supply-side reform to revive the country’s industrial base 
and boost employment. 
The government is considering a number of measures in its 
National Development Strategy to 2030 to boost economic activity: 
securing stable access to energy resources, attaining self-suciency 
in food production, integrating international and national transport 
links, developing communication networks, and broadening access to 
social services.
Further, Tajikistan would do well to address important obstacles 
facing businesses. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business 2016 
report, Tajikistan ranks exceptionally poorly on getting electricity, 
at 177 out of 189 economies surveyed; taxation at 172; and getting 
construction permits at 152. Moreover, the complexity of tax regulation 
is the second highest concern among firms in Tajikistan, according to 
the Global Competitiveness Report 2015–2016 of the World Economic 
Forum. During the past year, many firms have been pressured to make 
advance tax payments. Tight foreign exchange controls have further 
complicated doing business. 
In the short run, a few measures would make private investment 
more attractive: adopting more stable and transparent investment 
incentives; reducing the number of surprise business inspections, in 
part by halving the number of government units conducting them; 
limiting advance tax payments to 3 months’ worth of annual liabilities; 
streamlining the granting of construction permits; and simplifying 
regulations on certifying product quality, toward boosting exports. 
Over the medium term, a sequenced approach to growth should 
start small in carefully selected locales. Private investment should 
be encouraged to improve identified urban growth nodes, value 
chains in priority areas, and connections with external markets. 
This approach would build on the four special zones the government 
has created to increase exports, which otherwise risk becoming 
enclaves because of weak links with the local economy. Simple, 
infrastructure-driven economic corridor development anchored on the 
strongest center, Dushanbe, could magnify current growth potential, 
propelling expansion in the Kurgan–Tube area. Economic corridor 
development—featuring improved transportation and small but clustered 
investments in energy, information and computer technology, or 
urban infrastructure—could also create the jobs that Tajikistan needs, 
in particular for returning migrants. 
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This chapter was written by Jennet Hojanazarova of the Turkmenistan Resident Mission, 
ADB, Ashgabat.
Turkmenistan
Growth slowed to 6.5% in 2015 with the decline in global energy prices, and the current account 
deficit widened to 11.8% of GDP with exports falling more than imports. Growth is forecast to 
remain at 6.5% in 2016 on reduced energy earnings, then recover to 7.0% in 2017 with expected 
higher petroleum prices. Diversifying the highly concentrated export sector would help smooth 
output volatility and create jobs to absorb a young and growing working-age population.
Economic performance 
The government reported growth at 6.5% in 2015, down from 10.3% a 
year earlier (Figure 3.7.1). The slowdown reflected declines in energy 
prices, but growth found support from investments in social and 
industrial development, which picked up to 7.8% from 6.7% in 2014. 
On the supply side, slower growth in hydrocarbons cut expansion in 
industry to 3.1% from 11.4% in 2014. Growth in agriculture accelerated 
to 7.9% from 4.2% a year earlier, reflecting good harvests of wheat 
and cotton and increased livestock farming. Expansion in services 
diminished slightly, to 10.0% from 10.6% in 2014, mainly due to slower 
growth in services related to construction.
Average annual inflation is estimated to have held steady at 6.0% 
(Figure 3.7.1). Despite the 19% devaluation of the Turkmen manat at the 
beginning of the 2015, prices for food and services stabilized during 
the second half with price controls, state subsidies, and the absence 
of further depreciation. The government’s import-substitution policy 
contributed by helping to fill the market with less expensive locally 
produced food and household goods. Broad money growth slowed to 
8.4% from 11.4% in 2014. However, growth in private credit is estimated 
to have risen to 30.0% from 20.9% in 2014, reflecting mainly import 
substitution and construction by small and medium-sized enterprises. 
The government budget is estimated to have moved from a 
surplus equal to 0.8% of GDP in 2014 to a deficit of 1.0% (Figure 3.7.2). 
This reflects continued spending on social programs, including a 10% 
rise in public wages, pensions, and students’ stipends, along with higher 
investment outlays. Lower hydrocarbon exports limited revenues, but 
the government’s Stabilization Fund helped smooth revenue volatility. 
As in past years, energy revenues largely covered the fiscal deficit in 
the non-hydrocarbon economy, estimated at 10.3% of GDP in 2015. 
Public debt rose slightly, to 18.7% of GDP from 16.8% in 2014. 
Lower prices and slack demand for energy products—especially 
natural gas, Turkmenistan’s main export—sharply reduced export 
earnings. Export revenues are estimated to have fallen by 34% as 
hydrocarbon exports plunged by 36.5%. Imports dropped by 22.4%. 
3.7.1 GDP growth and inflation
%
0
4
8
12
16
2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP growth
Inflation
2011
Sources: International Monetary Fund. 2015. Regional 
Economic Outlook, Middle East and Central Asia. October; 
ADB estimates.
Click here for figure data
3.7.2 Government fiscal balances
%
–20
–10
0
10
20
2012 2013 2014 2015
Non−hydrocarbon fiscal balance
Non−hydrocarbon revenue
Overall fiscal balance
2011
Note: Non-hydrocarbon fiscal balance and revenue are 
percentages of non-oil gross domestic product, and 
the overall fiscal balance is a percentage of total gross 
domestic product.
Sources: International Monetary Fund. 2015. Regional 
Economic Outlook, Middle East and Central Asia. October; 
ADB estimates.
Click here for figure data
Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia: Central Asia Turkmenistan  115
The current account deficit widened to 11.8% of GDP from 5.8% in 
2014 as exports declined more than imports. Foreign direct investment, 
mainly in hydrocarbons and construction, rose slightly to 9.6% of GDP. 
External debt, all of it public, stayed below 20% of GDP, while foreign 
exchange reserves were estimated at 30 months of import cover at the 
end of 2015.
Economic prospects 
The economy relies heavily on oil and gas exports, the earnings from 
which are envisioned to remain weak with lower prices. This may 
prompt the government to cut spending, but a low public debt ratio 
and considerable fiscal reserves allow it to adjust gradually and sustain 
growth through social spending and public investment that support the 
non-hydrocarbon economy. 
Growth is projected steady at 6.5% in 2016, rising to 7.0% in 2017. 
However, it could be lower if external weakness persists, requiring the 
government to implement more stringent fiscal adjustment. 
To limit inflation, the government will continue import-substitution 
policies and price controls. Inflation is nevertheless projected rising 
to 6.6% in 2016 before returning to 6.0% in 2017, assuming no further 
manat depreciation. The Central Bank of Turkmenistan will likely 
tighten monetary policy by restraining credit expansion. Broad money 
growth is expected to slow further to 7.2% in 2016.
The state budget for 2016 projects a deficit equal to 1.2% of GDP. 
The Stabilization Fund will continue to support domestic development 
projects to build social and industrial infrastructure. With lower natural 
gas prices, export earnings should diminish further in 2016, widening 
the current account deficit to 12.3% of GDP. A modest recovery in global 
energy prices in 2017 is expected to narrow the current account deficit 
to 10.0% of GDP. Foreign direct investment will likely remain strong in 
both years. External debt is projected at 16.6% of GDP in 2016 and 15.9% 
in 2017. 
Policy challenge—diversification  
for sustainable growth
Turkmenistan has one of the highest ratios of trade to GDP in 
Central Asia. Trade generates nearly 84% of GDP, and hydrocarbons 
account for over 90% of exports, making Turkmenistan’s exports the 
most concentrated in the subregion (Figure 3.7.3). Such reliance on 
earnings from hydrocarbons leaves the economy highly exposed to 
developments in the global oil and gas market. 
The current deterioration in the external environment, and 
especially falling energy prices, highlight the economy’s vulnerability 
from dependence on energy exports (Figure 3.7.4). While fiscal measures 
can oset external shocks over the near term using savings accumulated 
in sovereign wealth funds, a prolonged period of low energy prices 
could diminish these buers. Greater diversification would help 
smooth output volatility, create jobs to absorb the country’s young and 
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growing working-age population, and develop the economy outside of the 
hydrocarbon sector. 
The government initiated programs within the National Program for 
Socio-Economic Development, 2011–2030 to diversify the economy through 
state-led industrialization and private sector development. The priority 
sectors—oil and gas, electric power, chemicals, construction, transport 
and communications, light industry, food processing, textiles, and 
agribusiness—received targets and government allocations with the aim 
of boosting growth in the non-hydrocarbon economy and in hydrocarbon 
processing. Heavy public investment and strong foreign direct investment 
(Figure 3.7.5) support the government’s industrial policy with gross 
investment that in 2015 equaled 36.6% of GDP. 
As the share of processing in all industry rose from 29% in 2012 
to a provisional 42% in 2015, diversification has been most evident in 
hydrocarbons, and a dynamic tradable sector beyond hydrocarbons 
has yet to emerge. Gaining more from diversification requires balanced 
investment management, with adequate support to manufacturing and 
agriculture in addition to expanding hydrocarbons and services, making 
investments more e¡cient, and deepening structural reforms. 
The magnitude of public investment provides ample opportunity to 
improve its management. A well-coordinated multiyear investment plan 
should balance growth in hydrocarbons and the rest of the economy. 
Raising the quality of investment depends on introducing a strong 
medium-term fiscal framework, careful prioritization, and thorough 
appraisal and selection of investment projects. 
As the capital-intensive hydrocarbon sector employs little labor—only 
1.7% of total employment (Figure 3.7.6)—industrial policy should dedicate 
adequate support to productive sectors outside of hydrocarbons that can 
generate export income and employment. Investment in highly productive 
industrial clusters would strengthen value chains throughout the economy, 
create networks of local suppliers, and expand the employment potential 
of the export sector. Industrializing agriculture, which provides 43% 
of all employment, by developing agribusiness and adopting advanced 
technology would likely boost its productivity and add value to its products. 
Productivity can be further enhanced, and more jobs created, by developing 
a high-quality service sector where large potential exists: transport and 
communications, logistics, finance, trade and marketing, and tourism. 
Policies should aim to create an environment conducive to private 
sector expansion, encouraging firms to develop export markets, upgrade 
workers’ skills, and promote technology transfer through foreign capital. 
Investments in education and health would create the human capital 
needed for structural transformation and improve social development 
in the country, whose current Human Development Index ranking is 
109 out of 188. Investing in research and development for innovation, and 
providing local businesses with information and financial support, would 
help them acquire the critical mass needed to enter the global market.
Reform to strengthen institutions and governance, the legal and 
regulatory framework, and the protection of property rights—and 
to render public finance more open and transparent—would enable 
hydrocarbon revenues to be invested more e¡ciently and productively, 
thereby furthering diversification.
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Uzbekistan
Despite a challenging external environment, rising public investment buoyed growth at 8.0% 
in 2015. Trade contracted sharply, and the current account surplus narrowed. Growth is expected 
to slow to 6.9% in 2016, reflecting continued weakness in trade partners, before recovering to 
7.3% in 2017 as the global outlook improves. Strengthening competitiveness in diverse markets will 
require further efforts to promote innovation.
Economic performance 
The economy grew by 8.0% in 2015, the ninth consecutive year of 
expansion at 8.0% or higher. Growth was expected to be lower because 
of a slowdown in the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan’s largest trade 
partner and source of remittances. This slowdown has profoundly 
aected Uzbekistan in two ways: It reduced bilateral trade and 
remittances, thereby diminishing foreign exchange revenues and private 
consumption, and it accelerated the depreciation of the Uzbek sum 
against the US dollar. In response, the government tightened import 
controls while expanding public investment and commercial lending to 
sustain domestic demand. 
On the supply side, the main contributors to growth were industry at 
8.0%, down from 8.3% in 2014, and services (including construction) at 
14.0%, down from 15.4%. In industry, public investment boosted output 
in metallurgy, construction materials, and food processing. Export-
oriented machinery and energy—traditional locomotives of industrial 
growth—showed little or no expansion despite receiving more than 
a quarter of all investment. Public investment also supported robust 
construction, which expanded by 17.0%. In services, telecommunications 
expanded by 15.4% and finance by 30.0%, mainly on higher domestic 
lending and sustained demand. Transport, including logistics, 
grew by 5.1%, down from 8.9% in 2014 in line with weaker external 
trade. Agriculture grew by 6.8%, slightly down from 6.9% in 2014, 
supported by favorable weather and good harvests of grain and cotton 
(Figure 3.8.1).
On the demand side, growth found support in public investment and, 
to a lesser extent, consumption. The government reported that gross 
investment, a fifth of which came from abroad, rose by 9.5%, while gross 
fixed capital formation rose by 9.6%. Energy received the largest share 
of investment at 24.0%, followed by petrochemicals at 2.6%. In 2015, a 
consortium involving Uzbekistan and the Republic of Korea completed 
a $4.0 billion petrochemical plant on the Surgil natural gas deposit that 
produces polymers high in demand, generating exports and replacing 
3.8.1 Supply-side contributions to growth
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imports. Other projects expanded power plants and constructed a new 
production facility at General Motors Uzbekistan. Despite a 17% rise 
in public sector wages, a massive drop in remittances limited growth 
in private consumption. According to the Central Bank of the Russian 
Federation, in the first 9 months of 2015 (the latest for which data are 
available), remittances to Uzbekistan sent via money transfer systems 
fell by 59% from the same period in 2014, to $1.8 billion (Figure 3.8.2). 
Recession in the Russian Federation, the sharp depreciation of the ruble, 
and the return of 330,000 Uzbek migrant workers in 2014 and 2015 
precipitated the plunge in remittances.
The government reported inflation at 5.6%, well within the target 
range of the Central Bank of Uzbekistan. The International Monetary 
Fund, using the same data but a dierent methodology, estimated 
inflation at 9.3% in the year to September 2015, down from the previous 
year (Figure 3.8.3). Average annual inflation for 2015 is estimated 
at 9.0%. Despite higher public wages and pensions, tari hikes, and 
currency depreciation, inflation slowed in 2015, reflecting lower global 
food prices and import costs. Inflationary pressures came largely from 
greater depreciation of the sum, which lost 37% of its value against the 
US dollar on the parallel market in 2015, reflecting the depreciation of 
the ruble against the US dollar and lower global petroleum prices.
The central bank continued its policy of steadily lowering 
the o¢cial rate of the sum against the US dollar, as the uno¢cial 
rate fell even faster on the parallel market. Taking into account 
weaker currencies across the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(most notably the ruble and Kazakh tenge), the sum is estimated to 
have appreciated in real terms in 2015, making exports less competitive. 
The government responded by restricting imports and strengthening 
foreign exchange controls. The gap between o¢cial and parallel market 
exchange rates more than doubled in 2015.
The central bank cut its policy interest rate from 10.0% in 2014 
to 9.0% while keeping strict control over payment arrears and cash 
in circulation by promoting noncash payments through debit cards. 
Broad money growth is estimated to have risen slightly, to 20.7% in 2015 
from 18.0 % a year earlier, in line with expanding domestic credit. 
The augmented budget balance—which includes the surplus of the 
Uzbekistan Fund for Reconstruction and Development, the sovereign 
wealth fund—is estimated to have recorded a surplus equivalent to 0.2% 
of GDP for 2015, down from 2.1% a year earlier (Figure 3.8.4). 
The state budget was reported in deficit as tax cuts for firms 
and individuals and lower international prices for gas, copper, and 
cotton reduced revenues. Early in 2015, the government announced 
a new 5-year public investment program to upgrade industry and 
infrastructure. The $40.8 billion program raised capital spending to an 
estimated 4.7% of GDP from 4.1% in 2014. Total government debt, all of 
it external, rose to 11.0% of GDP from 8.7% in 2014, in line with higher 
foreign borrowing for domestic infrastructure. Holding substantial 
foreign exchange reserves of around $24 billion, the government has no 
plans to borrow domestically over the medium term. 
The government reported a $455.1 million surplus in external 
trade in goods and services in 2015, triple the $149.5 million surplus 
3.8.3 Broad money and inflation
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reported a year earlier (Figure 3.8.5). Excluding services, the trade 
balance recorded a deficit of $1.7 billion, and the current account 
surplus narrowed to 0.3% of GDP from 1.4% in 2014. Exports of goods 
and services plunged by 8.8% as global prices for the country’s export 
commodities (natural gas, gold, copper, and cotton) hit historic lows 
and slowdowns in Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, and the Russian 
Federation constrained trade. Total trade with these three partners 
dropped by 22% from 2014. Exports of energy declined by 30%, cotton 
by 9%, and metals by 16%. 
Developments in the Russian Federation since mid-2014 have 
profoundly aected Uzbekistan’s export performance. Weak consumer 
demand there and rapid appreciation of the sum against the ruble 
hurt bilateral trade, which fell by 25%. These factors had a particularly 
negative eect on machinery exports, mainly General Motors 
automobiles, which plunged by 71%. The local market absorbed some 
of the surplus vehicles, often as investments to preserve the value 
of savings.
Imports of goods and services fell by 12.2% from 2014, mainly due to 
lower global prices and tighter import controls, with imports of energy 
falling by 16.2% and metals by 17.4%. External debt, mostly medium to 
long term, was estimated at 15.8% of GDP at the end of 2015, up from 
13.4% in 2014.
Economic prospects 
Growth is forecast to slow to 6.9% in 2016 because of the weak external 
outlook and recover to 7.3% in 2017, led by public investment and 
government spending (Figure 3.8.6). On the supply side, investment-led 
industry will remain the key driver of growth, supported by domestic 
lending. Planned wage and pension increases that exceed inflation 
should, along with social transfers, support private consumption and 
growth in services.
Agriculture is projected to grow at 6.0% in 2016 and 6.5% in 2017 
as vegetable harvests improve and wheat production holds its own. 
Early in 2016, the government announced a gradual reduction in output 
and state procurement of cotton fiber, from 3.4 million tons in 2015 to 
3.0 million by 2020. It also announced the reallocation of substantial 
cropland from cotton to vegetables. These two measures reflect a shift 
from energy- and water-intensive cotton to more sustainable crops with 
higher valued added.
In March 2015, the government announced a program of structural 
reform, modernization, and diversification of industry to 2019, which 
carries forward policies initiated in 2010 (Box 3.8.1). The program will 
boost investments to develop high-tech industry, make production 
less energy intensive, and expand the output of goods with high 
valued added, potentially generating a more advanced export mix. 
Public investment will rise substantially to achieve program objectives. 
The sovereign wealth fund is expected to finance an increasing share of 
domestic investment. Gross fixed capital formation is forecast to rise by 
13% in 2016 and 11% in 2017.
3.8.1  Selected economic indicators (%)
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The government will continue to support domestic consumption 
in 2016 and 2017, most likely by raising public sector wages, welfare 
payments, and pensions. However, the continued economic slowdown in 
the Russian Federation and associated losses in remittances will restrain 
growth in consumption, at least during 2016. Private consumption is 
forecast to rise by only 1.5% in 2016 but 3.0% in 2017.
Inflation is forecast at 10.0% in 2016 and 11.0% in 2017 (Figure 3.8.7). 
Inflationary pressures will emanate from higher government spending 
and, from 2017, anticipated faster depreciation of the currency. Continued 
declines in global prices for food and other imports could partly oset 
these pressures. Nevertheless, over the medium term, inflation will 
remain a key challenge, requiring close coordination of monetary, 
exchange rate, and fiscal policy. 
The government has projected a consolidated budget deficit of 1.0% 
of GDP in 2016, supporting economic expansion. Including expected 
sovereign wealth fund surpluses, the augmented budget is projected to 
post a surplus of 0.1% of GDP in 2016 and 0.3% in 2017. Expenditure is 
forecast to increase in 2016 and 2017 as the government raises health 
and education outlays, along with capital spending. It announced that 
expenditures for health and education will rise by 16% in 2016 and 
together comprise 59% of total budget outlays. 
The current account surplus is forecast to narrow to 0.2% of GDP 
in 2016 before widening to 0.8% in 2017 with some improvement in the 
global environment. Falling international prices for the country’s main 
exports, weak global trade, and the deteriorating economic situation in 
the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China will reduce 
the trade surplus and transfers. Merchandise exports are projected to 
rise by 2.0% in 2016 and 4.0% in 2017. 
Merchandise imports are projected to rise more gradually, by 2.0% 
in 2016 and 2.5% in 2017. Demand will come mostly from public 
infrastructure spending and the industrial modernization program. 
Lower global commodity prices and import controls should limit 
import payments.
Policy challenge—improving competitiveness 
through innovation
The weak global environment and historically low energy prices will 
continue to restrain activity in Kazakhstan, the People’s Republic of 
China, and, along with ongoing trade sanctions, the Russian Federation, 
undermining Uzbekistan’s primary trade flows. Uzbekistan’s exports 
depend heavily on prices for a few major commodities and developments 
in a handful of countries. A more diverse and sophisticated export 
base is essential to minimize external shocks and ensure export 
competitiveness, highlighting the importance of securing the continued 
transfer of technology along with capital equipment procured under the 
state-led industrial development program. 
Important as technology transfer may be, economic growth in 
Uzbekistan still comes mainly from factor accumulation, notably 
increases in the capital stock. State-led industrialization and the ensuing 
3.8.1  Overview of industrial policy 
for 2015–2019
In March 2015, the government 
adopted an ambitious program 
of structural reform, industrial 
modernization, and diversification 
for 2015–2019. The program carries 
forward government industrial 
policies initiated in 2010 and 
follows a program for 2011–2015. 
It targets developing high-tech 
industrial sectors, reducing the 
energy intensity of production, 
and expanding the production of 
finished goods. The program has 
846 investment projects totaling 
$40.8 billion for modernization 
and technological renovation, 
including $19.6 billion of committed 
financing and $21.2 billion in 
potential projects. The government 
aims to mobilize a rising share of 
foreign investment to finance the 
new program using infrastructure 
support, tax exemptions and 
preferences, and other incentives. 
Successful implementation of this 
program is expected to raise the 
share of industry in GDP to 27% by 
2020 (from 24% in 2015) and enable 
average growth of 9% per year in 
industry during 2015–2019.
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capital accumulation have not produced significant technology transfer 
or productivity gains, probably because of policy-based allocation 
of capital and labor and distortions in prices and exchange rates. 
In addition, most investment goes to capital-intensive state-owned 
enterprises, in which management preferences and government support 
provide little incentive for innovation. The lack of innovation also 
reflects low spending on research and development (R&D), equal to only 
0.2% of GDP, compared with more than 2.5% in advanced economies. 
State-owned research institutions dominate the financing of R&D 
for lack of interest among enterprises and foreign investors in innovative 
products, which represent only 7% of industrial output. Moreover, 
barely 0.5% of enterprises use innovative technologies for production, 
and the number of patent applications has languished for over a 
decade (Figure 3.8.8). Three-quarters of firms interviewed in a recent 
World Bank industrial survey had not introduced any new products in 
the past 3 years, and only 1% had contracts with local R&D institutes. 
Constraints on innovation include the high costs and economic risks of 
innovation, a shortage of qualified personnel, and the lack of financial 
resources, incentives, and information about new technologies.
Innovation needs support from appropriate interventions to 
strengthen technological capacity in domestic firms. The speed and 
depth of technological upgrading are closely linked to how domestic 
firms acquire technological knowledge: through informal learning, 
foreign direct investment, or licensing. 
Liberalizing foreign trade and promoting foreign investment 
facilitate access to global technology and innovation. Though exposing 
the country to more volatility, a more open economy promotes the 
adoption of external knowledge through trade and foreign investment. 
It also facilitates the absorption of foreign technology, which helps 
developing countries catch up with more advanced economies and grow. 
Uzbekistan’s high costs of external trade (as evidenced by consistently 
low ratings for trading across borders in the World Bank’s annual 
Doing Business surveys) and inadequate access to foreign exchange 
hamper knowledge acquisition and, thus, economic restructuring. 
Accordingly, measures to lower trade barriers and liberalize access 
to foreign exchange would promote innovation and long-term 
competitiveness.
While learning and technological absorption occur at the firm 
level, the extent to which countries upgrade their technological 
prowess also depends on institutional linkages. Innovation depends 
critically on facilitating interaction between enterprises and science 
and research institutions, expanding public funding for R&D and 
education, and enacting measures to reduce the cost of innovation for 
private firms. Science and research institutions and universities in 
Uzbekistan currently develop 72% of all innovations, versus industrial 
enterprises’ 7%. Thus, facilitating interaction between research 
institutes and firms should raise the share of innovative products in 
industry and accelerate the adoption of innovative processes.
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Economic growth continues to decelerate and is increasingly driven by services and consumption. 
Inflation will rise but remain low in 2016 and 2017, and the current account surplus will stay 
broadly stable. The authorities need to intensify supply-side structural reform to improve 
economic resilience in the face of a darkening international environment, financial market volatility, 
and financial and social challenges associated with industrial transformation.
Economic performance
Growth slowed further from 7.3% in 2014 to 6.9% in 2015 (Figure 3.9.1), 
continuing a trend since 2010 as the economy of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) shifts further toward a new normal in which domestic 
consumption and services are the main engines of growth, with the 
government increasingly focused on growth quality over quantity. 
Despite growth moderation, the PRC has doubled its GDP since 2009 
to reach $10.8 trillion in 2015, thus continuing to account for about a 
third of global growth in 2015, almost the same as in 2010 when its 
then smaller economy was growing by double digits. Apart from the 
diculty of sustaining the high growth rates of the past in today’s much 
larger economy, the moderation mainly reflects growth in the workforce 
slipping from its peak in recent years and the short-term adverse 
impact of measures to alleviate economic, environmental, and social 
imbalances. Delay in the global recovery played a role by suppressing 
export growth, though the PRC benefited from lower commodity prices. 
On the supply side, rebalancing progressed further toward growth 
driven by the service sector. Services contributed an estimated 
3.7 percentage points to GDP growth, while industry contributed 
2.8 points and agriculture 0.3 points. The share of services in nominal 
GDP increased to 50.5% (Figure 3.9.2). Financial services performed 
particularly strongly, growth of retail sales remained robust, and the 
hospitality sector stabilized after 2 lean years in which an anticorruption 
initiative limited scope for lavish entertainment. Within industry, 
consumer-oriented manufacturing outperformed heavy industry, which 
continued to suer from excess capacity, spillover from an ailing housing 
sector, and lower commodity prices. Heavy industry was the main 
factor behind the decline in aggregate industrial profits by 2.3% in 2015. 
Profits fell in 12 of 41 industrial subsectors, particularly aecting coal 
mining, petroleum and natural gas, and metals. Five northern provinces 
where these industries are concentrated reported growth substantially 
below the country average. They also reported job losses, though the 
labor market remained stable countrywide with 13.1 million new jobs in 
cities and healthy wage growth. 
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On the demand side, consumption was the main growth engine, 
contributing 4.6 percentage points to GDP growth, up from 3.7 in 2014 
(Figure 3.9.3). Investment contributed 2.5 percentage points, down 
from 3.4 in 2014, while the contribution of net exports turned negative. 
The continuing structural slowdown in investment growth was most 
pronounced in real estate, which suers from a large housing overhang. 
The government cushioned the correction by removing purchase 
restrictions, improving access to mortgages, relaxing down-payment 
requirements, and accelerating public housing construction and 
shantytown redevelopment. Real estate sales grew in recent months and 
prices increased, even as unsold floor space kept rising (Figure 3.9.4). 
Growth in manufacturing investment decelerated further due to an 
uncertain business outlook, particularly for capital-intensive industries, 
and a high corporate debt burden weighing most heavily on state-
owned enterprises. Investment in infrastructure slowed less, benefiting 
from government support. Consumption remained robust, supported 
by strong growth in households’ real disposable income, which rose 
by 7.4% year on year, driven by higher wages and social transfers. 
Stock market volatility since mid-2015 did not aect consumption, 
as stocks are only a fraction of financial wealth even for the small 7% 
of the urban population with trading accounts (Figure 3.9.5). Indeed, 
urban depositors’ propensity to spend increased markedly in the second 
half of the year, according to a survey by the People’s Bank of China, the 
central bank. The disparity between urban and rural household incomes 
narrowed further from 2.75 times in 2014 to 2.73 in 2015 (Figure 3.9.6), 
edging the ocial Gini coecient of inequality further down to 0.462 
from 0.469 in 2014 and 0.473 in 2013. 
Consumer price inflation averaged 1.4% year on year in 2015, down 
from 2.0% in 2014 and 2.6% in 2013, and substantially below the central 
bank’s inflation ceiling of 3.0% (Figure 3.9.7). This moderation mainly 
reflected lower prices for imported food and other commodities in 
line with global trends and renminbi appreciation in real eective 
terms. Core inflation, which excludes energy and food, remained stable 
at 1.6%. Average producer price deflation intensified from 1.9% in 2014 
to 5.2% in 2015 as falling global commodity prices reduced industrial 
input costs, which have a large weight in the PRC producer price index. 
Persistent excess capacity in a number of industries likely did not aect 
the producer price index, as it was broadly stable during the year.
Fiscal policy became more expansionary in 2015 and was instrumental 
to achieving the ocial GDP growth target of “about 7%.” The deficit 
in the ocial consolidated budget of the central and local governments 
nearly doubled from 1.8% of GDP in 2014 to 3.5% as growth in 
expenditure outpaced revenue (Figure 3.9.8). Consolidated government 
expenditure grew by 11.8% year on year in the first half of 2015 and 
by 19.4% in the second half, to average 15.9% in 2015. Only part of the 
increase can be explained by the inclusion in consolidated expenditure 
of sizable o-budget spending by local governments. Budgetary 
revenue growth accelerated to 8.5% year on year, after a slow start. 
Personal income tax revenues increased particularly strongly, suggesting 
better collection.
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As a result, public sector debt likely increased beyond the 57% 
of GDP estimated by the International Monetary Fund for 2014. 
Public debt sustainability was improved as local governments, which are 
the main holders of public debt, transformed into bonds CNY3.2 trillion 
in principal payments that came due in 2015 (4.7% of GDP), thus 
reducing servicing costs and lengthening maturity. Nevertheless, 
according to the Ministry of Finance, many sub-provincial governments 
still have debt-to-revenue ratios above the ocial ceiling of 100%, and 
some still violate restrictions imposed on o-budget borrowing.
To keep funding costs stable in light of moderating inflation, the 
central bank cut regulatory reserve requirements and benchmark 
loan and deposit rates on several occasions and injected liquidity into 
the banking system through open market operations and refinancing 
facilities for selected banks. As a result, money market rates fell to 
historic lows in nominal terms, as did benchmark deposit, lending, and 
mortgage rates (Figure 3.9.9). Lending rates declined a bit if deflated 
by the consumer price index but increased if deflated by the producer 
price index. Despite increased capital outflows, broad money (M2) 
supply growth averaged 11.9% in 2015, only marginally down from 12.7% 
in 2014, and was 5.5 percentage points above nominal GDP growth, up 
from a 4.6 point dierence in 2014 and 4.7 points in 2013 (Figure 3.9.10). 
Hence, debt and its associated risks continued to mount. Bank lending 
grew strongly, particularly in the second half of the year. The estimated 
stock of total social financing (a broader gauge of financing provided to 
nonfinancial enterprises and households from banks, nonbank financial 
institutions, and capital markets) expanded by an average of 15% in 2015. 
These developments suggest that economic activity was not constrained 
by credit supply. 
Financial intermediation became more transparent as banks and 
capital markets gained ground at the expense of nonbank financial 
institutions, mainly due to regulatory tightening and policy initiatives 
including central bank lending facilities provided through banks. 
Bank loans accounted for almost 70% of total social financing provided 
in 2015, up from 61.8% in 2014, while credit from trust funds and other 
nonbanks plunged to only 3.8% from 17.6% in 2014 and a peak of 29.8% 
in 2013 (Figure 3.9.11). The role of equity in enterprise finance continued 
to grow despite a setback after midyear stock market turbulence, and 
it accounted for 5.0% of total social financing in 2015, up from 2.7% 
in 2014 and only marginal contributions in preceding years. Similarly, 
corporate bonds contributed 18.5% of total social financing, up from 
12.3% in 2014. Local governments’ o-budget financing vehicles 
continued to account for a substantial share of corporate bond issuance. 
The renminbi is pegged to a basket of currencies that is undisclosed 
but was estimated in 2014 to be weighted 90% in US dollars. It has 
thus risen in tandem with the strong appreciation of the US currency 
since late 2014. By July 2015, according to the Bank for International 
Settlements, the renminbi appreciated by more than 14% year on 
year in nominal eective terms (against a trade-weighted basket of 
currencies) and in real eective terms, taking inflation into account 
(Figure 3.9.12). On 11 August 2015, the government moved to make the 
ocial exchange rate more market oriented by basing its determination 
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3.9.8  Fiscal indicators and nominal GDP
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on daily market quotes, thus taking another step toward the declared 
policy objective of full exchange rate flexibility. As a result, the 
appreciation of the renminbi against trade partner currencies moderated 
to about 1.5% year on year by January 2016 in both nominal and real 
terms. The government also improved foreign central banks’ access to 
the currency market and its reporting about ocial reserves, which 
facilitated the decision of the Executive Board of the International 
Monetary Fund in November 2015 to include the renminbi in special 
drawing rights by September 2016. The authorities have recently 
indicated that they will pay more attention to the nominal eective rate 
as a benchmark, which suggests that they will change the composition 
of the basket and lower the weight of the US dollar. This expectation has 
already generated more exchange rate volatility against that currency. 
Exports fell by 4.4% year on year in dollar terms in 2015 as global 
demand remained soft. However, real export growth was stronger 
than the dollar figures suggest, given the weakness of other invoicing 
currencies like the euro and the Japanese yen. Further, while a stronger 
renminbi might have narrowed the competitive edge of the PRC relative 
to its trade partners, the PRC has not lost global market share, according 
to the central bank, and the share of high-tech products in overall 
exports increased. 
The import bill also fell, by 13.4% in US dollar terms, owing to lower 
commodity prices and important structural changes: Imports of raw 
materials declined as domestic demand for construction materials and 
energy weakened, while robust demand for consumer goods, including 
cars, and for intermediate products and machinery is increasingly 
met by domestic suppliers. Imports would have fallen even more if 
oil import volume had not increased by 8.8%, most likely to build up 
reserves. 
The result was a trade surplus one-third above 2014. This propelled 
the current account surplus up to $293.2 billion, or 2.7% of GDP, despite 
a sharp increase in the services deficit caused by substantial overseas 
expenditure by outbound tourists (Figure 3.9.13). Nevertheless, the 
balance of payments was pushed into deficit by smaller net inflows of 
foreign direct investment and larger net outflows of other investment, 
including repayment of trade credits and other foreign currency loans, 
and by PRC exporters’ retention abroad of foreign currency proceeds 
in expectation of further renminbi depreciation (Figure 3.9.14). 
Gross international reserves declined accordingly by $513 million 
(including valuation changes caused by US dollar strength vis-à-vis 
other reserve currencies) at the end of 2015 but remained sizable at 
$3.4 trillion, or 31.2% of GDP.
Economic prospects 
Further weakening of economic growth momentum in early 2016 and 
the likely adverse short-term impact of structural reform, including 
reduced investment in industries with excess capacity, point to 
continued deceleration in economic growth over the forecast period, 
albeit somewhat mitigated by fiscal stimulus targeted to maintain social 
and financial stability. GDP growth is forecast to ease to 6.5% in 2016, 
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within the government target range of 6.5%–7.0%, and to 6.3% in 2017 
before stabilizing or rising again (Figure 3.9.15). 
Investment will remain the main drag on growth. Investment in real 
estate and capital-intensive industries with excess capacity will show 
particularly weak growth over the forecast period. This can be only partly 
compensated by sustained government spending on infrastructure and by 
higher investment in services and consumer-oriented manufacturing—
two areas where growth is likely to hold up. Infrastructure investment 
will continue to enjoy strong government support, though its growth rate 
will likely decline further (Figure 3.9.16). Moreover, with only a 22% share 
in overall investment, infrastructure investment cannot contribute as 
much to GDP growth as does investment in manufacturing or real estate. 
Government support for investment activity indicates that reducing the 
high share of investment in GDP (perhaps 45%), in line with the strategy 
of rebalancing GDP toward consumption, will be managed over several 
years to avoid a hard landing in the short term. 
Consumption growth will remain more robust. However, with 
incomes in poorer parts of the country still heavily dependent on 
slowing investment on large projects, consumption may weaken 
somewhat along with decelerating income growth. As in previous years, 
net exports are unlikely to make a significant contribution to growth.
Inflation is projected to rise over the forecast period as administered 
prices are further deregulated, and as commodity prices recover from 
current lows, but it will be held below the government ceiling of 3.0% 
by decelerating GDP growth (Figure 3.9.17). Thus, there is still room 
for interest rate cuts to stimulate growth, but the authorities may opt 
instead to reduce regulatory reserve requirements, which are still 
very high at 17.0% for large banks after the last cut on 1 March 2016. 
The central bank seems to be moving toward a monetary policy 
oriented to interest rates but is likely to maintain quantitative tools to 
control credit supply for priority sectors. High growth in lending and 
associated risks, particularly related to a high debt burden in those parts 
of industry that are most aected by decelerating economic activity, 
will continue to deserve close attention. With continuing liberalization 
of capital movements, more flexibility in exchange rate policy will be 
needed over time to make monetary policy more eective.
The government has announced that fiscal policy will stay 
expansionary. Eorts to curb local government spending will continue 
over the forecast period toward achieving the strategic objective of 
rendering local government finance more ecient, accountable, and 
sustainable. Ocial budget deficits will widen as more o-budget 
activities of local governments are brought on budget. Legislative and 
institutional preparations for a national property tax that will raise local 
government revenues have made progress but will take time to complete. 
Therefore, further increases in central government transfers can be 
expected. An alternative would be to redistribute personal income 
and consumption tax receipts from the center to local governments. 
Further, responsibility for financing and implementing major projects 
will be shifted away from local governments, thus ameliorating their 
need for unorthodox financing. Ceilings on bond issuance by provincial 
governments will be raised to help finance a larger share of deficits and 
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to transform all principal debt payments due over the forecast period 
into bonds. If bond ratings and yields further diverge according to how 
creditworthy the issuers are, this would signal that the program is 
becoming increasingly market driven.
The current account surplus will be maintained in 2016 but decline 
somewhat in 2017. Imports, following the pattern set by commodity 
prices, are forecast to be lower in 2016 but higher in 2017, while exports 
are unlikely to pick up strongly in light of lackluster global growth 
and trade. Exports with higher value added will continue to grow, 
however, compensating for diminished exports with lower value added. 
The services deficit will continue to widen, especially in the absence of 
substantial additional progress toward service sector deregulation. 
The government is expected to peg the renminbi to a more 
diversified basket of currencies over the forecast period and thereby 
keep it broadly stable in trade-weighted terms. Capital flows are thus 
likely to become even more a function of progress toward opening 
the capital account and reforming the domestic financial sector. 
The authorities are expected to improve equity market governance, 
streamline procedures for share issuance, and license more private 
banks to improve resource mobilization and allocation. Administrative 
measures taken in late 2015 and early 2016 to slow capital outflows 
are likely to be only temporary. The government will continue to 
pursue its strategic objective of further opening the capital account by 
improving cross-border capital movement, but not at the expense of 
financial stability. It will retain sucient controls to limit potentially 
destabilizing short-term capital flows. In February 2015, the government 
substantially broadened and simplified foreign private investors’ access 
to the domestic bond market, which at $7.3 trillion is the third largest in 
the world. This has potential to increase net capital inflows; foreigners 
currently hold less than 2% of domestic bonds. Additional channels 
for private cross-border capital transfer would likely facilitate capital 
outflow. A reduction in low-yielding ocial reserves could be in the 
interest of the PRC, particularly if it results from an increase in higher-
yielding outbound foreign investment. 
The principal international risks to the projections arise from 
the worsening global investment climate, considerable volatility in 
financial markets, and another dip in global commodity prices since 
the beginning of 2016. Complicating these developments is uncertainty 
about the economic trajectory of the PRC, which could aect investor 
and consumer sentiment worldwide and put the global recovery at risk, 
thereby reverberating back on the PRC. 
The principal domestic risk is that uncertainty about PRC 
exchange rate policy could create expectations of further renminbi 
depreciation, which would accelerate capital outflows and invite 
additional administrative measures to stem them. Wavering on renminbi 
internationalization could erode confidence in PRC market reform more 
broadly, exacerbating negative sentiment. This risk could be defused 
by better explaining the new PRC exchange rate regime and policy, as 
well as the composition of the peg basket, which should include only 
currencies that are suciently liquid.
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Another domestic risk is that consumer sentiment could be 
undermined if income growth decelerates further and labor market 
conditions become more complicated as industrial restructuring 
progresses, changing consumption patterns in ways that are dicult 
to predict. Continued close attention to labor market conditions and 
income growth will be needed. 
Slower economic growth and rapid credit expansion, including 
credit to inecient firms, harbor risks to the quality of bank assets. 
Nonperforming loans ocially account for less than 2% of the loan 
portfolio, but an increasing number of loans overdue for more than 
90 days are not classified as problem loans. Further, continuing 
strong credit growth may mask more serious repayment problems. 
These risks are, however, still manageable. Recent interest rate cuts 
have reduced financing costs, loan-loss reserves are still twice as high 
as the ocial nonperforming loan total, and banks are well capitalized 
and further strengthening their capital base by issuing shares and 
subordinated loans. In addition, safeguarding financial stability is a key 
motivation for the government’s policy favoring a managed slowdown in 
economic growth.
Policy challenge—trimming excess property 
inventory and industrial capacity
Since the Central Economic Work Conference in December 2015, the 
government has stressed the need to accelerate “supply-side reform.” 
This emphasis is not new. Reform in the PRC over the past 35 years has 
been mostly about supply-side reform, or how to use existing human 
and physical resources more eciently by reforming prices, company 
ownership, and the financial sector while opening up to trade and 
foreign investment, streamlining the role of the government in the 
economy, and strengthening markets. The reform agenda outlined in 
November 2013 consists mainly of structural reform aiming to increase 
productivity and ensure that high growth over the long term propels the 
PRC toward high-income status. Reemphasizing supply-side reform now 
highlights the government’s policy that, although targeted demand-side 
support through monetary and fiscal policy will continue, structural 
reform will remain the priority going forward.
Two key supply-side reforms among several identified by the 
government are reducing the housing overhang to reenergize the 
real estate sector and alleviating excess capacity in manufacturing. 
Strengthening local government finances is a precondition for success 
in both areas.
The way to move the property inventory is to generate demand 
for housing by deepening land reform in rural areas and liberalizing 
the household registration (hukou) system. Rural land reform, which 
aims to facilitate land sales to give rural residents the seed money 
they need to successfully establish themselves in cities, should be 
accelerated even though some pilot projects reportedly met local 
resistance. The government’s plan to expand low-rent public housing 
programs could benefit some migrant workers, but implementing hukou 
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reform would be more eective. If provided with full urban resident 
rights through hukou reform, and with better access to credit, many 
of the 274 million rural migrants currently in urban areas could take 
up unsold properties. The government’s urbanization plan foresees 
100 million more migrants permanently settling in urban areas. For this 
urbanization program to succeed, migrants must have full access to 
public services in cities, which requires stronger local government 
finances. Another challenge is to ensure that the migrants are trained 
appropriately for urban jobs. 
Many companies with excess capacity, most of them state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), use outmoded technology to generate meager profits, 
if not losses, and are deeply in debt. Because these companies are 
inherently inecient, supporting them through stimulus programs to 
raise demand for their products has aggravated problems rather than 
solved them. However, reducing excess capacity by closing enterprises 
faces several challenges, including widespread layos and related 
increases of social spending, falling tax revenues, and loan losses. 
ADB estimates that reducing excess capacity in iron and steel, 
coal mining, cement, shipbuilding, aluminum, and flat glass by 20% 
might eliminate 3.6 million jobs, or 0.7% of total nonfarm employment. 
These losses would be concentrated in cities and regions that specialize 
in mining and metal production. Concerned about how closing 
such firms could derail near-term growth, social stability, and local 
government finances, the government has set less ambitious targets to 
reduce production capacity for steel by 10%–15% and for coal by 10% 
within 3–5 years.
Many local governments are already struggling as revenues from 
land sales shrink and debt for infrastructure and social housing 
construction grows, leaving them dependent on taxes paid by state-
owned enterprises. Closing these enterprises might squeeze local 
governments’ revenues further while forcing them to spend more on 
social security. The central government has promised to help pay for 
social benefits and the retraining of laid-o workers, and intends to 
establish a special fund for this purpose, among other measures. 
As most state-owned enterprises with excess capacity depend 
heavily on bank lending and have high ratios of debt to assets 
(estimated at 68% in the coal sector in 2015), forcing them into 
bankruptcy threatens banks’ balance sheets with more nonperforming 
loans. This is one reason why the government encourages mergers 
rather than bankruptcy to meet the challenge of excess capacity. 
The merger process must be well managed to ensure that the merged 
enterprises run eciently and are not burdened by unsustainable debt. 
The government should also make it easier for banks to acknowledge 
and write o nonperforming loans. For instance, it should rescind 
the policy of requiring a lower credit allocation to a region, city, 
and industry if a single industry or state-owned enterprise in it 
incurs excessive bad debt, as this policy penalizes enterprises that 
perform well. This would reduce local authorities’ resistance to 
closing hopelessly indebted and inecient enterprises, improve credit 
allocation, and support the development of well performing enterprises 
in their jurisdiction.
This chapter was written by Benno Ferrarini and Marthe Hinojales of the Economic Research 
and Regional Cooperation Department, ADB, Manila.
Hong Kong, China
Growth slowed to 2.4% in 2015, but inflation eased and the current account and fiscal position 
were healthy. Growth will be still slower in 2016 and 2017 with weak tourism and global trade. 
Inflation will remain subdued, and the current account surplus will narrow. The dollar peg can 
accommodate US interest rate hikes and growing ties with the People’s Republic of China, but 
these developments foreshadow broader policy challenges.
Economic performance 
GDP grew by 2.4% in 2015, down from 2.6% in 2014. Sluggish global 
trade and significant volatility in the financial markets of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) halted the upward growth trajectory enjoyed in 
the first half of the year. Uncertainty about the timing of US interest rate 
hikes exerted downward pressure on domestic demand, asset prices, and 
market sentiment.
Domestic demand nevertheless remained the main engine of growth 
in 2015. Private consumption expanded by 4.8% and contributed 3.2 
percentage points to GDP growth (Figure 3.10.1). Rising real incomes, 
moderating inflation, and low unemployment helped oset the drag 
from weak retail sales amid softening tourist arrivals. Government 
consumption also expanded, but its contribution to growth remained 
unchanged at 0.3 percentage points. Investment fell by 7.3%, shaving 
1.7 percentage points from GDP growth. Investment in machinery and 
equipment acquisition declined, together with inventories, but private 
construction outlays remained resilient. Net exports broke their 4-year 
negative streak, contributing 0.7 percentage points to growth. Imports 
shrank by 1.8% year on year because of low consumption demand from 
visitors, while exports fell by 1.5% as external demand and inbound 
tourism weakened (Figure 3.10.2). 
While expanding slower than in 2014, construction and services 
drove growth on the supply side. Construction grew by 1.7% on a 
buoyant private sector, and expansion in most services propelled growth 
in the service sector to 1.9%. 
The current account surplus widened to 3.1% of GDP as the 
merchandise balance improved, though the services surplus narrowed 
on weak tourist arrivals and trade and cargo flows. The improved 
current account and large net inflows of direct and other investment 
oset net outflows of portfolio capital, enlarging the overall balance of 
payments surplus. Gross ocial reserves rose to $359 billion by the end 
of 2015, cover for 7.1 months of imports. 
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Consumer price inflation slowed to 3.0% from 4.4% the previous 
year (Figure 3.10.3). External price pressures continued to recede in 
light of subdued international prices for food and other commodities, 
low imported inflation, and a strengthening US dollar, to which the 
local dollar is pegged. Steady labor costs and softer rental growth 
helped contain domestic costs. After rising early in the year, residential 
property prices calmed in the fourth quarter, falling by 7% quarter 
on quarter.
On the fiscal front, the government expects the budget surplus to 
narrow to the equivalent of 1.3% of GDP in FY2015 (ending 31 March 
2016), with fiscal reserves equal to 35.8% (Figure 3.10.4). Estimated 
revenues were below the original estimate mainly because land 
sales were lower and HK$45 billion was set aside for the Housing 
Reserve, established to finance public housing programs. Meanwhile, 
expenditures increased modestly along with higher social welfare 
services, which absorb 15% of government expenditure. Overall public 
expenditure in FY2015 is estimated to equal 19.2% of GDP, in line with 
the fiscal management guideline of holding public expenditure below 
20.0% of GDP.
Monetary conditions remained loose, while macroprudential 
measures implemented in February 2015 helped bring down the 
average loan-to-value ratio and debt-servicing ratio of new mortgages. 
Meanwhile, a softening property market and the government’s 
demand-management measures tamped down the volume and value 
of new mortgages and suppressed speculative buying (Figure 3.10.5). 
Domestic credit growth slowed to 3.9%, and growth in broad money 
(M2) supply further decelerated to 5.5% from 9.5% in 2014. The 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) raised its benchmark base rate 
in December 2015 to 0.75% from 0.50% in tandem with the US Federal 
Reserve’s increase of its federal funds rate. 
Uncertainty about the US interest rate hike and concern over the 
PRC economy wiped out early hefty gains on the Hang Seng Stock 
Exchange Index, pushing it 7.2% lower by year-end (Figure 3.10.6). 
Hong Kong, China remains a leading international fund-raising 
platform, raising in 2015 over HK$260 billion with initial public 
oerings, a 13% rise over 2014 that propelled it past New York and 
Shanghai to first place by this measure. Its role as the premier center 
for oshore renminbi trading has been strengthened with an additional 
issuance of PRC sovereign bonds and the opening of new channels for 
two-way financial flows with the PRC, including the mutual recognition 
of funds, which allows eligible locally domiciled funds in either market 
to be sold to retail investors in the other.
Economic prospects 
GDP growth is projected to slow to 2.1% in 2016 and recover to 2.2% 
in 2017 (Figure 3.10.7). Domestic demand will remain the engine of 
growth. A survey in the first quarter of 2016 showed a pessimistic trend 
in business sentiment, particularly in trade and retailing (Figure 3.10.8). 
However, private consumption will benefit from stable labor market 
conditions. The government expects tax and short-term relief measures 
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and spending initiatives in the FY2016 budget to boost 2016 GDP by 1.1%. 
Large public infrastructure projects will drive investment growth. 
Trade is likely to oer little growth impetus in 2016 as manufacturing 
and trade remain subdued globally and economic rebalancing in the 
PRC weighs on exports. Imports will stay constrained by weakness in 
both retained imports and export-induced demand. The trade deficit 
will be oset by a modest surplus in the services account as demand 
for professional and financial services osets weaker tourism. In the 
near term, the government’s strategic focus on innovative technologies 
can, along with positive spillover from the new 5-year plan of the PRC, 
provide support to the local services account. The current account 
surplus is forecast to narrow to 2.0% of GDP in 2016 and 1.8% in 2017.
Inflation is forecast at 2.5% in 2016 and 2.7% in 2017. Soft international 
commodity prices will keep external price pressures at bay, and local cost 
increases will be restrained by slower economic growth and lower rents. 
These factors will counter a slight uptick in world oil and commodity 
prices in 2017.
The FY2016 budget is expected to post a small surplus of 
HK$11 billion. To boost the economy, it has as one-time measures 
tax reductions for households and firms and waivers of property rates, 
business registration fees, and fees for tourism-related trades. Recurrent 
measures include higher tax allowances and deduction ceilings for 
payers of salaries tax. Ample fiscal reserves will enable an increase in the 
fiscal stimulus should the economy show signs of weakening. Sucient 
housing supply remains a core objective. Expenditure is thus expected 
to remain close to the government’s guideline of 20% of GDP. To address 
the longer-term fiscal challenges arising from an aging population, the 
government is implementing a 3-year expenditure-control measure and, 
in January 2016, established its Future Fund by investing a portion of 
fiscal reserves in long-term assets for achieving higher returns. 
One risk to growth is negative spillover from the PRC as it transitions 
to more sustainable growth, which could harm employment and 
business conditions but could also create higher demand from the PRC 
for services. The other main risk is unexpectedly sharp increases in 
US interest rates, which could tighten monetary conditions, deepen 
the current correction in residential property, and burden the private 
sector with potentially soaring debt service costs, further weakening 
domestic demand. The risk of a “perfect storm”—a sharp PRC downturn 
coinciding with heightened volatility from further US rate hikes—is small 
but significant. Yet the economy remains resilient, buered by prudent 
economic management, ample fiscal resources to finance countercyclical 
measures, and a sound financial system able to withstand external 
headwinds.
Policy challenge—pressure on the exchange rate 
The start of 2016 witnessed some downward pressure on the local 
dollar. In January, the currency dropped to its lowest value against the 
US dollar in nearly a decade. Deepening concern about the depreciating 
renminbi and a slowing PRC economy, and about interest rates in the 
US, caused outflows to mount, reversing the capital inflows that had 
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pushed the exchange rate with the US dollar closer to the middle 
of the exchange rate band during much of the second half of 2015. 
The exchange rate and the Hang Seng stock index have moved broadly 
in tandem since the beginning of 2016 (Figure 3.10.9). 
The currency peg to the US dollar and concomitant alignment with 
US monetary policy pose a challenge to Hong Kong, China in view of 
its close ties with the PRC, but the HKMA sees no need to modify or 
abandon the peg. It stands by the currency board, which has since 1983 
been central to economic development and the emergence of Hong Kong, 
China as a global financial center. Proximity to the PRC is one thing, 
but the monetary link with the US has suited the local economy as an 
anchor and its financial system as a stabilizer. A fully backed monetary 
base and diligent fiscal management over the years have helped the 
linked exchange rate system outlast many past crises, including the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997–1998, when it survived severe speculative attack.
The argument for pegging to the renminbi is likely to solidify as 
financial ties with the PRC continue to grow. Changing the currency 
regime may deserve consideration when the PRC currency is freely 
convertible, its capital account fully liberalized, and its financial 
system well developed. These conditions are, however, not yet in view. 
In the meantime, financial integrity should be preserved by continuing 
to adhere to high regulatory and supervisory standards, deploying 
macroprudential measures as appropriate, and continuing prudent 
fiscal policies. 
The government’s fiscal reserves accumulated through sustained 
fiscal discipline and year after year of budget surpluses have kept the 
peg credible. Its fiscal health remains strong in the short term. However, 
fiscal reserves are seen gradually diminishing over the longer term, 
mainly because the government has earmarked additional provision 
over the medium term for health-care reform and retirement protection. 
Recurrent expenditures are set to increase in the coming years as an 
aging population requires expanded social services, and the tax base 
will likely become narrower with a shrinking workforce. Ensuring good 
fiscal management to support the peg depends on strengthening the 
revenue regime by broadening the tax base and avoiding any reliance on 
volatile and cyclical sources such as land sales.
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This chapter was written by Gemma Esther Estrada and Donghyun Park of the 
Economic Research and Regional Cooperation Department, ADB, Manila.
Republic of Korea
Buffeted by a challenging external environment, exports and growth disappointed in 2015, but 
inflation was lower and the current account surplus higher. Growth will remain steady in 2016 
before picking up modestly in 2017 on an improved global outlook. The current account surplus 
will shrink this year and next, and inflation will be higher. Deregulating the service sector can 
provide a much-needed fillip to the economy.
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Economic performance 
The economy suered a tepid first half in 2015 but bounced back in the 
second half to grow by 2.6% for the year, down from the 3.3% recorded 
in 2014 as weak external demand and an outbreak of Middle East 
respiratory syndrome (MERS) took their toll. The recovery, supported 
by fiscal stimulus and an accommodative monetary policy, came as the 
impact of MERS on domestic demand began to fade in the third quarter 
(Figure 3.11.1). 
Investment contributed 2.2 percentage points to GDP growth 
(Figure 3.11.2). Construction investment picked up after a subdued first 
half to record 4.0% growth for the year, and sustained growth in plant 
and equipment investment by 5.2% drove the surge in investment. 
Consumption grew by 2.4% in 2015 and contributed 1.6 percentage 
points to GDP growth. Private consumption expanded by 2.1% and 
government consumption by 3.3%. Consumer spending surged in 
the second half as consumer sentiment reached a 14-month high 
in November and employment prospects improved (Figure 3.11.3). 
Job creation strengthened in the final quarter, and the labor 
participation rate reached 62.6% in 2015, the highest since 2000. 
The unemployment rate declined steadily, but the annual average 
unemployment rate remained at 3.6%. Net exports subtracted 
1.2 percentage points from GDP growth as the volume of imports 
expanded but real exports of goods increased only by 0.4%, down from 
2.8% in 2014 (Figure 3.11.4).
On the supply side, services posted 2.8% growth and contributed 
1.5 percentage points to GDP growth. Expansion in finance and insurance 
accelerated and contributed the most to overall service sector growth, 
which found further support as the volume of retail sales rebounded 
from 1.7% growth in 2014 to 3.4% on a government-sponsored shopping 
promotion. Mirroring export weakness, manufacturing decelerated from 
4.0% growth in 2014 to 1.4% in 2015, and its contribution to economic 
growth declined to 0.4 percentage points.
Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia: East Asia Republic of Korea  137
In response to economic softness induced by MERS and the collapse 
of exports, the government introduced in July a supplementary budget 
equal to 0.8% of GDP to cover new spending plans and compensate for 
the tax shortfall. The fiscal deficit widened to 3.0% of GDP from 2.0% 
in 2014, raising government domestic debt to an estimated 36.6% of GDP 
from 33.9%.
Growth was also supported by an accommodative monetary policy. 
The Bank of Korea, the central bank, cut its policy rate in March and 
June 2015 to a record low of 1.5%. Nevertheless, monthly inflation 
remained below 1% in most months, and annual inflation averaged 0.7% 
as global oil prices languished, with core inflation averaging slightly 
above 2% during the year (Figure 3.11.5). Inflation slipped back to 0.8% 
in January 2016 from 1.3% in December as oil prices continued to fall.
The easy monetary policy has further deepened household debt, 
which amounted to a record $1.0 trillion, or 78.9% of GDP, at the end 
of 2015 (Figure 3.11.6). Mortgages accounted for 41.5% of household 
debt, confronting policy makers with a quandary over how to support 
the housing market while containing household debt.
Exports suered as shipments to all major destinations declined. 
Exports to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), accounting for about 
one-fourth of all merchandise exports, have contracted since early 
2014 and dropped further by 5.6% in 2015 as that economy decelerated 
(Figure 3.11.7). Exports to the European Union also fell by 6.9% and 
those to the US slipped by 1.0%. In US dollar terms, merchandise 
exports declined by 10.5% in 2015, but imports contracted even more 
sharply by 18.2%, partly reflecting the steep decline in global commodity 
prices. In January 2016, imports fell further by 20.1%, while exports 
declined by 18.6%, the sharpest drop since 2009.
The current account surplus widened to an estimated 7.8% of GDP in 
2015 from 6.0% in 2014, ensuring a healthy overall balance of payments 
surplus despite foreign portfolio outflows. Amid turbulence in global 
financial markets, the country posted net foreign portfolio equity and 
debt outflows by year-end of $7.3 billion, equal to 0.5% of GDP.
After mildly appreciating against the US dollar during the first 5 
months, the won slid in the remaining months to close 5.8% lower by the 
end of the year. In real eective terms, it appreciated by 0.7% during the 
year, owing to an inflation rate higher than those of trade partners.
Economic prospects 
Against a backdrop of subdued external demand, growth is likely to 
stagnate in 2016 at 2.6%. The forecast assumes sustained expansion 
in domestic demand, in particular private consumption, countering 
the di¡cult export environment. As the economy remains fragile, 
the broadly accommodative monetary and fiscal stance is expected 
to continue. Growth will edge up to 2.8% in 2017, assuming stable 
expansion in the global economy (Figure 3.11.8). 
Growth in private consumption is expected to accelerate slightly this 
year on improving consumer sentiment. In the absence of a major shock, 
private consumption will rise by 2.2% in 2016, spurred by moderating 
price pressures, given low oil prices, the extension of the lower sales 
3.11.1  Selected economic indicators (%)
2016 2017
GDP growth 2.6 2.8
Inflation 1.4 2.0
Current account balance  
(share of GDP)
6.5 5.5
Source: ADB estimates. 
3.11.3 Growth in private consumption
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2014 2015
%
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Year on year
Quarter on quarter
Q = quarter.
Source: Bank of Korea, Economics Statistics System, http://
ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp (accessed 29 January 2016).
Click here for figure data
3.11.4  Merchandise export and 
import volumes
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2014 2015
%
-2
0
2
4
6
Exports
Imports
Q = quarter.
Source: Bank of Korea, Economics Statistics System, http://
ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp (accessed 29 January 2016).
Click here for figure data
3.11.5 Monthly inflation
%
0
1
2
3
Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan
Overall 
Core
 
2014 2015 2016
Source: CEIC Data Company (accessed 15 March 2016).
Click here for figure data
138  Asian Development Outlook 2016
tax on vehicles, and steady growth in employment (Figure 3.11.9). 
The projections also assume eective policy to control mounting 
household debt, which threatens private consumption. To limit further 
buildup of household debt, the government has started to enforce 
stricter standards for screening mortgage applications and to closely 
monitor household lending by nonbank institutions. 
Growth in investment, particularly gross fixed capital, will likely 
continue its moderate pace. Growth in construction will be buoyed 
by government plans to ease regulations and provide tax incentives 
for rental housing construction on a large scale. Investment in 
new industries will find encouragement in government support 
for investment by small- and medium-sized enterprises through a 
W2 trillion loan fund, tax incentives for research and development, and 
the frontloading of expenditure in the Corporate Investment Promotion 
Program. Growth in plant and equipment is nevertheless likely to slow 
as both external and domestic environments remain uncertain.
Exports may rebound on better global prospects in the second half, 
but import growth driven by stronger domestic demand is expected 
to outpace export growth to the forecast horizon. Although oil prices 
are expected to average lower this year, import values will increase as 
growth in import volume accelerates. As a result, the current account 
surplus will narrow to 6.5% in 2016 and further to 5.5% in 2017.
On the fiscal front, the government will maintain its expansionary 
stance to support consumption and investment. Proposed higher 
spending on welfare and employment will bolster domestic demand. 
The government’s proposed spending and revenue program suggests the 
fiscal deficit equaling 2.3% this year—lower than last year though the 
government plans to raise spending by 2.9% in 2016 and expects fiscal 
revenues to increase by 2.3%. As in 2015, healthy public finances will 
allow the government to introduce supplementary budgets if economic 
conditions deteriorate. Meanwhile, to support growth, the government 
announced that first quarter spending will be W14 trillion higher than a 
year earlier.
In tandem with a sustained and moderate expansion in domestic 
demand and higher oil prices, inflation is likely to pick up this year to 
1.4% and next year to 2.0%, which is the central bank’s new annual 
inflation target for 2016–2018. With price pressures subdued, the central 
bank is likely to keep interest rates at current record lows to stimulate 
domestic demand, while remaining vigilant about any further buildup in 
household debt.
Downside risks to growth are both internal and external. 
Domestically, mounting household debt could tamp down consumption. 
Subdued business confidence, which has fallen from already low levels 
since November 2015 (Figure 3.11.10) owing to a di¡cult outlook for 
exports and low capacity utilization (Figure 3.11.11), may undermine 
prospects for investment.
 Softer-than-expected external demand, especially in the slowing 
PRC, poses probably the single biggest risk to GDP growth. As the PRC 
is an important export market, a sharp growth slowdown there would 
be a major blow to growth in the short run. In addition, the Bank of 
Japan’s decision in late January to move toward negative interest rates 
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could weaken the Japanese yen and thereby hurt the competitiveness 
of exports from the Republic of Korea, as many of them, including 
electronics and automobiles, compete directly with Japanese exports. 
While low oil prices will improve terms of trade and boost household 
income, they are not an unmixed blessing. They dampen demand in 
oil-exporting countries, which collectively account for 7.1% of exports 
from the Republic of Korea. Last year, such exports declined by 15.5%. 
Further, financial market turmoil in oil producers and other emerging 
markets could spill over into the Republic of Korea. 
Uncertainties generated by US Federal Reserve rate hikes may 
destabilize financial markets and further dampen sentiment, especially 
in light of the country’s highly open capital account. The stock market 
has not been immune to the recent sello in regional equity markets. 
The Korea Composite Index fell by 8% about a month after the Fed 
hiked its federal funds rate by 25 basis points. Persistent uncertainty 
over asset prices could temper both business and consumer confidence. 
A particularly di¡cult risk to assess is the possibility of heightened 
tension with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea arising from its 
nuclear program.
Policy challenge—strengthening the 
service sector as an engine of growth
For several decades, the Republic of Korea pursued export-oriented 
industrialization, and it successfully developed a globally competitive 
manufacturing sector. As manufacturing is now highly e¡cient, 
achieving further productivity gains is a challenge. Indeed, GDP 
growth that languished short of 3.0% in 3 of the past 4 years has fueled 
concerns that potential growth over the medium to long term may have 
declined. An eective response would be to unlock potential in the 
service sector, which could boost growth in the short term and beyond. 
Service sector productivity in the Republic of Korea has lagged 
behind both domestic manufacturing and the service sectors of 
other members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) (Figure 3.11.12). This indicates large scope for 
developing the service sector to reduce the economy’s dependence on 
currently lackluster exports of manufactured goods. In the high-income, 
high-tech economy of the Republic of Korea, service sector development 
should center on services with high value added. These include financial 
intermediation, computer services, business services, communication, 
and legal and technical services, which currently account for a smaller 
share of service sector output than do traditional services with lower 
value added, such as public administration, wholesale and retail trade, 
and transport and storage.
The shift from a manufacturing-led economy to a more balanced 
one in which services play a larger role requires various reforms, the 
most crucial of which is deregulation. The service sector is highly 
regulated to protect small and medium-sized enterprises. Strict entry 
and licensing requirements, stringent approval requirements, and price 
controls have likely contributed significantly to low sector productivity. 
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An indication of how regulation in the Republic of Korea fares vis-à-vis 
other economies is provided by product market regulation indicators, 
which measure regulations that are potentially anticompetitive and 
cover state control, barriers to entrepreneurship, and barriers to trade 
and investment. A lower score means fewer restrictions. The Republic 
of Korea does better than the OECD average in terms of state control 
and barriers to entrepreneurship, but scores poorly on barriers to trade 
and investment, and to entry in the service and network (information 
technology) sectors. 
Enhancing services has been on the government’s agenda. 
Its “creative economy” policy agenda, announced in 2014, emphasizes 
the role of the service sector, naming five service areas for government 
support: health and medical care, tourism, finance, education, 
and software. Little progress was made in 2015 due to legislative 
gridlock, but prospects are better for 2016 after the April elections. 
The government has announced that it will continue to provide support 
specific to the service sector, correct unfair regulatory practices against 
the service sector, and promote exports of services.
It will try to push through deregulation of the hotel industry, 
encourage remote medical services, and allow home and vehicle 
sharing in selected locations. While challenging, these reforms will 
be major steps, if implemented, toward improving productivity in the 
service sector.
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Mongolia
Economic growth decelerated sharply in 2015, but so did inflation, and the current account 
deficit narrowed. Growth will stagnate in 2016 under lower mining output and necessarily tight 
macroeconomic policies. Inflation will dip further before climbing again in 2017. Consistently 
pursuing fiscal policy, effectively continuing efforts to diversify the economy, and ensuring social 
protection are important challenges of economic management in Mongolia.
Economic performance 
Growth decelerated sharply to 2.3% in 2015 from 7.9% in 2014 as 
macroeconomic policies became less expansionary, falling mineral prices 
and a strong currency eroded exports, and foreign direct investment 
declined by 33.8%. On the supply side, growth slowed in all sectors but 
remained robust in industry, which contributed 2.0 percentage points 
to growth, and agriculture, which contributed 0.9 points (Figure 3.12.1). 
Industrial output rose by 8.8%, supported by 13.0% expansion in mining 
as production at the vast Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold mine increased. 
However, a decline by 1.4% in construction dragged down growth in the 
rest of industry to 0.6%. Agriculture grew by 10.7% despite a drought. 
As trade and social sectors shrank, service sector growth fell to 1.1%, 
subtracting 0.7 percentage points from GDP.
On the demand side, a 27.7% fall in investment following a 30.1% 
decline in 2014 subtracted 9.9 percentage points from growth. 
Consumption growth slowed to 4.6% as government consumption 
declined, reducing its contribution to growth to 3.2 percentage points. 
Substantial import contraction turned net exports positive, which 
contributed 9.1 percentage points to growth (Figure 3.12.2).
Several factors caused average inflation to halve to 6.6% from 12.8% 
in 2014. Preemptive slaughtering of livestock in anticipation of a harsh 
winter sharply reduced meat prices, which have a large weight in the 
consumer price index. Subdued domestic demand, an insuciently 
flexible exchange rate, and tight monetary policy also reduced price 
pressures. 
In April 2015, the International Monetary Fund assessed Mongolia 
at high risk of debt distress. The ratio of public debt to GDP, including 
the central bank’s foreign liabilities, swelled from 31.0% in 2010 to 
77.4% in 2015, with public debt per capita quadrupling to over $3,000 
(Figure 3.12.3). The budget deficit stabilized at 3.1% of GDP in 2015, 
and the consolidated deficit—including Development Bank of Mongolia 
expenditures—shrank to 7.9% of GDP from 11.4% in 2014. The move 
toward lower consolidated deficits is positive but also partly reflects 
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diculties in borrowing on favorable terms. Indeed, the Chinggis bond 
2018 yield peaked at 13.3% in February 2016, following a multiyear low 
of 4.5% in 2015 (Figure 3.12.4). This development and a 16.9% revenue 
shortfall from optimistic assumptions forced a 48.9% cut in government 
investment (excluding investments by the Development Bank of 
Mongolia), limiting expenditure growth to 1.5%. To further fiscal 
consolidation, social welfare transfers are better targeted to the poor, 
and ineciencies in public spending corrected.
The Economic Transparency Law, 2015 exposed substantial 
undeclared income or assets and waived evaded taxes, fines, 
and penalties (equivalent to 47% of GDP or 151% of government 
expenditures). The law expanded the tax base marginally but also 
rewarded tax evasion and may have strengthened incentives to conceal.
Monetary policy was tightened as the central bank sold foreign 
currency and raised its policy rate in August 2014 and January 2015 by 
2.5 percentage points in total, and as the price-stabilization program 
was phased out. As price pressures receded, the central bank lowered 
its policy rate by 1 percentage point in January 2016. The broad money 
supply declined by 1.3% in 2015, following 24.6% growth in 2014. 
Outstanding loans declined by 6.5%, but nonperforming loans increased 
by 64.2% to 5.5% and loans past due by 217.8% to 7.5% (Figure 3.12.5). 
An asset management institution may be established. However, avoiding 
a recurrence of nonperforming loan proliferation depends on avoiding 
moral hazard, strengthening prudential regulation and supervision, and 
prudent monetary policy.
Bolstered by central bank interventions totaling $1.2 billion, equal 
to 10.2% of GDP, the exchange rate hovered in the range of MNT1,950–
MNT2,000 per US dollar for most of last year, a depreciation of only 
6% year on year. By its real e¢ective exchange rate, the Mongolian 
togrog appreciated by an average of 7.8%. Exports declined by 19.2% as 
higher exports of copper concentrates, oil, and gold by volume failed 
to compensate for declining commodity prices and volume reductions 
in coal and iron ore shipments (Figure 3.12.6). As imports fell by 28.1%, 
the merchandise trade surplus increased and the current account 
deficit narrowed from 11.5% of GDP to 4.8%. With substantial external 
borrowing, this narrowed the overall balance of payments deficit to 
$268.1 million from $471.1 million in 2014.
As reported by the central bank, gross international reserves 
declined by $326.8 million to $1.3 billion, reduced by currency 
interventions but benefiting from external debt issuance by the central 
bank and the government, versus $1.9 billion in foreign liabilities. 
Public and publicly guaranteed external debt, including these foreign 
liabilities, rose by 21.5% to equal 65.3% of GDP, heightening the 
vulnerability of the fiscal and external accounts to currency risk 
and financial market volatility. Additional commercial external debt 
was reportedly incurred in March 2016 to finance infrastructure. 
The policy regarding the repayment or refinancing of over $1.8 billion 
in external debt due in 2017–2018 is yet to be made public. An equal 
amount withdrawn from the credit line provided under a currency swap 
facility with the central bank of the People’s Republic of China will also 
eventually have to be reversed.
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Economic prospects
Growth will stagnate at 0.1% in 2016 and 0.5% in 2017 as mining 
production declines and shrinking Development Bank of Mongolia 
disbursements, rising debt repayment, and mounting balance-
of-payments pressures necessitate tighter macroeconomic policy 
(Figure 3.12.7). Agriculture will be the main growth driver, and services 
will be flat as demand falters. Industry will benefit from the midyear 
start of underground mine construction at Oyu Tolgoi, ramping up 
in 2017 and likely to generate $2.5 billion in domestic capital cost 
expenditure to 2022. However, the mine’s ore quality is lower than 
originally expected, which will a¢ect export values and budget revenues 
in 2016–2017. This factor—excluded from this forecast—will be captured 
when the government’s GDP estimates are revised later and could lower 
growth by 1–2 percentage points each year.
Average inflation will stabilize at around 3.0% in 2016, with meat 
prices normalizing in the second half of the year (Figure 3.12.8). 
Inflation will pick up to 7.0% in 2017 with gradual currency depreciation 
as central bank interventions are expected to be phased out.
International reserves face pressure as debt repayments loom and 
the fiscal situation and the external environment hinder debt issuance. 
Moreover, the current account deficit will expand to equal 8.0% of GDP 
in 2016 and 15.0% in 2017, reflecting the lower quality of exported ore, 
weak external demand, and increased imports related to Oyu Tolgoi. 
A delay in Oyu Tolgoi underground development would a¢ect 
economic prospects and raise risk perceptions, thereby constraining 
debt refinancing options. Although a delay is unlikely because project 
financing is secured, the scenario brings to the fore the absolute necessity 
of maintaining policy bu¢ers and prudent macroeconomic policy. 
Other external risks include lower commodity prices and tightened 
external financing conditions. Further, risks to fiscal and external 
accounts would accumulate if large external borrowing occurred at 
high interest rates (except for debt repayment). 
Policy responses should include reducing consolidated deficits 
further, strengthening debt management, and—most urgently—resolving 
looming external debt repayments. Gradual currency depreciation in line 
with market fundamentals would restore competitiveness and contain 
balance-of-payments pressures while safeguarding foreign exchange 
reserves, but its adverse impact on the financial sector and the public 
debt ratio cannot be ignored. Loose monetary policy should be avoided, 
as it could aggravate balance-of-payments pressures. Special care 
needs to be taken with civil servant replacements, especially in key 
macroeconomic areas, to ensure that sucient institutional memory and 
capacity are retained to address immediate challenges.
Policy challenge—maintaining social protection 
while restructuring
Endowed with vast mineral wealth, Mongolia has promising long-term 
prospects. Large mining projects are expected to generate fiscal and 
balance-of-payments surpluses in the future. Successfully managing this 
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mineral wealth is key to Mongolia’s future. In this process, ensuring 
macroeconomic stability and making mining-led growth sustainable and 
inclusive are the greatest development challenges ahead. 
Limited economic diversification has left Mongolia highly dependent 
on its mining sector, which relies heavily on inflows of foreign direct 
investment. This exposes the economy to external shocks caused by 
swings in commodity prices and the economic cycles of its trading 
partners. The current unfavorable external environment—characterized 
by plummeting foreign direct investment, falling commodity prices, and 
growth moderation in the PRC—is adversely a¢ecting socioeconomic 
conditions in Mongolia. GDP growth has sharply decelerated, reducing 
employment. 
A decade of heretofore strong economic growth has substantially 
boosted average incomes in Mongolia, reducing the incidence of poverty 
since 2010 by 17 percentage points to 21.6% in 2014. The poverty rate 
would be an estimated 10 percentage points higher today in the absence 
of Mongolia’s social welfare programs. Income inequality as measured 
by the Gini coecient was reduced from 0.36 in 2008 to 0.32 in 2014, 
but severe disparities remain between urban and rural areas, especially 
those in the remote western regions. Despite commendable progress, 
one in five Mongolians still lives in poverty and depends largely on 
welfare benefits for basic sustenance.
The current economic slowdown underscores the importance 
of strengthening social protection in Mongolia. This is particularly 
important in the context of the government’s commitment to economic 
restructuring and adjustment. The fiscal consolidation and monetary 
tightening required to ensure macroeconomic stability could weaken 
the economy in the short term. A smaller welfare budget would reverse 
gains in poverty reduction by pushing people back below the poverty 
line, perhaps even creating some newly poor. Social welfare programs’ 
past success in reducing poverty argues for their continuation and 
strengthening.
The government administers 71 social welfare programs that reached 
a third of the population in 2014. Expenditures for all programs have 
been increased since 2010 to reflect demographic trends in an expanding 
population, o¢set the impact of inflation on real incomes, and reduce 
poverty. However, challenges persist. Many social welfare programs 
are unnecessarily expensive because they do not target only the poor. 
Moreover, the fragmentation of programs results in the duplication of 
benefits and high administrative and implementation costs. Subsidies to 
support such programs would have greater impact if they were better 
targeted.
To reform these welfare programs, policy should improve poverty 
targeting and consolidate programs to reduce implementation costs and 
strengthen program impact. Better targeting and consolidation would 
ensure the fiscal sustainability of programs as the government strives 
to stabilize the macroeconomic situation and institute the structural 
reform that is essential to laying a foundation for sustainable growth.
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Taipei,China
Growth slowed in 2015, prices fell, and the current account surplus widened. Growth will likely 
be higher in 2016 and 2017 on countercyclical government expenditure and robust private 
consumption, with rises also for inflation and the current account surplus. Ensuring sustainable 
export growth is the main policy challenge but cannot be achieved through competitive currency 
depreciation.
Economic performance
GDP expanded by 0.8% in 2015, down from 3.9% in 2014 and the 
weakest growth since 2010, dragged down by declines in government 
expenditure and exports (Figure 3.13.1). Government consumption 
contracted by 0.4%, subtracting 0.1 percentage points from growth. 
Private consumption was the driver of growth, boosted by subsidies for 
the purchase of energy-saving products, as well as for rents, transport 
services, and mobile phone upgrades. It expanded by 2.3%, adding 
1.2 percentage points to growth as the unemployment rate improved, 
albeit only marginally and countered by a decline in average monthly 
earnings. Investment rose by 1.5% to contribute 0.3 percentage points 
to growth as private investment remained robust, compensating for 
declining government outlays (Figure 3.13.2). Exports of goods and 
services, which account for 64.5% of GDP, dropped by 0.2% as demand 
for industrial products weakened in all major trading partners. Imports 
of goods and services expanded by 0.9%, causing net exports to shrink 
by 8.5% and subtract 0.7 percentage points from GDP growth.
On the supply side, sector growth rates cannot be determined 
because of a large discrepancy in the preliminary data, but indications 
are that most sectors stagnated. Sizable declines in mining and 
quarrying, and in electricity and gas, are thought to have pushed down 
industrial output. The service sector, which is the largest contributor to 
GDP at 62.8%, is thought to have grown only marginally with increases 
in finance and insurance and in information and communication, but 
contraction in wholesale and retail trade. Agriculture is likely to have 
contracted, but its 1.8% share of GDP renders its impact on growth 
marginal. 
The consumer price index fell by 0.3% year on year in 2015 as 
prices for electricity and gas, transportation and communication, and 
fuel declined significantly, outweighing a food price increase of 3.1%. 
However, core inflation, which excludes food and energy, remained 
unchanged at 0.4%. The average wholesale price index fell by 8.8% on 
account of large declines in the prices of mineral products, water supply, 
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electricity, and gas (Figure 3.13.3). In response to emerging deflation and 
stalling growth, the central bank reduced the discount rate in two steps 
from 1.875% in September to 1.625% in December. The money supply 
(M2) rose by 5.8%, and credit to the private sector increased by 4.5%.
The budget deficit rose from the equivalent of 0.8% of GDP in 2014 
to 0.9% in 2015. Central government revenue grew by 2.9% on the 
full-year impact of higher business tax rates for banks and insurance 
companies implemented in late 2014, and on proceeds from the sale 
of shares of some listed public companies. However, expenditure 
increased more, by 4.4%, as spending grew for education and—reflecting 
demographic trends—social security and pensions.
The current account posted a surplus equal to 14.5% of GDP in 2015 
(Figure 3.13.4) as the balance on goods and services and net income 
increased, widening the overall balance of payments surplus to 2.9% of 
GDP, despite a decline in net capital inflows. Foreign exchange reserves 
increased by the end of December 2015 to $426 billion, or 81.4% of GDP. 
After local dollar appreciation by 2.3% against the US dollar during 
the first half of the year came depreciation by 6.1% in the second half. 
Following a similar trend, the currency depreciated in nominal eective 
terms by 1.3% and in real eective terms by 1.2% during 2015.
Economic prospects
GDP growth is forecast to rise to 1.6% in 2016 and 1.8% in 2017 on 
countercyclical investment planned by the government and on private 
consumption. Government outlays are expected to rise by the equivalent 
of 2.1% of GDP in 2016. Expansionary fiscal policy and the delayed 
impacts of past measures, such as facilitating companies’ access to 
credit and investment in real estate, will be the main drivers of growth 
in 2017. Private consumption expenditure should rise modestly in 2016 
and 2017, benefiting from consumer subsidies initiated in November 
2015. Private investment will be less robust than in 2015 as sector 
sentiment indexes for manufacturing and services remain low, though 
the manufacturing purchasing managers’ index signaled in January 
2016 likely future expansion. Meanwhile, a sharp 12.4% decline year on 
year in export orders that same month extended contraction in export 
orders to 10 consecutive months, pointing to only a modest rise, if any, in 
exports this year (Figure 3.13.5). Weak external demand, especially from 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and rising competition from the 
Republic of Korea and other economies will counter the potential benefit 
to export demand this year and next from higher growth in the US.
Fiscal policy is expected to be expansionary, keeping the deficit at 
0.9% of GDP in 2016 but perhaps lower in 2017. The revenue base will 
expand in both years with the introduction of a unified tax on profits 
from land and other property sales, which raises the tax rate on land 
sales. Demographic trends will start to impose greater pressures on public 
finances, requiring further widening of the relatively narrow tax base. 
Monetary policy is expected to remain expansionary during the 
forecast period, given the low growth prospects, helping to push inflation 
up this year and next. Likely further weakening of the local dollar and 
moderate food price increases will be tempered by falling oil prices to 
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yield an inflation rate of 0.7% in 2016. Inflation will rise further to 1.2% 
in 2017 as oil prices recover. The current account surplus will grow 
to the equivalent of 14.8% of GDP in 2016 and 15.3% in 2017, as trade 
contraction is expected to aect imports more than exports. 
The projections are subject to downside risks. The start of 
proposed fiscal stimulus is uncertain with a change of administration, 
the newly elected President taking o¥ce in May 2016. Any delay in 
implementing the stimulus would undercut growth prospects for 2016. 
Lower-than-expected growth in the PRC or the US, or volatility in 
global stock markets, would have adverse spillover. 
Policy challenge—maintaining sustainable growth 
in exports
Taipei,China’s economy depends heavily on exports to the US, the PRC, 
and Hong Kong, China (Figure 3.13.6). 
Since 2001, when Taipei,China joined the World Trade Organization, 
the share of its exports to the PRC in its total exports has increased 
steadily, from 3% in 2000 to 26% in 2015. The share of exports to 
Hong Kong, China has grown to 14%, and exports to the US now 
amount to 12% of the total. With 52% of exports going to these three 
destinations and generating 33% of GDP in Taipei,China, developments 
in these economies strongly influence the sustainability of export 
growth. An empirical analysis of the sensitivity of these exports to 
growth rates in these trade partners shows that economic growth in 
the PRC and the US are the main determinants of export growth for 
Taipei,China (Table 3.13.2). A 1.0% increase in nominal GDP growth 
in the PRC raises the rate of export growth for Taipei,China by 2.0%, 
while a 1.0% increase in nominal GDP growth in the larger but slower-
growing US economy increases it by 4.5%. Therefore, strengthening 
economic growth in the US over the coming years can be expected to 
oset any weakening of economic growth in the PRC in terms of the 
eect on the rate of export growth for Taipei,China.
However, Taipei,China cannot rely on growth in these economies 
alone to sustain its export growth momentum, as these relationships 
can erode over time with competition from other exporters. Indeed, 
correlation analysis indicates that depreciation of the local dollar against 
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3.13.2  Determinants of Taipei,China export growth rate (2001–2014)
Coe»cient of GDP growth
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the US dollar does not increase export orders for Taipei,China, and 
depreciation against the renminbi decreases export orders from the PRC 
and Hong Kong, China—as well as export orders overall (Table 3.13.3). 
This result implies that competitive devaluation by export competitors, 
especially the Republic of Korea, nullifies the eect of local dollar 
depreciation (Figure 3.13.7). On the other hand, the correlation results 
show that depreciation of the local dollar against the won increases 
PRC, US, and overall export orders (Table 3.13.3). 
However, this finding should not be taken as evidence that 
depreciation against the currencies of competing exporters, rather than 
against the currencies of export partners, can promote exports. Indeed, 
monthly exchange rate data from January 2001 to December 2015 
point to the futility of such a policy. During this period, local dollar 
depreciation against the renminbi was accompanied half of the time by 
its appreciation against the won. This indicates that depreciation of the 
local dollar against the renminbi or the US dollar will likely be followed 
by larger depreciation of the won against the same currencies, rendering 
futile any policy of promoting exports through currency depreciation.
To encourage export growth, Taipei,China should promote 
innovations to move from price competition to value competition, and 
to dierentiate its products from competing exporters. For example, 
for its semiconductor industry, it can move toward producing wafers 
and manufacturing equipment rather than importing them as inputs for 
its own exports, thus reducing production costs and helping to develop 
more profitable capital-intensive industries.
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3.13.3 Correlations between export orders and NT dollar depreciation against di¬erent currencies
NT$/$ NT$/CNY NT$/W
Change in A B A B A B
Total export orders
Month on month  –0.001  0.132 –0.037  0.045 0.082 –0.138
Quarter on quarter   –0.146* –0.170 –0.180* –0.266* 0.240* 0.331*
Semester on semester   –0.269* –0.443* –0.289* –0.480* 0.346* 0.425*
Year on year   –0.249* –0.292* –0.306* –0.411* 0.342* 0.424*
United States export orders
Month on month    0.0250  0.129 0.043 –0.172
Quarter on quarter  –0.086 –0.136 0.162* 0.207*
Semester on semester   –0.189* –0.393* 0.246 0.309*
Year on year   –0.233* –0.258* 0.293* 0.399*
People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong, China export orders
Month on month –0.065  0.112 0.097 –0.106
Quarter on quarter –0.192* –0.152 0.239* 0.331*
Semester on semester –0.282* –0.394* 0.346* 0.402*
Year on year –0.270* –0.363* 0.370* 0.435*
* = significant at 10% level, A = January 2001–December 2015, B = January 2009–December 2015. 
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This chapter was written by Rehman Gul of the Afghanistan Resident Mission, ADB, Kabul.
Afghanistan 
The unity government formed after presidential elections in 2014 is beset by an escalation in the 
insurgency that undermines its efforts to boost growth and public confidence in the wake of the 
2014 withdrawal of international security forces. Growth edged up in 2015, and the outlook is for 
a modest pickup. Improved security, political cooperation, and donor support are required for the 
economy to transition to a sustainable path.
Economic performance 
Growth remained slow in 2015 as deteriorating security and 
continuing political uncertainty sapped consumer and investor 
confidence. GDP growth is provisionally estimated to have accelerated 
marginally to 1.5% from 1.3% in 2014 (Figure 3.14.1). 
On the supply side, agricultural output is estimated to have fallen 
by 2.0% with less favorable weather, but production has remained 
relatively high since the record-breaking harvest in 2012. Growth in 
services picked up slightly to 2.8% on marginally higher demand, while 
expansion in industry slipped to 1.4% as investment dropped markedly 
and consumers spent less on manufactured goods. With the investment 
fallo, private and government consumption now appear to account for 
85% of GDP. 
Afghanistan experienced mild deflation in 2015, with consumer 
prices averaging 1.5% less than in 2014. Food prices averaged 1.9% 
lower and nonfood prices 1.2% lower, reflecting weak domestic demand 
as well as declining global prices for fuel and other commodities. 
Prices tended to recover after July, and by December the consumer 
price index was 0.2% higher than in December 2014 (Figure 3.14.2). 
Fiscal policy was tight in 2015, holding current expenditure lower 
than in 2014 and cutting the discretionary development budget by 
almost half. The tighter fiscal stance was required by missed revenue 
targets, the accumulation of arrears, and the drawdown of cash 
reserves in 2014. New tax measures and better collection restored fiscal 
discipline and boosted budget revenue by 22.1%, allowing the budget 
to record a slight cash surplus in 2015 (Figure 3.14.3). Nevertheless, the 
budget continues to be heavily dependent on support, as grants funded 
67% of national budget expenditures: 62% of recurrent expenses and 
81% of development. 
Reserve money is the nominal anchor for monetary policy, which 
continues to be conducted under a floating exchange rate regime largely 
through biweekly foreign exchange auctions that sell dollars for current 
account transactions and also to mop up excess local currency liquidity. 
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The deteriorating security situation has eroded trust in the local 
currency and left the economy even more highly dollarized. Growth 
in broad money declined to 5.7% from 8.3% in 2014. Increased private 
capital outflows in 2015, mostly accompanying a marked increase in 
emigration, put pressure on the foreign exchange market, resulting in a 
17% depreciation of the afghani against the US dollar and a $300 million 
decline in gross international reserves to $7.0 billion (Figure 3.14.4).
The current account including ocial grants is estimated to have 
been a surplus equal to 4.5% of GDP in 2015, down from 6.4% in 2014 
(Figure 3.14.5). The decline came with a 26.5% fall in exports of services 
mainly provided to international security forces, whose withdrawal 
was completed at the end of 2014, taking many local jobs and markedly 
reducing national personal income. Excluding grants, the current 
account is estimated to have recorded a deficit equal to 41.7% of GDP, 
widened from 37.8% in 2014. 
Economic prospects
Economic growth is projected to accelerate slightly to 2.0% in 2016 
and 3.0% in 2017, assuming that security and political conditions 
do not deteriorate, planned donor support holds firm, and the current 
positive trend of improved policy and governance reform continues. 
Raising investor confidence depends on improving the security and 
business environment, especially for the extractive industry, and 
strengthening governance and the rule of law. If the government 
implements measures to improve governance, moderate growth in 
industry and services is projected to the forecast horizon. Growth in 
agriculture, on the other hand, is forecast to remain flat in 2016 with 
unfavorable weather but likely to improve in 2017. 
Fiscal policy will continue to focus on boosting revenue collection 
by at least 1% of GDP per annum, as well as on improving the execution 
of the development budget through reforms that strengthen policy and 
governance and build capacity. The overall fiscal position including 
grants is forecast to be about balanced, with no borrowing, in the 
forecast period as expected donor grants will supplement domestic 
revenue to fully fund recurrent and development expenditure 
requirements. The ratio of domestic revenues to recurrent spending is 
projected to improve to 47.1% in 2017 from 43.9% in 2014. 
Headline inflation is forecast to be 3.0% in 2016 and 3.5% in 2017, 
based on Asian Development Outlook baseline assumptions and prudent 
fiscal and monetary policies. Monetary policy will continue to prioritize 
price stability and avoiding undue depreciation of the afghani, which 
is expected to remain under downward pressure because of uncertain 
political and security conditions. 
Including grants, the current account surplus is projected to narrow 
to 2.0% of GDP in 2016 and cross to a 0.7% deficit in 2017 as growth 
in imports exceeds exports. This trend underscores the need to pass 
the extractive industry law and adopt reform to create an environment 
more friendly to business. Excluding grants, the current account deficit 
is projected to equal 42.0% of GDP in 2016 and 42.8% in 2017. 
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Policy challenge—narrowing the fiscal gap
Afghanistan faces major macroeconomic challenges, the greatest being 
to improve fiscal sustainability. Since 2012, the fiscal gap has been 
widening as growth in domestic revenues lagged rising expenditure, 
in large part because of markedly slower economic growth and also 
because of lapses in governance (Figure 3.14.6). Public spending is rising 
because of larger security expenditures following the withdrawal of 
international forces, necessary increases in social benefit spending, 
and higher outlays for operations and maintenance as donors transfer 
completed projects to the government. Nevertheless, Afghanistan 
must reduce its heavy dependence on foreign aid, as set out in the 
government’s plan for its “transformation decade” from 2015 to 2024. 
At the least, this means fully financing operating expenditures from 
domestic revenues. If progress is not made toward improving revenue 
performance, budget deficits and public debt will rise, the delivery of 
essential public services will come under pressure, and donor fatigue 
will set in. 
In 2015, the government took significant steps to improve revenue 
collection: doubling the tax on business receipts to 4% from 2%, 
introducing a 10% tax on mobile phone top-ups, increasing the fuel fee 
from AF1 to AF2 per liter, and raising fees for international airlines 
overflying national air space. As a result, domestic revenue grew by 22%. 
Moreover, the government began implementing broad reforms set out in 
agreements with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank-
administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. 
Projections over the medium term, however, show government 
expenditures increasing faster than domestic revenues under the 
existing tax system. Revenues need to be boosted by expanding the 
rates and coverage of excise and property taxes, minimizing substantial 
tax exemptions, improving taxpayer compliance and enforcement, 
and stemming leakage. In particular, Parliament needs to approve 
the long-delayed value-added tax law as quickly as possible to replace 
the business receipts tax and institute a major source of revenue. 
The government also needs to develop a taxation structure and revenue-
sharing framework specifically for the extractive industry. The sector 
enjoys investor interest and high potential for revenue generation 
if deficiencies in security and essential infrastructure are successfully 
addressed.
Steps can be taken on the expenditure side as well to narrow the 
fiscal gap. The execution of the development budget should be improved 
to accelerate the development of new infrastructure that will drive 
private investment and spur growth that can enlarge the tax base, create 
jobs, and reduce poverty. In addition, savings can come from improved 
transparency and accountability in the use of public funds achieved 
through ecient budget and expenditure management.
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Bangladesh
Growth was resilient in FY2015 despite political protest that hindered exports and private 
investment. Global headwinds notwithstanding, growth is expected to edge up in the next 2 years 
on steady expansion in garment exports. The goal of graduating from low- to middle-income 
status requires much higher investment and thorough reform to improve the business environment, 
boost budget revenue, and strengthen financial discipline.
Economic performance 
GDP growth in FY2015 (ended 30 June 2015) picked up to 6.6% from 
6.1% in FY2014 despite a short period of political protest at midyear 
that disrupted transportation and services (Figure 3.15.1). Growth in 
agriculture moderated to 3.3% from 4.4% a year earlier because harvests 
of staple and horticultural crops were less favorable. Meanwhile, 
robust domestic demand pushed industry expansion to 9.7% from 8.2% 
the previous year, led by manufacturing for the domestic market and 
construction. Services growth advanced slightly to 5.8% from 5.6%.
On the demand side, the main contributor to growth was private 
consumption boosted by higher remittances. Net exports subtracted 
from growth as exports grew more slowly than imports. Investment 
rose only marginally to 28.9% of GDP in FY2015 from 28.6% the 
previous year, mostly on increased public investment. Private investment 
remained stagnant owing to investor caution, infrastructure and skill 
shortages, and a weak business environment. Foreign direct investment 
remains below 1.0% of GDP and 3.0% of total investment.
Average inflation moderated to 6.4% in FY2015 from 7.4% a year 
earlier, largely in response to lower global prices for food and other 
commodities (Figure 3.15.2). Year-on-year inflation eased throughout 
the year to end at 6.3% in June 2015, down from 7.0% a year earlier. 
Food inflation decelerated to 6.3% from 8.0%, while nonfood inflation 
edged up to 6.2% from 5.5%. Food inflation subsequently fell to 3.8% 
year on year in February 2016 on bountiful seasonal supplies, while 
nonfood inflation spiked to 8.5% on increases in administered prices for 
natural gas and electricity. These divergent trends oset each other to 
leave overall inflation hovering at just below 6%. 
Growth in broad money supply slowed in FY2015 mainly as net 
credit to the government fell and expansion in net foreign assets 
decelerated. Broad money growth was, at 12.4%, lower than the FY2015 
monetary program target of 16.5% (Figure 3.15.3). Private credit growth 
was also below the program target, at 13.2% versus 15.5%, as uncertainty 
held back demand for investment loans. Bank credit to the government 
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declined as the government turned increasingly to financing the deficit 
through sales of national savings certificates. 
With ample liquidity in the banking system, interest rates trended 
downward. As inflation remained above its target, Bangladesh Bank, the 
central bank, kept the main policy (repo) rate unchanged. The average 
yield on 91-day Treasury bills declined to 5.4% in June 2015 from 
6.9% a year earlier. Banks’ weighted average interest rate for lending 
declined to 11.7% in June 2015 from 13.1% a year earlier as the deposit 
interest rate fell to 6.8% from 7.7%, narrowing banks’ rate spread by 
0.5 percentage points to 4.9%. 
National Board of Revenue tax collection grew by 13.2% in FY2015, 
underperforming the budget target, particularly for income taxes 
because of subdued economic activity together with delayed reforms in 
revenue collection. The collection of nontax revenues was also weaker 
than expected because profit transfers from state-owned enterprises 
disappointed. Although social spending was maintained as budgeted, 
overall spending was under budget as fuel subsidy requirements and 
public investment were both lower than expected. As a share of GDP, 
revenue fell to 9.6% from 10.4% a year earlier, while spending slipped 
to 13.9% from 14.0%, holding the budget deficit to 4.3% (Figure 3.15.4). 
Three-quarters of the deficit was financed domestically, entirely from 
nonbank sources as demand for national savings certificates ballooned, 
their rates highly attractive as bank deposit rates fell.
Exports grew by only 3.3% in FY2015, down from 12.1% a year 
earlier. Disruption to production early in 2015 from political protest, 
weak demand from leading export destinations, and unfavorable 
exchange rate movements against the euro helped keep expansion tepid. 
Garments, which accounted for 81.7% of exports, grew by only 4.1%, 
down from 13.8%. Import growth accelerated from 8.9% in FY2014 to 
11.2% on higher demand for capital goods, food grains, industrial raw 
materials, and petroleum products, expanding the trade deficit to $9.9 
billion. Workers abroad remitted $15.3 billion as greater employment 
overseas pushed remittances 7.7% higher than a year earlier. 
Despite the pickup in workers’ remittances, the current account 
suered as higher deficits in trade, services, and primary income 
reversed it to a deficit of $1.6 billion, equal to 0.8% of GDP, from the 
surplus of $1.4 billion recorded in FY2014 (Figure 3.15.5). The combined 
capital and financial accounts recorded a large surplus of $5.6 billion in 
FY2015, up from $3.4 billion in FY2014 because of a larger increase in 
net trade credit. However, the current account deficit pushed the overall 
balance of payments to a lower surplus of $4.4 billion from $5.5 billion 
in FY2014. The surplus lifted the central bank’s gross foreign exchange 
reserves to $25.0 billion including valuation adjustments, or cover for 
6.2 months of imports, by the end of June 2015 from $21.5 billion a year 
earlier (Figure 3.15.6). 
The central bank’s active exchange rate management kept the 
Bangladesh taka stable against the dollar, depreciating by only 0.2% in 
FY2015. However, trade partners’ greater currency depreciation against 
the dollar and lower domestic inflation pushed the taka up in real 
eective terms by 14.0% year on year during the fiscal year, indicating 
some loss of export competitiveness (Figure 3.15.7).
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The Dhaka Stock Exchange broad index experienced some month-
to-month volatility but rose moderately by 2.3% in the year to June 
2015 (Figure 3.15.8). The ratio of market price to earnings declined 
over the fiscal year to 15.9 as market capitalization climbed by 10.3% 
to about $42 billion, mainly reflecting the listing of 19 new companies. 
Net foreign portfolio investment is estimated to have fallen by a third to 
$618 million. The capital market is becoming more stable and transparent 
as regulations are strengthened and demutualization progresses with 
the separation of trading rights from ownership and management in the 
Dhaka and Chittagong stock exchanges.
Economic prospects
Growth is expected to inch up to 6.7% in FY2016, underpinned by 
stronger garment exports and rising private consumption as government 
employees get wage increases (Figure 3.15.9). Despite macroeconomic 
stability, domestic demand remains restrained by consumer and investor 
caution. This is reflected in slower private credit growth, a decline in 
consumer and capital goods imports, and slow tax revenue collection in 
the first half of FY2016. Growth is expected to rise to 6.9% in FY2017, 
aided by higher remittance and export growth as the US and the euro area 
economies strengthen. Domestic political calm is seen to build confidence 
in consumers and investors and so support growth momentum.
Agriculture is expected to be little changed, growing at 3.2% in 
FY2016. Rising demand for agricultural products other than traditional 
crops—and improved infrastructure, connectivity, and marketing 
facilities—are projected to edge sector growth up to 3.4% in FY2017.
Industry is expected to expand slightly faster at 9.8% in FY2016. 
Though export growth is forecasted to rise, it will be partly oset by 
slackening consumer demand caused by a slowing of remittance growth. 
Industry will likely grow by 10.0% in FY2017 with a pickup in domestic 
and external demand, better safety standards and compliance in garment 
factories, some gains in electricity supply and infrastructure availability, 
and improved business confidence.
Services growth is projected to improve a bit to 5.9% in FY2016 as 
industry expands. With a pickup in external trade and domestic demand, 
services growth is projected to rise further to 6.1% in FY2017.
Inflation is seen to moderate slightly in FY2016 to average 6.2% 
despite an increase in public sector wages early in the fiscal year 
(Figure 3.15.10). Global fuel and commodity prices are expected to 
decline, the crop outlook is broadly favorable, and the central bank will 
follow prudent monetary policy without hampering output growth. 
Although nonfood inflation is on the rise, driven by higher wages 
and upward adjustments to administered prices of natural gas and 
electricity, continuing low food inflation will keep overall inflation in 
check. Inflation decelerated to 5.6% year on year in February 2016 from 
6.1% a year earlier as food inflation declined to 3.8% from 6.1% and 
nonfood inflation rose to 8.5% from 6.2%. Inflation is expected to average 
higher at 6.5% in FY2017 on account of global fuel prices bottoming out, 
economic growth picking up modestly, and a new value-added tax 
coming into eect.
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The monetary policy statement for the second half of FY2016 
(January–June 2016) prioritizes stabilizing inflation and supporting 
inclusive and environmentally sustainable growth. In a bid to further 
ease market interest rates and stimulate investment, the central bank 
lowered in January 2016 its main policy rates by 50 basis points, 
taking the repurchase rate to 6.75% and the reverse repurchase rate 
to 4.75% (Figure 3.15.11). In view of prevailing excess bank liquidity, 
and to meet competition from private banks, seven state-owned banks 
jointly decided to lower lending rates by 1.5–2.0 percentage points from 
February 2016.
Exports grew by 8.9% in the first 8 months of FY2016, significantly 
up from 2.4% growth in the corresponding period of FY2015 as garment 
exports grew by 9.5%. This reflects in part improved safety standards 
and worker rights in the garment industry, which major buyers 
demanded following fatal factory collapses with severe loss of lives in 
2012 and 2013. With a stable political environment, export growth is 
expected to be 8.0% in FY2016, markedly better than the 3.3% recorded 
in FY2015. Export growth is projected to accelerate further to 9.0% in 
FY2017 (Figure 3.15.12).
Imports rose by 7.0% in July–December 2015 as higher imports 
of chemicals, crude oil, pharmaceuticals, and raw materials for the 
garment industry were only partly oset by declining imports of food 
grains, sugar, fertilizer, and capital equipment. Imports are expected 
to pickup in the second half to grow by 9.0% in FY2016. Imports are 
expected to increase by 11.0% in FY2017.
Workers’ remittances declined by 1.5% to $9.8 billion in the first 
8 months of FY2016, reflecting stagnant wages and taka appreciation 
against host currencies. Overseas jobs for Bangladeshi workers surged by 
55.7% in the first 8 months of FY2016 (Figure 3.15.13). This foreshadows 
in the following months a likely rise in remittances, which are expected 
to grow by 5.0% in FY2016 and a further 7.0% in FY2017. 
The current account deficit is expected to improve slightly to 
0.5% of GDP in FY2016 with a narrower trade deficit (Figure 3.15.14). 
However, the current account deficit is projected to widen to 1.0% of 
GDP in FY2017 as remittance inflows will not su¦ce to oset the larger 
trade gap that is projected.
The FY2016 budget targets 29.5% growth in tax revenue and 
23.1% growth in total spending, including current spending and the 
annual development program. Achieving these large increases will 
be challenging, so shortfalls are likely on both sides of the ledger. 
Developments in the early months of FY2016 indicate that revenue as a 
share of GDP increased to 10.3%, while public spending rose to 15.0%. 
The projected fiscal deficit is, at 4.7% of GDP, slightly higher than the 
4.3% outcome in FY2015. Just over 70% of the deficit is expected to be 
financed from domestic sources—again mostly not from banks.
Like other net oil-importing countries, Bangladesh enjoyed a 
windfall gain from lower global oil prices. Visible impacts are in the 
trade balance and in lower subsidy costs to the budget. The authorities’ 
maintenance of retail fuel prices enabled the Bangladesh Petroleum 
Corporation to earn healthy operating profits and recoup some of its 
large past losses. Retail fuel prices may be lowered if international prices 
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fall further and all past liabilities of Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation 
are duly paid.
External and domestic debt does not pose a systematic risk to 
debt servicing. Debt as a percentage of GDP continued to improve in 
FY2015. Central government debt declined to 27.2% of GDP in FY2015 
from 29.1% in FY2014 as the ratio of external debt to GDP continued its 
steady decline (Figure 3.15.15). The government’s prudent decisions on 
borrowing from external sources were reflected as external debt stepped 
down annually to reach 12.0% of GDP in FY2015, for which the external 
debt service ratio is 2.3%. Domestic debt rose slightly to 15.2% of GDP in 
FY2015 from 15.0% in FY2014 as the sale of national savings certificates 
to the public expanded to cover a shortfall in revenue collection. The 
average interest paid on domestic debt is 10.6%.
Policy challenge—promoting investment 
and growth
The Seventh Five-Year Plan aims to achieve 8% GDP growth and scale 
up investment from the equivalent of 29% of GDP to 35% by FY2020. 
As in the past, momentum has to come from private investment. 
Indicative growth scenarios suggest that private investment needs to 
rise from 22% of GDP to at least 27%. However, it will be a challenge to 
achieve an increase in the private investment rate in the next 5 years 
that is equal to 5 percentage points of GDP, especially in view of stagnant 
private investment over the past 5 years. Despite a very favorable 
macroeconomic performance and political calm prevailing since the 
second quarter of 2015, investor confidence remains subdued. 
To boost private investment it is necessary to address three binding 
constraints by improving electricity and gas supply, easing problems 
in property acquisition and registration, and strengthening logistics. 
Additionally, policy focus is required on resolving insolvency and 
lowering the cost of trading across borders. Bangladesh needs real 
progress toward greatly cutting the cost of doing business to boost 
private and foreign investment. It ranks 174 among 189 countries 
surveyed in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2016—well below India 
at 130, Pakistan at 138, and Sri Lanka at 107. Streamlined tax payment 
procedures, improved access to credit, and better contract enforcement 
are priorities. 
High transaction costs caused by inadequate supply of electricity and 
gas badly constrain investment and growth. Despite considerable new 
investment in power generation, getting electricity connections for new 
businesses is a challenge, according to surveys. Addressing the problem 
requires that regulatory procedures be further simplified by reducing 
their number and application response times. Capacity enhancement 
is critical to enable response to new requests for electricity and gas 
connections in the required volume and at lower cost. This will require 
substantial public investment and an eective strategy for primary 
energy supply in the medium term.
Long delays and the high cost of obtaining and registering 
land frustrate private investment, especially in manufacturing. 
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The land market is very ine¦cient because of weak land ownership 
documentation, institutional bottlenecks, poor zoning laws, and 
high transaction costs. The government has started digitizing land 
records in an initiative that needs to be scaled up and out across the 
country. Meanwhile, population pressure and rapid urbanization have 
made urban land increasingly hard to acquire. As land prices have 
skyrocketed, so have land disputes and various forms of corruption 
including land grabbing. The challenge for policy makers is acute, and 
it will take time and eort to simplify land transactions and registration 
through regulatory reform, improve land administration and record 
keeping through institutional reform, establish economic zones for 
private investors both domestic and foreign, and improve mechanisms to 
enforce zoning laws on land use.
The authorities must also address weak trade logistics and the 
long delays to trade transactions and associated costs that they cause. 
Much of the problem lies in getting goods from the factory gate to the 
port. Handling capacity at Chittagong port has improved, and port 
handling charges are now less of a concern. However, road and railway 
networks need their capacity enhanced in line with rising transport 
demand to capitalize on such gains.
More generally, boosting investment and sustaining growth 
momentum as Bangladesh approaches middle-income status require 
deep policy reform and strengthened institutions. Ensuring easier access 
to finance depends on a healthy banking sector with enhanced capital 
adequacy and fewer nonperforming loans. Continuing reform to the 
capital and insurance markets needs to be accelerated in tandem with 
regulatory strengthening to provide long-term loans for investment. 
Import tari reform, stalled for the past 2 decades, must be tackled 
to enhance the economy’s competitiveness. Revenue collection in 
Bangladesh is low even compared with other South Asian economies 
and must be markedly improved to provide resources for investment in 
infrastructure and social development. Operationalizing the new value-
added tax is an essential first step toward significantly better revenue 
mobilization. Likewise, rationalizing energy and power subsidies is 
essential to improve fiscal flexibility. Finally, institutional capacity needs 
to be strengthened with a sharper focus on project implementation.
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Bhutan
Growth accelerated in FY2015 on revived domestic demand and continued expansion of 
construction on large hydropower projects. The outlook is for moderately higher growth from new 
hydropower output, strong domestic demand, and strengthened fiscal programs for economic 
diversification and small enterprise development. Strategies to enhance education and labor skills 
that are more attuned to economic demands will help make growth in Bhutan more inclusive.
Economic performance
Growth quickened to an estimated 5.9% in FY2015 (ended 30 June 2015) 
after slowing in recent years as domestic demand faltered under 
import and credit restrictions imposed to alleviate shortages of Indian 
rupee reserves. With the restrictions lifted in September 2014 and 
hydropower construction back on track following an earlier delay, 
gross fixed investment strongly recovered, and imports of machinery 
and equipment markedly pick up. 
On the production side, services and industry both accelerated 
(Figure 3.16.1). Faster growth in the service sector was broad based, 
led by the revival in wholesale trade and financial activities. Hotels 
and transport gained from double-digit growth in tourist arrivals, 
while socioeconomic services rose from increased public spending. 
Industrial growth advanced on a robust pickup in construction and 
import-related manufacturing. Agriculture also grew, benefitting from 
continuing government programs to enhance production.
 Despite robust demand, inflation slowed markedly throughout the 
year as prices fell for both domestic and imported food, which together 
comprise 40% of the consumption basket (Figure 3.16.2). Bhutan’s prices 
broadly follow movements in India’s market prices, as most goods are 
imported from India and the Bhutanese ngultrum is pegged one-to-one 
to the Indian rupee. Domestic inflationary pressures were subdued by 
improved harvests and lower housing and transport costs courtesy of 
declining world oil prices. Average inflation eased to 6.6% in FY2015 
from 9.6% in the previous year.
Government expenditure (excluding net lending) grew by 18.1%, 
rising by 1.2 percentage points as a share of GDP (Figure 3.16.3). 
In line with the goal in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, FY2013–2018 of 
making growth more inclusive and diversified, spending supported 
crop and livestock production, infrastructure improvement, and the 
development of priority sectors. Despite a 7.1% increase in revenue, total 
government resources fell by 3.8% because grants declined by 21.7%, 
mainly reflecting the high base in FY2014 that included a large grant 
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from India to support priority sectors. The overall fiscal balance turned 
to a deficit of Nu2.8 billion, equal to 2.2% of GDP. 
The Royal Monetary Authority introduced new macro-prudential 
regulations to improve monetary management and, early in FY2015, 
withdrew the foreign exchange and credit restrictions. With liquidity 
and credit building up, the cash reserve ratio was raised from 5% to 10% 
in March 2015, and the base rate for bank lending was revised up from 
10.32% to 10.49% in May 2015. Priority sectors remained exempted from 
the base rating system to steer credit to them. By the end of FY2015, 
money supply had grown by 7.8%, well below the 26.0% monthly peak 
that fiscal year but outpacing the 6.6% recorded in the previous year 
(Figure 3.16.4). Credit to the private sector rose by 13.8% by the end 
of FY2015, double the expansion rate in FY2014, as credit growth in 
construction markedly quickened. Credit increased as well in trade and 
commerce—and to an extent in agriculture—supported by low lending 
rates for priority sectors.
The current account deficit remained high at the equivalent of 28.2% 
of GDP, up slightly from 26.4% in FY2014 (Figure 3.16.5). The rise was 
mainly from higher hydropower interest payments, which drove up 
the primary income deficit. The trade deficit, though still high on large 
hydropower-related imports and robust consumption, narrowed slightly 
to 20.3% of GDP owing to higher exports of hydropower and mineral-
based construction goods, as well as moderating prices for imports 
from India. 
As net capital and financial flows could not o¡set the current 
account deficit, gross o¢cial reserves fell slightly by $39 million to 
$959 million, equal to nearly 10 months of imports and well above 
the conventional benchmark of 3 months (Figure 3.16.6). The share of 
Indian rupee reserves, at about 18% of the total, remained adequate for 
cross-border payments. 
Bhutan’s external debt rose by $96 million to $1.85 billion in FY2015 
on continued hydropower construction, and despite lower debts 
from the short-term line of credit, but fell as a share of GDP to 90% 
(Figure 3.16.7). The debt service ratio improved with the increase in 
export value. As most debt is for hydropower with large economic gains 
expected in the future, the International Monetary Fund estimates the 
risk of debt distress to be only moderate. 
Economic prospects
Industry growth is expected to strengthen moderately in FY2016 as 
electricity output increases with the year-round operation of the new 
Dagachhu hydropower station, while construction of the new Nikachhu 
hydropower station will supplement ongoing investment. Manufacturing 
growth is expected to remain strong on robust demand for construction-
related goods—iron, steel, and cement—for export and domestic use. 
Industry growth will ease slightly in FY2017 on base e¡ects and because 
no new hydropower capacity is expected until at least 2018. 
The service sector is projected to maintain momentum in FY2016 
on robust domestic demand that will benefit retail trade, hotels and 
restaurants, and finance, and on strengthened wholesale trade supporting 
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domestic construction and goods exports. Fiscal programs are expected 
to intensify and support growth in FY2016, as expenditures excluding 
net lending are projected to increase to 32.5% of GDP, and the deficit 
to widen to 3.1% before narrowing to 0.6% in FY2017. The government 
will strengthen diversification e¡orts with priority lending facilities and 
tax exemptions for sectors with potential: agribusiness, small cottage 
industries, and tourism. 
Against this backdrop, GDP growth is expected to climb 
moderately to 6.4% in FY2016 before easing slightly to 6.1% in FY2017. 
Notwithstanding robust demand, inflation is projected to ease further 
to 4.0% in FY2016 in view of India’s policy targeting inflation and a 
continued downward drift in global commodity prices. Inflation is 
projected to pick up to 5.0% in 2017 following projected price movements 
in India and in the world market.
The current account deficit is expected to remain large in the 
forecast period as imports for hydropower construction strengthen, 
hydropower interest payments build up, and consumption imports stay 
strong. The deficit is likely to shrink markedly beginning in 2018 as 
two large projects amounting to 1,740 megawatts are brought on line, 
essentially doubling current electricity export capacity. 
Policy challenge—strengthening education 
for inclusive growth 
Bhutan needs to improve its labor base to ensure that growth is 
sustainable and inclusive. The strength and quality of the workforce 
depends on its educational attainment and acquisition of the knowledge 
and skills needed for productive employment. As the economy has 
rapidly transformed over the decades from agriculture toward 
hydropower and services, it needs a strong workforce that responds to 
the demand from the growing sectors. Interventions will be challenged 
by low educational attainment, skills shortages and mismatch with labor 
demand, and employment disparity by region, gender, and age. 
Over the past decade, Bhutan has invested 5.5% of GDP annually in 
education, which is higher than the regional average of 3.5%. Despite 
this high investment, considerable gaps remain in the country’s 
educational achievement. Nationally, average years of schooling is 
very low by regional standards (Figure 3.16.8), with only 34% of 
the population at least 15 years old achieving at least a secondary 
education. Adult and youth literacy rates are the lowest in South Asia 
(Figure 3.16.9). Although primary school enrolment rates are high, many 
students do not continue to secondary and tertiary school, as access 
is limited and unequal because of high costs and a lack of higher-level 
schools, especially in rural areas. Some of those who leave school enter 
vocational training, but most work in low income-earning agriculture.
Among students that reach the tertiary level, 70% major in language, 
business, or commerce. Only 15% major in engineering or technology, 
with the rest in law or medical-related studies. By contrast, most jobs 
in the private sector require skills in construction, crafts, machinery 
operation, or engineering. Because of labor skills shortages, 60% of 
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these jobs have been filled in the past 5 years by foreign workers. 
Various studies point to this mismatch of education and skills as a major 
constraint on private sector development. 
Bhutan’s high employment rate, averaging 97% over the past 
10 years, masks regional and gender disparities, in particular high 
unemployment in urban areas and among women and youth, and 
underemployment in rural areas. Worker vulnerability is commonplace, 
as 58% of workers depend on subsistence agriculture, mostly as 
unpaid family workers or working on their own account. Only about 
24% are employed in the private sector, and the remaining 19% are in 
government or the civil service.
If growth is to be inclusive, economic progress must translate into 
local employment and benefits. The country’s growth path dictates 
higher investments in technical and skills-based infrastructure and 
better alignment of education with future labor demands. 
Under the Bhutan Education Blueprint, 2014–2024 and its 
implementation plan for 2015, action is being taken to improve the 
quality of education, widen access to schooling especially in remote 
areas, address achievement gaps, and strengthen system e¢ciency. 
A three-stage approach is planned. It starts by upgrading school 
curricula and teaching quality, increasing the number of skill-based 
learning institutions, improving learning methods through information 
and communication technology, and enhancing skills training and 
employment programs for youth. The next two stages will accelerate 
these programs to achieve target outcomes. Close collaboration with the 
private sector is important to maximize capacity and the interventions 
implemented with limited resources. The goal is to transform education 
and strengthen the workforce to make it more responsive to needs in the 
sectors that drive economic growth.
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India
Growth accelerated in FY2015 despite a double-digit decline in exports. It is projected to dip 
marginally in FY2016 with a slowdown in public investment, stressed corporate balance sheets, 
and declining exports, then pick up in FY2017 as newly strengthened bank and corporate finances 
allow a revival in investment. Notwithstanding unexpected delays in enacting some economic 
reform, the prospects for continued rapid growth are undiminished.
Economic performance 
Advance government estimates point to the economy growing at 7.6% in 
FY2015 (ending 31 March 2016), marginally above the forecast of 7.4% 
in Asian Development Outlook 2015 Update. The estimate could be a tad 
optimistic, however, as achieving it would require GDP to increase by 
7.7% in the last quarter of the fiscal year (Figure 3.17.1). 
Despite a weak monsoon for a second consecutive year, 
agriculture grew by 1.1% in FY2015, mainly on strong growth in 
livestock. Food grain production is estimated to have increased by 0.5% 
in FY2015, though there was lower production of rice, coarse cereals, 
oilseeds, and sugarcane.
After growing by 5.9% in FY2014, industry accelerated further to 
7.3% in FY2015. Manufacturing growth rebounded to 9.5% with the 
aid of robust performance in the manufacturing operations of private 
corporations, whose margins have been inching up with lower input 
costs. Strong growth in manufacturing as measured by value added 
continues to be at variance with anemic growth in industrial production, 
which measures volume. Growth in other industry subsectors—mining, 
construction, and utilities—moderated in FY2015. 
Expansion in services also moderated, to 9.2%, largely in line 
with slower growth in public administration, defense, and the 
“other services” category. An increase in bank deposit and credit 
growth in the second half of FY2015 helped financial, real estate, and 
professional services grow at a healthy 10.3%, while robust growth in 
airline passengers and sales of commercial vehicles bolstered expansion 
in trade, hotels, transport, and communications to 9.5%. 
Private consumption growth is estimated to have picked up to 
7.6% in FY2015 from 6.2% a year earlier (Figure 3.17.2). However, 
these estimates are likely to be optimistic, as achieving them would 
require private consumption to grow at 11.7% in the fourth quarter 
of FY2015, nearly double the 6.1% growth rate achieved in the first 3 
quarters. Much of the improvement in private consumption stems from 
a pickup in urban consumption, while rural consumption has remained 
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subdued as a result of two consecutive weak monsoons. Government 
consumption growth also stayed tepid as the central government 
boosted capital expenditure and curtailed current expenditure. A 20.9% 
increase in capital expenditure undertaken by the central government 
helped investment growth improve to 5.3% from 4.9% in FY2014. 
However, private investment remained weakened by overcapacity and 
Indian corporations’ debt overhang. 
Inflation has stayed subdued, averaging 5.0% in FY2015 (Figure 3.17.3). 
Despite 2 years with weak monsoons, food inflation continues to trend 
low, though it picked up in the second half of the year on higher prices 
for selected products such as pulses, onions, and sugar. The easing of food 
inflation overall was helped by lower global commodity prices, restrained 
increases in domestic procurement prices, and improved management 
of government food stocks. Despite soft global prices for crude oil, 
fuel inflation inched up to 5.5% from 4.1% in FY2014. The uptick came 
primarily from higher fuel inflation in rural areas, which commonly 
use domestically produced fuel such as firewood and biogas that are not 
aected by low oil prices. Even in urban areas, the decline in oil prices 
was only partly passed through to retail prices, as taxes were increased to 
bolster government revenues. After declining by nearly 300 basis points in 
FY2014, core inflation has remained relatively sticky, staying within the 
narrow range of 4.1% to 4.8% in FY2015, indicating entrenched inflation 
expectations. 
Despite inflation declining by nearly 500 basis points from its peak 
in late 2013, key policy rates were reduced by a cumulative 125 basis 
points: 75 basis points in the last quarter of FY2014 followed by 50 basis 
points in September 2015 (Figure 3.17.4). Such calibrated policy rate 
reduction reflected concern about the prospect of the US Federal Reserve 
increasing interest rates and the resulting volatility in global financial 
markets, sharp price increases for some food products, and possibility of 
deviation from the path of fiscal consolidation.
Bank credit growth averaged less than 10% in FY2015 as falling 
inflation lowered firms’ input costs and thereby reduced their working 
capital requirements, and as firms increased their use of nonbank 
financing (Figure 3.17.5). Banks’ limited pass-through of cuts in policy 
rates meant the cost of funds fell only slowly, prompting firms to shift 
to other instruments such as corporate bonds and commercial paper, for 
which interest rates fell much more steeply. Moreover, a surge in foreign 
direct investment, low global interest rates, and ready access to credit 
allowed companies to source foreign funds at lower cost. 
Weak balance sheets at public banks, which account for 70% of 
bank lending, continue to pose risks for economic growth as they 
limit banks’ ability to fund investment. The ratio of nonperforming 
assets to total advances deteriorated from 4.6% in March 2015 to 5.1% 
in September 2015, though restructured loans declined a bit to 6.2% 
from 6.4%. Taken together, the ratio of stressed advances exceeds 11%, 
raising concern about the quality of bank assets (Figure 3.17.6). 
The government and the central bank have moved to revitalize public 
sector banks by recapitalizing selected banks, allowing others to raise 
capital from markets (thereby diluting the government’s holding), and 
improving governance by appointing executives in a professional and 
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transparent manner. Moreover, bank lenders were given the option 
to convert their loans into equity in borrowers’ companies under a 
specified pricing formula to collectively become majority shareholders, 
and to appoint new management if a company failed to meet milestones 
set up under a restructuring package.
The government was able to achieve its target of reducing the 
budget deficit to the equivalent of 3.9% of GDP from 4.1% in FY2014 
(Figure 3.17.7). The reduction came through curtailed current 
expenditure and through tax revenue growth that exceeded the target. 
While corporate and personal income tax collection fell short of their 
targets, revenue from excise duties and taxes on services grew faster 
than planned, helped by hikes in excise duties on petroleum products. 
Despite receipts from planned asset sales falling well below their target, 
nontax revenue registered healthy growth at over 30% as public sector 
enterprises, including public banks, paid higher dividends.
Expenditure grew by 7.3% in FY2015, marginally higher than 
budgeted growth at 6.8%. Unlike in previous years, capital expenditure 
grew robustly, by 20.9%, such that the ratio of capital expenditure to 
GDP rose to 1.8% in FY2015. By contrast, current expenditure growth 
was tamed at 5.5%. The sharp drop in global oil prices, deregulation 
of diesel prices, and use of cash transfers to qualified recipients to 
rationalize the subsidized cooking gas benefit cut expenditures on the 
petroleum subsidy by more than half. However, there was an uptick in 
the outgo on account of fertilizer and food subsidies.
A national commission that reviews the salaries of the central 
government employees every decade recommended a 23.5% increase 
in salaries and pensions. According to the commission, the wage 
revision would cost the central government budget the equivalent of 
0.46% of GDP. The government is waiting for a committee set up in 
late January 2016 to announce its final verdict on the commission’s 
recommendations.
Imports are estimated to have contracted by 15.5% in FY2015, 
primarily aided by a sharply reduced oil import bill. With the price of 
imported crude oil declining by more than half in the course of FY2015, 
oil imports fell by more than 40% even as volume picked up by 8% 
over the previous year. Gold imports increased by 2.6%, despite lower 
prices, as import volumes registered a marked gain of 21.4% during 
the year. At the same time, imports other than oil and gold stabilized 
as consumption goods such as electronics and readymade garments 
registered growth, indicating improved domestic consumption demand. 
However, imports of capital goods such as machinery, transport 
equipment, and iron and steel remained weak. 
Lower commodity prices and anemic global demand weighed on 
exports, which contracted by 18.0% in FY2015. While lower oil prices 
brought refined petroleum exports down by more than half, non-oil 
exports also declined by 9.4%. Exports of key products including 
engineering goods, electronics, leather, textiles, and gems and jewelry 
contracted as demand weakened in the advanced economies, the People’s 
Republic of China, and oil-producing nations. Higher service exports and 
remittances helped to narrow the estimated current account deficit to the 
equivalent of 1.3% of GDP (Figure 3.17.8).
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Buoyed by measures to enhance foreign direct investment—including 
raising the ceiling for investment in several important sectors such as 
broadcasting and defense, as well as rationalizing and simplifying 
procedures—net flows of foreign direct investment surged to an 
estimated $32 billion, nearly 26% higher than in the previous year. 
Inflows in the form of deposits by nonresident Indians also remained 
strong, growing to nearly $15 billion in FY2015. These inflows and 
continuing business and government loan inflows increased gross 
international reserves in FY2015 by $9.2 billion to over $350 billion 
(Figure 3.17.9). 
Portfolio flows turned negative during the year with estimated 
net outflows of $3.7 billion from the equity market and $0.7 billion in 
debt, in line with the experience of other emerging markets. The sello 
reflected concerns about interest rates rising in the US, the economic 
slowdown in key emerging markets, and slower-than-anticipated 
progress on politically di§cult domestic economic reforms. The outflow 
from the equity market was a factor pushing stock prices on the Bombay 
Stock Exchange Sensex down by 13% over the year (Figure 3.17.10). 
The Indian rupee depreciated by 8% against the US dollar in FY2015. 
However, it weakened in nominal eective terms by a smaller 5%, and 
in real eective terms by less than 3%, implying that it moved in parallel 
with the currencies of trading partners (Figure 3.17.11).
Economic prospects
While public investment and urban consumption were the major 
drivers of growth in FY2015, a revival of private investment and rural 
consumption is critical if growth is to remain strong in FY2016 and 
FY2017, given the likely sluggish recovery in the advanced economies 
and the anemic outlook for global trade. Urban consumption is 
expected to receive a boost from the impending salary hike for 
government employees in 2016. That salary hike is likely a factor in 
pushing private sector wages somewhat higher. However, reviving 
rural consumption will hinge on the quality of the monsoon, as a major 
part of the rural economy continues to depend heavily on agriculture. 
Nevertheless, budgetary support for programs to improve agricultural 
productivity and funding for the government employment scheme for 
poor rural families should boost rural incomes and spending.
Public investment will continue to be an important driver of growth, 
as the government is expected to use savings from oil to further boost 
government investment. However, the finances available to ramp up 
investment in FY2016 will be considerably smaller than in FY2015, 
given sharper fiscal tightening and increased outgo on account of a 
higher public sector wage bill. New investment announcements are 
just beginning to recover and inch higher (Figure 3.17.12). While the 
number of stalled projects has declined marginally, it remains elevated. 
Ongoing deleveraging by private corporations, reductions in policy 
rates, and public investment are likely to initiate a recovery in private 
investment. Further, the uptick in consumption could soak up excess 
capacity across sectors and invite fresh investment. 
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Various investment outlook surveys provide a mixed picture. 
The manufacturing purchasing managers’ index declined for 
6 consecutive months to December but turned higher in January and 
February 2016 on new orders and exports (Figure 3.17.13). The services 
index has been more robust, reaching a 21-month high in January 
but then falling in February on a marginal increase in output. At the 
same time, Nomura’s index of composite leading indicators shows 
growth momentum stabilizing, while the central bank’s industrial 
outlook survey points to strengthening business sentiment. 
A normal monsoon would augur well for growth in agriculture, 
which has been depressed by weak rains in the past 2 years. 
The slowdown in advanced economies including the US, lower export 
commodity prices, and weaker currencies in some major trading partners 
vis-à-vis the Indian rupee are likely to hit merchandise exports and 
financial, telecom, business, and other tradeable services. Lower net 
exports could thus impinge on growth.
Limited policy headroom exists to bolster growth, given pressures 
from an uptick in inflation and plans for further fiscal consolidation. 
However, with new guidelines from the central bank requiring banks 
to set their lending rates based on marginal cost of funds or the rates 
oered to new deposits, there will be greater transmission of reduced 
policy rates to lending rates. The consequent reduction in the cost of 
borrowing is likely to boost aggregate demand. 
On balance, growth is projected at 7.4% in FY2016, marginally lower 
than the 7.6% achieved in FY2015 as the expected decline in external 
demand osets a pickup in domestic demand. Moreover, the weak 
balance sheets of public sector banks will hamper lending and growth 
prospects. Growth is expected to pick up a bit to 7.8% in FY2017, helped 
by the government’s strengthening of public sector banks’ capital and 
operations, private investment benefitting from corporate deleveraging, 
the financing of stalled projects, and an uptick in bank credit. 
After 2 years of decline, consumer inflation is likely to accelerate 
slightly in both years. The salary hike for civil servants would boost 
consumption, perhaps fueling broad inflation. Meanwhile, somewhat 
higher global oil prices are likely in the second half of FY2016, some 
of which would transmit to retail prices. On the other hand, a normal 
monsoon would help mitigate some of the pressure on food prices, 
which firmed up in the second half of FY2015. Despite inflation 
declining substantially in the past 3 years, inflation expectations have 
remained elevated and even inched up since the beginning of FY2015, 
implying that core inflation is entrenched. Inflation is likely to average 
5.4% in FY2016, rising to 5.8% in FY2017 as global oil prices firm up and 
domestic demand strengthens. 
The central bank has signaled an accommodative monetary stance, 
though further cuts to key policy rates would be contingent on the 
evolving inflation trajectory and the implementation of planned budget 
consolidation. Thus, while aggressive rate cuts are unlikely, FY2016 may 
see some monetary easing. 
The FY2016 budget displays fiscal prudence by rea§rming the path 
of fiscal consolidation and reducing the fiscal deficit to 3.5% of GDP. 
Gross tax revenue growth of 11.7% in FY2016 seems achievable with 
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a tax buoyancy of 1.1. In fact, estimates of indirect tax growth appear 
to be conservative with excise duty growth pegged at 12.2% even after 
the government hiked the excise duty on petroleum products late in 
FY2015. Estimates of service tax revenue growth also appear to be more 
conservative than in previous years. By contrast, estimates of nontax 
revenue are optimistic. The government has targeted a 21% increase in 
the dividends of public sector companies excluding banks. Moreover, 
proceeds from telecommunications spectrum sales are expected to 
rise sharply from Rs560 billion in FY2015 to Rs990 billion, while the 
disinvestment target has been set at Rs565 billion, more than double the 
Rs253 billion achieved in FY2015. Reliance on asset sales makes achieving 
budget targets dependent on market conditions.
A focus of the budget is to revive rural demand, which has remained 
under stress for 2 consecutive years of weak monsoons. The budget also 
increases social sector spending and boosts infrastructure allocations 
for road transport, power generation, renewable energy, and railways. 
The expenditure mix is expected to deteriorate, however, with capital 
expenditure projected to grow by only 3.9% (and decline as a share of 
GDP), against 11.8% expansion for current expenditure. Within current 
expenditure, while petroleum subsidies are expected to decline further, 
allocations for food subsidies will increase. Outgo on account of salaries 
and pensions are budgeted to increase as the government implements 
recommendations from the national commission. 
As crude oil prices are projected to decline by 32% in FY2016, refined 
petroleum exports, which account for nearly 20% of merchandise exports, 
are likely to contract by 28% during FY2016. Sluggish global growth and 
an appreciating rupee in real eective terms are likely to further impede 
exports. Encouragingly, exports by volume of metal and metal products, 
basmati rice, and drugs have been resilient, and higher prices for these 
key exports are likely to provide a boost. On balance, exports will likely 
contract by 1.5% in FY2016. Imports of crude oil are expected to decline 
by 24% on weak prices. Gold imports are likely to remain flat as volumes 
rise but prices decline. Other imports could inch up as domestic demand 
strengthens, increasing total imports by 3.5%. Consequently, the current 
account deficit is expected to widen a bit to the equivalent of 1.6% of GDP 
in FY2016, up from an estimated 1.3% in FY2015.
With growth in the large advanced economies edging up, and 
higher oil prices in 2017 helping exports of refined petroleum, overall 
merchandise exports are expected to recover to 5.0% growth. At the 
same time, imports are projected to rebound by 9.0% with higher growth 
and oil prices, causing the current account deficit to widen to 1.8% of 
GDP. The higher current account deficit will likely be easily financed by 
stable capital flows. In the medium term, a sustained pickup in exports 
would require a competitive currency, continued progress in reducing 
supply-side bottlenecks, and a lower cost of doing business. 
Numerous measures enacted to attract foreign direct investment and 
further measures to improve the business environment will ensure that 
India remains a favored base for manufacturing and exporting. After 
registering an outflow of $4.4 billion in FY2015, portfolio investment 
is likely to pick up as Indian assets continue to look attractive vis-à-vis 
assets in emerging market peers. 
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Policy challenge—fostering bank finance 
of infrastructure
The private sector has played a large role in infrastructure financing 
since 2005. The Twelfth Five-Year Plan, 2012–2017 envisioned 21% 
of infrastructure financing (and 42% of all debt financing) being 
sourced from banks. Infrastructure financing needs were estimated 
at around $200 billion per year to FY2017. Healthy banks are needed 
to ensure that the private sector can continue to play its desired role 
in infrastructure financing, as public infrastructure spending can be 
raised only so far, even in light of a substantial drop in government 
debt. However, high and rising nonperforming assets (NPAs) in the 
banking sector, coupled with an overleveraged corporate sector, could 
choke o this important source of infrastructure financing, leaving a 
speed bump on India’s road to high and sustained economic growth. 
Since 2011, gross fixed capital formation has begun to decline as a 
share of GDP and is no longer a significant driver of economic growth 
(Figure 3.17.14).
The nexus of a highly indebted corporate sector and proliferating 
NPAs will be di§cult to resolve quickly. The interest cover ratio, 
measuring companies’ ability to pay interest on their debts, remains 
low in over 2,000 companies operating in such key sectors as 
electric power, steel, and construction, as regularly surveyed by the 
Reserve Bank of India, the central bank—though some sectors, such as 
manufacturing, experienced a decisive uptick in the last quarter of 
FY2014 (Figure 3.17.15). Credit growth has been slow, particularly at 
public sector banks, which still hold about 72% of all bank assets and 
are a vital source of infrastructure financing for India’s corporate 
sector. Key financial indicators deteriorated rapidly (Figure 3.17.16). 
With banks understandably cautious about extending new loans while 
resolving their NPA issues and cleaning up their balance sheet, and 
with the highly leveraged corporate sector reluctant to undertake new 
investment, viable projects may go unfinanced, considerably impeding 
economic growth. 
The causes for the sharp rise in NPAs are both internal and 
external: supply-side bottlenecks, a highly leveraged corporate sector, 
weak governance and project appraisal capacity within banks, and 
a slowdown in global and domestic demand. Moreover, loans to the 
electric power sector, to which banks are highly exposed, are beset 
with problems related to the deteriorating health of power distribution 
companies. However, the government is taking a wide range of steps 
to address these issues, tackling bank governance, recapitalization, 
debt restructuring, and NPA recognition. Its Indradhanush program, 
announced in early 2015, aims to recapitalize public sector banks with 
Rs700 billion over the next 4 years and strengthen internal governance. 
A package to strengthen the financial health of state-owned 
electricity distributors was unveiled in November 2015, with states 
voluntarily taking over 75% of the debt of their distribution companies. 
The package provides incentives for electricity distributors to reduce 
their technical losses and debt service costs and to improve their 
financial discipline. 
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In December 2015, a bankruptcy law was introduced in Parliament 
that promises to substantially improve the quality and speed of debt 
restructuring, a process that has heretofore been slow and unstructured. 
The central bank undertook several measures to strengthen NPA 
disclosure, risk control, and the appointment process at public sector 
banks. In early February 2016, the central bank governor advocated 
“deep surgery” for banks in place of Band-Aids, encouraging all banks 
to disclose and fully provide for all NPAs by March 2017. This call 
for greater recognition of NPAs came after an intense review of asset 
quality conducted by the central bank in the last 2 months of 2015 
and can be expected to push up the reported incidence of NPAs in the 
banking system (Figure 3.17.17). While the FY2016 budget provision to 
recapitalize banks generally disappointed industry observers and some 
international rating agencies, the central bank’s revision on 29 February 
2016 of how tier 1 capital is calculated is estimated to boost tier 1 
capital by Rs350 billion to Rs400 billion. Meanwhile, the government 
is taking steps to revive flagging private sector investment: introducing 
a strengthened resolution mechanism for troubled public–private 
partnerships, setting up the National Infrastructure Investment Fund 
to attract private sector financing into infrastructure, and introducing 
tax-free infrastructure bonds. 
Together, these measures should gradually unclog bank finance 
channels and increase private sector spending on infrastructure, 
provided that the legal changes are implemented properly and there is 
no further dramatic deterioration in the health of banks or corporations.
3.17.17  Nonperforming loans to all 
public sector bank loans
%
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
 
Note: Years are fiscal years, Q1 is April–June.
Source: CEIC Data Company (accessed 17 March 2016).
Click here for figure data
This chapter was written by Masato Nakane of the South Asia Department, ADB, Manila, 
and Elbe Aguba, consultant, South Asia Department, ADB, Manila.
Maldives
A downturn in tourism brought markedly slower growth in 2015 and, combined with higher capital 
spending, enlarged budget and current account deficits, even as inflation fell to a record low. 
The  outlook is for moderate growth on tepid recovery in tourism and on further infrastructure 
spending intended to foster economic diversification and higher, less volatile growth over the 
long  term. 
Economic performance
GDP growth braked to an estimated 1.5% in 2015 from 6.5% a year 
earlier as tourism contracted and transport growth slowed markedly 
(Figure 3.18.1). As most taxes are tied to tourism, growth was cut further 
as tax earnings net of subsidies fell. Growth came largely from robust 
public investment that propelled a doubling of construction growth to 
over 40%. 
In sharp contrast with previous years, tourism contracted by over 
4% as growth in arrivals slowed and bed-night occupancy slipped 
(Figure 3.18.2). Growth in tourist arrivals declined to 2% from 7% 
in 2014 despite upbeat tourism globally and in Asia. Arrivals from 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—which provides 30% of the 
total—fell by 1% following 6 years of rapid growth and despite resilient 
outbound travel from the PRC. Arrivals from Europe—which has a 
44% market share—picked up but only slightly. Despite some growth 
in arrivals, bed-night occupancy, which largely determines earnings, 
fell by 4.3% as the average stay continued to shorten.
With vibrant investment and construction, the related real estate 
sector expanded, and imports of wood, cement, and other construction 
materials jumped by about 40% over the year. Expansion in fishery-
based sectors, mainly agriculture and manufacturing, fell with lower 
fish purchases by volume and output of processed fish. Growth in the 
other sectors was minimal.
Average inflation eased further from 2.1% in 2014 to 1.0%—
the lowest rate in 10 years—as world food and oil prices declined. 
Monthly inflation rates were variable but fell in transport and remained 
low in fish, a staple, and in most other key items, including water and 
electricity (Figure 3.18.3). Also keeping prices low was the reversal of 
import duty hikes on some key items soon after they were introduced in 
April 2015. 
The government embarked in 2015 on a highly expansionary path 
through its scaled-up public investment program for airport and harbor 
expansion, energy projects, and housing construction in Malé and 
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the east atolls to accommodate its program of voluntary population 
consolidation. Budget expenditures including net lending surged 
by 30%, their share of GDP rising in 2015 by 8.9 percentage points 
to 43.7% (Figure 3.18.4). Capital spending accounted for most of the 
growth, increasing by 5.2 percentage points while remaining below 
30% of total expenditures. Revenue grew by only 11%, much lower than 
budgeted because increases in certain import duties were reversed and 
surprisingly low tourist arrivals depressed tourism goods and services 
taxes despite a rate hike from 8% to 12% in November 2014. The fiscal 
deficit swelled to equal 7.4% of GDP, from 2.7% the previous year.
Most of the fiscal gap was financed domestically, through 
issuances of bonds and Treasury bills, and borrowing from other 
financial corporations. For the second time since issuances were 
conducted through a tap system in 2014, Treasury bill interest rates 
were cut in November, by about 400 basis points across all maturities 
(Figure 3.18.5). The value of Treasury bill issuances in November fell by 
35.1% and for the whole year by 17.2%, while growth in the outstanding 
value slowed markedly to 12.9% from 36.0% in 2014. As a percentage 
of GDP, domestic public debt stood at 47.4%, and external public debt 
at 20.5%, pushing total public debt to 67.9%, or 1.4 percentage points 
higher than in 2014 (Figure 3.18.6).
Monetary policy remained broadly expansionary, with policy 
rates of liquidity windows kept low (1.5% for the overnight deposits 
and 10.0% for the overnight Lombard) and the required reserve ratio 
halved to 10% in August. Domestic assets expanded by 27.4% after 
falling by 1.6% in 2014, with most of the growth in domestic credit 
derived from claims on the public sector, largely government securities 
(Figure 3.18.7). Growth in credit to the private sector quickened to 12.6% 
from 3.1% in 2014. Growth in money supply slowed slightly from 14.7% 
in 2014 to 13.6% as net foreign assets fell by 2.6% following 5 years of 
rapid growth.
A larger trade deficit and a decline in the services surplus from 
lower tourism receipts widened the current account deficit substantially 
to 12.6% of GDP, the largest in 4 years (Figure 3.18.8). The trade deficit 
widened as exports, mainly fish and re-exports of fuel, fell sharply by 
19.6% and imports, which are nearly 9 times exports, grew by 9.1% on 
higher transport and construction-related imports, notwithstanding 
low global oil and commodity prices. 
Inflows of direct and other investments were lower than in 2014, 
and the net capital and financial accounts fell short of covering the 
current account deficit. Gross international reserves fell by $50.7 million 
to $564 million at year-end, although usable reserves—funds available 
for foreign exchange requirements—increased slightly by $49.7 million 
(Figure 3.18.9), with import coverage at less than a month.
Economic prospects 
The growth outlook rests heavily on prospects for tourism and 
public-led investments. Growth will be driven in the near term by 
investment, as external economic developments will likely keep recovery 
in tourism modest and gradual over the forecast period.
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Arrivals growth may pick up moderately to 5% in 2016, broadly 
in line with the tourism outlook for Asia. Bed-night occupancy and 
earnings are projected to recover to positive but minimal growth, 
held back by the short average stay preferred by Asian tourists. 
The PRC will continue to lead arrivals growth, but less so in view 
of recent trends, notably moderating economic growth there and 
stronger competition from nearer destinations. A stronger pickup from 
Europe may be expected as economic recovery there gathers pace. 
Strengthened marketing, new flights, and the opening of 10 new resorts 
are seen to boost travel interest. Integrated resorts for the middle-
income segment that are expected to open by 2017 would also help 
augment tourism numbers.
Growth will come largely from strong public investments fueling 
construction and real estate development. The government plans 
for its public sector investment program to grow by about 140% to 
Rf9.1 billion in 2016, with growth easing to 6% in 2017. Most of the 
investment surge is to be financed through external loans, while 
domestic borrowing is to be kept restrained. Correspondingly, budget 
expenditures are programmed to grow in 2016 by 23% and then 
moderate in 2017. The share of capital spending will rise to 39% in 2017 
from 24% in 2015, while that of recurrent spending will decline to 61%. 
The budget deficit is expected to remain high at 6.5% of GDP in 2016 
and 7.3% in 2017. 
Assuming similar investment growth in 2015, construction-led 
industrial growth is projected to reach at least 20% in 2016 in 
conjunction with the public sector investment program before 
moderating slightly in 2017. Against this backdrop and the expected 
gradual recovery in tourism, GDP growth is projected to rise to 3.5% 
in 2016 and further to 3.9% in 2017. Growth could be much higher if 
tourism or foreign investment picks up faster than expected, or if oil 
prices and therefore fuel and electricity subsidies decline more than 
anticipated. 
Inflation is expected to remain low at 1.2% in 2016, as the further 
easing of world oil and food prices will help oset upside pressures from 
expansionary policies. Inflation is seen edging up to 1.4% in 2017 as 
world prices recover modestly. The current account deficit is projected to 
remain large on strong construction-related imports and limited exports, 
despite likely higher tourism receipts and low world commodity prices. 
Policy challenge—diversifying the economy
The economy depends heavily on tourism. In the last 10 years, 
tourism has come to account directly for around 30% of GDP—or 
nearly two-thirds if tourism-related sectors such as transportation 
and communications are included. This has increased the country’s 
already high vulnerability to external shocks and GDP growth volatility. 
Tourism has created significant sources of government revenue, notably 
the goods and services tax on tourism. At the same time, though, 
the fiscal balance has become much more led by the business cycle. 
Stabilizing the economy and strengthening development depend on 
diversifying the economic base.
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In September 2014, the government introduced special economic 
zones (SEZs) for export processing, free trade, a high-technology park, 
and oshore financial services especially in Islamic finance. Early this 
year, the Maldives Monetary Authority began acquiring the capabilities 
necessary to screen and register companies for participation. SEZs can, 
if well managed, enable economic diversification into labor-intensive 
and strategic sectors, toward engendering economic stability and rapid 
growth. The country’s existing liberal investment regime will help them 
succeed with a range of incentives, including 100% foreign ownership, 
long-term land leases, and freedom to employ foreign labor, among other 
rights. However, geographic and logistical conditions pose challenges to 
commercial viability.
The government plans to expand financial services through 
Islamic banking and a capital hub for channeling SEZ and tourism 
investments. The financial service sector is currently dominated 
by banks, which hold over 60% of financial assets (Figure 3.18.10). 
Although bank assets as a share of GDP are high, expansion has been 
volatile as most capital inflows and lending are connected with tourism. 
Sustained expansion has been restrained by sluggish credit to the 
private sector, a limited consumer market, high nonperforming loans, 
and the high cost of finance. The development of SEZs provides good 
potential to widen the market base—as can further development of a 
wider range of financial products and credit information and guarantee 
systems to help reduce credit risks.
Islamic finance was first introduced in 2005 through an insurance 
company that grew to become in 2011 a full-fledged bank oering 
various banking products and services in line with Islamic principles. 
Five licensed institutions currently oer Islamic finance, and traditional 
finance institutions have shown interest. The Maldives Monetary 
Authority is developing a legal, regulatory, and supervisory framework 
to facilitate further expansion of Islamic banking. 
Institutional capacity for macroeconomic and fiscal management 
will likely need strengthening to enhance the SEZ growth strategy, 
as will expenditure management to ensure the sustainability of 
substantial external borrowing for infrastructure projects under 
expansionary fiscal programs for 2016 and 2017. Attracting more 
foreign direct investment for projects in the SEZs requires transparent 
and flexible currency convertibility and the honoring of contracts for 
existing foreign investments.
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Nepal
Devastating earthquakes late in FY2015 cut economic growth, and a surge in worker remittances 
expanded the current account surplus. Growth is expected to slide markedly in FY2016, affected 
by reconstruction delays, extended trade and transit disruptions as minority groups object to 
features of the newly announced constitution, and an unfavorable monsoon. Recovery in FY2017 
is contingent on accelerating reconstruction and restoring trade and transit to normal. 
Economic performance 
GDP growth fell to 3.0% in FY2015 (ended 15 July 2015) from 5.1% a 
year earlier after earthquakes in April and May 2015 caused extensive 
damage to homes and other infrastructure and caused transport and 
supply disruptions (Figure 3.19.1). Growth in services, which account for 
over half of GDP, slowed to 3.9%, the lowest since 2012, as wholesale and 
retail trade, transport, tourism, and financial services were disrupted. 
Expansion in agriculture, which suered earlier from an unfavorable 
monsoon, slowed to 1.9%. Persistent supply-side constraints, especially 
power shortages, held back growth in industry to a lackluster 2.6%. 
Inflation averaged 7.2% in FY2015, down from 9.1% a year earlier 
and the lowest since FY2008, as prices moderated across the board 
(Figure 3.19.2). Despite a weak harvest and supply disrupted by the 
earthquakes in much of the country, food inflation eased to average 
9.6%, which was still elevated but down from 11.6% in the previous 
year as food stocks proved adequate and relief operations eective, 
and as inflation fell in India, the country’s major trading partner. 
Nonfood inflation also moderated to average 5.2%, down from 6.8% in 
FY2014 as the marked fall in global oil prices pulled down administered 
domestic prices aligned with them. 
Although the FY2015 budget was announced in a timely manner, 
actual expenditure (equal to 20.0% of GDP) was just 81.0% of budget 
allocations, lower than the 84.0% achieved in the previous year. 
Expenditure was aected by disruptions from the earthquakes in the 
last quarter of the fiscal year, when expenditure bunching usually 
takes place, but the expenditure shortfall mainly reflected persistent 
procedural and procurement ineciencies that impede capital spending 
and economic development. Actual capital spending fell 30.0% short of 
the budget allocation, a much larger shortfall than 21.6% a year earlier, 
and remained at only 4.0% of GDP (Figure 3.19.3).
Monetary conditions continued to be highly accommodative, as in 
the previous year. A surge in remittances bolstered bank deposits and 
reserves, but financial institutions struggled to find bankable projects 
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ready for investment. The average interbank rate increased to 0.70% 
from 0.22% the previous year, indicating that short-term liquidity 
management by Nepal Rastra Bank, the central bank, had become 
more eective (Figure 3.19.4). Weighted average deposit and lending 
rates continued to moderate, leaving real lending rates positive but real 
deposit rates negative. Growth in credit to the private sector picked up 
to 19.4% from 18.3% a year earlier (Figure 3.19.5). Although the central 
bank continued to direct financial institutions to channel credit to 
productive sectors to promote growth, private investment opportunities 
remained constrained by the persistent infrastructure deficit, other 
supply-side constraints, and political uncertainty.
A slowdown in imports combined with the surge in remittance 
inflows further expanded the current account surplus to 5.1% of GDP 
from 4.6% a year earlier (Figure 3.19.6). Despite the depreciation of the 
Nepalese rupee, which is pegged to the Indian rupee, exports declined by 
3.9% as the currency appreciated in inflation-adjusted terms and because 
earthquakes disrupted production and transport services. Import growth 
slowed markedly to 8.0% from 13.9% in the previous year, mainly as 
imports of petroleum products declined by 19.0% from the combined 
eects of falling global oil prices and supply disruptions in the final 
months of the year. The trade deficit widened marginally to 31.2% of 
GDP from 30.7% in FY2014. Remittance inflows grew by 12.2% to equal 
a record 29.1% of GDP as migrant workers boosted their remittances 
to rebuild family homes and provide other post-earthquake support. 
The surplus in the overall balance of payments climbed to $1.5 billion, 
swelling gross foreign exchange reserves to $8.1 billion, enough to cover 
over 11 months of imports of goods and services (Figure 3.19.7).
Economic prospects 
Economic growth is projected to slide further in FY2016 due to slow 
recovery from the earthquakes, political strife on the Terai plains 
bordering India, and an unfavorable monsoon for the second year 
running. Earthquake recovery has been dismayingly slow largely 
because the establishment of the National Reconstruction Authority was 
greatly delayed by political dierences on its organizational structure 
and leadership. The high-powered authority—considered necessary 
for fast-tracking reconstruction through streamlined and prioritized 
program planning and implementation—was ocially established only 
in December 2015 under revised legislation. While its head has been 
named, the organization has yet to become fully functional. 
Although the Constituent Assembly, the second of which was elected 
in November 2013, finally enacted the long-pending new constitution on 
20 September 2015, it did so amid protests from political parties on the 
Terai, which view as inadequate constitutional provisions for citizenship, 
provincial and electoral constituency delineation, and the representation 
of disadvantaged groups in state organizations. The protests escalated 
into disruptive strikes beginning in September that shut down trade 
through cross-border entry points with India, causing acute shortages 
of petroleum products, raw materials for construction and industry, 
and other essential commodities. Though Parliament (the successor 
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to the Constituent Assembly) passed several amendments to the new 
constitution on 23 January 2016 in response to demands for change, 
the Terai parties remain dissatisfied and continued their protests. 
On 8 February 2016, however, they withdrew their obstructions at the 
cross-border entry points, allowing trade to resume. 
The constitutional dispute has adversely aected the ability of the 
new coalition government, formed soon after the enactment of the 
constitution, to roll out high-priority economic reforms committed 
to earlier in the reconstruction- and reform-oriented FY2016 budget. 
These include the enactment of a new electricity act, the electricity 
regulatory commission act, and the foreign investment and technology 
transfer act, which is essential for attracting private sector investment 
including foreign direct investment. 
In light of the delayed implementation of reconstruction programs, 
trade and transit disruption, and the unfavorable monsoon, GDP growth 
is projected to slow further to 1.5% in FY2016, below the government’s 
revised projection of 2.0%. Very low growth is seen in services, 
particularly in wholesale and retail trade, transport and communication, 
and tourism, which are worst aected by the supply disruptions. 
The Ministry of Agricultural Development expects harvests of paddy 
to drop by 10.0% and maize by 5.0%, slowing agriculture growth to a 
projected 0.5%. Industry is projected to see little or no growth owing 
to fuel shortages and the lack of raw materials for manufacturing and 
construction. GDP growth in FY2017 could rebound to 4.8%, but this 
assumes a normal monsoon, the National Reconstruction Authority 
becoming fully operational and accelerating reconstruction, normal 
cross-border trade, and progress in resolving domestic political tensions. 
Inflation is projected to rise to 10.5%, higher than the target of 8.5% set 
by the central bank in its FY2016 monetary policy. Although lower global 
oil prices are being passed through to administered fuel prices (a policy 
adopted in September 2014), average inflation in FY2016 will be elevated 
on the combined eects of a smaller harvest, acute shortages of fuel and 
other essential commodities, and higher transport costs during much of 
the year. Food inflation is expected to average 11.8% and nonfood inflation 
9.5%. Inflation is projected to subside to 8.2% in FY2017. This assumes a 
normal harvest, fuel and other commodity supplies returning to normal, 
and lower global prices for oil and other commodities. 
Nepal’s external position is expected to further strengthen in FY2016 
with surpluses in both the current account and the overall balance of 
payments above the already high surpluses of FY2015. The trade deficit 
is expected to narrow sharply on an 8.0% decline in imports resulting 
from the trade and transit disruption and lower prices for petroleum 
imports. The narrowing will come despite a 15.0% fall in exports, 
which are much smaller than imports. The significant narrowing of the 
trade deficit coupled with a continued rise in remittances is expected 
to further expand the current account surplus to equal 10.3% of GDP. 
In FY2017, the current account surplus is expected to narrow again 
to 6.4% of GDP as import growth recovers on the resolution of trade 
obstruction and the increase in import demand with the acceleration 
of reconstruction programs, and with some slowdown in remittance 
inflows aected by weakening demand for labor in host countries.
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Policy challenge—accelerating reconstruction 
and capital expenditure 
The devastating earthquakes challenged Nepal’s growth and 
development prospects over the short to medium term. The disaster 
exacted a huge human toll, taking nearly 9,000 lives and destroying 
750,000 homes, factories, and cultural heritage sites. It upended the 
livelihoods of 5.4 million, pushing an estimated 3.0% of the population 
into poverty. The government’s post-disaster needs assessment 
estimated $5.2 billion in capital stock losses and another $1.9 billion in 
economic losses. The combined losses are estimated to equal one-third 
of GDP. The cost of recovery and rebuilding the lost capital stock is 
estimated at $6.7 billion (Table 3.19.1). 
Notwithstanding the significant cost of reconstruction and recovery, 
the key policy challenge is not a dearth of resources. Nepal’s development 
partners pledged $4.0 billion in reconstruction aid during the 
International Conference on Nepal’s Reconstruction that the government 
successfully organized in the aftermath of the earthquakes. Further, in 
response to the earthquakes, the government presented an ambitious 
budget for FY2016, which calls for total spending to increase to equal 
32.1% of GDP from 24.3% in FY2015, while capital expenditure is to 
more than double to 10.0% of GDP (Figure 3.19.8). The $910 million 
allocation for reconstruction is nearly half of the capital budget. 
However, more than 8 months into the fiscal year, only a 
small fraction of the reconstruction budget has actually been spent, 
reflecting institutional and procedural bottlenecks that constrain 
the timely execution of capital works. Key factors holding back 
rapid reconstruction include (i) delay in establishing the National 
Reconstruction Authority, which particularly aected the speedy 
initiation of housing reconstruction; (ii) significant damage in vast 
rural areas with dicult access; (iii) the limited capacity of sector 
institutions that oversee private housing, schools, hospitals, roads, and 
other community infrastructure to assess damage, plan reconstruction, 
procure materials, and implement reconstruction with quality control; 
and (iv) the limited availability of such human resources as masons, 
engineers, and social workers. 
There has nevertheless been progress in pre-construction activities, 
as the National Reconstruction Authority was finally established and its 
head appointed in December 2015 toward beginning significant physical 
reconstruction by April 2016. To make up for the delay, significant 
eorts are required toward (i) fully operationalizing the authority 
with a lean structure and autonomy to eectively monitor, coordinate, 
and enforce timely delivery by designated agencies; (ii) ensuring the 
quality of design and implementation toward building back better; 
(iii) building and supplementing capacity in relevant institutions 
through outsourcing and management support; (iv) assembling and 
training a sucient number of skilled and semiskilled workers for 
reconstruction; and (v) ensuring transparency and accountability in 
program delivery with community participation. 
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Parallel to accelerating reconstruction, scaling up capital 
expenditure on critical infrastructure for energy, transport, urban 
amenities, and irrigation remains a key priority toward attaining higher 
economic growth that is inclusive and sustainable. Capital spending has 
been persistently weak at the equivalent of about 4.0% of GDP annually, 
but spending at 8.2%–11.8% of GDP is required to close existing 
infrastructure gaps within a decade. Nepal’s robust fiscal balance in 
recent years suggests that there are substantial fiscal resources with 
which to expand capital expenditures. Current circumstances call for 
wider and longer-term reform and capacity development in investment 
planning, budget formulation and execution, and project management 
including design, procurement, and implementation that is timely and 
cost-eective and has good quality control. 
Likewise, investment in human capital development needs to be 
enhanced in terms of both amount and quality. Despite substantial 
achievement of Millennium Development Goals related to education, 
Nepal’s human capital base remains very weak, with only 14% of 
16-year-olds earning school completion certificates. The country 
cannot aord to be complacent but needs to substantially improve its 
delivery of education services in primary schools, technical education 
and vocational training centers, and universities. This calls for 
accelerating reform to improve the quality of education and learning 
outcomes through the early enactment of the proposed education act, 
restructuring of school and examination systems, improvement of 
teacher management and development, and establishment of strong and 
regular mechanisms to guide the reform process. 
These eorts to build critical infrastructure and human capital need 
to be accompanied by economic and sector reform as announced in the 
FY2016 budget. Reform can engender an enabling environment to attract 
private sector investments into the country’s competitive industries 
such as high-value agriculture and agro-processing, hydropower, labor-
intensive and other competitive manufacturing, and high-value services 
such as tourism and information and communication technology. 
Priorities include legislative reform to promote public–private 
partnership, ecient budgetary processes and management, industrial 
enterprise development, agribusiness promotion, and institutional and 
regulatory restructuring of the energy sector.
3.19.1 Damage, losses, and reconstruction needs ($ billion)
Sectors Damage Losses Reconstruction needs
Social: cultural heritage, education, health, housing and human settlements, 
and nutrition
3.6 0.5 4.1
Productive: agriculture, finance, industry, commerce, irrigation, and tourism 0.6 1.2 1.8
Infrastructure: communications, community infrastructure, electricity, 
transport, water, and sanitation
0.5 0.1 0.7
Cross-cutting: gender, social protection, employment and livelihoods, 
disaster risk reduction, environment and forestry, and governance
0.5   0 0.5
Total 5.2 1.9 7.1
Source: National Planning Commission.
3.19.8  Budgeted and actual capital spending 
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Pakistan
The economy continued to pick up in FY2015 as economic reform progressed and security 
improved. Inflation markedly declined, and the current account deficit narrowed with favorable 
prices for oil and other commodities. Despite global headwinds, the outlook is for continued 
moderate growth as structural and macroeconomic reform deepens. Persistence will be required 
to overcome longstanding structural impediments to investment and enable faster growth.
Economic performance 
GDP growth edged up slightly to 4.2% in FY2015 (ended 30 June 2015) 
but remained below the government target of 5.0% (Figure 3.20.1). 
Services expanded by 5.0% and remained the largest contributor to 
growth in FY2015, as agriculture and manufacturing posted more 
modest gains. Growth in services was led by recovery in finance and 
insurance that reflected higher profits and in general government 
services, which expanded on higher infrastructure spending and 
wages. Continued energy shortages, slowing external demand, and 
a base eect on food and fertilizers pushed down expansion in large-
scale manufacturing to 3.3%. Continued resilience in small-scale 
manufacturing and a pickup in construction to double digits supported 
industry growth at 3.6% that was nevertheless nearly a full percentage 
point lower than a year earlier.
Consumption grew by 5.1% in FY2015 and remained the largest 
demand-side component in GDP. Private consumption expanded by 
3.6%, benefitting from continued inflows of remittances, higher public 
sector salaries, and low inflation, while public consumption rebounded 
to grow by 16% (Figure 3.20.2). Total investment increased to equal 
15.1% of GDP in FY2015, largely on higher public fixed investment. 
Private fixed investment edged lower to 9.7% of GDP from 10.0% a year 
earlier, hampered by continued energy constraints and the generally 
weak business environment that has depressed investment for several 
years. Net exports subtracted from growth for a second consecutive year 
as exports fell more sharply than imports. 
Average consumer price inflation decelerated by almost half to 4.5% 
in FY2015 in line with lower global prices for oil and food. Inflation 
was down across all major groups. It fell to 3.2% year on year in June 
2015 from 7.2% a year earlier (Figure 3.20.3). Food inflation was very 
slight for nearly a year to October 2015 if compared with high rates 
12 months earlier. With the fading of a high base eect, inflation rose 
again in the first 7 months of FY2016, though in January 2016 it was a 
moderate 3.3%. 
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The State Bank of Pakistan, the central bank, significantly eased 
monetary policy in FY2015 as inflation fell and the government 
borrowed less from it. The central bank cut policy rates by a cumulative 
300 basis points in four steps from November 2014 to May 2015 to 
lower its lending rate to banks (the reverse repurchase rate) to 7.0%. 
To improve transmission of monetary policy, the central bank 
introduced from 1 June 2015 the policy rate, a new target for operations 
in the money market that will be maintained 50 basis points below 
the reverse repurchase rate, as it narrowed the interest rate corridor 
to 200 basis points. Subsequently, to support domestic credit growth, 
it lowered in September all corridor rates by 50 basis points to bring the 
new policy rate to 6.0% (Figure 3.20.4). 
The consolidated budget deficit excluding grants equaled 5.4% 
of GDP in FY2015, marginally lower than in the previous year 
(Figure 3.20.5). Nevertheless, recent performance is markedly better 
than the average deficit of 8.1% of GDP during FY2011–FY2013, 
as notable progress was achieved in reining in energy subsidies and 
boosting tax revenues by eliminating many concessions and exemptions. 
On the expenditure side, increases in power taris reduced total 
budget subsidies to 1.0% of GDP. Another achievement was to increase 
funding for the public sector development program to 3.7% of GDP 
from an average 3.4% during FY2012–FY2014. That the primary 
deficit (the overall deficit less interest payments) meanwhile fell more 
steeply than the overall deficit—to 0.7% of GDP from 4.1% in FY2013—
underlines how rapidly interest payments on the public debt are 
expanding. 
Government revenue was, at 14.4% of GDP in FY2015, marginally 
lower than in the previous year as larger tax collection was oset by the 
normalization of nontax revenue receipts, which had ballooned in the 
preceding year with one-o events. Tax collection by the Federal Board 
of Revenue enjoyed double-digit growth that still fell short of the 
ambitious budget target. Slower growth in both direct taxes and general 
sales tax reflected weakness in manufacturing, declining imports, and 
lower inflation crimping the tax base. Tax as a share of GDP is, at 11%, 
very low compared with other Asian economies. Ongoing reform aims to 
widen the tax net, improve tax administration, and eliminate distortions 
in the tax system.
The budget deficit was financed mostly by heavy borrowing from 
commercial banks (Figure 3.20.6). Nearly 80% of the expansion 
in banking system credit during FY2015 went to the government. 
Despite ample liquidity provided by the central bank, growth in 
private credit slowed to PRs209 billion from PRs371 billion a year 
earlier. Credit demand for working capital including trade finance 
slowed as commodity prices declined, power shortages continued, and 
external demand remained weak. Loans for fixed investment increased 
markedly, albeit from a small base. 
Total public debt marginally declined to the equivalent of 64.8% of 
GDP in FY2015 from 65.1% the previous year, but it remained above the 
60% threshold set under the Fiscal Responsibility Debt Limitation Act, 
2005 (Figure 3.20.7). Foreign public debt fell to 20.3% of GDP from 
21.6% as domestic public debt increased by 1 percentage point to 44.5% 
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3.20.5 Government budget indicators
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of GDP, excluding power sector arrears at 0.8%. Better public debt 
management has reduced the share of short-term domestic debt by 14% 
since 2013, lengthening the maturity profile. However, half of domestic 
debt is still short term and vulnerable to interest rate variation.
The current account deficit eased to the equivalent of 1.0% of GDP 
in FY2015 from 1.3% a year earlier (Figure 3.20.8). The trade deficit 
widened by 3.8% to $17.2 billion as exports fell by 4.0%, mainly from a 
marked drop in textile and cotton exports, while the large decline in 
oil import payments was largely oset by increased quantities of other 
imports—including consumer goods, textile raw materials, iron and 
steel, and selected food items—such that total imports fell by only 0.9%. 
Deficits in both services and primary income also widened, but an 18.2% 
gain in worker remittances to $18.7 billion nevertheless brought modest 
improvement in the current account deficit. 
Economic prospects
GDP growth is expected to accelerate modestly to 4.5% in FY2016 and 
4.8% in FY2017, assuming continued macroeconomic stability, expected 
improvement in energy supply, and planned infrastructure investment 
tied to an economic corridor project linking Pakistan with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). Further implementation of structural reform 
will consolidate recent gains in macroeconomic stability and improve 
the investment climate as the security situation improves, especially in 
Karachi, the commercial hub of the country. 
Growth in industry is expected to be driven by strong expansion 
in construction and continued moderate expansion in mining, utilities, 
and manufacturing. Growth in large-scale manufacturing accelerated 
to 3.9% in the first half of FY2016 from 2.7% in the same period of 
last year, supported by low prices for raw materials, improved gas and 
electricity supply, and expanded construction, as well as lower interest 
rates (Figure 3.20.9). However, textile production, the largest segment, 
grew by only 1.0% during the first half and is expected to constrain 
overall growth in large-scale manufacturing this year, partly because 
of weaker demand in export markets and rising competition. Strong 
construction that reflects government spending on development and 
large investments in power projects has pushed up cement production.
Agriculture is likely to continue to grow only moderately, as cotton 
output is projected to fall because of heavy rains in July 2015 and 
much lower global cotton prices. However, continued strong expansion 
in livestock, which accounts for over half of agricultural production, 
will partly oset reductions elsewhere. The government introduced 
an agriculture support package in September 2015 that oers cash 
transfers to cotton growers, tax concessions for imports of agricultural 
machinery, and subsidies for fertilizers. Growth in services will be 
led largely by transport improvements and higher profits for financial 
services, though retail and wholesale trade should also benefit from 
improved industrial activity.
Consumption will expand with low inflation, higher public sector 
salaries and pensions, and government employment schemes in the 
auto industry, but a slowdown in remittances and lower commodity 
3.20.6 Budget borrowing from banks
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3.20.8 Current account components
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prices are expected to retard growth in rural incomes and spending. 
Private investment should pick up in line with monetary easing 
and the improved security situation. Military operations in parts of 
the country have significantly curtailed the terror attacks that had 
hampered economic activity in recent years. Net private credit flows 
more than doubled during the first 7 months of FY2016, mainly for 
fixed investment and working capital in manufacturing, electricity, 
and construction. Net exports will continue to be a drag on growth as 
exports falter and lower oil imports are oset by higher quantities of 
other imports. 
Inflation is expected to average 3.2% in FY2016, reflecting lower 
global oil and commodity prices. In the first 8 months of the fiscal year, 
inflation averaged only 2.5%, with food inflation at 1.5% and other 
inflation at 3.2%. Tax adjustments on some imports in December 2015 
are expected, however, to push inflation up marginally in the remaining 
months of the fiscal year. Inflation is expected to pick up to 4.5% in 
FY2017, mainly because of a slight recovery expected in global oil prices, 
firmer prices for other international commodities, and somewhat higher 
domestic demand. 
The central bank stood by its accommodative monetary stance 
as inflation fell. In September, it reduced the policy rate, eective in 
October, by 50 basis points to 6%, the lowest in decades. Net credit to 
the private sector expanded by PRs310 billion during the first 7 months 
of FY2015 from PRs164 billion in the same period of the previous year, 
reflecting monetary easing and capacity improvements. The government 
borrowed heavily from commercial banks to finance the deficit and to 
retire its debt to the central bank. 
The FY2016 budget targets a lower fiscal deficit equal to 4.3% 
of GDP, to be achieved by both boosting revenue and containing 
expenditure. Revenues are budgeted to increase by 17.6% and 
expenditure by 7.0%. Federal Board of Revenue tax collection during 
the first half of FY2016 fell below target partly because lower oil prices 
undercut import duty collection (Figure 3.20.10). To oset the revenue 
shortfall, the excise duty on cigarettes was increased, and regulatory 
duties and additional customs duties were imposed on a variety of 
products, especially luxury goods, eective on 1 December 2015. 
The government further curtailed tax concessions and exemptions in 
February 2016. 
On the spending side, the government is selectively trimming 
current and capital spending, which includes absorbing the cost of 
the agricultural support package announced in September. Budgetary 
allocations for the public sector development program in FY2016 were 
increased by 50% over the amount actually spent in the previous year. 
The higher allocations include extending the Benazir Income Support 
Program to 5.3 million beneficiaries and the rollout of a conditional 
cash-transfer program for education that will benefit 1 million children 
by the end of the fiscal year. Moreover, 11% of spending is earmarked 
for transport projects under the economic corridor project with the 
PRC. Budgetary spending on untargeted subsidies, including for 
electric power, was reduced by a third over the past 3 years as the 
government raised power taris to bring them close to cost recovery. 
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Nevertheless, the past accumulation of inter-company arrears in the 
sector, or circular debt amounting to $3 billion at the end of June 2015, 
is a fiscal risk that will only worsen with any more buildup. However, 
low global prices for oil, which fuels a third of power generation in the 
country, have temporarily lifted some of the financial pressure on these 
high-cost producers. Construction on larger and more e¦cient plants is 
rapidly proceeding.
The current account deficit in FY2016 is projected to remain low 
at 1.0% of GDP for a second year in a row as prices for oil and other 
commodities stay low and inflows continue under the Coalition Support 
Fund—despite declining exports and slowing growth in remittances. 
The current account deficit fell to 1.2% of GDP during the first 7 
months of FY2016 from 1.7% a year earlier as trade and services deficits 
narrowed. Import payments fell by 7.0% on divergent developments: 
food and petroleum products, which together account for about 
one-third of imports, fell by 32% because of high domestic wheat stocks 
and the drop in global oil prices. Meanwhile, all other imports grew 
by 8.3% on quantity increases for textile raw materials (reflecting 
the drop in domestic cotton production), fertilizers, and power 
generation machinery (reflecting major investment in the power sector). 
The savings from lower import payments were more than oset by an 
11.4% fall in export receipts over the period, reflecting lower quantities 
and prices. 
Challenges for export growth are generally weak external demand, 
growth moderation in the PRC, Pakistan rupee appreciation against 
the euro, lost textile market share to new competitors, and unfavorable 
terms of trade for exports with little value added. Persistent rupee 
appreciation, by 20% in real terms over the past 2 years, has adversely 
aected export competitiveness (Figure 3.20.11). The rupee continued 
to be a relatively strong currency as the US dollar strengthened in 
the first half of FY2016, depreciating by only 2.8% to PRs104.9 per 
dollar. Assuming some revival in prices for oil and other commodities, 
larger imports to support higher investment and growth, and some 
improvement in exports as factories enjoy better power supply, the 
current account deficit is projected to widen to 1.2% of GDP in FY2017. 
Workers remittances expanded by only 6% in the first 7 months of 
FY2016, down from an average of 15% annually in the previous 6 years, 
the fallo likely reflecting reduced oil incomes in the Gulf, a major host 
region. As remittances significantly contribute receipts and buer against 
external shocks, any sustained slowdown on top of falling exports would 
create concern for the stability of external accounts. 
O¦cial foreign exchange reserves expanded to $15.4 billion in 
January 2016 (Figure 3.20.12). The financial account was strengthened 
by a $500 million euro bond issued in September 2015 and larger 
multilateral disbursements in the first 7 months of FY2016. However, 
inflows that do not create debt continued to be limited, as foreign 
direct investment increased only slightly to $624 million, with inflows 
mainly into electric power and oil and gas, while portfolio investment 
amounted to only $155 million. 
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Policy challenge—economic reform to lift growth
Achieving high and sustainable growth has been a challenge for 
Pakistan. Growth has been volatile, with periodic episodes of high 
growth followed by spells of low growth as economic reform is 
implemented only sporadically and incompletely (Figure 3.20.13). 
GDP growth fell to an average of 2.8% during FY2009–FY2013 from 
6.6% during FY2004–FY2008. Longer-term growth potential has also 
declined. Studies that have disaggregated growth into supply-side 
components suggest that the contributions of productivity gains and 
capital accumulation have slipped.
Challenges that impede growth in Pakistan include weak 
infrastructure and transport connectivity and inadequate workforce 
skills, governance and institutions, service delivery, and access to finance. 
Limited public resources constrain investment in infrastructure 
for energy, transport, irrigation, and urban services. This impairs 
connectivity, raises the cost of doing business, restrains productivity, 
and blocks access to public services. Governance and institutional 
challenges across all sectors undermine eective public service 
delivery and obstruct private sector development. Operational losses 
incurred by many large public enterprises drain already meager public 
resources. These challenges are most obvious in the energy sector and 
its deficient infrastructure. Inadequate investment has weakened human 
development, and the resulting dearth of skills hampers the country’s 
ability to compete in global markets and transition to production with 
higher value added. Access to finance is limited as the financial system 
lacks depth because of constrains on both demand and supply. 
These barriers are reflected in Pakistan’s low ranking in the 
World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2016, at 138 out of 189 economies 
surveyed. Policies to alleviate these constraints would help improve 
the business climate, raise domestic savings and investment, boost 
competitiveness and exports, and improve public service delivery, 
thereby boosting productivity and growth. 
The government is currently implementing a structural reform 
program to relieve constraints on growth by improving service delivery 
in energy and other infrastructure sectors, expanding fiscal space, 
fostering a competitive business environment, liberalizing trade, and 
restructuring or privatizing public enterprises. 
Economic reform and an improving security environment should 
further boost business confidence and foster private investment. 
Ongoing reforms to address the power deficit, which is the greatest 
impediment to manufacturing and growth, have shown progress. 
Improved governance in the energy sector has reduced power outages 
for industry, improved tari revenue recovery, and curtailed line losses. 
Initiatives to monitor the performance of power distribution companies 
and to introduce multiyear taris aim to improve e¦ciency and 
strengthen the regulatory environment. 
With power taris gradually moving toward market-based 
pricing, power sector subsidies are contained, thus leaving funds for 
infrastructure spending. Reform is under way to raise tax revenues and 
widen the tax base through improved governance of tax administration 
supported by legislative action. The government has also initiated a 
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process for restructuring and possibly privatizing prioritized public 
enterprises under a dedicated reform strategy. Besides providing 
fiscal relief and improving service delivery, e¦ciency improvements 
thanks to these reforms are critical to improving the competitiveness 
of downstream industries that depend on production from these 
enterprises for inputs. 
The government’s plan to improve the business climate addresses 
issues across the board: obtaining construction permits, paying taxes, 
enforcing contracts, starting businesses, trading across borders, and 
accessing credit. As the first step, the government introduced one-stop 
shops online to facilitate new business registration, streamline firms’ 
navigation of business regulations and bureaucratic procedures, and 
reduce the cost of doing business. It started to remove statutory tax 
concessions and exemptions, reduce maximum import tari rates, 
and institute a simpler tari system with fewer slabs. The National 
Financial Inclusion Strategy was launched in May 2015 to broaden 
access to finance. The enactment of the Credit Bureau Bill aims to 
support financial institutions’ extension of credit to more small and 
medium-sized enterprises. The Deposit Protection Fund is being set 
up to establish a modern deposit insurance mechanism to strengthen 
financial stability. 
A sustained reform eort will be required over the medium to 
long term to boost productivity and potential growth, building on the 
progress achieved so far. Reform needs to be supplemented by other 
policy measures, including the formulation of a well-coordinated 
industrial policy to support faster growth and revive exports. While 
the government is committed to its reform program, implementation 
challenges that include resistance from various stakeholders could 
slow progress. In addition, domestic security concerns remain despite 
improvement, and natural disasters are a perennial downside risk. 
The price of oil remains a wildcard.
This chapter was written by Tadateru Hayashi, Nimali Hasitha Wickremasinghe, and 
Savindi Jayakody of the Sri Lanka Resident Mission, ADB, Colombo.
Sri Lanka
Growth was marginally lower in 2015, but the current account deficit improved slightly and 
inflation moderated. Meanwhile, the budget deficit widened, and foreign exchange reserves 
dropped sharply. The government will have to work to realign fiscal policy toward putting the 
country on a high and sustainable growth track.
Economic performance 
Economic expansion has markedly slowed in the past 3 years from the 
rapid pace of the post-conflict economic boom. Provisional estimates 
place growth at 4.8% in 2015, marginally lower than 4.9% expansion a 
year earlier (Figure 3.21.1). Weak global demand and political change 
characterized the year, as did an expansive fiscal policy following 
presidential elections in January and parliamentary contests in August 
that established a coalition cabinet. Investment faltered as investors 
decided to wait and see, and as the new administration cut capital 
spending and temporarily suspended some large investment projects 
approved by its predecessor. A surge in private and government 
consumption spending was left to sustain growth during the year.
On the supply side, 5.3% expansion in the large service sector was 
the main driver of growth as the contribution from industry declined. 
The higher outcome for services came from acceleration in financial 
activities and in transportation of goods and passengers. Agriculture 
expanded by 5.5%, up from 4.9% a year earlier as the paddy harvest 
recovered and the production of fruit and vegetables increased—
and despite lower output of tea and rubber, two major export crops. 
Expansion in industry slowed to 3.0% from 3.5% a year earlier, dragging 
down growth. Apparel production stagnated on weak external demand, 
though the important food-processing industry expanded by 5.4% 
even as exports slumped. Weakness in industry mainly reflected a 
0.9% decline in construction caused by a marked fall in public and 
private investment. 
Preliminary demand-side estimates of real GDP are not available, 
but nominal expenditure was estimated by the Central Bank of 
Sri Lanka. Central bank projections of private and government 
consumption expenditure indicate much higher growth in 2015 than 
in 2014, while investment, exports, and imports fell (Figure 3.21.2). 
Government consumption accelerated to 25.3% growth from 15.9% 
in 2014, reflecting higher pay and allowances for public employees. 
Expansion in private spending picked up to 8.0% from 4.7% in 2014 on 
higher salaries and larger transfers. Fixed capital investment slowed to 
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2.9% as spending on large infrastructure projects slowed and private 
investors adopted a cautious approach.
Average annual inflation, as measured by the national consumer 
price index, moderated to 3.8% in 2015 (Box 3.21.1). While food 
inflation was almost 20% in January and February 2015, it subsequently 
stabilized to bring average annual food inflation to 5.4%. At the same 
time, nonfood inflation hovered at around 2% in the first half of 2015. 
It trended up in the second half partly because of Sri Lankan rupee 
depreciation from September but averaged only 2.6% for the year. 
Overall inflation was 4.2% year on year in December 2015, but in 
January 2016 prices were 0.7% below those a year earlier because of a 
sharp fall in food prices from December highs and a large base eect 
(Figure 3.21.3). 
Credit to the private sector accelerated sharply from mid-2014 to 
reach 25.1% in December 2015 (Figure 3.21.4). Much of the growth was 
from expansion in consumer credit fueled by excess liquidity in the 
domestic money market. In view of growing pressure on the balance of 
payments and foreign exchange reserves, the central bank tightened its 
monetary policy and in mid-January 2016 raised the statutory reserve 
ratio by 1.5 percentage points to 7.5% (Figure 3.21.5). As a result, excess 
liquidity declined to SLRs42 billion from SLRs90 billion in December 
2015, causing a slight upward adjustment in market interest rates. 
In February 2016, the central bank firmed its policy rates by 50 basis 
points. Growth in credit to the private sector has slowed slightly. 
The all share price index remained high at around 7,000 for most 
of 2015 (despite some overseas investors’ withdrawal of capital) on the 
expectation that the new government would set an economic policy 
oriented to the private sector (Figure 3.21.6). However, deepening 
economic uncertainty and the government’s announcement to suspend 
tax reforms announced in the 2016 budget caused the market to slump 
and likely put o new portfolio and foreign direct investment. 
Eorts for fiscal consolidation were reversed in 2015. The new 
government’s revised budget for 2015 aimed to provide more support for 
the poor and to collect more revenue from high-income groups and large 
commercial operations. The budget provided for a sizeable monthly 
allowance for public employees and higher transfers and subsidies. 
These changes combined with higher interest payments (which consume 
about one-third of budget revenue) to boost recurrent expenditure to 
14.7% of GDP from 12.9% the previous year (Figure 3.21.7). Reversing 
recent trends, revenue increased to 12.2% of GDP from 11.6% in 2014 
on increases in excise and custom duties on vehicle imports as imports 
surged in response to lower import tax rates set in the revised budget. 
The overall budget deficit excluding grants widened to the equivalent of 
7.2% of GDP in 2015, well above both the 5.7% outcome in the previous 
year and the 4.9% budget target. Total government debt is estimated to 
have increased to equal 73.5% of GDP in 2015 (Figure 3.21.8). 
Budget policy for 2016 sought to enhance tax revenue. The 2016 
budget, presented to Parliament in November 2015, set a lower 
minimum threshold for liability under the value-added tax (VAT) to 
SLRs12 million from SLRs15 million, and revised the prevailing 11% 
single rate into three bands: 0%, 8%, and 12.5%. The threshold for the 
3.21.1  National versus Colombo 
consumer price index
The national consumer price index 
was released in November 2015 with 
the series starting in January 2014. 
Compared with the Colombo 
consumer price index, it has 
broader coverage, including all the 
provinces and a larger basket that 
adds two new categories: alcoholic 
beverages and tobacco, and hotels 
and restaurants. The national index 
puts more weight on food, at 44% 
versus 41% on the Colombo index. 
While inflation measured by the 
national index in 2015 was on 
average 3.8%, it was much lower at 
0.9% as measured by the Colombo 
index. This was because housing 
rent showed a decline in Colombo 
after a significant rise in 2013 and 
early 2014, which substantially 
pushed down inflation as measured 
by the Colombo index.
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nation building tax, a levy on gross business receipts, was also revised 
lower and the tax rate doubled from 2% to 4%. The budget also aimed 
to stop ad hoc and unproductive tax concessions oered by various 
government agencies. Moreover, tax concessions granted for any 
investment project were brought under the supervision and monitoring 
of the Ministry of Finance.
The implementation of major tax reform to the VAT and national 
building tax were deferred in January 2016. The latest fiscal projection 
taking into account these developments estimates a more modest 
increase in revenue equal to 13.2% of GDP, rather than 16.3% as 
proposed in the original budget, while the original ambitious public 
investment target is reduced. In this fiscal framework, recurrent 
expenditure is to be contained at 14.1% of GDP, while public investment 
will be 5.2%. The fiscal deficit excluding grants will narrow to 5.9% of 
GDP in 2016. 
The balance of payments was under pressure in 2015 from a decline 
in exports, weak remittances from workers overseas, and large capital 
outflows. The current account deficit narrowed, however, on account 
of much lower spending on oil imports and robust tourist arrivals. 
Export earnings dropped by 5.6% in line with lower earnings from 
all major export categories as global demand weakened and prices 
fell. Exports of tea, rubber products, and garments largely accounted 
for the decline. Imports also fell during the year, by 2.5%, reflecting 
diverse developments. Imports other than oil—notably vehicles but 
other consumer goods as well—increased sharply by 10%, while oil 
imports fell by 41% because of lower prices to a total $1.9 billion less 
than a year earlier.
Earnings from tourism continued to expand robustly, growing by 
17.8% to $2.9 billion. Overseas workers’ remittances contracted by 0.5% 
to $6.9 billion, which seemed to be partly attributable to the fall in oil 
prices and weak growth in the Middle East, the main host destination. 
On balance, the current account recorded an estimated deficit equal 
to 1.9% of GDP in 2015, narrower than the 2.6% deficit in 2014 
(Figure 3.21.9).
Capital outflow was the major factor in the deterioration of the 
balance of payments in 2015. Foreign investments in government 
securities recorded a net outflow of $1.1 billion, while foreign direct 
investment and portfolio inflows were well below levels a year earlier. 
The central bank estimates the overall balance of payments deficit to be 
$1.5 billion, reversing a surplus of $1.7 billion in 2014. 
Gross international reserves fell to $7.3 billion in December 2015 
from $8.2 billion a year earlier and declined further to $6.3 billion in 
January 2016 (Figure 3.21.10). Sri Lanka’s latest sovereign bond, for 
$1.5 billion, was issued on 28 October 2015 at a coupon rate of 6.850% 
per annum. Fitch Ratings rated it BB–, Moody’s Investors Service 
B1, and Standard and Poor’s B+. Gross international reserves were 
supported by a $1.1 billion currency swap arrangement with India 
concluded in September 2015. 
The Sri Lanka rupee was broadly stable against the US dollar 
for most of 2015 but weakened after September 2015, when the 
central bank stopped intervening on the foreign exchange market. 
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The rupee depreciated by 6.2% from SLRs137 to the dollar at the end of 
August 2015 to SLRs146 as of 11 February 2016 (Figure 3.21.11). In all of 
2015, the rupee depreciated by 9% against the dollar and by nearly 4% 
in nominal and real eective terms, following a 3-year trend of gradual 
appreciation.
External debt in June 2015 was $43.5 billion, equal to 58.1% of GDP, 
of which 83% had a maturity of more than 1 year and was categorized 
as long term. The government’s outstanding external debt amounted to 
$24.3 billion, or 56% of all external debt, of which $8.4 billion was in 
debt securities (Treasury bills and international sovereign bonds) and 
$6.8 billion was from multilateral lenders, $6.1 billion from bilateral 
lenders, and $3.0 billion from commercial sources. 
Economic prospects
Weak global demand and uncertainty over policy will continue to hold 
down economic performance in 2016. Weak demand and low prices 
for Sri Lanka’s major exports will constrain economic growth and 
exert pressure on the balance of payments, though somewhat lower 
oil prices projected for 2016 will alleviate this pressure, albeit less 
than in 2015. Continued concern over fiscal consolidation will hinder 
foreign investment and other capital inflows. Notably, in February 2016 
Fitch Ratings downgraded Sri Lanka to B+ from BB– with a negative 
outlook because of rising refinancing risk and weaker public finances. 
Fiscal consolidation is to be put back on track by a revision of the 
2016 budget. Following the suspension in January 2016 of earlier plans 
for tax reform, the government has been preparing a revised budget 
for 2016. Its proposed tax reforms include a VAT rate increase to 15% 
from 11% and the introduction of a capital gains tax. The revised budget 
will be the basis for discussions with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) for possible support that interests the government. IMF support, 
once agreed, will protect against expected pressures from external 
imbalances as it builds international confidence and facilitates fiscal 
consolidation and tax reform.
A national development strategy will facilitate investment, both 
domestic and foreign. The Prime Minister outlined the government’s 
strategy in his statement in November, which focused on job creation, 
rural development, linking up to global value chains, and attracting 
more foreign direct investment. The 2016 budget builds on these 
priorities and introduces some measures necessary to attract foreign 
investment. The master plan for the Western Region Megapolis 
Project, released in January 2016, elaborates on the development plan 
for Western Province, including Colombo, which will be a significant 
component of capital expenditure over the medium term. The public 
investment plan for 2016–2018 to be published in May 2016 will 
prioritize and streamline public projects, provide vision for economic 
development, and thus promote private sector investment. 
Private investment can recover to drive economic growth in 2016, 
assuming that the revised budget is approved in mid-2016, the national 
development strategy is finalized, and agreement is reached with the 
IMF on possible support. Growth will be driven by domestic demand 
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as weak global economic recovery suppresses external demand. 
Consumption will increase only modestly after strong expansion last 
year. Public investment has potential to expand once additional revenue 
streams materialize. Under these circumstances, there is room for 
private sector investment to lead growth. In this scenario, economic 
growth is projected to pick up to 5.3% in 2016 and further to 5.8% in 
2017 as the global environment improves. 
Inflation will accelerate moderately under monetary tightening. 
While domestic demand remains restrained, the 9% depreciation of the 
Sri Lanka rupee in 2015 will exert upward pressure on import prices. 
The fading of base eects from several reductions to administered 
energy prices in 2015 may also cause some upward movement in 
inflation in 2016. Monetary policy will maintain a tight stance balanced 
between restraining price increases and fostering economic recovery. 
With global oil prices holding down domestic fuel prices, and assuming 
a steady supply of agriculture products, inflation is expected to rise only 
moderately. Accordingly, inflation is forecasted to pick up to 4.5% in 
2016 and, as growth strengthens, to 5.0% in 2017. 
The overall balance of payments will continue to be under pressure 
as exports stay weak during the global slowdown and remittances 
slacken from workers in the Middle East. Although exports will 
continue to struggle, a positive factor is the expected renewal in 2016 of 
concessions under the Generalized System of Preferences Plus scheme 
of the European Union. Imports will contract as oil prices decline and 
vehicle imports subside in response to the import tax. Receipts from 
tourism will continue to grow at a healthy rate in line with recent 
trends. Given this outlook, the current account deficit is projected to 
widen slightly to 2.0% of GDP in 2016 and improve in 2017 to 1.8% as 
exports pick up. 
The government’s commitment to fiscal consolidation is critical 
to ensure capital inflow. IMF support would help the government to 
maintain su©cient gross international reserves to sustain public and 
investor confidence. The overall balance of payments is likely to remain 
in deficit for the second consecutive year in 2016. 
Policy challenge—tax reform
A persistently low revenue ratio has been a major challenge to 
Sri Lanka’s eorts to achieve fiscal consolidation while meeting growing 
needs for social expenditure and public investment. The ratio of tax 
to GDP is, at 12%, uniquely low among countries at a similar stage of 
development. The tax system is quite complex, with a multiplicity of 
taxes. A relatively thin base reflects significant base erosion as various 
government o©ces granted an array of tax incentives. The government’s 
repeated attempts to improve the tax system have had little impact. 
The Prime Minister’s statement to Parliament in November 2015 
indicated that he intended to address this issue partly by strengthening 
tax management and removing tax holidays and benefits. His policy 
includes minimizing regressive taxes and doubling the ratio of direct to 
indirect tax contributions from 20/80 to 40/60. 
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The 2016 budget nevertheless depended on expanded indirect taxes. 
It planned ambitious tax increases worth 2% of GDP, including increases 
in the nation building tax (NBT), excise duties, and taxes on external 
trade, while income taxes both personal and corporate are reduced 
marginally (Figure 3.21.12). The budget proposed expanding the tax 
base for the VAT and the NBT by lowering the minimum tax liability 
threshold and doubling the NBT rate. Indirect taxes in general place 
a smaller burden on tax administration and can immediately increase 
revenue, but they are regressive in that they impose a larger burden on 
the poor than the rich. Further, since the NBT is levied on turnover, the 
burden cascades and has a larger distortionary eect on the economy 
than does a VAT. 
Moreover, personal income tax will became less progressive as the 
rate is unified at 15% from six bands: 4%, 8%, 12%, 16%, 20%, and 24%. 
Corporate tax rates were reformed to two bands—15% broadly and 30% 
applicable to a few selected activities including betting and gaming, 
liquor, tobacco, and banking and financial services—from the previous 
structure of 12% for incomes below SLRs5 million and 28% for higher 
incomes. The annual tax-free threshold for the personal income tax was 
increased to SLRs2.4 million from SLRs750,000, further narrowing 
the tax base. These proposals run counter to the policy outlined by the 
Prime Minister. 
Proposed tax amendments in March 2016 address progressivity in 
the tax system. The Prime Minister announced to Parliament details 
of his proposed tax amendments. The proposal is to change the VAT 
to a 15% single rate that will not be imposed on essential commodities 
or electricity (though VAT concessions for telecommunications, private 
education, and private health expenditure will be removed), keep the 
NBT tax rate at 2%, and introduce a capital gains tax. The 2016 budget 
proposals on personal income tax and corporate tax are to be suspended. 
The statutory personal income tax rate to be applied from 2017 is 
increased from 15.0% to 17.5%. 
The government has taken well-considered steps to enhance revenue. 
Further improving the tax system requires stronger policy analysis 
and more capacity in decision-making agencies. The Inland Revenue 
Department needs to set up a comprehensive tax policy analysis unit 
with the capacity to conduct statistical modelling and social surveys. 
Such analysis will inform policy makers on the impact of tax policy 
changes on revenue and the economy and facilitate tax administration 
policy analysis, intervention, and equitable revenue generation.
3.21.12 Government revenues
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Brunei Darussalam
Slight gains in oil and gas production in 2015 slowed the pace of GDP contraction and, if 
maintained, are expected to restore GDP growth this year. Consumer prices, after easing in 2014 
and 2015, are forecast to edge up. Lower oil and gas prices will likely push the current account 
into deficit in 2016. They also provide an opportunity to rein in energy subsidies.
Economic performance 
Heavily dependent on exports of oil and natural gas, the economy 
contracted by an estimated 1.1% in 2015 (Figure 3.22.1). The pace of 
GDP contraction slowed from declines of 2.1% in 2013 and 2.3% in 2014 
as oil and gas output edged up in 2015 after declining for several years. 
Crude oil production rose by 0.2% to 126,800 barrels per day and 
natural gas output by 4.9% to 1.4 billion cubic feet per day, owing largely 
to the completion of maintenance on some aging wells and pipelines 
(Figure 3.22.2). 
Oil and gas accounts for more than 60% of GDP and 90% of both 
merchandise exports and government revenue. While hydrocarbon 
production rose a little last year, export prices plunged, sharply reducing 
export income and fiscal revenue. The rest of the economy—mainly 
services and construction—contracted by 2.3% in the first 3 quarters of 
2015, the latest period for which data are available, and likely contracted 
in the full year (Figure 3.22.3). Services, particularly those provided 
by the government, contracted, but construction expanded as the 
government built infrastructure and housing projects.
On the demand side, investment, government consumption, and 
net exports all shrank in the first 3 quarters, but private consumption 
recorded solid growth.
Government spending was constrained by falling revenue from 
taxes, dividends, and royalties from oil and gas. Estimated revenue 
dropped by about half in FY2015 (ending 31 March 2016). The 
government responded by cutting expenditure by more than 25%, in 
part by postponing smaller capital outlays. The fiscal deficit in FY2015 
is estimated at 14% of GDP, a sharp contrast with large surpluses 
exceeding 20% of GDP a few years ago (Figure 3.22.4). The deficit was 
financed by transfers from a fiscal stabilization fund.
Falling prices for oil and gas exports cut the trade surplus by more 
than half, and the current account surplus narrowed to an estimated 
6.5% of GDP in 2015. Merchandise exports on a customs basis fell 
by 42.9% to $6.3 billion, and merchandise imports fell by 17.1% to 
$3.0 billion (Figure 3.22.5). International reserves were, at $2.9 billion, 
down by 16.9% from 2014 but still covered a high 11.4 months of imports.
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Consumer prices declined for a second year in a row. Lower prices 
for transportation, clothing, education, and household equipment and 
maintenance more than oset small increases in prices for food, utilities, 
health care, and communications. Over the year, the consumer price 
index fell by 0.4%. 
Growth in credit to the private sector slowed further to 3.1% at the 
end of 2015. Money supply (M2) declined by 1.8%. In October 2015, the 
monetary authority relaxed some conditions on unsecured personal 
credit. The Brunei dollar, which is pegged at par to the Singapore dollar, 
depreciated by 6.5% against the US dollar in 2015. Since 2006, the 
government has issued Islamic securities worth B$9.4 billion and plans 
to issue more with longer maturities. The monetary authority indicated 
that it might start a securities exchange in 2017. 
Economic prospects 
The economy is projected to return to growth this year on the 
assumption that oil and gas production continues to recover gradually 
as new technology extracts more oil from existing fields and that the 
government maintains significant investment in infrastructure. GDP is 
forecast to edge up by 1.0% this year and accelerate to 2.5% in 2017 if 
global demand and prices for hydrocarbons start to recover. 
Construction will contribute to growth. The $100 million Sungai 
Kebun Bridge is to be completed this year, and construction on a bridge 
to Pulau Muara Besar, an island in Brunei Bay to be developed as an 
industrial hub, is expected to run through 2018. Work has started 
on the $1.1 billion Temburong Bridge to connect the Brunei Muara 
district with Temburong. This large project will continue through 2019. 
Site preparation and dredging is under way for a $2.5 billion oil refinery 
and aromatics cracker on Pulau Muara Besar. This project, planned 
by a company from the People’s Republic of China, has been delayed, 
but construction could start during the forecast period. Commercial 
production is scheduled from 2019. 
The impact that low oil and gas prices has on government revenue 
indicates that spending on public services and smaller capital projects 
will remain constrained. The FY2016 budget cuts total spending by 
12.5% from the previous year’s budget. Revenue is projected to fall 
further, and the budget is expected to post another deep deficit in 
FY2016. The budget puts a higher priority on spending that stimulates 
the economy, such as infrastructure construction and maintenance and 
the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. Accumulated 
financial assets provide a buer against declines in revenue.
The government will push ahead with eorts to diversify the 
economy through foreign investment in export-oriented ventures. 
New foreign investments include a $52 million plant being built by 
Japanese companies to supply pipes and tubing for the petroleum 
industry and a $17 million organic farm proposed by investors from 
Singapore and Taipei,China. To attract investment the government 
has reduced the corporate tax rate to 18.5% and introduced a tax 
credit equal to 50% of salaries paid to new local employees in the first 
3 years of employment. Progress has been made toward improving 
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the business environment. Brunei Darussalam moved up 21 places to 
84 among 189 countries ranked in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2016 
report. The higher ranking followed government moves to improve 
online procedures and simplify registration requirements for starting 
a business and to make it easier and less costly to pay business taxes. 
Under new registration procedures, a business can be started in only 
1 day. In addition, the government established its Brunei Darussalam 
Arbitration Center to resolve commercial disputes and drafted a new 
competition law that it said aligns with international best practice.
Consumer prices are forecast to rise slightly as economic growth 
picks up. The depreciation of the Brunei dollar against the US dollar 
will exert some upward pressure on prices. The consumer price index 
fell by 1.2% year on year in January 2016 but, for the year as a whole, 
is forecast to rise by 0.2% (Figure 3.22.6). Subsidies and price controls 
keep inflation low in this economy. 
Lower global oil and gas prices this year will further diminish the 
value of merchandise exports. Next year, some recovery in oil prices 
should see exports start to recover. Imports are expected to rise a little 
in 2016 and more so in 2017. The current account is forecast to fall into 
deficit this year, returning to surplus in 2017.
Policy challenge—reducing fuel subsidies
International studies show that subsidies on fossil fuels and electricity 
not only impose a burden on government budgets but also divert funds 
from more productive investment in physical and social infrastructure. 
Moreover, subsidies artificially lower the price of energy, encouraging 
higher consumption and discouraging the development of alternative 
energy sources. They disproportionately benefit higher-income earners 
who own cars and air-condition their homes. 
Brunei Darussalam’s subsidies on fuel and power cost almost 
$400 million in 2014, or $900 per person, based on estimates by the 
International Energy Agency. The subsidy on gasoline has kept the 
retail price, in US dollars, around $0.40 per liter over the past decade. 
That compares with a retail price per liter of $0.98 in the US and 
$1.58 in Singapore in 2014 (Figure 3.22.7). 
The sharp decline in oil prices provides an opportunity to rein in 
subsidies without causing steep increases in fuel prices for consumers. 
Indeed, the minister of energy and industry noted in 2015 that subsidies 
left people with little awareness of the true value of energy, adding that 
it was important to educate people away from dependence on subsidies 
and to find innovative alternatives to traditional approaches. 
The government has started to address the issue by introducing 
progressive electricity taris for residential users. This system charges 
B$0.01 per kilowatt hour (kWh) for consumption up to 500 kWh, 
B$0.10 per kWh for higher consumption to 1,500 kWh, and B$0.15 
per kWh for consumption beyond 1,500 kWh. Thus, electricity is still 
subsidized but less so for bigger consumers. The government says this 
system has encouraged consumers to use electricity more e§ciently 
and reduced electricity consumption by 15%. It is considering extending 
progressive taris to commercial users.
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Cambodia
Expansion in industry and services sustained solid economic growth in 2015. Inflation slowed to 
its lowest rate since 2009 but picked up at the end of the year. The outlook is for further robust 
growth led by garment and footwear manufacturing, construction, and services, and for moderate 
inflation. Rapid growth in credit and a real estate boom have heightened risks in the financial 
sector. Another challenge is to improve the quality of employment. 
Economic performance 
Industry, particularly garment and footwear manufacturing and 
construction, contributed strongly to 7.0% economic growth in 2015, 
as did services (Figure 3.23.1). Agriculture was virtually flat because 
of drought. 
Cambodia’s large supply of inexpensive, low-skilled labor has 
attracted substantial foreign direct investment (FDI) into the 
production of garments and footwear for export. Growth in such 
manufacturing accelerated to 9.8% last year. Meanwhile, growth in 
construction moderated from 2014 but was still buoyant at 19.2% in 2015. 
With expansion estimated at 11.7%, industry overall was the biggest 
contributor to GDP growth last year.
Services, the second biggest contributor to growth, grew by an 
estimated 7.1%. Strong domestic demand spurred expansion in real 
estate and business services at almost 12%. Finance, transport and 
communications, and wholesale and retail trade all grew by about 8%. 
Tourist arrivals rose by 6.1% in 2015, which was somewhat slower 
than in the previous year owing to declines in visitors from Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, as well as 
slower growth in arrivals from other major markets (Figure 3.23.2). 
Agriculture, by contrast, grew by just 0.2% as El Niño brought 
dry weather. The rice harvest was broadly unchanged from 2014. 
Production of maize and soya beans fell, but cassava output jumped 
by half, and natural rubber output rose slightly. 
Domestic demand remained strong, accommodated by low inflation 
and high credit growth. Inflation averaging 1.2% in 2015, the lowest 
since 2009, was restrained by falling global oil prices and subdued food 
prices. By the end of the year, though, inflation had picked up to 2.8% 
(Figure 3.23.3). 
Net FDI rose to an estimated $1.8 billion last year, up by 8% from 
2014 and equal to 10% of GDP. Higher foreign investment in banks and 
microfinance institutions was notable. 
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The government’s fiscal consolidation e£orts narrowed the deficit, 
excluding grants, to an estimated 2.4% of GDP in 2015 from 3.5% in 2014 
(Figure 3.23.4). Public revenue as a share of GDP was little changed at 
17.1%, after having increased significantly in 2014 with improved tax 
collection. Expenditure as a share of GDP fell to an estimated 19.5% 
of GDP from 20.7%, partly the result of underspending in the capital 
budget. Government deposits in the banking system, which can be 
drawn down during economic shocks to implement fiscal policy in the 
absence of a domestic bond market, continued to rise last year, reaching 
an estimated KR6.7 billion, equal to 9.1% of GDP.
The monetary authorities kept the reserve requirement on foreign 
currency bank deposits, the main monetary policy tool, at 12.5% last 
year. However, they expanded reserve requirements to cover banks’ 
foreign borrowings, to stem high growth in credit. Estimates indicate 
that growth in credit to the private sector moderated to 27.1% from 
31.3% in 2014, and growth in the money supply (M2) halved to 14.7% 
from 29.9% (Figure 3.23.5). The Cambodian riel was broadly stable 
against the US dollar. Dollarization remained high, with a ratio of 
foreign currency deposits to broad money at 83% in 2015. 
Merchandise exports increased by an estimated 14.1% to $8.5 billion 
in 2015. Shipments of garments and footwear, which comprise 70% 
of total exports, rose by an estimated 10.2%. Rice exports also rose. 
Merchandise imports increased by an estimated 11.9% to $11.9 billion, 
despite lower oil prices, as imports for the garment industry rose steeply. 
A smaller trade deficit and higher remittances narrowed the current 
account deficit excluding o¥cial transfers to an estimated 11.1% of GDP. 
This gap was largely financed by FDI. 
Gross international reserves rose by 16% to $5.1 billion. 
While reserves equivalent to 4.4 months of imports appear adequate, 
high dollarization and financial vulnerabilities in the economy 
argue for building additional reserves to strengthen resilience under 
external shocks.
An International Monetary Fund analysis of debt sustainability 
in November 2015 found Cambodia at low risk of debt distress but 
vulnerable to shocks to growth, exports, and the budget. External public 
debt rose from $5.3 billion in 2014 to an estimated $5.7 billion in 2015, 
equal to 31.1% of GDP. Cambodia has practically no domestic debt.
Economic prospects 
Steady economic growth of 7.0% is projected for 2016, with the pace 
quickening slightly in 2017 (Figure 3.23.6). Services are forecast to 
expand by 7.8% this year on robust growth in wholesale and retail 
trade, real estate and business services, and finance. Industry is seen 
growing by 9.5%, supported by diversification in garments and footwear 
toward products with higher value added. Growth in construction is 
expected to continue slowing from the very rapid pace of recent years. 
Agriculture should have a better year, projected to grow by 1.6% as 
El Niño fades. 
Fiscal policy will likely be more expansionary. The 2016 budget 
targets a fiscal deficit, excluding grants, equal to 4.3% of GDP, 
considerably wider than last year’s actual deficit. Public expenditure is 
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projected to increase by 16.1% over the 2015 budget, mainly through a 
hike in civil service wages. Higher revenue is projected from improved 
tax collection. 
While the economy shows signs of becoming more diversified 
within and across sectors, including garments and light manufacturing, 
and in export destinations, the base for growth remains narrow. 
Structural changes in the People’s Republic of China and the relocation 
of some factories to Southeast Asia o£er Cambodia opportunities to 
diversify production and exports. However, pressures for higher wages, 
US dollar appreciation, and stagnating productivity may weigh on 
Cambodia’s competitiveness, in particular with other low-cost garment 
producers such as Myanmar. 
To support diversification, the government launched last August an 
industrial development policy to 2025 aimed at upgrading industry from 
low-cost, labor-intensive manufacturing to production with higher value 
added. The strategic pillars of the policy are the promotion of foreign 
and domestic investment, the expansion and modernization of small and 
medium-sized enterprises, stronger regulations and enforcement, and a 
better business-enabling environment. 
Subdued global food and fuel prices are expected to contain 
inflation to an average of 2.5% in 2016. Next year, the projected pickup 
in growth and higher global oil prices are seen lifting inflation to 3.0% 
(Figure 3.23.7). The external position is expected to remain stable, 
with the current account deficit financed mainly by FDI and o¥cial 
inflows. The current account gap is forecast to be little changed this 
year but narrower in 2017 in line with better export opportunities 
(Figure 3.23.8). 
Domestic risks to the outlook stem from financial sector 
vulnerabilities that have emerged during a period of rapid growth in 
credit and a real estate boom, despite some moderation last year in 
lending and construction. Growth in bank lending for construction 
and real estate-related activities eased from a very rapid 45.0% 
year on year in the first quarter of 2015 but was still high at 34.3% 
in the fourth quarter, comprising 19% of total credit. The ratio of 
private sector credit to GDP almost doubled in 4 years to over 60%, and 
banks’ average loan-to-deposit ratio breached 100 in February 2015. 
Rapid expansion of the financial system and the large number of banks 
and microfinance institutions have stretched the supervisory capacity of 
regulators. 
External risks include disappointing growth in major export markets 
and a stronger US dollar that, under high dollarization, would further 
erode Cambodian competitiveness. Weaker-than-expected growth in 
the PRC could have spillover through investment, banking, and tourism 
channels. As banks and microfinance institutions increasingly rely on 
external funding, increased volatility in global financial markets could 
exacerbate funding costs and liquidity pressures. To counter external 
shocks, the government has rebuilt some fiscal space, but room for 
monetary policy to support growth is constrained by high dollarization 
and a consequent lack of monetary control. E£orts to build policy bu£ers 
and resilience should therefore continue. 
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Policy challenge—improving the quality 
of employment 
Cambodia has achieved sustained high growth that averaged 7.9% from 
2000 to 2015. However, the growth model of attracting FDI to take 
advantage of inexpensive, low-skilled, and abundant labor may not be 
viable for much longer. Generating more good jobs to sustain growth 
and raise incomes depends on diversifying the economy with new 
industries that will require a di£erent and wider range of skills. 
Labor force participation is high and a large proportion of the labor 
force is employed, but many jobs are informal, vulnerable, unstable, 
and poorly rewarded. To improve the quality of employment there is 
a critical need to address shortcomings in education and training and 
to help children complete school. 
While 98% of children attend primary school, many drop out for lack 
of funds or because they expect low economic returns from education. 
Only 30% of young people complete high school. Low enrollment 
in secondary and higher education, and its poor quality, has left 
a mismatch between young workers’ skills and employers’ needs. 
Substantial benefits would likely result from improving the skills of 
those already in the workforce. 
As for children still in school, preparing them for technical and 
vocational education and training, higher education, and employment 
will require upgrading the physical infrastructure of schools, 
modernizing curricula and textbooks, and improving teaching skills, 
particularly at the secondary level in math and science. 
Coordinating general education with technical training would 
ensure that the two streams are complementary options for students. 
Better implementation of the qualification framework that was approved 
by the government in 2014 and collaboration with the private sector 
could link education and training across all levels and respond better to 
the skills needs of industry. 
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Indonesia
Stronger public investment is expected to pull the economy out of a slowdown that persisted 
in 2015. The government has increased infrastructure funding and unveiled policy reforms to 
stimulate private investment. Lower interest rates will help. Inflation is forecast to decelerate by 
almost 2 percentage points this year. Further reforms are needed to boost productivity, attract 
investment, and stimulate new sources of growth.
Economic performance 
Despite a pickup in government spending that lifted economic growth 
in the second half of 2015, the pace of GDP growth for the year was, at 
4.8%, the slowest since 2009. 
Growth in private consumption, by far the biggest contributor 
to GDP growth, decelerated to 4.8% last year on a decline in rural 
incomes, higher inflation, tighter consumer credit, and a weaker 
labor market (Figure 3.24.1). Rural incomes were hurt by lower 
prices for agricultural products and drought caused by El Niño. 
Private consumption got some support in the second half from increases 
in government funding for village funds and pay rises for civil servants.
Growth in fixed investment improved to 5.1% as the government 
ramped up investment in infrastructure and introduced a series of 
reforms to revive private investment (Figure 3.24.2). After facing 
delays in the first half, public investment rose sharply in the second, 
assisted by the government’s improved performance in executing 
capital expenditure. Encouragingly, the ratio of fixed investment to 
GDP increased to 33.2%. Government consumption spending also rose, 
recovering from a slowdown in 2014 to expand by 5.4% in 2015 on 
improved budget execution. 
Even though exports of goods and services fell by 2.0% in real terms, 
net external demand made a small contribution to GDP growth in 2015 
as imports in real terms contracted by 5.8% on lackluster domestic 
demand and Indonesian rupiah depreciation.
Services, the biggest supply-side contributor to GDP growth, 
grew by 5.5% in 2015, easing from 6.0% in 2014. In particular, growth 
slowed sharply in wholesale and retail trade, reflecting moderation in 
private consumption. By contrast, information and communications 
maintained double-digit expansion. Manufacturing grew by 4.2%, the 
slowest pace in several years. As the property market softened, growth 
in construction moderated to 6.6% despite the upturn in infrastructure 
spending. Growth in agriculture slowed to 4.0% as the drought 
and forest fires struck on top of weak global prices for palm oil and 
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natural rubber. Mining actually contracted by 5.1% due to declining 
crude oil extraction and low mineral prices.
The labor market weakened in 2015 (Figure 3.24.3). Fewer than 
200,000 jobs were created in the 12 months to August 2015, during 
which the working-age population aged 15 years and over increased 
by 3.1 million. The labor force participation rate fell to 65.8% in 
August 2015, the lowest on record, and the unemployment rate rose to 
6.2% in August 2015 from 5.9% a year earlier, with youth unemployment 
climbing to 22.6%. 
Inflation ebbed gradually from 8.4% at the end of 2014, then 
decelerated sharply in late 2015 as the impact of a 2014 fuel price hike 
faded (Figure 3.24.4). By December, inflation had subsided year on 
year to 3.4%. Core inflation, excluding food and fuel, eased to 4.0% in 
December. Nevertheless, year-average inflation remained high at 6.4% in 
2015 owing to the 2014 fuel price hike, El Niño-induced drought, import 
restrictions on some food staples, and rupiah depreciation. 
Higher food prices, lower rural incomes, and the weaker labor market 
caused the incidence of poverty to worsen to 11.1% in September 2015. 
Inequality as measured by the Gini coecient remained elevated at 0.41 
nationally.
Bank Indonesia, the central bank, reduced its policy interest rate 
by 25 basis points to 7.50% in February 2015, then kept the policy rate 
unchanged for 11 months to foster exchange rate stability and combat 
capital outflows. Growth in credit slowed to 10.5%. After inflation 
decelerated in the last quarter of 2015, the central bank reduced the 
policy rate by 75 basis points to 6.75% in the first quarter of 2016. 
The monetary authorities also cut the reserve requirement for banks in 
December 2015 and March 2016 to stimulate bank lending. 
The government pushed ahead with planned spending on 
infrastructure and social development in 2015 even as subdued 
economic activity and lower commodity prices caused budget revenue to 
decline. This widened the fiscal deficit to 2.5% of GDP from 1.9% in the 
budget and 2.1% in 2014. Standard & Poor’s, citing improved fiscal policy 
credibility, revised up its credit rating outlook for Indonesia to positive 
from stable in May 2015. 
Merchandise exports fell by 15.4% in US dollar terms, weighed 
down by sagging demand in major markets and lower prices for export 
commodities. Merchandise imports fell in US dollar terms by an even 
steeper 19.8% because of subdued investment, rupiah depreciation, and 
lower oil imports. Consequently, the trade surplus almost doubled to 
$13.3 billion, which, coupled with lower deficits in services and primary 
income, narrowed the current account deficit to $17.8 billion, equal to 
2.1% of GDP (Figure 3.24.5). 
Foreign direct investment inflows were, at $15.5 billion in 2015, 
the lowest in 5 years, and net portfolio investment of $16.7 billion was 
down by just over one-third from 2014. A smaller surplus in the capital 
and financial account relative to the previous year tipped the balance 
of payments into deficit by $1.1 billion. Gross international reserves 
declined by 5.3% to $105.9 billion in 2015, sucient to cover 7.5 months 
of imports and government debt payments (Figure 3.24.6). 
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 The rupiah depreciated by 10.2% against the broadly strengthening 
US dollar in 2015. In response to heightened rupiah volatility in August 
and September, the central bank moved to stabilize the currency by 
lengthening the maturity of its deposit facility. 
Economic prospects
Public investment is projected to increase in 2016 as infrastructure 
projects initiated last year gather momentum and new projects get 
under way. Higher public capital spending should provide additional 
opportunities for private investment, which, together with the 
implementation of structural reform, will improve the investment 
climate. Household spending is projected to pick up, but net external 
demand could weigh on economic growth. On balance, the economy is 
seen expanding by 5.2% in 2016 and 5.5% next year (Figure 3.24.7). 
The 2016 budget sees further improvement in the composition 
of public spending (Figure 3.24.8). Energy subsidies are projected to 
decline by 14% from 2015, freeing up resources for infrastructure, health 
care, and social protection. To this end, the government has raised its 
allocation for infrastructure by 7.4% from 2015. Local governments 
will receive higher transfers from the central government and are 
being encouraged to use accumulated surpluses for public investment. 
The 2016 budget also injects additional capital into state-owned 
enterprises involved in infrastructure, and some state enterprises get 
government guarantees to facilitate borrowing from international 
financial institutions. 
Aiming for higher rates of budget realization, ocials advanced the 
bidding process for public investment projects. By the end of January 
2016, the government had completed the bidding process for 53% of 
the capital spending planned by central government ministries. Several 
infrastructure projects, notably in telecommunications and roads, 
commenced in the first quarter of 2016.
The government targets an ambitious 21% increase in revenue over 
the outcome in 2015, which will require significant improvements 
in tax collection. Excise tari¥s have been raised, and a partial tax 
amnesty is planned for those who declare and repatriate o¥shore funds. 
Against this, low oil and commodity prices will continue to constrain 
revenue this year. The government anticipates a fiscal deficit equal to 
2.2% of GDP in 2016—though, as in 2015, the outcome is expected to 
exceed the target. 
Policy reforms are expected to stimulate private investment, 
particularly over the medium term. The government has unveiled 
10 packages of such reforms since September 2015. The central bank 
is expected to maintain its focus on macroeconomic stability, though 
slower inflation over the forecast period could provide room for further 
reductions in interest rates to spur growth. 
Household consumption is projected to improve slightly on easing 
inflation, tax cuts for lower-income workers from July 2015, and higher 
government allocations for village funds, which hire rural workers 
to build village infrastructure. These factors will help to mitigate the 
lingering impact of El Niño on farm incomes. The latest consumer 
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survey by the central bank shows that consumers generally remained 
optimistic in February 2016, but less so than in January (Figure 3.24.9). 
The outlook for exports is weak, however, in light of lackluster 
economic performance in many of Indonesia’s trade partners. 
The decline in exports that started in 2012 is projected to continue, 
but at a much slower pace than in 2015 (Figure 3.24.10). Likewise, the 
decline in imports that has been under way since 2013 is expected to 
slow as investment gathers momentum. The current account deficit is 
forecast to widen over the next 2 years, but the balance of payments may 
well return to surplus on stronger capital inflows that should follow a 
better economic performance and strong implementation of investment 
reforms. Foreign holdings of rupiah bonds rose by $2.9 billion in the 
first 11 weeks of 2016, and the rupiah appreciated by 5.1% against the 
US dollar in this period.
By sector, services are expected to benefit this year as lower inflation 
and interest rates bolster consumer and business sentiment. Stronger 
spending on infrastructure will lift construction. The manufacturing 
purchasing managers’ index in February appears to have bottomed out, 
and this indicates a potential upturn in the months ahead (Figure 3.24.11). 
As for agriculture, farmers postponed crop sowing late in 2015 to wait out 
the drought, which will hurt harvests in the first half of 2016. 
Damage to agriculture from drought has put upward pressure on 
food prices, with inflation edging up to 4.3% year on year in the first 
2 months of 2016. The government has approved imports of rice to 
dampen price increases. The rupiah’s depreciation in 2015 is expected 
to have a modest impact on inflation this year. Year-average inflation 
is seen at 4.5% in 2016, down almost 2 percentage points from 6.4% in 
each of the past 3 years (Figure 3.24.12). 
Domestic risks to the outlook are posed by delays in public 
infrastructure projects, including from possible shortfalls in government 
revenue. Delays in implementing infrastructure projects would hurt 
business confidence. In this regard, it will be important that reforms 
announced in 2015 are firmly implemented. An unexpected spike in 
inflation, perhaps caused by tight food supplies, could dent consumption 
and investor sentiment. External risks include weaker-than-anticipated 
growth in trading partners, which would further depress exports, and 
continued weakness in prices for export commodities. Current account 
and budget deficits reinforce the importance of maintaining capital 
inflows, which would be put at risk by renewed volatility in global 
financial markets. 
Policy challenge—spurring new engines of growth
Development of commodity production for export has been an 
important driver of Indonesia’s economic growth. Now that the global 
commodities boom has faded, the challenge is to spur other sources 
of growth. The expansion of manufacturing holds great promise. 
Others areas with potential for strong growth include tourism, marine 
fisheries, aquaculture, e-commerce to serve the growing middle class, 
and agricultural commodities with higher value added. 
3.24.9  Consumer and business confidence 
indexes
Index
80
90
100
110
120
130
  Q1
2013
Q3   Q1
2014
Q3   Q1
2015
Q3
Business tendency index  
Consumer confidence index  
 
Q = quarter.
Source: CEIC Data Company (accessed 14 March 2016).
Click here for figure data
3.24.10 Merchandise trade
Imports
Exports
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
30
45
% change
15
0
–15
–30
Sources: CEIC Data Company (accessed 2 March 2016); 
ADB estimates.
Click here for figure data
3.24.1  Selected economic indicators (%)
2016 2017
GDP growth  5.2  5.5
Inflation  4.5  4.2
Current account balance  
(share of GDP)
–2.6 –2.8
Source: ADB estimates.
Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia: Southeast Asia Indonesia  207
Recent reforms are designed to diversify growth sources and 
address growth constraints. From September 2015 to February 2016, 
the government unveiled 10 packages of reforms to attract investment, 
particularly in manufacturing. It opened an additional 35 sectors 
to foreign ownership, eliminated or simplified various regulations, 
improved procedures for land title registration, and accelerated 
business licensing. A new formula for setting minimum wages aims to 
make annual adjustments more simple and predictable. Tax breaks are 
provided to new manufacturing and labor-intensive industries, while 
credit subsidies are expanded for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Port logistics services are to be reformed, and special economic zones 
further developed. 
The next priority should be to forcefully implement the reforms 
to ensure a positive impact on investor perceptions. In this respect, 
decisions last year to raise tari¥s on 5,000 products and require that all 
transactions be made in rupiah may have countered some of the gains.
The reform agenda is incomplete. For example, policies are needed 
to foster micro and small enterprises. One in three such manufacturing 
enterprises cites inadequate finance as its main constraint. Interventions 
to address the main issues—high interest rates, cumbersome procedures, 
and lack of collateral—have important roles to play in structural 
reform, as do upgrading technology and encouraging micro and small 
enterprises to form clusters to promote cooperation and economies 
of scale. 
Indonesia’s working-age population is projected to increase steadily 
through 2030. To take full advantage of this demographic dividend, 
further investment is needed in education and training that will help 
the economy make the transition to activities that add more value. 
Longer term, changes are required to improve the quality and relevance 
of education and training, and to address skill shortages and mismatches 
in the labor market (Figure 3.24.13). 
The GDP share of trade in goods and services has declined over 
the past decade, even as it has increased in most other Southeast Asian 
economies. Although Indonesia is a large producer of palm oil, coal, 
rubber, and co¥ee, its total exports are less than 2% of global trade 
in goods and services. This points to the tremendous potential that 
expanding trade has for boosting demand for Indonesian goods and 
services, provided that a firm commitment to openness and global 
competitiveness is maintained. The growing use of nontari¥ measures 
such as import and export restrictions, and of state interventions to 
stabilize domestic commodity markets, ultimately weakens external 
competitiveness and should be reconsidered. 
Economic integration under the auspices of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations will add to competitive pressures but also 
create opportunities to integrate Indonesia more closely into one of the 
world’s most rapidly growing regions. 
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Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Having decelerated since 2013, growth is projected to pick up over the next 2 years, lending 
support to the economy’s eligibility for graduation from least-developed status by 2020. Inflation 
has ebbed to its lowest in 6 years and is forecast to remain modest. Lower global oil prices have 
helped to bolster a fragile external position, but international reserves provide only a thin buffer 
against external shocks.
Economic performance 
Expansion in services and electricity generation sustained solid 
economic growth in 2015, though the pace moderated for a second year 
in a row to an estimated 6.7%, largely owing to fiscal constraints and 
lackluster global demand for minerals (Figure 3.25.1). 
Services, the biggest supply-side contributor to GDP growth, slowed 
a little in 2015 but still grew by an estimated 8.5%. The number of bank 
branches and microfinance institutions continued to increase, and 
telecommunications recorded moderate expansion. Tourism-related 
services such as accommodation and transportation benefitted as tourist 
arrivals rose by 12.6% to 4.7 million and revenue from tourism increased 
by 13.1% to $725.4 million (Figure 3.25.2). 
Industry grew by an estimated 8.0%, also coming o the pace set in 
2014. Inflows of foreign direct investment supported the construction 
of power plants, residential and commercial property, and projects in 
special economic zones. However, fiscal constraints dampened public 
construction. Output of electricity, mostly sold to Thailand, rose after 
the Hongsa lignite-fired power plant and new hydropower plants started 
commercial production (Figure 3.25.3). Production of copper, gold, and 
silver from the major mines edged up, but some potash mines closed.
Also slowing from 2014, agriculture expanded by an estimated 2.0% 
in 2015. Dry weather suppressed the production of rice, vegetables, and 
fish in some parts of the country, and rice output nationwide rose by less 
than 1%. Exports of forestry products fell by over 20%. 
Government spending has been constrained over the past 2 years 
by the need to curb the fiscal deficit and repay arrears. Because the 
fiscal gap, including grants but excluding o-budget items, widened 
sharply to equal 5.6% of GDP in FY2013 (ended 30 September 2013), 
the government has since postponed some infrastructure investment, 
curbed o-budget spending, and cancelled a hike in civil service wages 
and allowances. These measures started to rein in the deficit in FY2014. 
However, as lower commodity prices weighed on revenue in FY2015, 
the fiscal gap widened to an estimated 4.7% of GDP. 
3.25.1 Supply-side contributions to growth
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At about 16% over the past 2 years, credit growth has decelerated 
from almost 36% in 2013, and the central bank has phased down its 
direct lending for public infrastructure (Figure 3.25.4). Growth in 
the money supply has also slowed. To stimulate lending to small and 
medium-sized enterprises, the central bank directed commercial banks 
to lower interest rates eective from August last year. The Lao kip 
depreciated by 0.7% against the US dollar over 2015 but appreciated by 
8.3% against the Thai baht.
Lower global fuel and food prices brought down inflation from 2.5% 
at the start of 2015 to 0.9% by December (Figure 3.25.5). Slower credit 
growth and firmer control over fiscal spending have helped to dampen 
inflation over the past 2 years. In 2015, the average inflation rate was, at 
1.3%, the lowest since 2009.  
Merchandise exports, mainly electricity and minerals, fell by an 
estimated 7.1% in US dollar terms in 2015. Imports also fell in US dollar 
terms, by an estimated 5.8%, due to lower oil and commodity prices 
and more subdued domestic demand. The trade deficit improved by an 
estimated 3% to $3.1 billion, and the current account deficit narrowed to 
equal 20.3% of GDP. Inflows of foreign direct investment and earnings 
from tourism contributed to an increase in gross international reserves 
to an estimated $986.8 million in December 2015, which covers less than 
2 months of goods and services imports. 
Expenditure and consumption surveys show that the poverty rate fell 
from 33.5% in 2003 to 23.2% in 2013, the latest available data. After gross 
national income per capita surpassed $1,000 in 2011, the World Bank 
reclassified the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) as lower-
middle income. The government aims to meet income, quality of life, and 
economic vulnerability criteria by 2020 for eligibility to graduate from 
United Nations status as a least-developed country.
Economic prospects
Electricity production is expected to maintain growth as more new 
hydropower plants come online this year and the 1.9 gigawatt Hongsa 
lignite-fired plant makes a full-year contribution to GDP. 
Growth in construction will be underpinned by work on additional 
hydropower plants, including the 1.3 gigawatt Xayaburi project 
scheduled for commissioning in 2019, as well as by new commercial, 
industrial, and residential developments. Robust expansion is projected 
for services, driven by growth in tourism and development in finance 
and telecommunications. Agriculture is projected to pick up in 2016, 
assuming better weather. However, mining is likely to be subdued in 
light of soft global demand and prices for minerals.  
The impact of slowing growth in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) on Lao PDR trade and investment is countered in part by gradual 
recovery forecast for Thailand—which will lift Lao PDR exports, tourism, 
and remittances—and by robust growth in Viet Nam. GDP growth could 
get a lift from next year if a planned $6.8 billion railway to link Vientiane 
with Yunnan Province in the PRC goes ahead. This project, to be built 
and largely funded by the PRC, would stimulate other investment from 
that source. It would also add to Lao PDR external debt. 
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The government has committed to restrain growth in administrative 
spending, including civil service salaries. It will continue to repay 
arrears and has budgeted for additional expenditure related to a series 
of meetings to be hosted by the Lao PDR as the chair of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations in 2016. To address shortfalls in revenue, the 
government has stepped up eorts to strengthen tax collection, and it 
raised excise tax rates on vehicles and luxury goods from October 2015. 
Still, the fiscal deficit is expected to widen to 5.0% of GDP in FY2016 
before narrowing in FY2017. 
Taking these factors into account, GDP growth is forecast to pick up 
to 6.8% this year and 7.0% in 2017. 
Lower oil prices and stable food prices forecast globally in 2016 will 
keep inflation subdued. The consumer price index rose by 1.1% year 
on year in the first 2 months of 2016. Inflation is forecast to quicken in 
the months ahead to average 1.8% in 2016 and edge higher in 2017 if oil 
prices turn up as projected (Figure 3.25.6).  
Meanwhile, lower oil prices will help to sustain downward pressure 
on merchandise imports this year, though exports are seen edging 
up mainly on increased sales of electricity to Thailand. The current 
account deficit is forecast to narrow in 2016 but widen again in 2017 if 
the planned railway project is at a stage that requires sizable imports of 
materials and equipment (Figure 3.25.7).
Policy challenge—strengthening the 
external position
Measures to curtail the fiscal deficit and curb rapid growth in credit 
have succeeded, with substantial help from the drop in global oil prices, 
in lowering inflation and narrowing the external deficit. Nevertheless, 
the external position remains fragile. International reserves that cover 
less than 2 months of imports of goods and services provide only a thin 
buer against external shocks. 
Further, rising external debt has increased the risk of external 
debt distress, according to a 2014 debt-sustainability analysis by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The analysis 
estimated total public and private external debt at the equivalent of 
85% of GDP in 2013, projected to rise to 90%. Most of the external debt 
was long term. About half was public and publicly guaranteed debt, 
much of it on concessional terms. 
Sustained fiscal and monetary discipline should go some way toward 
addressing external vulnerabilities. Higher and more diverse exports 
could make an important contribution but would require an improved 
domestic business environment to spur production, as well as greater 
exchange rate flexibility. Kip appreciation in real eective terms has 
hurt exports and stimulated imports, worsening the external deficit.
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Malaysia
A broad economic slowdown last year is expected to continue through 2016 before growth 
starts to pick up in 2017. Inflation is forecast to rise after moderating in 2015. The current 
account surplus is seen narrowing further this year. Significant progress has been made toward 
strengthening the fiscal position, but achieving a balanced budget by 2020 may require further 
action on both revenue and expenditure. 
Economic performance 
Though facing weaker global demand for exports and steep price 
declines for oil and other commodities, the economy grew by 5.0% 
in 2015 against average growth of 5.4% over the 4 previous years 
(Figure 3.26.1). Compared with 2014, GDP growth decelerated by 1.0 
percentage point, with slowdowns in consumption and fixed investment 
and a decline in net exports.
Private consumption moderated last year, after several years 
of rapid expansion, to record growth at 6.0%, still robust enough 
to generate 3.1 percentage points of the growth in GDP. Household 
spending was dampened by the introduction of a goods and services 
tax (GST) in April 2015 together with softening in the labor market as 
the unemployment rate edged up from 2.9% to 3.2% in 2015, as well as 
by slowing growth in credit to households. 
Growth in government consumption spending eased to 4.3%, and 
government fixed investment fell for a second year in a row, reflecting 
the completion of some large public projects and eorts to narrow 
the fiscal deficit. Private fixed investment decelerated, partly on the 
weak outlook for exports, but it still grew by 6.4%. Fixed investment 
overall rose by 3.7% in 2015, maintaining a slowing trend since 2012 
(Figure 3.26.2). A rise in inventories contributed to GDP growth last 
year, but net external demand subtracted from growth as imports of 
goods and services rose in real terms by 1.3%, faster than the 0.7% 
real increase in exports of goods and services. 
By sector, growth in services eased to 5.1% from 6.5% in 2014 
as government services, finance, insurance, and retailing slowed, 
the last area dampened by the GST. Transport and communications 
maintained robust growth on demand for data communication services. 
The service sector generated more than half of GDP growth. 
Vigorous 8.2% expansion of construction came from residential 
and civil engineering projects. Mining output rose by 4.7% on higher 
hydrocarbon production, but growth in manufacturing slowed to 4.9% 
as both domestic and external demand slackened. Industry as a whole 
3.26.1  Demand-side contributions to growth
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grew by 5.2% in 2015, marginally faster than services but decelerating 
from 2014. Agriculture output increased by only 1.0%, held down by 
floods and haze. 
After decelerating sharply in the first quarter of 2015 in line with 
lower oil prices, inflation picked up as the GST took eect and bad 
weather pushed up food prices (Figure 3.26.3). Depreciation of the 
Malaysian ringgit added to inflationary pressures. Nonetheless, inflation 
slowed on a year-average basis to 2.1% in 2015 from 3.1% the previous 
year, when the government cut fuel subsidies.
The government, committed to reining in its fiscal deficit, reduced 
public expenditure by 0.7% last year. Subsidy reductions and the new 
GST from April helped to shield the 2015 budget from steep falls 
in revenue from hydrocarbons, but total revenue still fell by 0.7%. 
The budget deficit continued to shrink gradually, narrowing to 3.2% 
of GDP (Figure 3.26.4). 
The central bank kept its policy interest rate at 3.25% through 
2015. Concerns over ringgit depreciation and capital outflows inhibited 
monetary easing. The rate of increase in broad money (M3) slowed to 
2.7% by year-end. Growth in credit also decelerated, to 7.7% for credit to 
households and to 8.0% for businesses. 
Malaysia recorded lower trade and current account surpluses last 
year. Merchandise exports fell by 15.5% in US dollar terms on declines 
in resource-based manufactures such as refined petroleum and natural 
rubber products, and in commodities, largely the result of lower prices 
for oil, liquefied natural gas, and some agricultural commodities. 
Merchandise imports fell by 14.7% in US dollar terms. Imports of 
intermediate and capital goods fell, reflecting weaker export demand 
and investment, while imports of consumer goods remained buoyant. 
The merchandise trade surplus fell by 19.5% to $27.9 billion. 
Trade in services posted a wider deficit, partly from a decline in 
tourist arrivals, but the income deficit narrowed. The outcome was 
a 40% decline in the current account surplus to $8.7 billion, equal to 
2.9% of GDP. Net outflows on the capital and financial accounts, taking 
into consideration large positive errors and omissions last year, totaled 
$7.7 billion, compared with larger outflows of $25.6 billion in 2014. 
Portfolio investment recorded net outflows of $7.2 billion, down by 39%, 
and for the first time since 2006 net direct investment turned slightly 
positive, taking into account reduced investment abroad by Malaysians. 
The balance of payments recorded a small surplus (Figure 3.26.5). 
Gross international reserves fell by 18% to $95.3 billion, sucient to 
cover 7.6 months of retained imports of goods. Lower reserves reflected 
central bank eorts to support the ringgit, which came under downward 
pressure in 2015 from falling oil prices and volatile global capital flows. 
Investor concerns about the finances of the government-owned 
investment company 1Malaysia Development added to pressure on the 
ringgit, which depreciated by 19% against the US dollar last year after 
6% depreciation in 2014.
External debt fell to $194.3 billion but, as a ratio to GDP, rose to 72.1% 
from 67.5% owing to foreign exchange valuation eects. About 58% of 
the external debt was medium and long term and 36% was denominated 
in ringgit. Foreign investors pared holdings of government and corporate 
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debt securities as global oil prices weakened and expectations mounted 
that US interest rates would start to move higher. 
The government unveiled in May 2015 its Eleventh Malaysia Plan, 
2016–2020, which targets average annual GDP growth of 5.0%–6.0%. 
Average growth during the previous plan period, 2011–2015, was 5.3%. 
Inflation for the new 5-year plan period is targeted at below 3.0%. 
The goal of the plan is to raise gross national income per capita from 
$10,200 in 2015 to $15,690 in 2020, lifting Malaysia into the ranks of 
high-income nations.
Economic prospects 
Economic growth is projected to moderate further in 2016 to 4.2% 
before it starts to recover next year (Figure 3.26.6). External demand 
will remain subdued in 2016 as growth slows in the People’s Republic 
of China, Malaysia’s second biggest export market, and economic activity 
stays sluggish in major industrial economies. Domestic demand will 
drive growth, but it is dampened this year by softer labor and property 
markets, lower earnings from hydrocarbons and other commodities, 
higher inflation, high household debt, slower growth in credit, and 
fiscal tightening.
These factors will weigh on private consumption, which is projected 
to grow at a slower pace than in 2015. The government has taken 
steps to cushion the slowdown in household spending. To bolster 
incomes it reduced mandatory employee contributions to the national 
retirement fund from March 2016, trimmed some personal tax rates 
from January 2016, and maintained a range of cash transfers. Further, 
the government increased the number of items exempted from the GST. 
The national minimum wage will rise from July 2016. Nevertheless, 
consumer confidence was low at the start of 2016 (Figure 3.26.7).
Slowing domestic demand and lackluster global prospects have 
taken their toll on business sentiment. The business conditions index 
declined through last year, though it steadied in the fourth quarter 
(Figure 3.26.7). The manufacturing purchasing managers’ index shows 
little sign of sustained recovery after falling last year (Figure 3.26.8). 
In February 2016, manufacturers indicated renewed deterioration in 
operating conditions, led by a fall in new domestic orders. Moreover, 
the government’s leading economic indicator pointed in January 2016 to 
slowing economic growth in the months ahead. 
On the bright side, semiconductor book-to-bill ratios in 
North America and Japan are trending up, which suggests improving 
demand for electronic and electrical products (Figure 3.26.9).
Infrastructure projects under the Eleventh Malaysia Plan will 
support growth in fixed investment. Government-linked companies, 
particularly those in transportation and utilities, are expected to make 
substantial investments in the next 2 years. The government committed 
to push ahead with major infrastructure projects including mass rapid 
transit and light railway systems. However, prospects are bleak for 
investment in oil and gas exploration and production, considering the 
plunge in hydrocarbon prices. The state oil company Petronas reported 
that it will cut $11.4 billion in capital and operating expenditure over the 
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3.26.9  Semiconductor book-to-bill ratios
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next 4 years. A fall in manufacturing capacity utilization last year from 
79.8% to 75.0% indicates slack capacity overall in manufacturing, though 
investment is continuing to expand in oil refining and petrochemicals 
and is expected to pick up in electronic and electrical products. 
Fiscal policy intends to further narrow the budget deficit in 2016 to 
3.1% of GDP. Falling oil prices prompted the government in January 2016 
to revise down its revenue expectations and reduce budgeted operating 
and development expenditures. 
As for monetary policy, the central bank lowered in January 2016 its 
reserve requirement for banks to support economic growth. In March, 
it reiterated that the policy interest rate at 3.25% supports economic 
activity, suggesting the rate may remain there for some time. 
Inflation is seen rising to average 2.7% in 2016 (Figure 3.26.10). 
Lower energy prices are expected to be oset by increases in prices of 
administered goods, higher road tolls, and higher prices for imports 
from ringgit depreciation. Dry weather from El Niño is expected to lift 
food prices. Inflation jumped to 4.2% in February 2016, largely on a 
temporary base eect caused by sharply lower inflation in the first few 
months of 2015. From April, the impact of the GST will drop out of the 
year-on-year inflation rate. 
The outlook for exports this year remains weak. External demand is 
subdued and prices for export commodities remain low (Figure 3.26.11). 
In January 2016, customs-recorded exports fell by almost 20% in 
US dollar terms. Exports of mineral fuels and lubricants dropped by 
48%, and shipments of manufactured goods fell by 21%, including an 
11% fall in electronic and electrical products. The export performance 
is seen improving in 2017, assuming firmer global demand and help 
from the more competitive ringgit exchange rate. Prices for export 
commodities, too, are expected to rise next year. 
Merchandise imports continued to decline in January but are 
expected to rise over this year, with the pace quickening in 2017 if 
investment picks up. Inbound tourism is likely to get a lift from relaxed 
visa requirements starting in February 2016 for tourists from the 
People’s Republic of China. The current account surplus is forecast to 
decline this year before rising in 2017 (Figure 3.26.12). 
Domestic and external uncertainties pose risks to the outlook, 
notably disappointing demand for exports and renewed weakness in 
oil and commodity prices. However, the economy’s resilience under 
such developments is supported by its increasingly diversified economic 
structure (services and manufacturing now account for 75% of GDP), 
adequate international reserves, a flexible exchange rate, well-developed 
capital markets, and steps taken to bolster the budget.
Policy challenge—strengthening the fiscal position
Malaysia’s budget has depended heavily on income from oil and gas, 
leaving it vulnerable to sharp declines in global prices for hydrocarbons. 
Until recently, oil and gas revenue accounted for about a third of total 
budget revenue. In the past 2 years, the government has taken two 
important steps to strengthen the fiscal position: It introduced the GST 
to broaden the tax base and cut subsidies, particularly on fuel, to free up 
budget resources for more productive purposes. 
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Fuel subsidies were cut from RM21 billion, or 10% of total operating 
expenditure, in 2014 to RM2 billion, or 1%, in 2015. This saving oset a 
significant drop in revenue caused by lower oil and gas prices. The GST, 
introduced at a relatively low rate of 6% in April 2015, replaced sales 
and services taxes that raised the equivalent of 1.6% of GDP in 2014. 
The GST yielded about 3% of GDP in 2015. Nevertheless, the non-oil 
fiscal deficit in 2015 was still substantial at 7.0% of GDP, as the gain from 
the GST was oset by higher development expenditure (Figure 3.26.13). 
The GST should improve the non-oil fiscal balance starting in 2016, 
though the near-term gains may be limited given the more subdued 
domestic demand. The government plans to make the GST more 
eective by lowering the registration threshold to broaden the tax base. 
Meanwhile, however, it also has foregone revenue by extending the 
number of items that are excluded from GST. 
The 2016 budget includes other revenue-raising measures: 
The excise tax on tobacco was raised by 40% in November 2015, and 
personal income tax rates for high-income earners were increased 
from January 2016. The government’s aim of a balanced budget 
by 2020 may require further action on both revenue and expenditure. 
Among other possibilities, higher revenue could come from improving 
the administration of personal and corporate income tax, raising the 
GST rate, or reducing tax exemptions. 
The expenditure side would benefit from further reductions and 
improved targeting of subsidies, which include subsidies on cooking oil, 
assistance for education expenses, and cash transfers. These and other 
subsidies still absorb 10% of budget operating expenditure. For example, 
the BR1M cash transfer program for needy families could be targeted 
more tightly. In March 2016, 7.1 million people, or almost a quarter of 
the population, were approved to receive the cash transfer for this year, 
which is expected to cost RM5.9 billion. 
Myanmar
Despite severe flooding, the economy continued to perform well in the closing fiscal year. Growth 
is forecast to accelerate during 2016 on recovery in agriculture and increases in foreign direct 
investment. Among the near-term challenges facing the incoming government are high inflation 
and wide fiscal and external deficits. Upgrading the transport system is one of many longer-term 
challenges.
Economic performance 
Economic growth eased to an estimated 7.2% in FY2015 (ending 31 March 
2016) owing to severe floods and landslides that damaged agriculture, 
as well as to slower growth in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that 
hit trade and investment. 
In July–August 2015, a cyclone and intense monsoonal rains caused 
widespread flooding and landslides that displaced more than 1.6 million 
people, killed 132, and devastated one-fifth of all cultivated land. 
The economic cost was estimated at $1.5 billion, equal to 3% of GDP. 
It was a disaster for agriculture, which contributes almost 30% of GDP 
and more than 60% of employment. International partners joined the 
reconstruction and rehabilitation eorts.
Construction, manufacturing, and services nevertheless continued 
to expand, and the government pushed ahead with structural reform to 
raise investment in social and physical infrastructure and improve the 
business climate. Growth in services was spurred by further increases 
in tourist arrivals to 4.7 million in 2015, about 70% entering overland 
(Figure 3.27.1). Spending by tourists rose by 19% to $2.1 billion in 2015.
Garment manufacturing maintained solid growth with new foreign-
owned garment factories in Pathein, Bago, and Thilawa. Exports of 
garments rose by 28% to an estimated $2 billion. Exports of natural gas 
in volume terms increased by an estimated 2.9%, a much slower pace 
than in the previous year, and the value of gas exports likely fell by 
about 18% to $3.5 billion.
In a sign that business confidence remained robust despite the floods 
and political uncertainty ahead of national elections in November 2015, 
the number of business registrations in the first 9 months of FY2015 was, 
at 4,825, comparable to that in the same period of FY2014 (Figure 3.27.2). 
Approvals of foreign direct investment (FDI) totaled $4.9 billion from 
April to December 2015, down by 26% from the same period a year 
earlier. Most of the FDI was channeled into telecommunications, oil and 
gas, and manufacturing, primarily garments. None went into agriculture. 
FDI disbursements in FY2015 likely eased as well.
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Hikes in food prices after the floods and depreciation of 
the Myanmar kyat propelled inflation to 16.2% in October 2015 
(Figure 3.27.3). For FY2015 the average inflation rate was estimated 
at 11.0%. A widening current account deficit contributed to the kyat 
depreciating by 26% against a firming US dollar from April 2014 to 
January 2016. Rapid growth in credit to the private sector, estimated 
at 45% year on year, and 17.9% growth in the monetary base added to 
inflationary pressures. 
Higher government spending during the election year widened the 
consolidated fiscal deficit to an estimated 4.8% of GDP in FY2015 from 
2.9% in FY2014. Treasury bill auctions introduced in January 2015 
broadened options for funding the deficit, but the auctions have yet to 
raise the amounts targeted. When fully implemented, the auction system 
should end the inflationary practice of monetizing the deficit through 
the sale of government debt to the central bank. 
The government is also addressing the fiscal gap through tax reform 
that aims to raise the ratio of tax to GDP from its current low level of 
about 8%. A new tax law approved by Parliament is the centerpiece of 
wider reform that covers income tax, commercial tax, and stamp duty, 
among other levies. 
Merchandise exports increased only marginally in FY2015 owing to 
softer demand for gems and minerals from the PRC, lower gas prices, 
and a fall in rice exports after the floods. Imports decelerated from the 
previous year but still grew at a double-digit rate as vigorous economic 
growth spurred demand for consumer and capital goods (Figure 3.27.4). 
Consequently, the trade deficit jumped by almost half, and the current 
account deficit widened to an estimated 8.9% of GDP. O¥cial reserves 
are estimated at 2.5 months of imports, down from 2.8 months in 
FY2014. Declining foreign reserves likely prompted the central bank’s 
move in mid-2015 to intensify measures to curb the use of US dollars. 
External debt increased to an estimated $9.7 billion, equal to 14.7% 
of GDP. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have 
assessed Myanmar as being at low risk of debt distress. Public debt 
management, both external and domestic, has been strengthened 
through a new public debt law ratified by Parliament in early 2016 
and a recently established debt management o¥ce. The government is 
encouraged to pursue further structural reform to broaden the base of 
economic growth and expand its finances.
Economic prospects 
GDP growth is forecast to recover to 8.4% in FY2016 and record a 
similar pace in FY2017 (Figure 3.27.5). The impact of the floods on 
agriculture will fade during this year. FDI is expected to get a lift from 
the successful completion of national elections. Additional FDI is seen 
flowing into newly established special economic zones and the rapidly 
expanding transport and energy industries. 
Government policy makers taking o¥ce in April 2016 have 
committed to continuing reform, which is necessary if Myanmar is to 
achieve its long-term growth potential, estimated at 8.0% annually. 
The new administration is expected to press for more transparency and 
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deregulation, less red tape, improved education and training, and more 
eective and e¥cient government services. Its focus is likely to be on 
creating jobs largely by stimulating economic growth, in particular for 
the 70% of the population living in rural areas.
Cross-border economic integration will be an important driver of 
growth. Factors dampening the outlook—moderating growth in the PRC 
and weak global prices for gas and commodities—are partly oset by 
improving economic prospects in neighboring India and Thailand.
On the fiscal front, the FY2016 budget passed by Parliament 
in February 2016 calls for a modest reduction in the fiscal deficit. 
Revenue and expenditure are expected to fall in FY2016. The government 
has laid out an ambitious fiscal plan to, among other things, raise tax 
revenue, make spending more e¥cient, and restructure state economic 
enterprises.
Inflation will moderate as agricultural recovery from the floods 
brings down food prices, but it is still projected to remain high at 9.5% 
in FY2016 and 8.5% in FY2017 (Figure 3.27.6).
To manage rapid growth in credit, the central bank is preparing to 
strengthen bank supervision and prudential controls and to improve 
the functioning of the interbank money market to provide benchmarks 
for short-term lending rates. More reforms for finance and business are 
expected in 2016 (Box 3.27.1). Maintaining exchange rate flexibility will 
be crucial, as measures to resist depreciation have so far been largely 
counterproductive and a drain on reserves. The incoming government 
has indicated it will strengthen the autonomy of the central bank and 
develop stronger monetary policy tools.
The current account deficit is seen narrowing to 8.3% of GDP 
in FY2016 (Figure 3.27.7). Stronger economic growth will drive up 
imports, but this will be countered somewhat by lower prices for 
imported oil. Exports of agricultural products will rebound, and those 
of manufactured products will continue to grow, but gas export prices 
remain under downward pressure. Vulnerabilities in the fiscal and 
external accounts call for stronger eorts to build up o¥cial reserves to 
more comfortable levels.
External debt is projected to rise to $11.2 billion in FY2016, equal to 
15.7% of GDP. Myanmar’s risk of debt distress is expected to remain low, 
however, as most debt is on concessional terms and the government has 
been cutting back on commercial borrowing. 
Despite significant economic reform since 2011, the new government 
faces daunting challenges. One is to maintain stability on the 
macroeconomic front and in regions aected by conflict. Another is to 
address deficits in infrastructure and in human resources and capacity 
that constrain social and economic development. A third challenge is 
to maintain and advance progress on reform to improve governance 
and strengthen public sector management, private sector development, 
and regional cooperation and integration. Combating poverty and 
child malnutrition remain high priorities, and anecdotal evidence 
suggests that income inequality is worsening. The economy is narrowly 
based, with growth depending on natural resource exports, construction, 
and tourism.
3.27.1  Reforms for finance 
and business
In January 2016, Parliament passed 
the amended Banks and Financial 
Institutions Law, which lays the 
foundations for more e¥cient 
licensing of financial institutions, 
a modern financial sector, and its 
enhanced supervision. The law sets 
guidelines for domestic and foreign 
banks, including more stringent 
rules on paid-up capital and reserve 
requirements. Four foreign banks 
received licenses in March 2016, 
adding to the nine that were licensed 
in 2014. 
An important reform for the 
business environment will be the 
ratification expected in 2016 of a 
new company law that incorporates 
international standards of corporate 
governance. The law will define 
a foreign company according to 
a threshold of investment from 
overseas, which will allow foreign 
equity investment in Myanmar 
companies that are not joint ventures, 
as well as enable foreign firms to 
participate in capital markets.
The new Yangon Stock Exchange 
started trading in March 2016, 
initially with one company listed. 
Five more have been approved for 
listing, and others have applied.
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Intensified eorts are needed to improve the business environment 
through legal and regulatory reforms, better access to finance, and 
targeted trade and investment promotion and facilitation.
Risks to the economic outlook come from thin external and 
fiscal buers, ethnic and sectarian tensions, unproven capacity in the 
new government to maintain reform momentum, and vulnerability to 
bad weather. El Niño is expected to bring drought to the dry zone in 
central Myanmar and unseasonable rainstorms to lower Myanmar. 
Incoming policy makers have promised to redouble eorts to improve 
economic and social data, which is badly needed to inform policy 
formulation and planning.
Policy challenge—upgrading the transport system
After decades of underinvestment, Myanmar’s transport infrastructure 
provides generally poor access to markets and services, perpetuates 
poverty and regional inequality, and hampers business development. 
The country could reduce by one-third its transport costs by upgrading 
infrastructure, according to one estimate.
Only 40% of Myanmar’s road network is paved. At least 60% of 
its trunk highways need maintenance or rehabilitation, as do most of 
its railways (Figure 3.27.8). Some 20 million people lack even basic 
access by rural road, and river transport infrastructure hardly exists. 
Demand is growing fast, with the number of vehicles on the roads 
more than doubling to 5 million from 2012 to 2015, and international 
air passengers more than doubling to 3.2 million from 2011 to 2014.
Investment estimated at $60 billion is needed through 2030 to 
upgrade transport systems to a standard in line with other countries at 
a similar stage of development. This means increasing transport sector 
investments to the equivalent of 3%–4% of GDP from little more than 1% 
in recent years.
The government’s newly developed National Transport Master 
Plan envisages an e¥cient, modern, safe, and environmentally friendly 
system that covers all modes of transport. Under the plan, investment 
is required to upgrade the trunk road and rail networks, improve links 
with neighboring countries, develop access to rural areas, provide public 
transport in urban areas, and enhance intermodal transport networks 
and logistics. 
Toward policy reform, a single transport ministry will help to 
coordinate policy, planning, investment, management, and regulation. 
Given the immense funding required, private sector resources could 
be mobilized through the restructuring of concessions to operate 
toll roads, competitive outsourcing of civil works, and corporatizing 
or privatizing of state-owned enterprises and activities that operate in 
competitive markets.
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Philippines
The economy posted solid growth last year generated by strong domestic demand, despite drag 
from net exports. Growth is projected to pick up with higher investment and consumption. Inflation 
is forecast to rise moderately as dry weather from El Niño presses upward on food prices and 
utility rates. Sustaining strong growth will require policy continuity supporting the development of 
infrastructure and human capital, improvements to the investment climate, and governance reform. 
Economic performance 
Economic growth moderated to 5.8% in 2015, a solid performance in 
the face of weak external demand and damage to agriculture inflicted 
by typhoons and drought from El Niño. Growth strengthened in the 
second half, reaching 6.3% in the fourth quarter.
Broad-based domestic demand underpinned growth last year. 
Growth in private consumption, which accounts for nearly 70% of GDP, 
accelerated to 6.2% and made the biggest contribution to overall growth 
from the demand side (Figure 3.28.1). Household spending benefitted 
from higher employment, remittance inflows from overseas workers, and 
low inflation. The unemployment rate fell from 6.6% in January 2015 to 
5.8% in January 2016, and 752,000 new jobs were created in that period. 
Remittances rose by 4.4% to $28.5 billion, equal to 9.8% of GDP. 
The increase was 5.8% in peso terms.
Government expenditure, particularly on construction, accelerated 
during the year, helped by improved budget execution. Growth in 
government consumption quickened to 9.4%, and public construction 
jumped by 20.6%. A 5.4% rise in private construction and higher 
purchases of machinery and commercial vehicles reflected robust 
private fixed investment. Total fixed investment grew by 14.0%, more 
than double the pace of 2014, and significantly contributed to GDP 
growth. The ratio of fixed investment to GDP improved to 21.7%, 
though at that pace it still lagged some other Southeast Asian economies 
(Figure 3.28.2).
Net exports exerted considerable drag on GDP growth as imports 
of goods and services rose much faster than exports in real terms. 
Exports of services, particularly business process outsourcing (BPO), 
remained buoyant, but goods exports were lackluster. 
By sector, services growth accelerated to 6.7%, which contributed 
nearly two-thirds of total growth. Trade, tourism-related services, and 
BPO were among the major contributors. Growth in manufacturing 
slowed to 5.7% on soft external demand but still generated about 
3.28.1  Demand-side contributions to growth
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one-fourth of the increase in GDP. Domestic demand supported 
manufacturing subsectors like food processing, chemicals, 
communication and transport equipment, and construction-related 
products. However, agricultural production was flat last year as 
typhoons and drought damaged crops, particularly rice and maize. 
Inflation eased to below 1.0% for several months and averaged a low 
1.4% in 2015 (Figure 3.28.3). Lower global oil and food prices dampened 
inflation, and rice imports to augment domestic supplies also helped. 
The central bank kept policy interest rates steady at 4% for overnight 
borrowing and 6% for overnight lending. Growth in broad money (M3) 
decelerated to 9.4% year on year in December 2015 from 11.2% a 
year earlier.
While the government ramped up public expenditure excluding 
interest by 15.7% in 2015, spending still fell short of the budget target. 
Revenue rose by 10.5% owing to higher tax income from tobacco and 
alcohol and more stringent tax enforcement. The budget deficit widened 
from 0.6% of GDP in 2014 to 0.9% in 2015, well below the 2.0% deficit 
ceiling in the budget. Reflecting a strengthening of the fiscal position in 
recent years, the ratio of government debt to GDP declined to 44.8% in 
2015, the lowest in over a decade (Figure 3.28.4). Foreign debt comprised 
just over one-third of the total.
In the external accounts, merchandise exports fell by 13.1% in US 
dollar terms, with declines in exports of manufactured goods, minerals, 
and fruit and vegetables. Merchandise imports declined by 3.2% in 
US dollars, largely from lower oil prices. Buoyant imports of capital and 
consumer goods underlined the strength of private consumption and 
investment.
These developments widened the trade deficit by 25.2% to 
$21.7 billion. Nevertheless, earnings from BPO and tourism, together 
with remittances, generated a current account surplus of $8.4 billion, 
equal to 2.9% of GDP (Figure 3.28.5). The balance of payments, 
tempered by outflows of portfolio investment, recorded a surplus of 
$2.6 billion. Gross international reserves totaled $81.9 billion as of 
February 2016, cover for 10.2 months of imports of goods and services 
and income payments (Figure 3.28.6). The peso depreciated by 4.7% 
against the broadly strengthening US dollar in 2015.
Economic prospects
Growth in domestic demand is expected to drive higher rates of 
economic growth this year and next. Election-related spending 
will support growth through May 2016 when national elections are 
scheduled. Net external demand will likely remain a drag on growth in 
2016, though less than in 2015, and add to growth in 2017. On balance, 
GDP is seen rising by 6.0% this year and 6.1% in 2017.
The acceleration in government spending in the second half of 2015 
is projected to continue this year. The government has maintained its 
budget deficit ceiling at 2.0% of GDP in 2016, which accommodates 
a larger deficit than that realized in 2015. Budget allocations for 
infrastructure are boosted to the equivalent of 5.0% of GDP, including 
investments in roads, agricultural infrastructure, and schools. 
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Moreover, the government has accelerated the release of budget 
allocations and enhanced bidding and procurement processes to step up 
project implementation. Spending is raised on social services including 
funding for health, education, and conditional cash transfers to poor 
households. Civil service salaries are also raised this year. 
Private consumption will be the main growth driver again this 
year. Rising employment, higher government salaries, modest inflation, 
and remittance inflows all point to robust consumer spending. 
Consumer confidence rose in the first quarter of 2016 (Figure 3.28.7). 
Nevertheless, the pace of increase in private consumption could 
moderate this year. Slower economic activity in the Middle East, where 
about one-fourth of overseas Filipinos work, has dampened growth in 
remittances (Figure 3.28.8). Still, diversity in sources provides a cushion 
as remittances flow from a broad range of countries (Figure 3.28.9). 
Buoyant imports of capital goods in 2015 and higher foreign direct 
investment in the past 2 years suggest that private investment will 
maintain solid growth. Net inflows of foreign direct investment totaled 
$5.7 billion in 2015, similar to the 2014 figure but more than double the 
annual average from 2010 to 2013 (Figure 3.28.10). Growth in credit to 
business picked up to 16.0% in January 2016. 
However, subdued global economic prospects indicate that 
merchandise exports will decline slightly this year before turning up in 
2017. Exports fell by 3.9% year on year in January 2016, moderating from 
double-digit declines in most of 2015. The outlook for major markets 
Japan (receiving 21% of total merchandise exports in 2015) and the 
People’s Republic of China (11%) is lackluster, but Philippine exports 
to the European Union (12%) are benefiting from expanded duty-free 
access granted in 2014, and exports to the US (15%) are expected to 
grow. Exports of services, mainly BPO, should perform well. Imports 
are projected to rise on growing consumption and investment, such that 
net external demand is seen weighing on GDP growth in 2016.
As inflation is projected to be within the o¤cial target range of 
2%–4%, the central bank is expected to maintain an accommodative 
monetary policy. Inflation is forecast to trend up this year to average 
2.3%, from 1.1% in the first 2 months (Figure 3.28.11). Drought from 
El Niño will likely raise food prices and utility rates, while peso 
depreciation and buoyant domestic demand will also contribute to 
inflation. The government has imported rice and expanded irrigation to 
mitigate the impact of El Niño. Next year, inflation is seen rising to 2.7%, 
assuming an upturn in global oil and commodity prices. 
On the supply side, services such as transportation and 
communications are benefitting from election-related spending. 
Strong private consumption is driving growth in wholesale and retail 
trade, and the outlook is favorable for BPO and tourism. BPO revenue 
rose from $18.9 billion in 2014 to $22.0 billion in 2015, according to 
an estimate by the BPO industry association, with employment at 
1.2 million. Tourism generated $5 billion in revenue from 5.4 million 
international tourists in 2015. The o¤cial target for 2016 is 6.0 million 
tourists. Tourism employed 5 million workers in 2015, or 12.7% of 
national employment. 
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Private construction, while moderating from the rapid pace of 
recent years, is projected to expand through the forecast period. 
Public construction, including public–private partnership (PPP) 
projects, is expected to post vigorous growth. Many of the 12 PPP 
projects awarded since 2010, involving investment of about $4 billion, 
are under construction. They include highways, railways, an airport 
terminal, and water supply facilities. Another 14 projects with total 
investment estimated at $12 billion are being prepared for bidding. 
Sustaining progress on PPPs requires the program’s continued 
development through the enactment of proposed legislation to improve 
the framework for PPP, better project appraisal and monitoring, and 
strengthened capacity in the agencies involved.
The government is putting more emphasis on manufacturing, 
illustrated by fiscal incentives for automobile production approved in 
2015 that have attracted more investment into this industry. Over the 
past 4 years, the government and industry groups have worked together 
to develop roadmaps for the expansion of several manufacturing 
subsectors, among them the automotive industry, electronics, cement, 
chemicals, furniture, and some agro-based products. Since mid-2015, 
the manufacturing production index has edged higher, and in January 
this year it rose sharply. But for agriculture, dry weather is hurting 
prospects for expansion. 
Slightly stronger GDP growth is forecast for 2017, in part on 
expectations of better economic performance in the US, the Philippines’ 
second biggest export market and a significant source of foreign direct 
investment and remittances. Net external demand is projected to add to 
GDP growth in 2017. Private investment is expected to pick up if e¦orts 
to improve the investment environment are sustained. 
The current account surplus is forecast to narrow this year. A wider 
merchandise trade deficit and slower growth in remittances are seen to 
outweigh a lower oil import bill and higher income from services exports.
Risks to the forecasts come from the impact on agriculture and food 
prices if El Niño is more severe than anticipated, and from weaker-
than-expected economic performances in major trading partners. 
Potential risks from global financial market volatility are cushioned 
by the country’s economic fundamentals: a surplus in the current 
account, high international reserves, low inflation, and an improved 
fiscal position. External debt as a share of GDP, at 26.5% in 2015, has 
been trending smaller since 2003. The economic outlook is subject to 
more uncertainty than usual as the outcome of the national elections 
will have an important bearing on policy. Sustaining the strong growth 
performance will require policy continuity in key areas, including the 
development of infrastructure and human capital, improvements to the 
investment climate, and governance reform. 
Policy challenge—tackling youth unemployment 
After some years of what was characterized as “jobless growth,” a 
pickup in economic growth to 6.2% on average since 2010 has lifted 
the pace of job creation. The unemployment rate at 5.8% in January 
2016 is historically low. The unemployment rate of young people aged 
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15–24 years is higher at 14.4%, though this too has fallen since 2010 
(Figure 3.28.12). The rate of underemployment also remains high at 
19.7%. In large part reflecting the lack of good jobs, poverty remained 
elevated at 26.3% of the population in the first half of 2015, though 
declining from 28.8% in 2006.
A survey found that college graduates took about a year to find 
work, and high school graduates took up to 3 years. Many drift into 
informal work, often part time and poorly paid, or remain unemployed. 
One in four young people is neither working nor pursuing education or 
training.
The Philippines has a relatively young population, as half of all 
Filipinos last year were younger than 25 years, and the median age was 
estimated at 23. This o¦ers an opportunity to raise potential growth, 
but the demographic dividend can be realized only if young people are 
employed in productive jobs. 
A number of factors keep youth unemployment high. On the 
demand-side, the number of jobs generated each year falls short of 
what is needed to both absorb new entrants into the labor force and 
the 2.5 million unemployed, half of them young people. Almost 80% of 
new jobs in the past 6 years have been generated by the service sector, 
particularly BPO, tourism, and retail trade. Industry contributed about 
20% of the new jobs, while employment in agriculture fell in most years 
(Figure 3.28.13). Stronger employment generation will require more 
broad-based growth driven by productivity gains across all sectors. 
Mismatches between the education and skills young people acquire 
and the needs of the labor market are a constraint. Improving the 
relevance and quality of technical and vocational training programs 
and strengthening certification frameworks will help overcome such 
mismatches. More programs are needed to provide employment 
services, such as career guidance and coaching for young people when 
they leave school. 
Following a successful pilot, the government is rolling out nationally 
the JobStart Philippines program, which aims to provide a full range of 
employment services to help students who have at least completed high 
school become job ready and find decent employment. These services 
include life skills and technical training, career guidance, and on-the-job 
training or internship. Other measures cover improving the quality of 
labor market databases to reduce job search costs and enable students 
and job seekers to make more informed decisions. 
The e¦ective implementation of these initiatives will require 
strengthening the capacity of local government employment o¤ces and 
boosting their budget resources. Improving policies on the national 
apprenticeship program, temporary work agencies, and labor dispute 
resolution will also be needed to help young people gain longer-term 
and better paying jobs, rather than temporary ones.
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Singapore
Economic growth slowed in 2015, prices declined, and the current account improved. Growth 
is seen unchanged in 2016, and prices will be lower, but an uptick in both is forecast for 2017. 
The  external surplus is expected to narrow in 2016 and widen next year. An important policy 
challenge is to rein in high household debt, as mortgage interest rates and falling property values 
could impinge on financial stability. 
Economic performance 
GDP growth slowed to 2.0% in 2015, the weakest growth rate since 
the global financial crisis in 2008. The main driver of growth was 
services, contributing 2.6 percentage points. Services expanded by 
3.5% on strong performances in wholesale and retail trade and in 
finance and insurance. Sluggish private construction moderated 
growth in the sector to 2.5%, reducing its contribution to growth to 
0.1 percentage points. Manufacturing, the biggest sector, has contracted 
for 5 consecutive quarters, pulling down GDP growth by 1.0 percentage 
point (Figure 3.29.1). Manufacturing output fell by 5.2%, mainly because 
of a slowdown in rig building and weaker demand for oil and gas 
equipment. 
On the demand side, total consumption expenditure grew by 4.9% 
to contribute 2.1 percentage points to growth, driven primarily by 
private consumption expenditure on transport, goods and services, 
housing, and utilities (Figure 3.29.2). Exports of goods and services 
grew by 2.5% and imports by 2.1%, both lower than in 2014. Net exports 
therefore increased by 4.6%, contributing 1.3 percentage points to 
growth. However, investment declined by 6.2%—largely from decreases 
in private construction, intellectual property products, and machinery 
and equipment—to subtract 1.7 percentage points from growth. 
Consumer prices fell by 0.5% on average in 2015 as rents declined 
and transport costs dropped in line with lower oil prices (Figure 3.29.3). 
Core inflation, which excludes accommodation and private road 
transport, remained subdued at 0.5% year on year.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) continued to manage 
monetary policy by adjusting the Singapore dollar’s nominal eective 
exchange rate within an undisclosed trading band. In response to 
expected further decline in consumer price index, the MAS eased 
monetary policy in October 2015, slowing the rate at which the 
Singapore dollar can appreciate by lowering the slope of the policy band 
but without changing its width. The currency appreciated by 0.2% on 
average in 2015 by its nominal eective exchange rate, as calculated 
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by the Bank for International Settlements, but depreciated by 1.6% by 
its real eective exchange rate. In nominal terms, the Singapore dollar 
depreciated by 8.5% against the US dollar on average to reach its lowest 
value since 2010 (Figure 3.29.4). The 3-month Singapore interbank 
oered rate rose gradually from 0.5% in December 2014 to 1.2% in 
December 2015 and, following the hike in the US federal funds rate, 
to 1.3% in February 2016 (Figure 3.29.5).
Merchandise exports contracted in US dollar terms by 12.2% in 
2015 as exports of oil and goods other than electronics fell. Imports 
declined by 14.7% as oil imports shrank, widening the trade surplus 
to $78.7 billion. The current account surplus widened, to $57.6 billion, 
equal to 19.7% of GDP, despite a deficit in the services account. 
The overall balance of payments surplus narrowed to $1.1 billion, 
or 0.4% of GDP, owing to a rising deficit in the capital and financial 
accounts (Figure 3.29.6). 
The budget for FY2015 (ending 31 March 2016) projected a primary 
deficit of S$4.0 billion, or 1.0% of GDP, following an actual primary 
surplus of 1.1% of GDP in FY2014, with expenditure rising by 19.3% 
and revenue by 4.8%. During the first 3 quarters of FY2015, revenue 
increased by 5.9% and expenditure by 11.8%, including developmental 
expenditure up by 19.6%. The budgetary outcome for FY2015 is therefore 
likely to be a primary surplus. Revenues increased as the number of 
certificates of entitlement for private car purchases grew and receipts 
rose from corporate and personal income tax, as well as from customs 
and excise taxes. Expenditures on social security and pensions were 
strengthened, and incentives were oered for investing in innovation. 
Outlays for celebrating Singapore’s 50 years of independence, the 
Southeast Asia Games, and the ASEAN Para Games of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations also increased, but development expenditure in 
FY2015 is likely to be below the budgeted amount.
Economic prospects 
Growth is forecast to remain stable at 2.0% in 2016 as expansion in 
services outweighs weakness in manufacturing and construction, 
which will be held back by low external demand and higher borrowing 
costs. The fall in the manufacturing purchasing managers’ index below 
the 50 threshold in February 2016 indicates likely contraction in the 
first half of the year (Figure 3.29.7). Moreover, slower momentum in 
construction is expected as private construction contracts dropped in 
2015. In 2017, GDP growth is expected to improve to 2.2% as services 
remain resilient and manufacturing rebounds moderately. 
Consumption will drive growth in 2016 as the government 
increases spending on social welfare, health infrastructure, public 
transport, and the development of the Changi Airport and a planned 
high-speed rail link with Malaysia. Household spending will benefit 
from lower inflation and moderate wage increases but, given high 
household debt, be crimped by rising interest rates. Gross fixed 
investment will be weaker, as investment commitments reported by 
the Economic Development Board declined for most sectors in 2015 
(Figure 3.29.8).
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In January 2016, exports fell by 15.1% year on year and imports by 
13.6%, pointing to continued weakness in external demand, including for 
oil. As Singapore is one of the world’s top refiners of crude, low demand 
for petroleum products will drag down export growth. The trade 
balance is nevertheless expected to be in surplus in 2016, as imports 
will decline more than exports in US dollar terms, and net services 
will improve, despite weaker exports of energy services, with rising 
net exports of financial and tourism services. The current account 
surplus will narrow to 18.8% of GDP and widen again to 19.5% in 2017 as 
external demand recovers. 
Lower certificate of entitlement premiums, continuing declines in 
rents and property prices that began in 2014, and falling utility prices 
will dampen prices in 2016 (Figure 3.29.9). The decline in consumer 
prices is projected to reach 0.6%, which is within the range of the 
forecast by the MAS. Inflation will return at 0.4% in 2017, assuming 
oil prices rise and food and social services costs continue to increase. 
Despite deflationary expectations for 2016, the MAS is expected 
to continue to manage the nominal eective exchange rate along 
a moderately appreciating trend, but the nominal value of the 
Singapore dollar, which fell to S$1.41 to the US dollar in February 2016, 
is expected to decline further in 2016. On the fiscal front, the new 
government is expected to continue a prudent fiscal policy in view 
of the constitutional requirement that the budget be balanced over a 
government’s full term.
Downside risks to the forecast stem from the uncertain global 
economic outlook and domestic property price movements. Lower oil 
prices and a sharper growth slowdown in the People’s Republic of 
China could dampen export growth in 2016, and persistent weakness 
in the residential property market could choke investment growth. 
Further tightening of the labor market could, together with declining 
labor productivity since 2014, pose another risk to growth projections.
Policy challenge—restraining household debt
Household debt in Singapore rose from the equivalent of 65% of 
GDP in 2010 to 75% in 2015 (Figure 3.29.10). Tight macroprudential 
policies implemented by the MAS in the past few years have eectively 
dampened domestic credit growth, but household debt in Singapore 
is still among the highest in the region, at more than 220% of 
household disposable income in 2015. Twin reasons are the high rate 
of homeownership and high real estate prices. Mortgages account for 
more than 74% of household debt and are the main avenue of rising 
household debt (Figure 3.29.11). Low interest rates on mortgages 
and long maturities fueled a rapid rise in property loans, with a 
corresponding increase in locally incorporated banks’ exposure to the 
property sector. Property-related lending accounts for 28% of banking 
system loans, and many other loans are collateralized with property. 
Soaring household debt may not pose an immediate risk to economic 
activity or bank soundness, but it sows vulnerability. Borrowers may 
default if domestic income growth falters or, as 70% of mortgages 
have floating rates, global interest rates rise abruptly. This could mean 
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more nonperforming loans. According to the MAS, the number of 
borrowers who had missed payments on unsecured credit for 2 or 
more months rose by 6% in September 2015, bringing the increase 
over the previous 12 months to 18%. Systemic risk could intensify, 
as higher borrowing costs are likely to dampen the housing market 
and construction, slowing domestic growth already weakened by a 
challenging external environment. This could further crimp consumer 
spending and hurt household finances. Housing price corrections also 
pose risks, and prices have fallen by more than 8% over the past 2 years 
following the 2013 introduction by the MAS of tighter macroprudential 
policies, including a 70% limit on the ratio of loan to value for new loans. 
Continuing moderation in residential property prices has tempered 
growth in household wealth and spending. A sharp correction would 
likely hamper economic growth further, as real estate activity 
contributes substantial employment and value added. A buildup of 
macroeconomic risks and vulnerability could pose a systemic risk to 
the financial sector. Property foreclosures and personal bankruptcies 
could amplify pressures on bank balance sheets and impair the health of 
financial institutions and broader financial stability.
Risk stemming from a correction in property prices and payment 
defaults appear to be manageable because the banking system is strong. 
Nonperforming housing loans are currently only 0.4% of the loan 
portfolio and are adequately provisioned. Further, banks meet their 
minimum regulatory capital adequacy ratio of 10%, and the overall loan-
to-value ratio was less than 50% in 2014, with just 5% of outstanding 
housing loans showing a ratio of above 80%. A financial stability review 
in 2015 therefore stated that only a huge fall in real estate prices could 
pose widespread debt-servicing problems. However, the adequacy of 
the existing substantial buer against mortgage risk depends on how 
rapidly loan rates increase, house prices falter, or economic growth 
slackens. Policy makers should be vigilant of mounting vulnerability 
because domestic banks are exposed to the property sector to the tune 
of at least 46% of their loan portfolio. Continuous monitoring of bank 
activities and risks are essential to detect bank fragility, and preemptive 
macroprudential policies are needed to avert financial instability.
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Thailand
Government spending revived economic growth in 2015, while private sector activity and exports 
lagged. Growth is seen picking up this year and next if planned infrastructure investment proceeds 
as scheduled. Lower farm incomes from drought and weak agricultural prices are weighing on 
private consumption. Consumer prices, having declined last year, are forecast to nudge up. 
Falling  imports are leaving sizable trade and current account surpluses while exports remain weak.
Economic performance 
Higher government spending, particularly on capital works, drove 
economic growth in 2015, assisted by a modest pickup in private 
consumption. GDP rose by 2.8%, compared with just 0.8% in 2014, 
when political unrest and a military coup disrupted the economy 
(Figure 3.30.1).
Public fixed investment rebounded by 29.8% from contraction in 
2014 as the government accelerated budget disbursements for water-
management, road, and community projects (Figure 3.30.2). State-
owned enterprises also boosted spending on construction projects after 
public investment slumped in 2014 because of political disruptions and 
legal challenges. Government consumption spending rose by 2.2% in 
2015, a pace similar to that of the 2 previous years.
In contrast with the rebound in public sector investment, fixed 
investment by the private sector fell by 2.0% in 2015 owing to lackluster 
prospects for exports, subdued private sector demand, and slack 
industrial capacity. The end of the year brought signs of improved 
private investment, mainly in buildings. 
Private consumption picked up from 2014 to grow by a modest 
2.1% last year. A major reason for tepid spending was contraction 
in agriculture caused by drought and low commodity prices, which 
cut farm incomes by 11.0% and reduced total employment by 0.2%. 
Another dampening factor was high household debt, equal to 81% of 
GDP. Consumer confidence sagged through the first 3 quarters before 
turning up at the end of 2015. The government launched two stimulus 
packages in the second half of 2015 to spur consumption. The first aimed 
to lift incomes and spending in rural areas through funding for village 
and community projects. The second provided tax rebates on consumer 
spending in the last week of 2015. Tax breaks for home purchase were 
also oered last year. 
Net external demand contributed to GDP growth in 2015, 
largely because imports of goods and services declined in real terms 
for a second year in a row, reflecting subdued domestic demand. 
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Exports of goods and services rose slightly in real terms as higher 
earnings from tourism more than oset a slide in merchandise exports.
From the supply side, GDP growth was driven by 5.0% expansion in 
services. Much of the growth in services stemmed from a 20.4% leap in 
tourist arrivals, a recovery from 2014 when street protests and military 
intervention hurt tourism (Figure 3.30.3). In particular, arrivals from the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) jumped last year. Solid expansion was 
recorded in tourism-related services including hotels, restaurants, and 
retail trade, as well as in finance and transport and communications.
Construction rebounded by 15.8% in 2015 as the government ramped 
up spending on capital works. Weak domestic and external demand 
held manufacturing growth to only 0.9%, which still improved on 2014. 
Car manufacturing and food processing performed relatively well, and 
electronics started to improve. Industry as a whole recorded growth 
at 2.2%.
Agriculture including fisheries had a particularly bad year, the 
sector shrinking by 4.2% because of drought and low prices for farm 
commodities. Rice and palm oil production fell, but shrimp culture 
recovered after a fall in 2014. Thailand’s capture fishing industry was 
disrupted by a crackdown on foreign boats working Indonesian waters 
and by the threat of a ban on seafood exports to the important 
European Union market unless it tackled illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated fishing. 
Economic growth did get support from fiscal and monetary policies. 
The government improved its budget disbursement rate to 94% in 
FY2015 (ended 30 September 2015) from 89% in FY2014, though still 
short of the 97% target. The fiscal outcome was a deficit equal to 2.5% 
of GDP. The central bank, confronted with an unexpectedly sluggish 
economy and declining consumer prices, lowered its policy rate in 
March 2015, and again in April, to 1.5%. Commercial banks reduced 
lending rates, and growth in credit to the private sector from deposit-
taking institutions picked up to increase by 5.6%. Lending to small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) jumped in the last quarter when the 
government oered them low-interest loans and loan guarantees. 
The consumer price index slipped by 0.9% in 2015 on lower prices 
for fuel and food, along with lackluster domestic demand (Figure 3.30.4). 
Core inflation remained positive, this measure of consumer prices that 
excludes fresh food and energy rising by 1.1%. 
Thailand recorded large trade and current account surpluses, 
largely because imports slumped. Merchandise exports and imports 
have declined in US dollar terms for 3 consecutive years (Figure 3.30.5). 
In 2015, merchandise exports fell by 5.6% to $212.1 billion, with steep 
falls in agricultural and fishery products, as well as in oil and chemical 
products, but higher shipments of passenger cars. Exports declined to 
the PRC, Japan, and the larger economies in Southeast Asia but rose 
to the group of neighboring countries: Cambodia, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Myanmar, and Viet Nam. 
Merchandise imports dived by 11.3% to $177.5 billion, reflecting slack 
domestic demand and lower prices for imported oil and commodities. 
As a result, the trade surplus jumped by 40.7% to $34.6 billion. 
Trade in services was also in surplus, by $9.9 billion, contributing to 
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a large current account surplus of $34.8 billion, equal to 8.8% of GDP. 
By contrast, capital and financial accounts registered a deficit of 
$19.0 billion, mainly from outflows of portfolio investment and Thai 
foreign investment abroad. Outward foreign direct investment doubled in 
2015 from 2014, as foreign direct investment into Thailand rose by 29%. 
Gross international reserves were, at $156.5 billion, little changed 
from 2014, covering 8.2 months of imports of goods and services, 
and standing at 2.9 times short-term external debt. The Thai baht 
depreciated by 8.6% against the broadly strengthening US dollar in 2015.
Economic reform in 2015 encompassed state-owned enterprises, 
special economic zones, and fuel subsidies. The government is 
forming a holding company to supervise state firms and improve their 
performance. The State Enterprise Supervisory Board ordered state 
enterprises to withdraw investment from 44 subsidiaries with business 
in areas unrelated to the parent firm. New special economic zones along 
borders with neighboring countries are being prepared. Lower global oil 
prices facilitated a phasing out of subsidies on diesel, cooking gas, and 
natural gas for vehicles. 
Economic prospects
Growth is forecast to rise over the next 2 years, assuming that 
substantial public infrastructure investments proceed on schedule and 
the political climate is calm around national elections proposed for the 
second half of 2017. On these bases, GDP is projected to edge up to 3.0% 
this year and accelerate to 3.5% in 2017 (Figure 3.30.6).
Investment will pick up in 2016 under the government’s Transport 
Infrastructure Master Plan, which runs through 2022. Implementation 
of 20 projects costing $51 billion will make headway in 2016. These 
projects include motorways, railways, mass transit rail lines, seaports, 
and expansion of Suvarnabhumi International Airport in Bangkok. 
The Ministry of Finance projects that almost $2 billion will be disbursed 
for these projects in FY2016. Thailand is also negotiating with the PRC 
to build two railway lines, but the timing of construction is uncertain. 
The FY2016 budget increases public expenditure by 7.8% from 
the previous year’s budget. The government has added B56 billion to 
the original FY2016 budget, with additional revenue sourced partly 
by auctioning 4G spectra for mobile phone services. Almost 39% of 
expenditure under the original budget was disbursed in the first 4 
months of FY2016, ahead of target. The fiscal deficit is expected to 
widen to the equivalent of 3.0% of GDP in FY2016.
Good progress on the major investment projects would lift business 
confidence and private investment. The private sector can participate in 
infrastructure projects through fast-tracked public–private partnerships 
that so far include mass rapid transit lines, motorways, and a renewable 
energy power plant. The government’s nascent Thailand Future Fund is 
another channel for equity investment in infrastructure. 
Following up on stimulus rolled out last year for rural areas, 
consumers, and SMEs, the government declared 2016 to be a special 
investment-promotion year supported by a raft of tax breaks intended 
to revive private investment. A corporate tax rate cut to 20% originally 
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for 2013–2015 is now permanent. SMEs pay a lower income tax rate 
for 2 years, and additional tax concessions are available for capital 
investment and for investments in special economic zones and in 
research and development. Investment in 10 industries targeted as new 
growth engines is exempt from corporate income tax for up to 15 years. 
The industries include biofuels, biotechnology, logistics, and robotics. 
Private consumption is expected to increase at a modest pace in 
2016 but then quicken next year. The stimulus measures will help, 
but consumption remains suppressed by household finances battered 
by drought, low prices for agricultural products, and already high 
household debt. Lower rice production curtailed by drought is unlikely 
to push up rice prices much because large stockpiles overhang the 
market. Rubber and palm oil face soft global demand and large 
inventories. Still, rural incomes are getting some support from 
government subsidies on both production costs and crop insurance, soft 
loans, and the funding for village projects. Planned tax restructuring 
in 2017 is expected to provide personal income tax relief, which should 
prod consumption. 
Economic data for January 2016 indicate a lackluster start to this 
year (Figure 3.30.7). Private consumption decelerated in January, 
particularly for durable goods, as tax rebates for spending in 2015 
expired and the excise tax on cars rose at the start of this year. 
Private investment and manufacturing continued to languish in January. 
Business sentiment for the near term declined, but most respondents to 
a Bank of Thailand survey in February expected business conditions to 
improve in the months ahead (Figure 3.30.8). 
The consumer price index fell by 0.5% year on year in the first 2 
months of 2016. Nevertheless, prices are projected to nudge higher 
during the year from the low base set in 2015. Baht depreciation puts 
some upward pressure on import prices while supporting economic 
growth. Inflation is forecast to average 0.6% in 2016, picking up to 2.0% 
in 2017 as domestic demand firms and oil prices turn up (Figure 3.30.9). 
Low inflation suggests that the Bank of Thailand will maintain an 
accommodative monetary stance.
External trade started 2016 on a weak note. Merchandise exports 
contracted in value terms in January and are projected to post a small 
decline this year before turning up in 2017. Tourist arrivals remained 
a bright spot in January, rising by 15%, with further gains expected. 
Merchandise imports slumped on lower oil prices and weak demand for 
raw materials and intermediate goods. Imports are seen rising slightly 
this year and accelerating in 2017 as investment gathers momentum. 
Another large current account surplus is forecast for this year before it 
subsides in 2017 (Figure 3.30.10). 
Risks to the outlook come from a possible worsening of the drought, 
which would hit incomes, private consumption, and exports. The timely 
implementation of government investment projects is crucial. Delays 
would reduce public investment and damage consumer and business 
confidence alike. External risks stem from slower-than-anticipated 
growth in major trading partners and volatile global capital flows. Sizable 
current account surpluses, relatively low external debt, and substantial 
international reserves mitigate downside risks (Figure 3.30.11).
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Policy challenge—supporting growth 
in smaller businesses
SMEs comprise 99% of Thailand’s businesses but generate less than 
40% of GDP (Figure 3.30.12). A study last year found that poor access 
to finance keeps SMEs from making a bigger contribution to 
economic growth. 
The state-owned Small and Medium Enterprise Development 
Bank of Thailand and the Thailand Credit Guarantee Corporation 
help to fund SMEs, but government resources alone are insu¨cient. 
Commercial banks are wary about lending to SMEs out of concern that 
their accounts are unreliable and they lack collateral for loans. 
The government has started a program to encourage SMEs to 
keep a single set of financial statements to improve their chances of 
accessing bank finance. Under the program, past accounts of eligible 
businesses with revenue of less than B500 million in 2016 are exempt 
from audits by tax o¨cials. Eligible businesses with revenue of up to 
B30 million and paid-up capital of up to B5 million get tax breaks for 
2 accounting years.
To address inadequate collateral, the new Business Security Act 
allows businesses to use as collateral for borrowing from banks assets 
other than land, such as inventories and trademarks. 
Start-ups can find it especially challenging to raise funds. 
In response, the government is oering new businesses exemption from 
corporate income tax for 5 years through 2020, and it wants state-
owned banks to set up venture capital funds. It will be important that 
such funds focus on entrepreneurial and technologically innovative 
firms that will eventually be able to compete in international markets. 
The government is also looking to remove legal and regulatory obstacles 
to the development of new businesses, including through better 
enforcement of competition law. 
Another constraint on SMEs is their lack of capacity and resources 
for research and development or to penetrate overseas markets. 
The government could help by investing in infrastructure and facilities 
that foster research and development. Thailand invested only 0.25% of 
GDP on research and development in 2011, comparing unfavorably with 
1.1% in Malaysia, 2.0% in the PRC, and 4.0% in the Republic of Korea. 
On the issue of access to overseas markets, the Ministry of Commerce 
will support and arrange business introductions for SMEs that join 
international trade shows.
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Viet Nam
Vigorous expansion of manufacturing and construction in 2015 spurred the fastest economic 
growth in 7 years. Foreign direct investment is seen supporting strong growth through the forecast 
period. Inflation will revive but remain relatively modest. The current account is forecast to slide 
into a small deficit. Reforms to banks and state enterprises continue to make gradual progress, but 
an emerging need is better management of rapid urbanization.
Economic performance 
Economic growth accelerated to 6.7% in 2015, the fastest clip since 2008. 
Industry expanded by 9.6% and contributed nearly half of total growth 
(Figure 3.31.1). Powered by high foreign direct investment (FDI), the 
manufacturing subsector rose by a rapid 10.6%, and construction grew 
by 10.8% on foreign investment in factories, a recovery in the property 
market, and higher spending on infrastructure. FDI disbursements, 
which have increased substantially over the past decade, swelled by 17% 
to $14.5 billion in 2015 (Figure 3.31.2). 
Growth in services was maintained at 6.3% last year. Wholesale and 
retail trade grew by 9.1% on strong private consumption, and banking 
and finance expanded by 7.4% as growth in credit quickened. However, 
a 0.2% decline in tourist arrivals dampened growth in tourism-related 
services. Agriculture recorded lower growth at 2.4% as global food 
prices fell and El Niño brought drought. 
By expenditure, private consumption accelerated to 9.3%, spurred 
by rising employment and incomes and lower inflation. Investment also 
strengthened as buoyant FDI inflows and expansion in credit supported 
a 9.0% rise in gross capital formation. Net external demand weighed on 
GDP growth, though, as imports of goods and services in real terms rose 
faster than exports.
Notwithstanding stronger domestic demand, inflation slowed to 
average just 0.6% last year, the lowest since 2001, mainly on lower food 
and fuel prices (Figure 3.31.3). The State Bank of Viet Nam, the central 
bank, kept policy interest rates steady in 2015 after reducing them over 
recent years, but commercial banks trimmed lending rates by 0.2–0.5 
percentage points on average. Lending rates have dropped by half since 
2011. Lower rates for borrowers complemented recovering consumer 
and investor confidence to spur credit growth to an estimated 18%, 
exceeding the government’s initial target of 13%–15%. Broad money 
supply increased by an estimated 14% (Figure 3.31.4).
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To support exports, and in response to depreciation aecting other 
Asian currencies, the central bank devalued the Viet Nam dong against 
the US dollar three times in 2015, adjusting the reference rate by 1% 
each time. The central bank also moved to enhance exchange rate 
flexibility by expanding the trading band from 1% to 3% on either side of 
the reference rate and changing to a daily reference rate announcement 
system. The monetary authority tightened regulations on foreign 
currency and discouraged foreign currency hoarding by mandating zero 
interest rates for US dollar deposits. Over 2015, the dong depreciated by 
5% against the US dollar (Figure 3.31.5). 
After several years of large external surpluses, the current account 
came under pressure in 2015 as imports rose faster than exports. 
Merchandise imports rose on a balance-of-payments basis by an estimated 
12% to $155 billion. Imports of machinery, equipment, and electronic 
components surged by more than 25%, reflecting strong demand for 
capital goods and inputs into export-orientated manufacturing. Imports of 
consumption goods rose by 10%, lifted by buoyant consumer spending. 
Merchandise exports increased by an estimated 7.9% to $162 billion. 
Customs data show that the biggest gains were in exports of mobile 
phones and their components, which jumped by 30% and comprised 19% 
of total exports. Viet Nam’s imports and exports together now exceed 
165% of GDP, compared with less than 70% when the government 
started economic reforms in the mid-1990s. 
The result was a 39% fall in the trade surplus, which, along with an 
estimated 17% decline in remittances, cut the current account surplus to 
an estimated 0.3% of GDP from 4.9% in 2014. After taking into account 
a smaller surplus in the capital account and sizable negative net errors 
and omissions, the overall balance of payments recorded a deficit equal 
to 3.1% of GDP (Figure 3.31.6). Foreign exchange reserves fell to an 
estimated 2 months of import cover (Figure 3.31.7). 
Eorts to rein in the fiscal deficit had limited impact last year. 
The government reported that the budget deficit equaled 5.4% of GDP, 
narrowing slightly from 5.7% in 2014. Revenue rose by 10.0% and would 
have increased faster if not for lower oil prices and a cut in the corporate 
income tax rate. Government expenditure grew by 7.3%. Public debt, 
including debt guaranteed by the government, was projected to equal 
a record 62% of GDP, approaching a 65% limit set by the National 
Assembly (Figure 3.31.8). 
Progress on economic reform remains slow. The government sold 
minority equity stakes in some 160 state-owned enterprises in 2015, well 
below its target of 289. Many individual equitizations fell short of targets. 
As for banking reforms, the central bank supported the mergers 
of several banks, following through on its plan for banking sector 
consolidation. Reported nonperforming loans (NPLs) declined to 2.7% of 
outstanding loans by the end of 2015, largely through their transfer from 
banks to the Viet Nam Asset Management Company. This company, 
established by the government in 2013 to acquire, restructure, and sell 
NPLs, had acquired $11.0 billion in bad loans by the end of 2015, up from 
$6.1 billion a year earlier. But with a limited capital base and lacking an 
adequate legal framework for resolving NPLs, it had sold or recovered 
by the end of December last year just 9% of the NPLs it held. 
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Economic prospects 
The economy is projected to sustain growth at 6.7% in 2016 before the 
pace moderates to 6.5% in 2017 (Figure 3.31.9). Strong export-orientated 
manufacturing, FDI inflows, and domestic demand will be partly oset 
by the eect of slowing expansion in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). New FDI commitments came in relatively flat at $22.8 billion in 
2015, which suggests that disbursements of FDI could level out this year 
and decline in 2017. About 60% of the FDI commitments are for export-
orientated manufacturing. 
Rising incomes and modest (though quickening) inflation are 
expected to buoy private consumption. Sharply rising sales of 
automobiles—up by 55% in 2015—illustrate the recovery in consumer 
confidence. Viet Nam has become the fastest-growing auto market in 
Southeast Asia. Business sentiment is similarly buoyant. A survey in 
December 2015 showed that 41% of businesses expected conditions to 
improve in 2016, and a further 40% expected stable conditions. 
Prospects for growth in private investment are enhanced by a 
proliferation of trade and investment agreements concluded over the 
past 18 months. These include trade agreements with the European 
Union and the Republic of Korea, and commitments to participate in 
both the Trans-Pacific Partnership led by the US and the Eurasian 
Economic Union led by the Russian Federation. Viet Nam is expected to 
benefit as well from the ASEAN Economic Community, whose members 
in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations collectively form Viet 
Nam’s third-largest export market after the US and the European Union.
These agreements will be implemented over several years but 
are expected to stimulate investment in the near term as businesses 
prepare for expanded trade opportunities. The agreements also signal 
to the business community the government’s renewed commitment 
to liberalize the economy. In recent years, it has eased restrictions on 
foreign ownership of property and corporate shares and has said it 
would reduce from 51 to 6 the number of industries closed to foreign 
ownership. The VN Index of share prices rose by 6.1% in 2015, building 
on a 8.1% gain in 2014. 
Manufacturing and construction are projected to maintain solid 
expansion. The purchasing managers’ index showed in the first 2 
months of 2016 improving business conditions for manufacturers, 
including a rise in new orders (Figure 3.31.10). Services are projected 
to expand at a robust pace, though prospects have dimmed for tourism 
from the PRC, the source of one-quarter of Viet Nam’s inbound tourists. 
Visitor arrivals from the PRC fell by 8.5% in 2015. Subdued growth will 
continue for agriculture in the near term under soft global food prices 
and the eects of El Niño.
Inflation picked up to average 1.3% in the first 3 months of 2016 and 
is forecast to average 3.0% this year and 4.0% in 2017 (Figure 3.31.11). 
The government is expected to raise administered prices for education 
and health care and boost public sector minimum wages. Import prices 
will rise this year with dong depreciation, and higher global food and 
fuel prices in 2017 will add to inflation next year. 
The central bank targets credit growth at 18%–20% in 2016 to 
accommodate strong economic growth. Lending interest rates might 
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come under upward pressure in the forecast period as inflation 
gradually turns up and rising demand for credit collides with tighter 
bank liquidity. 
Fiscal policy looks set to tighten gradually but to remain supportive 
of growth. The government aims to narrow the budget deficit to 4.9% 
of GDP in 2016 and 4.0% in 2017. Continuing a shift started in 2015, 
the budget for 2016 puts greater emphasis on capital expenditure, which 
is slated to rise by 25.5%. Current expenditure is set to rise by a more 
modest 6.5%. 
Plans for fiscal consolidation are at risk, however, from shortfalls in 
revenue. Over the past 5 years, reductions in corporate income tax rates, 
the removal of taris, and tax exemptions for favored firms have eroded 
the tax base. Low oil prices are dragging on resource tax revenue, 
which comprises 10% of the total. Central government revenue and 
grants fell from the equivalent of 27.6% of GDP in 2010 to 22.0% in 2015. 
The government could use funds from the equitization of state-owned 
enterprises and issue more short-term securities to support the budget 
in the near term, but achieving a more sustainable fiscal position is likely 
to require tax reform to reverse falls in the ratio of tax to GDP. 
Merchandise exports are seen rising by 10% in US dollar terms 
this year and by 14% in 2017 as new production from foreign-invested 
factories comes online and trade agreements take eect. Imports 
will also continue to grow in response to strong demand for both 
consumption and capital goods, and to supply inputs for manufacturing. 
Modest recovery is expected in remittances. The current account is 
forecast to slip into deficit this year and recover to balance in 2017 
(Figure 3.31.12). 
Sluggish progress on reforming banks and state-owned enterprises 
poses risks to the outlook. Undercapitalized banks with deficient 
financial transparency remain exposed to shocks. The upswing in credit 
growth could spark a new round of speculation in risky real estate. 
To mitigate such risks, the central bank took steps early in 2016 to 
tighten lending requirements for real estate and reduce the potential 
for maturity mismatch in bank lending. Further progress on bank 
consolidation and enhanced transparency, asset classification, NPL 
resolution, and disclosure requirements will be vital for strengthening 
the sector. 
Policy challenge—managing rapid urbanization
Urbanization has been relatively recent in Viet Nam. Until the 1980s, 
the government’s focus on agriculture encouraged workers to stay in 
rural areas, and as late as 1990 only 20% of the population lived in cities 
(Figure 3.31.13). Deeper economic reform and less-constrained rural–
urban migration from the mid-1990s triggered rapid growth in cities, 
which developed as centers for services and manufacturing. Over the 
past 2 decades, the number of urban dwellers has jumped to 31 million, 
or 34% of the population, and is projected to reach 46 million, or 44%, 
by 2030. 
Growth in urban centers and formal employment are important 
drivers of the economy, as illustrated by estimates that show at least 
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70% of GDP is now generated in cities. However, urban transportation 
networks, water and sanitation systems, health and education services, 
and other physical and social infrastructure have struggled to keep pace. 
Moreover, rapidly rising urban populations strain natural resources and 
pollute the environment. To remain a vibrant industrializing economy, 
Viet Nam will need to develop more e¨cient urban centers that can 
support much larger populations. Achieving this will require progress 
on three fronts. 
The first is urban planning. The current planning law stresses 
decentralized urban planning and stakeholder consultation, which 
requires more urban planning and management capacity in provincial 
and local governments. Too often, masterplans are idealized visions of 
future cities that do not take into account the real needs of households, 
businesses, or local governments.
Second is the funding of urban infrastructure. Outside of Ha Noi and 
Ho Chi Minh City, few urban governments can raise enough revenue 
for infrastructure on their own, leaving many heavily dependent on 
the central government annual budget. This inhibits infrastructure 
development because local governments need multiyear funding 
commitments to complete projects such as upgrades to citywide 
drainage systems. Funding can be even more di¨cult for critical 
projects that generate little revenue, such as sewerage, which typically 
require significant o¨cial development assistance from abroad. 
For lack of own-source funding, urban authorities sometimes rely 
on private developers to provide infrastructure through land-for-
development deals. Such deals can undervalue public land and build 
low-quality infrastructure. Further, a model of urban development 
driven by developers can distort supply by, for example, overinvesting 
in higher-end housing and underinvesting in homes for the urban poor. 
These issues can be addressed by strengthening provincial planning, 
creating medium-term frameworks for funding urban services, and 
encouraging provincial governments to deemphasize their role as 
investors and focus more on planning and regulating urban services, 
land use, and the stewardship of natural resources. 
Finally, urban development needs to take the environment into 
account. Land-for-development deals often create urban sprawl and 
build inappropriately in high-risk areas, including floodplains. Moreover, 
the present planning system does not encourage governments to 
eectively incorporate climate change into urban plans. As a result, 
cities often focus on expansion and give inadequate attention to climate 
and disaster risks. 
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Fiji
Recent strong growth driven by a favorable domestic environment and rising investor confidence 
suffered a setback in February 2016 when a category 5 cyclone struck. Early assessment shows 
agriculture, especially sugar, was hard hit. Tourism faces headwinds from cancellations as high 
as  25% immediately following the cyclone. Damage and losses initially estimated to exceed 
$500 million, equal to roughly 11% of GDP, are likely to constrain growth in 2016. 
Economic performance 
Economic growth moderated to 4.0% in 2015 from 5.3% a year earlier 
as agricultural activity in sugar, fisheries, and timber slowed under 
a strong El Niño weather system that aected the country for most 
of the year (Figure 3.32.1). Tourism, which is Fiji’s main earner of 
foreign currency, exceeded expectations with arrivals growing by 9.0% 
(Figure 3.32.2). While this likely reflected displacement of some tourists 
from Vanuatu following Cyclone Pam in early 2015, it was noteworthy 
that Fiji attracted larger numbers of visitors from Asia. Arrivals from the 
People’s Republic of China were up by 41% during the year. Fiji Airways 
is actively targeting Asian markets with flights to the Republic of Korea 
and Hong Kong, China. The airline plans to start a new route to 
Singapore in April following the delivery of a new A330-300 aircraft in 
December 2015. 
Growth in personal remittances at 28.3% and improved labor market 
conditions also helped to drive recent growth. Consumption spending 
remained strong as evidenced by a 12.4% increase in value-added tax 
(VAT) collections over the previous year and a 2.3% increase in domestic 
credit. Lending for investment surged by 77.7% in 2015, driven by strong 
growth in construction. Total investment equaled 29% of GDP in 2015 
and has now surpassed the government target of 25% for 3 years in a 
row. Investment shows little sign of abating in the near term. 
Fiscal policy remained expansionary and focused on road, water-
supply, and sanitation infrastructure and human capital development 
pursued mainly by providing free primary and secondary education. 
Despite spending increases, the fiscal deficit declined from the equivalent 
of 4.1% of GDP in 2014 to 2.5% in 2015 following sales of state assets 
(Figure 3.32.3).
The Reserve Bank of Fiji maintained an accommodative monetary 
policy during 2015 to support domestic private sector investment 
and consumption. Interest rates across the banking sector were kept 
at historic lows, and the policy rate remained at 0.5% throughout 
2015. Annual inflation was 1.4% at the end of 2015, kept low by falling 
international food and fuel prices. The government’s downward 
adjustments to controlled fuel prices ensured that much of the decline 
in the global oil price was passed on to consumers.
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The current account deficit narrowed from the equivalent of 7.4% of 
GDP in 2014 to 4.0% in 2015 as declining international commodity prices 
reduced the import bill. Export revenues also fell, particularly from sugar 
and gold (Figure 3.32.4). Foreign exchange reserves held steady and 
currently cover 5.7 months of retained imports of goods and services.
Economic prospects 
Following Tropical Cyclone Winston, the forecast for growth in 2016 
is 2.7%, revised down from a pre-cyclone forecast of 4.0%. The late-
February cyclone was the most powerful storm on record in the 
Southern Hemisphere. The worst damage occurred in rural areas 
and the islands to the north and west of the main island of Viti Levu. 
The cyclone caused severe damage to homes, schools, crops, and 
livelihoods. The sugar industry was particularly badly hit, and 
production in 2016 is expected to fall sharply. Damage was heavy but 
could have been much worse. The cyclone bypassed the capital city, 
Suva, and its central business district, as well as important tourist 
centers around Nadi. Major infrastructure was virtually unscathed. 
Growth is expected to recover to 4.5% in 2017 boosted by 
reconstruction. The outlook for exports is positive except for sugar, 
which faces loss of preferential access to European markets in 2017. Fiji 
Airways’ opening of a Singapore route in April 2016 will facilitate tourist 
access from Asia. Discussions over a new direct Beijing–Nadi route are 
also well advanced. These flights will likely boost tourism and could 
enhance opportunities for manufacturers and farmers to airfreight cargo 
to Asian markets. Fijian businesses are already exploring opportunities to 
expand exports of perishable goods such as fresh fish, other seafood, and 
flowers. Niche markets, including high-value garments and bottled water, 
are also expected to benefit from the new routes. 
Aggregate demand is expected to remain strong in 2016 and 2017. 
The VAT reduction from 15% to 9% in the 2016 budget and strong 
growth in personal remittances following Cyclone Winston should boost 
spending. To aid families hurt by the cyclone, the Fiji National Provident 
Fund is allowing members to withdraw deposits of $500–$2,500 for 
disaster recovery. While helpful now, this could deplete savings and 
leave people vulnerable to poverty in old age. 
Fiscal consolidation planned for 2017 is expected to have broad 
impact. The required extent of consolidation will depend on the 
government’s success in partly divesting selected public assets. If the 
sales do not go ahead, the government could face a much larger budget 
deficit than the forecast 2.9% of GDP in 2016 and 2.5% in 2017.
Inflation is expected to rise to around 3.0% in 2016 and 2017 
(Figure 3.32.5). Continuing low international fuel prices and the lower 
VAT are expected to be oset somewhat by upward pressure on prices 
from continuing strong domestic demand, and from local food prices 
driven higher by the cyclone and drought under El Niño. 
The current account deficit is forecast to widen to the equivalent of 
7.0% of GDP in 2016 as imports rise and sugar exports are lost in the 
wake of Cyclone Winston. The deficit is seen to narrow to 4.4% in 2017 
as agricultural exports recover and post-cyclone imports subside.
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Policy challenge—balancing cyclone recovery 
with long-term reform 
In the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Winston, the government must 
work to sustain economic growth momentum while maintaining fiscal 
discipline. While the economic costs of the cyclone are high, social 
protection costs soared in March with the announcement of about 
$10 million in targeted assistance to people who are most vulnerable to 
falling into poverty. The aid is being made available as immediate relief 
assistance to be paid out over 3 months to 44,169 households currently 
receiving aid through three social protection programs.
Higher social protection costs press on the government’s fiscal 
position as it reallocates spending to finance emergency relief eorts, 
including reorienting planned capital spending toward the rehabilitation 
of infrastructure and basic services in the worst aected areas. Despite 
an expected growth pickup in 2017 and beyond, the government will 
need to reduce expenditure in other areas to control fiscal deficits and 
keep its debt manageable during recovery (Figure 3.32.6).
In the medium-term, the government’s focus on private sector 
development is vital to stimulating domestic and foreign investment, 
and to putting Fiji on a higher growth path. With this in mind, the 
government has been reforming its tax policies to stimulate private 
investment and consumption, and to enhance tax system transparency 
and compliance. The 2016 budget removed VAT exemptions and 
introduced new service and environment taxes, but further reforms are 
needed to foster private investment and expand the private sector. 
The government has also introduced worthwhile business 
environment reforms, including financial reforms to encourage 
growth in small and medium-sized enterprises. For example, the 
new Companies Act, approved by the Cabinet in January 2016, and 
streamlined company registration are easing businesses’ access to 
credit and to financial information on business partners and customers, 
as well as lowering startup costs. The government is working on further 
legislative and regulatory reforms, including secured transactions 
reform, to encourage greater private sector investment and public–
private partnership, and to reduce ownership and control over a number 
of state-owned enterprises in 2016. Continuing progress will be vital to 
sustain Fiji’s growth momentum.
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Papua New Guinea
Following strong growth in 2015, the first full year of gas production, the economy is forecast to 
grow by only 4.3% in 2016 and 2.4% in 2017. Non-mineral GDP, which better indicates underlying 
trends and how growth affects people’s livelihoods, is projected to grow by 3.4% in 2016 and 3.6% 
in 2017. Increasing reliance on resource extraction raises volatility in the economy.
Economic performance 
In 2015, the first full year of liquefied natural gas (LNG) production, 
the economy of Papua New Guinea (PNG) grew by 9.9% (Figure 3.33.1). 
Growth was considerably lower than initially forecast, however, due to 
lower energy prices, unfavorable weather for agriculture, and reduced 
mining output from the closure of the Ok Tedi gold and copper mine. 
Moreover, the early start of LNG production in 2014 reduced the 
statistical impact of the first full year of production. This performance 
followed more than a decade of strong, uninterrupted growth—averaging 
6.8% per annum—supported by high global commodity prices and large 
private investments in the mineral sector.
The agriculture, forestry, and fisheries sector was aected by 
drought and low commodity prices in 2015. Growth in the sector 
decelerated to 2.1% in 2015 from 3.3% in 2014. Output from mining 
contracted by 3.7%. However, utilities continued to achieve strong 
growth, up by 6.0% in 2015, as did transport with 5.0% growth. 
Both outcomes reflected increased business activity in Port Moresby. 
Meanwhile, growth in wholesale and retail trade slowed from 4.0% 
in 2014 to 2.5%. 
Inflation was steady in 2015 as prices increased by an average of 
5.1%, down only slightly from the previous year’s 5.2%. Although prices 
for imported oil fell steeply—by more than the PNG kina depreciated—
the transmission of lower oil prices to the rest of the economy was 
constrained by market rigidities in sectors outside of mining. 
Low commodity prices depressed export receipts (Figure 3.33.2). 
This, along with disappointing revenue from mining and petroleum 
operations, created serious fiscal challenges in 2015 (Figure 3.33.3). 
The original 2015 budget projected a fiscal deficit equivalent to 4.4% 
of GDP, but the government’s 2015 midyear outlook projected an 
$800 million revenue shortfall and a deficit of $1.5 billion, equivalent to 
9.4% of GDP, in the absence of fiscal adjustments. Preliminary estimates 
of the final budget outcome in 2015—which excludes loans and grants—
suggests that the government was able to cut spending by the equivalent 
of $1.3 billion, leaving a deficit equal to 3.2% of GDP (Figure 3.33.4). 
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The smaller deficit reflected weak budget execution and payment 
deferrals, but these risk a buildup of expenditure arrears in the future. 
In June 2014, the Bank of Papua New Guinea, the central bank, 
fixed the kina exchange rate some 20%–30% above the market rate and 
set a trading band with the aim of stemming what it saw as excessive 
kina depreciation. Although the rate has since been allowed to adjust 
gradually, most observers believe the kina is still overvalued relative 
to the currencies of the country’s major trading partners. This has 
worsened foreign currency shortages and drained foreign exchange 
reserves, thereby heightening the risk of a forced and disorderly 
currency depreciation.
LNG exports pushed the current account balance into a surplus 
equivalent to 4.6% of GDP in 2015 (Figure 3.33.5). However, this did not 
translate into higher foreign reserves or tax revenue because oshore 
debt repayments climbed and investors were allowed to accelerate 
depreciation on the gas pipeline when calculating concession payments. 
Foreign exchange reserves actually fell from $2.3 billion at the end 
of 2014 (cover for 6.3 months of imports) to $2.1 billion a year later 
(5.6 months). Dollar shortages at commercial banks have persisted since 
2015, such that the current backlog of exchange requests reportedly 
amounts to $500 million. 
Economic prospects 
Growth is expected at 4.3% in 2016, less than half the 2015 rate, 
reflecting base eects from last year’s first full year of LNG exports 
and fiscal contraction. Although some recovery in oil and gas prices is 
expected over the next 2 years, average prices in both 2016 and 2017 are 
expected to remain below 2015 levels, to say nothing of earlier years. 
Food prices are also expected to continue to decline in 2016 before 
increasing modestly in 2017. These factors will likely push growth even 
lower in 2017, to 2.4%. 
Continuing weakness in oil prices has dampened investment in the 
mineral sector, which has been the main driver of growth in recent 
years. The sector is nevertheless expected to remain important to 
economic growth in the medium term with the start of a few large 
mining projects. Firms appear to be continuing to consolidate their 
operations, however, to improve eciency and reduce operating costs. 
This is expected to constrain private sector activity and consumption, 
as well as public revenue from payroll and corporate taxes. Fiscal 
consolidation is also likely to suppress domestic demand and formal 
employment. 
With the return of normal rainfall following El Niño-induced 
drought in 2015, agriculture is projected to grow by 3.8% in 2016 and 
3.4% in 2017. The sector projects higher output of coee, cocoa, and 
palm oil, but further unfavorable weather in 2016 could pose downside 
risks. Oil and gas extraction is forecasted to grow by 7.1% in 2016 
but then contract by 3.9% in 2017 as the sector enters decline from 
diminishing reserves. Construction is expected to grow by 3.0% in 
2016 and 3.5% in 2017 ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
summit that PNG will host in 2018. Wholesale and retail trade is 
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expected to grow by 3.0% in 2016 and 5.0% in 2017, and the transport 
sector by 4.0% in both years. 
Upside risks to the growth forecast include the expected resumption 
of production at the Ok Tedi mine and the Puma Oil Refinery in 2016, 
as well as the potential start of construction to extend the Papua LNG 
project. Despite falling commodity prices, LNG export volumes are 
expected to remain stable in 2016. Papua LNG is currently appraising 
gas resources, and a report due later this year will inform the company’s 
investment plan and the possible start of new construction. The coee 
harvest could be particularly large in 2016, as past experience suggests 
that coee plants tend to bounce back after a year of drought stress. 
Inflation is expected to accelerate to 6.0% in 2016 and 2017. 
The persistence of high inflation reflects government eorts to sustain 
public spending and expected kina depreciation. In 2017, recovering 
international oil prices are seen to compound inflationary pressure 
in PNG. 
Rising fiscal deficits and cash flow concerns weigh heavily in 
the government’s near-term policy concerns. Public expenditure is 
budgeted at $4.8 billion in 2016 (equivalent to 26.2% of GDP) and 
revenue at $4.1 billion. With lower revenue projections, the government 
plans fiscal deficits equal to 3.8% of GDP in 2016 and 2.2% in 2017. 
The primary deficit—estimated without revenues from resource 
exports, capital spending related to them, or interest payments—was 
estimated to equal 8.5% of non-mineral GDP in 2015. This deficit is 
seen to narrow modestly to 5.7% in 2016. Planned capital expenditures 
account for about 10% of total expenditure, and operational expenditure 
the remainder. Direct government financing covers 60% of capital 
expenditure, while the remaining 40% is financed from concessional 
loans and grants from development partners. 
The government is likely to continue to face pressing cash-flow 
problems in 2016 with the buildup of expenditure arrears from deferred 
obligations, diculties in financing its deficit, and higher debt servicing 
costs. Any unplanned expenditures, including cost overruns, would 
further strain cash-flow problems. Expenditures for hosting a meeting 
of African, Caribbean, and Pacific leaders in 2016, national elections 
in 2017, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in 2018 
also pose risks to budget integrity and fiscal balances. In light of fiscal 
constraints, the government plans to prioritize the completion of 
ongoing capital projects over starting new ones.
Cash-flow management is growing more dicult for the government 
as commercial banks reach their technical limits for exposure to 
government debt. The government is exploring options to float a 
$1 billion sovereign bond in 2016 to help refinance current borrowing, 
but this could prove costly. External debt servicing costs also appear 
likely to increase given downward pressure on the kina.
In 2016, the cost of domestic debt servicing is likely to increase 
significantly. Domestic debt stands at about 28% of GDP, while external 
debt equals 12% of GDP. Nearly half of the domestic debt (48.1%) is in 
Treasury bills for which yields have risen and maturity dates shortened. 
In 2014, no Treasury bills matured in less than 100 days, but at the start 
of 2016 such short-term Treasury bills accounted for an estimated 24% 
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of the portfolio outstanding. As domestic debt has shifted to shorter 
maturities, interest costs and refinancing risks have risen. The 2016 
budget estimates domestic debt repayments coming due this year 
will reach $3.0 billion, equal to a worrying 93.1% of projected current 
revenue (Figure 3.33.6). 
LNG exports are projected to contribute to a current account surplus 
equal to 3.8% of GDP in 2016. This is a smaller surplus than in 2015, in 
line with lower projections for commodity prices. The current account 
surplus is seen to increase to the equivalent of 7.2% of GDP in 2017 
with modest recovery in commodity prices. Coee and palm oil will 
likely boost agricultural exports and support the surplus in coming 
years. Import growth is seen to ease in 2016 and 2017 with an expected 
slowdown in public and private investment.
Policy challenge—fostering economic 
diversification to tame growth volatility 
The PNG economy has grown more dependent on resource exports 
in recent years with the rise of LNG and other extractive industries. 
This has elevated the influence of global commodity price volatility 
on the PNG economy. Strong global commodity prices attracted large 
investment in mineral extraction, triggering episodes of high growth. 
While this has significantly boosted government revenues and enabled 
large increases in public spending, the distribution of benefits has 
tended to be narrow. To encourage inclusive and sustainable growth, 
the government needs to ensure that other sectors—agriculture, 
manufacturing, and services—do not suer as a result of growth 
in the mineral sector and are able to operate at their full potential. 
However, inadequate infrastructure, inflated operating costs, and an 
unfavorable business environment have deterred investors and kept 
productivity low in these sectors, inhibiting broad-based, sustainable 
economic growth. 
Analysis suggests that past increases in output have resulted largely 
from increases in the labor force, and that the contributions of capital 
and new technology have been negligible except during periods of high 
investment in mining. Total factor productivity is estimated to have 
stagnated during the first 3 decades after independence. This highlights 
the deterioration in the operating environment and the extent of 
productivity stagnation in sectors other than mining.
Deteriorating infrastructure is an important constraint on 
productive capacity in agriculture, manufacturing, and services. It also 
hampers the government’s ability to expand its delivery of basic health 
care, education, and other services. The poor quality of the transport 
network limits producers’ access to markets and raises costs for 
service providers in remote communities. Although large investments 
in infrastructure development over the past few years have begun 
to address the problem, emerging fiscal pressures make it dicult to 
sustain recent progress. 
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Light manufacturing using domestically sourced agricultural 
inputs appears to be a promising area for improving labor productivity 
in PNG. Over the past decade, the agro-processing industry has grown 
by an average of 6.7% per year despite the challenges posed by kina 
appreciation and inflation tied to capital inflows for LNG development. 
Agro-processing now provides about a quarter of jobs in the formal 
sector and involves small producers as well as large global companies 
including Coca Cola and Nestlé. However, the high cost of doing 
business, poor connectivity, and human capital shortages impede further 
growth in this promising industry. 
Tourism is another industry with strong potential in PNG that 
would benefit from infrastructure investments and could create tens of 
thousands of private sector jobs. Recognizing this potential, the 2016 
budget more than triples to $19.9 million government expenditures 
to develop tourism. Developing the potential of PNG as a tourist 
destination first requires rehabilitating the image of the country as 
a safe destination for visitors. It also requires creating a business 
environment in which private developers can view PNG as a sound and 
secure place to invest in hotels and related businesses. 
Fiscal constraints on the delivery of basic services and public 
infrastructure limit diversification in the PNG economy. Contracting out 
the maintenance and management of recently developed public 
infrastructure assets oers opportunities to reduce expenditures and 
the administrative burden on the public sector while promoting private 
sector growth and employment. 
Diversifying the sectors of the economy that can create jobs, and 
from which the government can collect revenues, is clearly a policy 
priority if the country is going to avoid the cycles of boom and bust 
associated with reliance on mining exports. However, the approach to 
fostering diversification requires a rethink to emphasize institutional 
arrangements that rely on private sector enterprises to provide the 
bulk of the capital and know-how needed to develop businesses, and 
to keep the public sector focused on providing basic infrastructure and 
essential services.
Solomon Islands
Economic growth has recovered following severe floods in 2014, but longer-term prospects for 
sustaining growth are uncertain. Exports have been weak, and logging and development assistance 
are expected to decline over the medium term. The government hopes to use fiscal policy to drive 
economic growth. Policy should continue to safeguard macroeconomic stability while ensuring that 
increased spending is directed to areas that promote sustainable growth.
Economic performance 
Economic growth rebounded to 3.2% in 2015 from 2.0% in 2014, led 
by investment (Figure 3.34.1). Construction picked up from rebuilding 
after the April 2014 floods and on strong business investment. Imports 
of capital goods increased by an estimated 27.4% over the previous year. 
Credit to the private sector expanded by 16.7%, with personal loans 
accounting for most of the increase and manufacturing also absorbing a 
large share. 
Fiscal expansion contributed significantly to growth. After coming 
to power late in 2014, the government used its first budget to signal a 
shift toward expansionary fiscal policy after years of budget surpluses. 
Despite its late approval, the budget left a deficit estimated to equal 2.2% 
of GDP. Cash reserves built up in the past fell significantly, drawn down 
to finance deficit spending and to repay SI$154 million in domestic debt 
early. Cash reserves nonetheless remain substantial, equal to about 8.0% 
of GDP. 
Consumer prices fell by 0.3% in 2015. Domestic prices normalized 
after increasing in the aftermath of the 2014 floods. Imported inflation 
was contained by lower global commodity prices and the continued 
appreciation of the Solomon Islands dollar against the currencies of 
Australia and New Zealand, the main sources of imports.
Exports continued to be weak, with total merchandise export 
receipts falling by an estimated 3.6%. This reflected, in part, the 
cessation of gold exports following the closure of the country’s sole gold 
mine after the 2014 flood. Logging exports, which account for about 
two-thirds of export earnings, remained at record levels. However, 
other major export commodities saw volume declines, while softening 
international prices deepened the slump in export earnings. 
Lower global oil prices provided significant relief to the balance of 
payments. Solomon Islands depends heavily on imported fuel, which 
is used to power electricity generation in the country. Lower oil prices 
saw the fuel import bill fall from the equivalent of 10.2% of GDP 
in 2014 to 7.2% in 2015 (Figure 3.34.2), but the eect of lower prices on 
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the balance of payments was partly oset by higher import volumes. 
Merchandise import costs rose modestly on increased imports of capital 
goods, but imported business services fell significantly, which allowed 
the current account deficit to narrow slightly to 4.6% of GDP. 
The central bank maintained its accommodative stance, capping 
its issuance of Bokolo Bills to SI$710 million and leaving the required 
reserve ratio unchanged at 7.5%. Foreign exchange reserves increased 
modestly in 2015, rising to an estimated 10.3 months of import cover 
(Figure 3.34.3). Broad money growth increased to 15% as strong growth 
in credit to the private sector continued and government spending of 
cash reserves injected significant additional liquidity. The Solomon 
Islands dollar continued to appreciate in nominal eective terms as the 
US dollar, which the Solomon Islands dollar closely tracks, rose against 
the currencies of Solomon Islands’ major trade partners. 
Economic prospects
As current growth drivers fade, growth is forecast to slow to 3.0% 
in 2016 and 2.8% in 2017. The pace of investment is expected to ease 
but remain elevated. Fiscal expansion is also expected to slow. Weak 
exports are seen to continue to detract from growth. Low oil prices are, 
however, supporting consumption while easing pressure on the balance 
of payments and providing the authorities with room to continue to 
pursue expansionary policy. 
The government plans to continue to increase development spending 
as part of its growth strategy. It is targeting a fiscal deficit equal to 5.8% 
of GDP in 2016, financed by drawing down cash reserves. As in 2015, 
about 30% of government-funded expenditure will be directed toward 
its development budget, up significantly from 18.3% in the 2014 budget, 
and focused on infrastructure, rural development, and health. However, 
weak execution will likely continue to hamper spending in 2016 and 
2017, and the fiscal deficit will likely be much smaller than budgeted 
(Figure 3.34.4). 
Inflation is expected to rise to 4.4% in 2016 and 5.7% in 2017 
(Figure 3.34.5). Domestic inflation is expected to pick up, reflecting 
elevated broad money growth and the fading of base eects from the 
2014 floods. Imported inflation should remain contained in 2016 but 
will likely contribute to higher inflation in 2017 with a projected rise in 
global commodity prices.
Merchandise exports are seen to continue to contract as logging 
output falls. Copra and cocoa exports will likely continue to decline as 
other exports remain broadly flat. The import bill is expected to ease 
slightly in 2016 on account of lower average oil prices before rising 
in 2017 in line with forecasted increases in global commodity prices. 
The trade balance is expected to deteriorate, widening the current 
account deficit to the equivalent of 5.9% of GDP in 2016 and 7.2% in 2017. 
Monetary policy is seen to remain accommodative. Broad money 
growth is expected to accelerate as the government spends its cash 
reserves and growth in credit to the private sector remains robust. 
The central bank has some scope to accommodate these developments. 
Foreign exchange reserves are expected to fall but remain at a 
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very comfortable level. However, given the government’s fiscal 
targets, the central bank will need to carefully monitor developments 
and consider tightening monetary policy if fiscal expansion or other 
inflationary pressures prove greater than expected. 
Policy challenge—fiscal policy for development
The government aims to increase public spending to lay the foundation 
for sustainable economic growth. The strategy takes advantage of 
fiscal buers accumulated in recent years, and low global oil prices 
allow monetary policy to remain broadly accommodative. Preserving 
fiscal buers and ensuring that increased spending is well targeted to 
promote sustainable growth will be critical. Results will likely be better 
if spending is increased gradually. 
If fully implemented, the 2016 budget would largely exhaust 
government cash reserves. Even a rate of budget execution similar 
to last year would significantly erode cash reserves and constrain 
the government’s ability to respond to future economic shocks. 
Excessive fiscal expansion also risks crowding out private sector activity, 
especially if the central bank is forced to tighten monetary policy to 
contain inflation. Meanwhile, a weak outlook for revenues argues for 
conserving fiscal reserves for future use. Setting a floor for cash reserves 
and strengthening policy coordination between the government and the 
central bank would be useful measures to safeguard stability. 
Expenditure quality will be critical. Containing payroll costs would 
save money for higher-priority expenditures. Prioritizing public capital 
investment would likely yield the greatest growth impact. While the 
share of spending directed to the development budget has increased 
dramatically, it still contains significant recurrent expenditures. 
Tightening its focus on capital investment would benefit growth while 
ensuring that all recurrent spending is tracked and treated consistently. 
Eective recurrent budget management is particularly important as 
revenue growth is expected to slow, and funding requirements for 
the operation and maintenance of new capital investments need to be 
properly assessed and provided for in future budgets.
Line ministries’ weak execution of budgets—particularly their low 
execution rates of development budgets—has been a perennial problem. 
This largely reflects systemic capacity constraints, so improving 
execution will take time, particularly to avoid impairing expenditure 
quality or weakening expenditure controls. In the interim, the 
government can target more implementation-ready projects and consider 
gradually scaling up public investment in line with improvements in 
implementation capacity.
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Timor-Leste
Economic growth slowed in 2015 as fiscal stimulus eased. Growth is expected to accelerate in 
2016 and 2017 on rising public and private investment, but declining oil production highlights the 
need to diversify the economy. A young population lends Timor-Leste great potential to raise its 
long-term growth prospects by investing in human capital and encouraging broader participation 
in the labor market.
Economic performance 
Growth slowed in 2015 as GDP excluding the large oshore petroleum 
sector expanded by an estimated 4.1% (Figure 3.35.1). Public spending, 
which has been the major driver of growth since 2007, declined 
modestly in 2015 with total expenditures excluding grants falling by 
an estimated 1.5% (Figure 3.35.2). Despite this decline, public spending 
excluding grants still equaled 91.2% of non-oil GDP (hereafter GDP).
The composition of public spending changed significantly in 
2015 as increased transfers oset declines in purchases of goods and 
services and in capital investment. Growth in spending on salaries and 
wages halved from an average of 12.4% per annum in 2009–2014 to an 
estimated 6.3% in 2015. Spending on goods and services was cut by an 
estimated 9.1% year on year to $389.7 million in 2015. Savings on fuel 
from lower oil prices accounted for 39.8% of the reduction in goods and 
services purchases, and there were also significant cuts to spending on 
operational expenses, building and vehicle maintenance, and domestic 
and international travel by government ocials. 
Public transfers increased by 48.1% and accounted for almost one-third 
of public spending in 2015. This increase was driven by a doubling of 
payments to veterans of the fight for independence to $124.6 million 
and a $133.4 million transfer payment to the newly established Special 
Administrative Region of Oe-Cusse Ambeno. The region has been granted 
significant autonomy and is working to establish a special economic zone 
that will encompass the Oe-Cusse exclave and Atauro Island. It allocated 
85.6% of its budget to capital investments in roads, the airport, electricity 
upgrades, a small aircraft, and a passenger ferry. 
Capital investment through Timor-Leste’s multiyear Infrastructure 
Fund fell by 22.8% to $239.4 million in 2015, though total capital 
investment is likely to have increased once investment by Oe-Cusse 
is included. Road and bridge upgrades took more than half of all 
Infrastructure Fund spending, and the electricity system a further 
17.8%. Despite eorts to improve budget execution, a strong seasonal 
trend still marked capital disbursements (Figure 3.35.3). 
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Income from oshore petroleum fell significantly in 2015 but still 
supplied 84.9% of government revenues excluding grants. The volume 
of petroleum production exceeded the budget forecast by 16.6%, but 
petroleum revenues were 19.8% less than forecast. Investments through 
Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Fund recorded a net loss of $21.4 million in 
2015—far below the forecast net income of $915.8 million—due to stock 
market volatility and foreign exchange losses caused by the appreciation 
of the US dollar, the ocial currency. Domestic revenues equaled 12.8% 
of GDP in 2015 and grew by 1.2% year on year as a small decline in 
tax receipts was oset by improved collection of fees and charges for 
government services such as electricity. Lower petroleum income and 
poor investment returns saw Timor-Leste’s fiscal position swing from 
a surplus equal to 79.9% of GDP in 2014 to a deficit estimated at 14.2%. 
The Petroleum Fund balance consequently edged down to $16.2 billion 
by year-end, or $13,000 per capita.  
The consumer price index rose by 0.4% in Dili and 1.3% elsewhere 
to yield a weighted annual national inflation rate of 0.6% (Figure 3.35.4). 
Price stability stemmed from falling international prices for key 
commodity imports, including rice and fuel, and the continued 
appreciation of the US dollar against the currencies of Timor-Leste’s 
major trading partners in Southeast Asia.
Heineken broke ground on a new brewery and bottling plant due 
to begin operations late this year, and several economic indicators 
suggest good business conditions in 2015. Lending to the private sector 
increased by 10.5% with strong growth in construction and services. 
Business deposits in banks rose by 9.0%. Commercial electricity 
consumption climbed by 7.6%. International passenger arrivals rose by 
5.3% year on year in the first 3 quarters. 
Initial analysis suggests that recent increases in the planted area of 
rice and maize were sustained in 2015 and that high rainfall allowed 
good grain harvests in the first half. An improved coee harvest saw 
export volume increase by an estimated 51% from a low base in 2014, but 
depressed international prices sent earnings marginally lower.  
Merchandise imports increased by an estimated 10.9% despite lower 
commodity prices and a stronger US dollar. The resulting merchandise 
trade deficit of $537.9 million equaled 36.6% of GDP, in line with 
recent years. Lower income from petroleum production and the poor 
performance of Petroleum Fund investments saw the current account 
surplus tumble from 75.1% of GDP in 2014 to an estimated 14.2% in 2015 
(Figure 3.35.5).
Economic prospects
GDP growth is forecast at 4.5% in 2016, rising to 5.5% in 2017 on large 
public and private investments. A public–private partnership to build a 
new international seaport west of Dili is expected to break ground in 
2017 and will require an investment of $290 million, equivalent to 19.8% 
of GDP in 2015. Private sector financing is set to cover more than half 
of this cost. The government is planning major investments in other 
economic infrastructure, while private consortia are preparing to invest 
in cement manufacturing and tourism. The onset of El Niño in late 2015 
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is expected to hurt 2016 grain harvests enough to require increased 
food imports, but the coee harvest is expected to be significantly better 
in 2016 than in 2015. 
Inflation is projected to increase modestly to 2.0% in 2016 and 
3.0% in 2017 as the deflationary eects of the strong dollar and low 
commodity prices ease. Declining oil income has highlighted the 
challenge of balancing public investment needs with the twin goals of 
long-term fiscal sustainability and intergenerational equity. The 2016 
budget trimmed forecasts for petroleum production volumes and 
reduced the undiscounted forecast for petroleum revenues during 
2016–2022 by 56.4% relative to the 2015 budget forecast (Figure 3.35.6). 
This has reduced the estimate of sustainable annual income from 
the Petroleum Fund to $544.8 million from the 2015 estimate of 
$638.5 million. Yet the 2016 budget assumes an average oil price of 
$71.2 per barrel in 2016–2020, without taking into account the sharp 
decline in oil prices since mid-2015. 
The government had initially targeted a significant fiscal adjustment 
for 2016 and 2017 to cut budgeted expenditures excluding grants from 
$1.57 billion in 2014 to $1.30 billion in 2016 and $1.20 billion in 2017. 
However, this adjustment has been deferred, and the 2016 budget has 
spending at $1.56 billion this year and projects average annual spending 
at $2.08 billion for 2017–2020 to complete major capital investments. 
Reforms to boost non-oil revenue collection are being prepared but are 
unlikely to mobilize significant domestic revenues in the short term. 
Domestic non-oil revenues are expected to average 10.8% of GDP in 2016 
and 2017. 
While total budgets in 2015 and 2016 are very similar, the 
composition of planned spending has changed significantly. The 
allocation to Oe-Cusse in 2016 rose sharply by 63.3% as the region’s 
capital investment budget expanded by 49.6%. This compares with a 
6.9% increase in budgeted capital investment for the rest of the country. 
These commitments are accommodated by cutting the recurrent budgets 
of most line ministries, which has contributed to lower budgets for 
health (–21%), education (–10%), and agriculture (–32%).
The capital investment budget for major projects during 2016–2020 is 
equivalent to 248.8% of last year’s GDP. More than three-quarters of this 
budget is allocated to roads and bridges, expanding Dili’s airport, new 
public buildings, and the Tasi Mane project to develop a petrochemical 
industry on the south coast (Figure 3.35.7). Fully implementing this 
investment program would strain government management capacity and 
risk wasting scarce public resources (Figure 3.35.8). The weak outlook for 
oil prices may threaten the commercial viability of new state-sponsored 
petrochemical developments, so careful appraisal of the proposed 
investment is warranted. 
The 2016 budget law includes reform to restructure the 
Infrastructure Fund as an autonomous agency. Legislation specifying 
the details of the reform has yet to be tabled but could provide a timely 
opportunity to strengthen public investment management. In the short 
term, disruption associated with reform may delay the implementation 
of the 2016 capital budget. Over the longer term, reform may smooth 
budget execution and improve the quality of spending. The government 
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also aims to complete reforms to improve the business enabling 
environment and stimulate financial sector development before national 
elections in mid-2017. 
Income from petroleum production and Petroleum Fund investments 
will continue to be important to the current account balance. Improved 
returns on Petroleum Fund investments will partly oset declining 
petroleum production. As a result, the current account surplus is seen 
to rise to 26.1% of GDP in 2016 as investment returns improve, before 
falling to 11.8% in 2017 as petroleum production declines.
Policy challenge—realizing a demographic dividend
Timor-Leste can raise its potential growth rate by strengthening human 
capital formation and fostering labor market participation. Rapid 
population growth since independence has created a youthful nation, 
with 42% of citizens younger than 16. Timor-Leste’s dependency ratio—
the number of children and retired adults for each working-age adult—
is one of the highest in the world. At the same time, adult participation 
in the labor force is relatively low. 
As the young mature, Timor-Leste’s working-age population will 
expand by 2.8% compounded annually from 2015 to 2050, which is 
forecast to rein in the dependency ratio from 0.89 in 2015 to 0.61 in 2050 
(Figure 3.35.9). These trends can provide powerful economic stimulus if 
policy makes the most of Timor-Leste’s demographic potential. 
Expanded access to health care and education have produced clear 
gains since independence, with infant mortality halving from 2003 to 
2009 and primary school enrolment rising from 65.6% in 2007 to 91.9% 
in 2013. However, malnutrition among young children remains high, 
and assessments of learning outcomes highlight the need to further 
strengthen preschool and primary education (Figure 3.35.10). 
Investments to improve maternal and child health and strengthen 
education will raise long-term growth potential by improving future 
labor productivity. In the short term, growth may be enhanced and 
formal employment stimulated by reducing the costs employers face 
when hiring new workers. Timor-Leste’s labor code imposes a range of 
restrictive and costly conditions on employers. The minimum wage of 
$115 per month may be high, given current workforce productivity and 
the large number of unskilled workers without jobs who may be willing 
to work for less. 
At present, only 11.2% of the working-age population is formally 
employed, and half of these workers are directly employed by the 
government. Regulations that impede workers’ move from informal to 
formal employment can be counterproductive and should be reviewed. 
It is also important to consider how social assistance transfers, equal to 
11.8% of GDP in 2015, modify incentives for human capital accumulation 
and labor force participation.
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This chapter was written by Roland Rajah of the Pacific Liaison and Coordination O©ce, 
ADB, Sydney.
Vanuatu
The economy has been buffeted by a series of negative shocks, including a tropical cyclone, 
severe El Niño conditions, and problems at the international airport. Cyclone reconstruction has 
suffered significant delays. Following a corruption scandal and snap elections, a new government 
was formed. Meanwhile, much-needed infrastructure investment is getting under way, which 
should help improve the country’s appeal as a tourist destination.
Economic performance 
The economy is estimated to have contracted by 1.0% in 2015 
(Figure 3.36.1). Tropical Cyclone Pam struck Vanuatu in March 2015, 
causing extensive damage and losses estimated to equal 64.1% of 2013 
GDP. About a third of the damage was to private housing, but agriculture 
and tourism were badly aected. Planned reconstruction projects suered 
long delays that limited their possible stimulus to growth in 2015. 
In the aftermath of the cyclone, the authorities adopted a number 
of policies to support economic recovery. Parliament passed a budget 
revision that waived value-added tax and import duties on building 
materials and relief items, and doubled the allowances parliamentarians 
received for projects in their constituencies. Further, the Vanuatu 
National Provident Fund allowed members to withdraw up to 
20% of their retirement account to fund rebuilding and livelihood 
reconstruction. The Reserve Bank of Vanuatu eased monetary settings 
by linking its policy rate to its 91-day note rate (eectively slashing the 
policy rate from 5.2% to 1.8%) and reducing bank reserve requirements. 
The budget recorded a surplus equivalent to 1.4% of GDP. 
Strong revenue collection, which exceeded budget estimates by 8%, 
more than oset expenditures, which were only slightly greater than 
the budgeted amounts. As the bulk of cyclone reconstruction is being 
financed by development partners, external grants rose dramatically to 
reach about $75 million. Nonetheless, approval delays meant that major 
reconstruction projects did not break ground in 2015 and the expected 
boost to growth was delayed. 
The tourism industry was badly aected by the cyclone but 
recovered more quickly than anticipated. In the immediate aftermath 
of the cyclone, tourist arrivals dropped significantly. Arrivals by air in 
March–June were down by 26% from the previous year, and cruise ship 
arrivals were 52% lower. However, arrivals recovered in the second half 
of the year, such that visitors by air in the whole of 2015 declined by only 
17.3% and by ship by only 10.3% (Figure 3.36.2). Both shortfalls were less 
severe than initially feared. However, the extent to which the tourism 
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recovery has benefitted the local economy is unclear. This is because 
recovery was concentrated in cruise ship arrivals, and those arriving 
by ship tend to spend less locally than do other tourists. Many local 
tourism operators continued to report weak market conditions. 
In the aftermath of the cyclone, inflation jumped to 5.7% in the 
second quarter, driven by a 12.3% increase in food prices. However, 
inflation subsequently eased and for 2015 as a whole prices were up by 
only 2.5%. Costs of transport, health, education, food, and clothing led 
price increases. 
Agriculture was badly aected by the cyclone and suered further 
setbacks from dry conditions associated with El Niño. Consequently, 
production volumes for most major agricultural export commodities 
fell (Figure 3.36.3). Overall export earnings contracted by an estimated 
5.5% as softer international prices for most major exports worsened 
the decline.
The import bill rose sharply on higher imports of manufactured 
goods, food, and livestock after the cyclone, which outweighed the 
eects of lower prices for imported oil. The trade balance is estimated 
to have deteriorated to a deficit equal to 36.2% of GDP (from 25.3% 
in 2014), driving the current account deficit to an estimated 10.4% of 
GDP (compared with a surplus of 2.1% in 2014). 
Economic prospects
The economy is expected to grow by 2.5% in 2016 and by 3.8% in 2017. 
The commencement of major reconstruction and several large new 
infrastructure projects should provide a substantial boost to growth 
in 2016, but this may be oset by the recent cancellation of flights to 
Port Vila by major international airlines, which will likely weigh heavily 
on the tourism industry. In 2017, growth is expected to pick up as 
tourism recovers and infrastructure construction continues. 
Snap elections held on 22 January 2016, which were prompted 
by a corruption case that saw 14 members of Parliament convicted in 
late 2015, led to the formation of a new government in February. A new 
Prime Minister was elected unopposed by the new Parliament, which 
had most legislative districts represented by new representatives. 
The new government is focusing on political and electoral reform, 
as well as on more immediate issues such as passing the 2016 budget and 
addressing concerns about runway safety at the international airport. 
In late January, two major airlines operating in the region, 
Air New Zealand and Virgin Australia, announced they would stop flying 
to Port Vila over concern about the safety of the runway at Bauerfield 
International Airport. Qantas, a third major carrier, announced that it 
was ending its codeshare agreement with Air Vanuatu—the government-
owned airline. The government is undertaking urgent runway repairs, 
but these will take time and the immediate impact on the tourism 
industry in 2016 is expected to be significant. Air New Zealand 
and Virgin Australia carry around 40% of inbound tourists, and 
the cancellation of the Qantas codeshare may hurt Air Vanuatu’s 
customer base. However, Air Vanuatu has increased its flights and cut 
ticket prices, which may help to oset some of these eects. A broader 
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concern is the potential damage to Vanuatu’s profile as a tourist 
destination, particularly coming on the back of Cyclone Pam last year. 
Inflation is expected to remain subdued at 1.9% in 2016, reflecting 
lower international commodity prices as well as base eects from the 
jump in inflation in mid-2015 following Cyclone Pam (Figure 3.36.4). 
In 2017, inflation is projected to pick up to 2.4% in line with increased 
economic activity and rising international commodity prices.
The new government has yet to release its 2016 budget. The 2016 
budget policy statement, approved under the previous government, 
targeted a balanced recurrent budget while taking on concessional debt 
to fund infrastructure investment and keeping the ratio of debt to GDP 
below 25%. The central bank is expected to maintain its accommodative 
stance through 2016, as both inflation and economic activity will likely 
remain relatively subdued.
The current account deficit is seen to widen further to the equivalent 
of 15.0% of GDP in 2016 as imported inputs for reconstruction and 
infrastructure works rise, and as tourism earnings remain depressed. 
In 2017, the current account is projected to improve to a deficit 
equivalent to 11.0% of GDP as tourism earnings recover. 
Policy challenge—delivering infrastructure to 
boost tourism and lift potential growth
Growth has been lackluster over the past several years compared with 
the highs seen in the mid- to late-2000s. While private investment 
has been weak, the major dierence has been lower public capital 
investment (Figure 3.36.5). The country’s infrastructure has deteriorated 
for lack of maintenance. Inadequate funding for the operation of assets 
has further undermined economic returns on public investments. 
Tourism, the country’s key economic driver, has suered as a result 
of deteriorating infrastructure. This is most evident in the cancellation 
of flights into Port Vila. However, the underlying issues run deeper. 
Visitor arrivals by air have been flat since 2012. While cruise ship 
visitation has risen significantly, its benefits to the local economy 
depend on passengers venturing onshore and purchasing local goods 
and services. Many point to deteriorating conditions in Port Vila and 
other areas as a key problem. Responses to a recent survey found the 
poor quality of public services and infrastructure cited most frequently 
as the least appealing aspect of visiting Vanuatu and the area where 
improvement was most needed. Meanwhile, improving connectivity 
remains crucial to developing tourism on the outer islands. 
To address these problems and broader infrastructure deficiencies, 
the government recently approved the Vanuatu Infrastructure Strategic 
Investment Plan, 2015–2024, which plans $407 million in new projects. 
Ensuring adequate funding for operation and maintenance will be 
critical. Major projects funded by development partners are now 
getting under way, including upgrades to the international and domestic 
wharves in Port Vila and to Bauerfield International Airport, as well as 
urban development projects to improve public facilities in Port Vila.
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North Pacific economies
Recent performance across these economies was mixed and is expected to remain so. Strong 
growth continued in Palau driven by higher tourist arrivals, while GDP in the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia contracted in the absence of public 
investment. Growth is expected to slow this year in Palau as tourism faces capacity constraints. 
Recovery in the near term in the other two economies hinges on their ability to access capital 
grants to fund major infrastructure projects. 
Economic performance 
Growth accelerated to an estimated 6.7% in Palau (Figure 3.37.1) while 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and the Federated States of 
Micronesia (FSM) continued to contract in FY2015 (ended 30 September 
2015), though by less than in FY2014. The improvement in Palau 
from 4.7% growth in FY2014 reflected strong performance in tourism 
(Figure 3.37.2). Tourism receipts in FY2015 were equivalent to 54.8% of 
GDP, up from 39.7% in FY2010. Visitor arrivals grew by 32.5% in FY2015 
to reach 166,136, more than twice the number in FY2010. The increase 
in arrivals has been driven by expanded direct charter flights from 
Hong Kong, China and Macau, China. Arrivals from the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) accounted for 54.0% of all arrivals in FY2015, 
up from just 1.2% in FY2010. Despite a reduction in April of the number 
of charter flights allowed, from 48 per month to 32, arrivals remained 
strong as airlines adapted by flying larger aircraft.
The RMI and the FSM continue to rely on public infrastructure 
projects for growth, their economies otherwise characterized by small 
private sectors and widespread informal employment. The lack of new 
projects in these economies reflects continued problems in utilizing 
capital grants flowing from the compacts of free association that all 
three North Pacific economies have with the US. In addition, extreme 
weather exerted downward pressure on GDP growth. 
Output in the FSM contracted for a fourth consecutive year, with 
GDP declining by an estimated 1.5% in FY2015 following a series of 
devastating typhoons that aected all four of its states (Figure 3.37.3). 
In March 2015, Typhoon Maysak destroyed an estimated 90% of food 
crops and hundreds of homes in Chuuk and on outlying islands in Yap. 
In May, Typhoon Noul struck the main islands of Yap, and Typhoon 
Dolphin caused severe flooding and damage in Pohnpei and Kosrae. 
Private consumption fell by 3.1%. Construction contracted by 16.6% with 
the completion of several compact-funded infrastructure projects, and 
capacity constraints hindered pickup through reconstruction. 
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The RMI economy contracted by 0.5% in FY2015 as election-related 
spending brought a slight improvement from a 1.0% decline in FY2014 
(Figure 3.37.4). The most recent major infrastructure project, an airport 
road realignment, was completed in FY2013. Construction fell by 32.9% 
in FY2015 after an 11.9% decline in FY2014. The hotel and restaurant 
sector shrank by 4.3%, partly reflecting the government’s purchase of a 
36-room hotel to use as a campus for the University of the South Pacific. 
This reduced the number of rooms available in Majuro to around 150. 
Like the FSM, the RMI was aected by several typhoons, the strongest 
being Typhoon Nangka, which hit in July.
Lower international food and fuel prices pushed down inflation 
(Figure 3.37.5). In Palau, inflation fell to 2.2% in FY2015, the lowest since 
FY2010 (a year when GDP contracted). The second phase of a tobacco 
tax hike pushed up the prices of tobacco products by 14.6%. Cheaper fuel 
prices caused transportation and utility costs to fall by 5.0%, but food 
prices rose by 3.3% on strong demand. In the RMI, lower commodity 
prices pushed down utility and transportation costs, leaving inflation a 
minimal 0.5%. In the FSM, consumer prices declined by an estimated 
1.1% in FY2015 as global food and fuel prices fell, despite supply 
shocks caused by typhoons. A decline in private consumption also 
drove deflation. 
In FY2015, all three north Pacific economies continued to record 
fiscal surpluses (Figure 3.37.6). Additional revenues from fishing license 
fees provided much-needed revenue, especially for the FSM and the RMI 
(Figure 3.37.7). In the RMI, fishing license fees were estimated at 30.7% 
of total revenues excluding grants in FY2015, up from 11.4% the previous 
year. In the FSM, this share rose from 40.5% in FY2014 to 58.2%.
In October, Palau passed a law converting 80% of its territorial 
waters into a marine sanctuary, prohibiting commercial fishing, 
oil drilling, and seabed mining. To provide alternative livelihoods 
for aected households, the government will promote ecotourism. 
Fishing license fees, which accounted for 8.5% of total revenues 
excluding grants in FY2015, are expected to decline in the future. 
The North Pacific economies lack manufacturing, so they depend 
on imports of goods. Their current account positions depend heavily 
on international commodity prices and the status of infrastructure 
projects. Cheaper global prices for fuel and other commodities, and 
higher fishing license revenues, pushed the current account balances 
of all these economies into surplus in FY2015 (Figure 3.37.8). In Palau, 
strong growth in tourism provided an additional push to achieve a 
small current account surplus. In the RMI and the FSM, the lack of 
construction helped reduce the import bill.
Economic prospects 
The growth outlook in Palau remains positive because of tourism. 
In the RMI and the FSM, recovery will depend on their ability to 
resolve their access to capital investment funds under their compact 
agreements. Meanwhile, drought associated with El Niño could, 
if it intensifies, bring prolonged economic hardship. 
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Palau’s economic expansion is expected to fall back to 3.0% in 
FY2016 as growth in tourist numbers slows (Box 3.37.1). This will be 
partly oset by growth in construction as hotel rooms are added to 
improve room availability. The double-digit growth rates for tourist 
arrivals in the past 2 fiscal years are unlikely to be sustained as hotels 
and tourist attractions operated nearly at capacity in FY2015. In the 
first quarter of FY2016, arrivals dropped by 11.7% from a year earlier, 
including a 13.6% drop in arrivals from the PRC, mainly because 
an aircraft flying from Hong Kong, China required maintenance. 
Visitor arrivals from other markets also fell significantly, notably 
Taipei,China down 22.0% and Japan down 6.4%. Lower arrivals are 
expected to persist through FY2016. 
Palau is forecast to rebound in FY2017 with 7.0% GDP growth. 
The expected 9.2% increase in rooms is seen to enable business 
expansion in hotels and restaurants, retail trade, and transportation and 
communication. Infrastructure works such as the Koror-Airai sanitation 
project and a submarine broadband cable are expected to further 
spur growth. 
The RMI economy is forecast to recover and grow by 1.5% in FY2016 
and 2.0% in FY2017, supported by fisheries and projects financed by 
development partners, including a water supply and sanitation project in 
Ebeye. The recent election of a new government reflected public demands 
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3.37.1 Explaining changes in the Palau GDP forecasts
In Asian Development Outlook 2015 (ADO 2015), published in March 2015, 
Palau’s economy was projected to expand by 8.0% in FY2015 (ended 
30 September 2015). In the October ADO 2015 Update, the projection 
was revised up to 10.0%. In this ADO 2016, GDP growth in FY2015 is 
now estimated at 6.7%. The main factor behind changes are recent trends 
in tourism.
Visitor arrivals reached a then record high of 125,427 in FY2014, up by 
13.4% from the previous year. Rapid growth in arrivals from the PRC then 
pushed arrivals to 114,000 in the first half of FY2015. The Government of 
Palau was concerned by the steep increase in arrivals, especially in light of 
the low carrying capacity of public infrastructure and tourist attractions. 
Charter flights from Hong Kong, China and Macau, China—the main links 
from the PRC—were reduced from 48 to 32 per month. Final figures for 
FY2015 show arrivals at 166,136, up by 32.5% from the previous fiscal year. 
When ADO 2015 was being prepared, GDP growth for FY2014 was 
estimated at 6.9%. In mid-2015, o¨cial data for Palau was released, reflecting 
higher GDP growth at 8.0% in FY2014 with stronger contributions from 
wholesale and retail trade, financial intermediation, and information and 
communication technology. The latest data, released in October 2015, 
show growth in FY2014 revised down to 4.7%, partly because real estate, 
manufacturing, and financial intermediation contracted. 
The latest revision also aected GDP growth figures for previous years, 
downgrading most of them, particularly from FY2011 to FY2014. This 
suggests unexpectedly weak transmission of growth in visitor arrivals into 
related economic activity. In view of this, the impact of the sharp increase 
in visitor arrivals in FY2015 is likely to be more muted, hence the lower 
estimate of GDP growth for the year.
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for economic revitalization and job creation, but meeting high 
expectations will be a challenge. Support from development partners for 
reform to state-owned enterprises, in line with supportive legislation 
passed in 2015, could pave the way for private sector growth. 
Growth in the FSM is forecast to reach 2.5% in FY2016 and 3.5% in 
FY2017 on expenditures from infrastructure grants connected to the 
compact agreement and on higher revenue from fishing licenses. 
Low inflation is expected to persist in the North Pacific in FY2016 
but then accelerate slightly in FY2017 in line with international fuel 
and food prices. The RMI is projected to run 2.0% inflation in FY2016, 
rising to 2.5% in FY2017, reflecting its weak economic performance. 
Reconstruction in the FSM is expected to temper deflation to 0.3% in 
FY2016 and contribute to inflation of 0.3% in 2017. Inflation in Palau is 
seen to ease further to 1.5% in FY2016, as the impact from the second 
phase of a tobacco tax hike in January 2015 fades, then climb to 2.5% 
in FY2017.
Current account surpluses are expected to continue except in Palau, 
where deficits equal to 2.3% of GDP in FY2016 and 1.3% in FY2017 are 
forecast as increased imports of construction materials for tourism 
ventures and lower tourism revenues more than oset lower fuel 
prices. The current account surplus in the RMI is projected to reach 
the equivalent of 11.1% of GDP in FY2016 and 8.9% in FY2017 as fishing 
license revenues rise. In the FSM, the current account surplus is seen to 
expand to 19.5% of GDP in FY2016 and 30.1% in FY2017.
Policy challenge—ensuring fiscal sustainability
Because their compact agreements with the US and the accompanying 
grants are scheduled to end in FY2023, the three North Pacific 
economies face a common challenge over the medium to long term 
of matching expenditure to expected revenues (including trust fund 
earnings) without the hefty grants that have supplemented revenues 
over the years (Figure 3.37.9). This must be achieved through fiscal 
consolidation and strengthened economic growth. The di¨culty of 
achieving fiscal sustainability varies, however, among the economies. 
Palau is arguably the best placed—through strong growth in 
tourism—to achieve sustainability. It is seeking to better manage its fast-
growing tourism industry by controlling and coordinating multiple policy 
levers—foreign investment, public investment, taxation, small business 
development, environmental management—to translate high visitor 
demand into a flow of higher-value tourists and more local capture of 
their expenditure. This is an enormous challenge. Necessary tax reform 
has been delayed in the Senate and seems unlikely to progress in this 
election year. Eective policy implementation and enforcement will 
require political commitment, eort from the whole government, and 
an improved public understanding of the issues and the di¨cult choices 
they pose. 
The FSM and the RMI require considerable eort to lift their growth 
rates while simultaneously managing expenditures closely. Key to 
boosting growth is the strategic use of capital investment funds supplied 
both through compact agreements and from development partners. 
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The FSM developed a strategic capital investment plan in 2015 that 
prioritizes public investment projects through a process coordinated 
by the national and state governments. The plan includes steps to 
improve implementation capacity and build upon public investment 
that has recently averaged $20 million annually. Any delay in investing 
the backlog in compact grants, which currently total over $140 million, 
would hamper local public expenditure and job generation, and 
ultimately require greater fiscal adjustment. 
The RMI has maintained a steady flow of public investment projects 
and increasingly works to make operations more e¨cient and the 
business environment more attractive. The composition of the newly 
elected Parliament reflects increased public concern about economic 
performance. The passing of the State-Owned Enterprise Act in late 2015 
provides a foundation for reinvigorating these economically essential 
entities. Certainly, change is needed because the Marshalls Energy 
Company, Air Marshall Islands, and the Marshall Islands Shipping 
Corporation all struggle financially. Further, internet penetration is only 
about 25% despite a broadband submarine cable, the use of which is 
being restricted by an unregulated monopoly public service provider. 
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South Pacific economies
Samoa and Tonga achieved higher growth as low oil prices helped boost activity in the transport 
and energy sectors, and as the implementation of public infrastructure projects improved. Growth 
in the Cook Islands slowed for lack of infrastructure projects and sufficient accommodation for 
tourists. Outward migration for employment supports consumption and helps alleviate poverty, 
but it also hampers economic growth. Opportunities in agriculture, related light industry, and 
tourism offer promise as potential growth engines.
Economic performance 
In contrast with Samoa and Tonga, and despite growth in its own 
transport and energy sectors, the Cook Islands economy contracted 
by 0.5% in FY2015 (ended 30 June 2015) as activity in construction, 
finance, and business services slowed (Figure 3.38.1). A shortage of 
accommodation in the peak tourist season constrained visitor arrivals, 
and numbers from Australia and Canada, which jointly contribute 
one-fifth of all arrivals, were disappointing. Growth accelerated to 
1.4% in Samoa and to 3.4% in Tonga as lower oil prices reduced input 
costs in the transport and electricity sectors. In Tonga, preparations for 
coronation celebrations in July 2015 and improved execution of public 
infrastructure projects contributed to higher growth. Samoa’s relatively 
low growth rate reflects lower agricultural output, which declined by 
more than 11%, and sluggish construction.
Inflation in the Cook Islands accelerated to 3.0% in FY2015 as a result 
of higher alcohol and tobacco taxes and a weaker New Zealand dollar, 
its ocial currency (Figure 3.38.2). In Samoa, inflation averaged 1.9% as 
higher domestic food prices caused by lower agricultural output more 
than oset price declines for transport and imported food. This marked 
a sharp reversal of deflation in FY2014. Tonga experienced deflation at 
0.7% as transport and utility prices fell because of lower fuel prices. 
In the Cook Islands, the overall FY2015 fiscal deficit reached 1.7% of 
GDP, up from only 0.1% the previous year on increased infrastructure 
spending (Figure 3.38.3). In Tonga, a surplus equal to 1.7% of GDP 
in FY2014 turned into a small deficit of 0.2% in FY2015 with higher 
capital spending, including for cyclone reconstruction. In Samoa, a 
19.3% decline in external grants prompted the government to cut 
expenditures, narrowing the deficit to the equivalent of 3.9% of GDP. 
Debt sustainability is a concern across these economies. Public 
debt rose in all three economies in FY2015 and, by the end of the fiscal 
year, equaled 23.0% of GDP in the Cook Islands, 55.3% in Samoa, and 
51.3% in Tonga (Figure 3.38.4). The increase in Tonga’s ratio of debt to 
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GDP resulted from depreciation of the pa’anga against the renminbi 
and US dollar (the currencies in which most of Tonga’s external debt 
is denominated) and increased borrowing, both domestically and from 
external concessional lenders. 
Low growth and inflation in Samoa allowed the central bank to 
maintain an accommodative monetary policy in FY2015. Private sector 
credit grew by 17.6% year on year to June 2015 as credit to businesses 
and households increased. The National Reserve Bank of Tonga also 
maintained an accommodative monetary policy. Lending rates of around 
8.5% (down from 12%–14% in the aftermath of the global financial crisis) 
and a government-managed fund scheme underpinned an 8.6% growth 
in credit to the private sector in FY2015 from 0.7% in the previous year. 
In the Cook Islands, credit from commercial banks grew by 1.1% in 
FY2015 despite relative stability in interest rates. This reflected a change 
in the banks’ past preference for consolidating balance sheets, which 
succeeded in significantly reducing the prevalence of nonperforming 
loans in their portfolios.
Samoa’s current account deficit was equivalent to 4.8% of GDP 
in FY2015, 2.2 percentage points narrower than the year before 
(Figure 3.38.5). This was the result of lower imports of services and 
higher remittances. The deficit was oset in part by external capital 
grants and drawdowns on loans. Foreign exchange reserves remained 
at a reasonable level, providing cover for 5.2 months of goods imports, 
despite declining from $155.2 million in FY2014 to $132.8 million. Tonga’s 
current account deficit widened to the equivalent of 8.3% of GDP in 
FY2015 from 5.0% in FY2014, mainly due to increased merchandise 
imports related to coronation celebrations and lower earnings from 
exports of services. However, foreign exchange reserves ended FY2015 
stable at $150.8 million, sucient to cover 11.3 months of imports.
Economic prospects 
Economic activity in the Cook Islands is expected to be flat in 
FY2016 and to grow modestly by 0.2% in FY2017, supported by public 
investment and a slight improvement in tourism. This forecast takes into 
account a downbeat outlook for economic growth in both New Zealand 
and Australia, which are important export destinations and source 
markets for tourists. Limited local capacity to implement capital projects 
and a shortage of tourist accommodation in the peak holiday seasons 
constrain growth in the near term. The loss of skilled workers to 
outward migration also hinders growth.
With fishing and tourism activity expected to increase, Samoa’s 
economy is forecast to grow by 2.0% in FY2016 before slowing to 0.5% 
in FY2017 as nonfood manufacturing declines with the expected closure 
of a car parts factory. By contrast, the outlook for Tonga is positive, at 
least in the medium term. Preparations for the South Pacific Games and 
investments in tourism and government oces are expected to uphold 
growth at 2.8% in FY2016 and 2.7% in FY2017. 
Inflation in the Cook Islands is forecast at 1.8% in FY2016 and 
2.0% in FY2017 as import prices rise. In Samoa, prices are expected 
to increase by 2.0% in FY2016 in response to an expected decline in 
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domestic agricultural output and interruptions to local food supplies, 
and by the same rate in FY2017 as global fuel and food prices start to 
recover. In Tonga, deflation is seen to ease to 0.3% in FY2016 before 
returning to inflation, at 0.5%, in FY2017 in line with forecast global 
price rises for food and fuel. Demand generated by the South Pacific 
Games could exert additional upward pressure on prices.
The Cook Islands current account balance is forecast to improve 
on continued growth in tourism earnings. Surpluses are expected to 
equal 37.3% of GDP in FY2016 and 41.3% in FY2017 (Figure 3.38.5). 
Samoa’s current account deficit is forecast to ease to 4.3% of GDP 
in FY2016 with lower payments for imports, then widen to 5.1% in 
FY2017 on higher import prices. In Tonga, the current account deficit 
is expected to narrow significantly (to the equivalent of 1.9% of GDP) in 
FY2016 as import costs decline. The deficit is seen to widen to 3.2% in 
FY2017. These deficits are expected to be largely oset by foreign grants 
and concessional loans.
Policy challenge—raising growth and creating jobs
A common policy challenge facing these three South Pacific economies 
is to achieve higher economic growth to generate new jobs. Their 
working-age populations have the option of emigrating to labor markets 
in New Zealand and Australia with relative ease. This migration brings 
in remittances—inflows that are particularly significant for Samoa and 
Tonga—but the associated labor drain stymies growth and creates a 
cycle of low growth that encourages further emigration, which further 
depresses economic activity. 
The Cook Islands economy suers from low tourism growth due to 
shortages of accommodation during the peak season. The lack of large 
new investments in hotels constrains tourism and broader economic 
growth. Without adding accommodation, tourism earnings can be raised 
only by increasing local inputs and attracting more high-end tourists, 
but these measures are unlikely to spur employment growth. Easing 
approval procedures for land leases and new tourism developments 
could expedite investment and facilitate growth in the private sector, 
thus creating jobs in the tourism industry.
Samoa has struggled with low growth following a series of disasters. 
Nonfood manufacturing has been contracting for some years, causing 
employment in the sector to dwindle. Growth in tourism has been slow 
as well. The availability of new sources of finance for agribusiness holds 
promise to create employment, both formal and informal, but may not 
be sucient to catalyze sustained acceleration in economic growth. 
A higher growth path for Tonga over the medium term requires 
sustained commitment to reform to improve the business environment. 
In the absence of reform, growth is expected to revert to a low 
trajectory—at or below the historical average growth rate of 1.7%—in the 
long run, once activity related to post-cyclone reconstruction and the 
hosting of the South Pacific Games is completed. As in Samoa, growth in 
agriculture and related light industry development, as well as eorts to 
attract more tourist spending, appear to be the most promising avenues 
for increasing employment in Tonga.
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Small island economies
Achieving fiscal sustainability despite dependence on volatile and uncertain revenue sources is 
a common challenge for the small island economies of Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu. Record high 
fishing license revenues and investments from development partners have underpinned rising 
public expenditure and growth. However, in Nauru, damage to port facilities has disrupted 
phosphate exports and caused steep GDP contraction.
Economic performance 
Kiribati’s economy grew by 3.0% in 2015, driven by spending on 
infrastructure projects to upgrade a road and improve sanitation 
using development partner funds. Higher fishing license revenues that 
enabled increased government spending also contributed to growth 
(Figure 3.39.1). Nauru’s economy is estimated to have contracted by 
10.0% in FY2015 (ended 30 June 2015) after damage to the port’s 
mooring system disrupted phosphate exports (which declined by 
two-thirds) and imports of fuel and other supplies. These losses 
were partly oset by increased government and consumer spending. 
Tuvalu grew by 2.0% in 2015 with stimulus from higher public spending 
on infrastructure projects and high fishing license revenues. 
Inflation was lower in Kiribati as prices rose by only 1.4% in 2015 
despite depreciation of the Australian dollar, the ocial currency 
(Figure 3.39.2). Inflation was slightly higher in Tuvalu at 2.0% in 2015. 
In both Kiribati and Tuvalu, lower food and fuel prices helped keep 
prices in check. In Nauru, inflation surged to 11.4% in FY2015 because of 
disrupted supply of consumer goods through the damaged port and the 
elimination of retail fuel subsidies. 
The strongest El Niño in nearly 20 years has brought record tuna 
migrations to the region. As signatories to the Nauru Agreement, all 
three economies have benefited in recent years from higher licensing 
fees under the vessel day scheme. In 2015, fishing license revenues as a 
share of GDP were 99% for Kiribati, 21% for Nauru, and 64% for Tuvalu.
Government revenue declined by 14.3% in Kiribati, while 
expenditure increased by 3.5%. These trends replaced the large 
fiscal surplus in 2014 with a small deficit equivalent to 1.1% of GDP 
in 2015 (Figure 3.39.3). Nauru fell into fiscal deficit in 2015 as several 
revenue lines underperformed. In Tuvalu, revenues grew slower than 
expenditure to leave a much narrower fiscal surplus than in 2014.
Kiribati maintained its current account surplus with strong 
license fee and remittance inflows (Figure 3.39.4). Tuvalu, by 
contrast, saw declining inflows create a large current account deficit. 
No recent balance of payments data for Nauru are available. 
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Economic prospects
In Kiribati, the ongoing implementation of major projects, funded by 
development partners, in transport and in water supply and sanitation 
are expected to support growth at 1.8% in 2016, rising to 2.0% in 2017.
Growth in Nauru is expected to recover to 3.0% in FY2016 and 
then rise to 15.0% in FY2017 as phosphate exports recover following 
the full restoration of the moorings. Nauru will benefit as well from the 
gradual integration into the economy of about 850 refugees who recently 
cleared the Australian-run Regional Processing Centre. Most of these 
refugees are of working age and can significantly augment the existing 
labor force of 6,400. Many possess skills that could help address skills 
shortages, and some have already taken up local positions while others 
have opened new businesses. 
Expansionary fiscal policy in Tuvalu in 2016 is expected to help 
boost growth to 3.5% as the government increases spending to develop 
new accommodation ahead of the Pacific Island Leaders Meeting 
in 2016. The government plans higher spending to build health centers 
and classrooms on outer islands and so make public expenditures 
more inclusive. Growth is expected to moderate to 3.0% in 2017 as the 
temporary boost to the economy from the leaders’ meeting fades.
In Kiribati, inflation is expected to be low at 0.3% in 2016 as 
international prices remain depressed, then to rise to 0.8% as prices 
recover, particularly for oil. Inflation in Nauru is forecast to slow but 
remain elevated at 6.6% in FY2016 as problems with the moorings are 
likely to persist and continue to disrupt imports. However, inflation is 
seen to ease considerably in FY2017 to 1.7% after repairs to the mooring 
system are completed. In Tuvalu, inflation will likely accelerate to 3.5% 
in 2016, driven largely by demand created through fiscal expansion, then 
moderate to 2.0% in FY2017 in line with lower public spending.
The current account in Kiribati is projected to narrow in 2016 but 
maintain a surplus equal to 15% of GDP supported by fishing license 
revenues and remittances from workers overseas. A deficit equivalent 
to 10% of GDP is forecast for 2017 as fishing license fees are expected 
to moderate, and workers’ foreign incomes and remittances to decline. 
In Tuvalu, the current account is projected to record a deficit equal to 
21.4% of GDP in 2016 as public investments rise, before narrowing to 
18.7% in 2017 with fiscal consolidation.
Policy challenge—achieving fiscal sustainability 
The main macroeconomic challenge facing the small Pacific island 
economies is to achieve fiscal stability when existing revenue sources 
are volatile and highly uncertain. In early 2016, in response to 
falling prices for skipjack tuna, the three countries renegotiated the 
South Pacific Tuna Treaty with the US and agreed on lower access fees 
for 2016. Negotiations with the US are expected to continue. Further 
falls in skipjack tuna prices in 2017 pose a downside risk to fiscal and 
GDP growth projections for all three economies.
Fishing license revenues have contributed to annual budget 
surpluses in Kiribati in recent years. Since 2012, the government 
and development partners have worked to implement the Kiribati 
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Economic Reform Program, which aims to restore fiscal sustainability 
by improving revenue performance and containing public expenditure 
while safeguarding vital public services and infrastructure investments. 
The program reduces the amounts the government is allowed to draw 
down from its Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund, a sovereign wealth 
fund that was nearly depleted by high fiscal deficits in the wake of the 
global economic crisis. Development partners have encouraged the 
government to reinvest windfall fishing license revenues in the fund to 
build its real value per capita.
Nauru currently benefits from higher income associated with 
Australia’s Regional Processing Centre and a related refugee 
resettlement program, fishing license fees, and, until recently, phosphate 
exports. In late 2015, the government established its new Nauru 
Intergenerational Trust Fund to deposit a share of windfall revenues in 
a long-term investment vehicle intended eventually to provide a stable 
source of budget financing. The current budget allocates A$20.4 million, 
or about 18% of total domestic revenue, for transfer to the fund once it 
becomes fully operational. Regular annual contributions are to follow 
a formula applied to Nauru’s domestic revenues. The Government of 
Australia will also contribute to the fund annually and participate in 
its governing committee. Other partners have also been invited to join. 
The trust fund is a crucial step forward at a time when Nauru’s budget 
relies increasingly on uncertain and unsustainable revenue sources. 
However, broader reforms remain critical. In particular, the government 
needs to establish a comprehensive fiscal framework to ensure that 
it can continue to contribute to the fund while maintaining adequate 
fiscal buers, keeping consumption expenditure sustainable, and using a 
higher share of spending to develop human capital and infrastructure. 
The substantial increase in fishing license revenues has been the 
driving force behind fiscal expansion in Tuvalu, where expenditures 
are up by 28% in the 2016 budget. With assistance from development 
partners, the government has restored the value of the Consolidated 
Investment Fund of the Tuvalu Trust Fund, from which the government 
sources supplementary financing to cover budget deficits. The value 
of the trust fund rose from A$6.2 million at the end of 2008 to 
A$25.6 million at the end of 2015. This places the government in a strong 
position to consolidate its finances without severely disrupting public 
service delivery. Fiscal consolidation is crucial to put future spending 
on a sustainable footing. Introducing a medium-term fiscal framework 
that targets a structural surplus would strengthen Tuvalu’s capacity to 
manage revenue volatility, and placing more savings in the Tuvalu Trust 
Fund would help ensure resilience in the face of adverse shocks.
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Kiribati 2015 2016
GDP growth   1.8   2.0
Inflation   0.3   0.8
Current account balance  
(share of GDP)
 15.0 –10.0
Nauru
GDP growth   3.0  15.0
Inflation   6.6   1.7
Current account balance  
(share of GDP)
.‥ .‥
Tuvalu
GDP growth   3.5   3.0
Inflation   3.5   2.0
Current account balance  
(share of GDP)
–21.4 –18.7
... = data not available.
Note: Years are fiscal years ending on 30 June of that 
year for Nauru and coinciding with the calendar year 
for Kiribati and Tuvalu.
Source: ADB estimates.

STATISTICAL 
APPENDIx
Statistical notes and tables
The statistical appendix presents selected economic indicators for 
the 45 developing member economies of the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) in 18 tables. The economies are grouped into five subregions: 
Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. 
Most of the tables contain historical data from 2011 to 2015; some have 
forecasts for 2016 and 2017.
The data were standardized to the degree possible to allow 
comparability over time and across economies, but dierences in 
statistical methodology, definitions, coverage, and practices make full 
comparability impossible. The national income accounts section is 
based on the United Nations System of National Accounts, while the 
data on balance of payments are based on International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) accounting standards. Historical data were obtained from 
ocial sources, statistical publications and databases, and documents 
of ADB, the IMF, and the World Bank. For some economies, data for 
2015 are estimated from the latest available information. Projections 
for 2016 and 2017 are generally ADB estimates made on the bases of 
available quarterly or monthly data, though some projections are from 
governments.
Most economies report by calendar year. The following record their 
government finance data by fiscal year: Armenia; Azerbaijan; Brunei 
Darussalam; the Cook Islands; Hong Kong, China; Kazakhstan; the 
Kyrgyz Republic; the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR); 
Samoa; Singapore; Taipei,China; Tajikistan; Thailand; and Uzbekistan. 
The Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, the Republic of Marshall 
Islands, and Palau report government finance and balance-of-payments 
data by fiscal year. South Asian countries (except for the Maldives 
and Sri Lanka), Myanmar, Samoa, and Tonga report all variables by 
fiscal year.
Regional and subregional averages or totals are provided for seven 
tables (A1, A2, A6, A11, A12, A13, and A14). For tables A1, A2, A6, and 
A14, the averages are computed using weights derived from gross 
national income (GNI) in current US dollars following the World Bank 
Atlas method. The GNI data for 2011–2014 were obtained from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators online. Weights for 2014 
were carried over through 2017. The GNI data for the Cook Islands 
were estimated using the Atlas conversion factor. Myanmar and 
Nauru have no GNI data. For tables A11 and A12, the regional and 
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subregional averages were computed on the basis of a consistent sum, 
which means that if there are missing country data for a given year, the 
sum of the prior year used for computing the growth rate excludes the 
corresponding country data. Data for Myanmar and Nauru are excluded 
from the computation of all subregional averages and totals.
Tables A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5. These tables show related data on 
output growth, production, and demand. Changes to the national income 
accounts series for some countries have been made to accommodate 
a change in source, methodology, and/or base year. The series for 
Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, and Pakistan reflect fiscal year 
data, rather than calendar year data, while those for Timor-Leste reflect 
the GDP excluding oil and United Nations inputs.
Table A1: Growth rate of GDP (% per year). The table shows annual 
growth rates of GDP valued at constant market prices, factor costs, 
or basic prices. GDP at market prices is the aggregation of the value 
added of all resident producers at producers’ prices including taxes 
less subsidies on imports plus all nondeductible value-added or similar 
taxes. Constant factor cost measures dier from market price measures 
in that they exclude taxes on production and include subsidies. Basic 
price valuation is the factor cost plus some taxes on production, such as 
property and payroll taxes, and less some subsidies, such as labor-
related subsidies but not product-related subsidies. Most economies 
use constant market price valuation. Fiji, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka use 
constant factor costs, while the Maldives and Nepal use basic prices. 
The series for Taipei,China has been changed to accommodate its 
adoption of the chain-linking method.
Table A2: Growth rate of per capita GDP (% per year). The table 
provides the growth rates of real per capita GDP, which is defined as 
GDP at constant prices divided by the population. The series for most of 
the Pacific countries were revised to accommodate a change of source 
for population data. Data on per capita gross national income in US 
dollar terms (Atlas method) for 2014 are also shown, sourced from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators online.
Table A3: Growth rate of value added in agriculture (% per year). 
The table shows the growth rates of value added in agriculture at 
constant prices and its corresponding share in 2014 at current prices. 
The agriculture sector comprises agricultural crops, livestock, poultry, 
fisheries, and forestry. 
Table A4: Growth rate of value added in industry (% per year). The 
table provides the growth rates of value added in industry at constant 
prices and its corresponding share in 2014 at current prices. This sector 
comprises manufacturing, mining and quarrying, construction, and 
utilities. 
Table A5: Growth rate of value added in services (% per year). 
The table gives the growth rates of value added in services at 
constant prices and its corresponding share in 2014 at current prices. 
Subsectors generally include trade, banking, finance, real estate, public 
administration, and other services.
Table A6: Inflation (% per year). Data on inflation rates represent 
period averages. The inflation rates presented are based on consumer 
price indexes. The consumer price indexes of the following economies 
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are for a given city or group of consumers only: Afghanistan is for 
Kabul (until 2011), Cambodia is for Phnom Penh, the Marshall Islands 
is for Majuro, Solomon Islands is for Honiara, and Nepal is for urban 
consumers.
Table A7: Growth in money supply (% per year). This table tracks 
the annual percentage change in the end-of-period supply of broad 
money as represented by M2 for most countries. M2 is defined as the 
sum of M1 and quasi-money, where M1 denotes currency in circulation 
plus demand deposits, and quasi-money consists of time and savings 
deposits including foreign currency deposits.
Tables A8, A9, and A10: Government finance. These tables give 
the revenue and expenditure transactions and the fiscal balance of 
the central government expressed as a percentage of GDP in nominal 
terms. For Cambodia (since 2006), the People’s Republic of China, 
India, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, and Tajikistan, 
transactions are those reported by the general government.
Table A8: Central government revenues (% of GDP). Central 
government revenues comprise all nonrepayable receipts, both current 
and capital, plus grants. These amounts are computed as a percentage 
of GDP at current prices. For the Republic of Korea, revenues exclude 
social security contributions. For Singapore, revenues include the net 
investment returns contribution. For Kazakhstan, revenues include 
transfers from the national fund. Grants are excluded in Cambodia, 
the Lao PDR, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand; revenues from 
disinvestment are included for India; and only current revenues are 
included for Bangladesh.
Table A9: Central government expenditures (% of GDP). Central 
government expenditures comprise all nonrepayable payments to 
both current and capital expenses, plus net lending. These amounts 
are computed as a share of GDP at current prices. For Thailand, 
expenditures refer to budgetary expenditures excluding externally 
financed expenditures and corresponding borrowing. Those for 
Tajikistan include externally financed public investment programs. 
One-time expenditures are excluded for Pakistan.
Table A10: Fiscal balance of central government (% of GDP). Fiscal 
balance is the dierence between central government revenues and 
expenditures. The dierence is also computed as a share of GDP at 
current prices. Data variations may arise from statistical discrepancies, 
e.g., balancing items for both central and local governments, and from 
dierences in the concept used in the individual computations of 
revenues and expenditures as compared with the calculation of the 
fiscal balance. For Fiji, the fiscal balance excludes total loan repayments. 
For Thailand, the fiscal balance is a cash balance composed of the 
budgetary and nonbudgetary balances. Some o-budget accounts are 
included in the computation of the fiscal balance for Turkmenistan.
Tables A11, A12, A13, and A14: Balance of payments. These tables 
show selected international economic transactions of countries as 
recorded in the balance of payments. These items cover annual flows.
Tables A11 and A12: Growth rates of merchandise exports and 
imports (% per year). These tables show the annual growth rates of 
exports and imports of goods. Data are in million US dollars, primarily 
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obtained from the balance-of-payments accounts of each economy. 
Exports are reported free on board. Import data are reported free on 
board, except for the following economies, which value them on the 
basis of cost, insurance, and freight: Afghanistan; Bhutan; Cambodia; 
Hong Kong, China; India; the Lao PDR; Myanmar; the Philippines; 
Samoa; Singapore; Solomon Islands; and Thailand. 
Table A13: Trade balance ($ million). The trade balance is the 
dierence between merchandise exports and merchandise imports. 
Figures in this table are based on the exports and imports amounts used 
to generate tables A11 and A12. 
Table A14: Current account balance (% of GDP). The current 
account balance is the sum of the balance of trade for merchandise, 
net trade in services and factor income, and net transfers. The values 
reported are divided by GDP at current prices in US dollars. In the case 
of Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Viet Nam, ocial transfers are excluded 
from the current account balance. 
Table A15: Exchange rates to the US dollar (annual average). 
Annual average exchange rates are quoted as the local currencies per 
US dollar.
Table A16: Gross international reserves ($ million). Gross 
international reserves are defined as the US dollar value of holdings of 
foreign exchange, special drawing rights, reserve position in the IMF, 
and gold at the end of a given period. For the Marshall Islands and 
Taipei,China, this heading refers to foreign exchange reserves only. In 
some economies, the rubric is foreign assets and reserves of national 
monetary authorities and national oil funds, i.e., foreign assets of the 
Maldives Monetary Authority, net foreign reserves of the State Bank 
of Pakistan, assets of the National Oil Fund of Azerbaijan, and ocial 
external assets of Kiribati. The data for India are as of 6 February 2015.
Table A17: External debt outstanding ($ million). For most 
economies, external debt outstanding, public and private, includes 
medium- and long-term debt, short-term debt, and IMF credit. For 
Cambodia, and the Lao PDR, only public external debt is reported. 
For Azerbaijan, India, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand, the figures for 2015 are 
as of the end of September.
Table A18: Debt service ratio (% of exports of goods and services). 
This table generally presents the total debt service payments of each 
economy, which comprise principal repayments (excluding on short-
term debt) and interest payments on outstanding external debt, as a 
percentage of exports of goods and services. For Cambodia and the 
Lao PDR, debt service refers to external public debt only. For Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa, and Viet Nam, exports of goods are used as 
the denominator in the calculation of the ratio; for the Philippines, 
exports of goods, services, and income are used as the denominator. 
For Bangladesh, the ratio represents debt service payments on 
medium- and long-term loans as a percentage of exports of goods, 
nonfactor services, and workers’ remittances; and for Azerbaijan, the 
ratio represents public and publicly guaranteed external debt service 
payments as a percentage of exports of goods and nonfactor services.
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Table A1 Growth rate of GDP (% per year)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Central Asia 6.8 5.6 6.6 5.3 2.9 2.1 2.8
Armenia 4.7 7.2 3.3 3.5 3.0 2.0 2.3
Azerbaijan 0.1 2.2 5.8 2.8 1.1 –1.0 1.0
Georgia 7.2 6.4 3.3 4.6 2.8 2.5 3.5
Kazakhstan 7.5 5.0 6.0 4.3 1.0 0.7 1.0
Kyrgyz Republic 6.0 –0.1 10.9 4.0 3.5 1.0 2.0
Tajikistan 7.4 7.5 7.4 6.7 6.0 3.8 4.0
Turkmenistan 14.7 11.1 10.2 10.3 6.5 6.5 7.0
Uzbekistan 8.3 8.2 8.0 8.1 8.0 6.9 7.3
East Asia 8.3 6.6 6.8 6.6 6.0 5.7 5.6
China, People’s Rep. of 9.5 7.7 7.7 7.3 6.9 6.5 6.3
Hong Kong, China 4.8 1.7 3.1 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.2
Korea, Rep. of 3.7 2.3 2.9 3.3 2.6 2.6 2.8
Mongolia 17.3 12.3 11.6 7.9 2.3 0.1 0.5
Taipei,China 3.8 2.1 2.2 3.9 0.7 1.6 1.8
South Asia 6.3 5.6 6.2 6.7 7.0 6.9 7.3
Afghanistan 7.2 11.9 3.7 1.3 1.5 2.0 3.0
Bangladesh 6.5 6.5 6.0 6.1 6.6 6.7 6.9
Bhutan 9.7 6.4 3.6 3.8 5.9 6.4 6.1
India 6.6 5.6 6.6 7.2 7.6 7.4 7.8
Maldives 8.7 2.5 4.7 6.5 1.5 3.5 3.9
Nepal 3.8 4.6 3.8 5.1 3.0 1.5 4.8
Pakistan 3.6 3.8 3.7 4.0 4.2 4.5 4.8
Sri Lanka 8.4 9.1 3.4 4.9 4.8 5.3 5.8
Southeast Asia 4.8 5.9 5.0 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.8
Brunei Darussalam 3.7 0.9 –2.1 –2.3 –1.1 1.0 2.5
Cambodia 7.1 7.3 7.4 7.1 7.0 7.0 7.1
Indonesia 6.2 6.0 5.6 5.0 4.8 5.2 5.5
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 7.8 7.9 7.8 7.5 6.7 6.8 7.0
Malaysia 5.3 5.5 4.7 6.0 5.0 4.2 4.4
Myanmar 5.6 7.3 8.4 8.7 7.2 8.4 8.3
Philippines 3.7 6.7 7.1 6.1 5.8 6.0 6.1
Singapore 6.2 3.7 4.7 3.3 2.0 2.0 2.2
Thailand 0.8 7.2 2.7 0.8 2.8 3.0 3.5
Viet Nam 6.2 5.2 5.4 6.0 6.7 6.7 6.5
The Pacific 8.1 5.8 3.8 9.4 7.0 3.8 3.1
Cook Islands –2.6 4.1 –1.7 –1.2 –0.5 0.0 0.2
Fiji 2.7 1.4 4.7 5.3 4.0 2.7 4.5
Kiribati 2.7 3.4 2.4 3.8 3.0 1.8 2.0
Marshall Islands 1.3 4.0 1.9 –1.0 –0.5 1.5 2.0
Micronesia, Fed. States of 1.8 –0.5 –3.6 –3.4 –1.5 2.5 3.5
Nauru 46.9 25.7 15.4 17.5 –10.0 3.0 15.0
Palau 4.4 3.1 –1.7 4.7 6.7 3.0 7.0
Papua New Guinea 10.7 8.1 5.0 13.3 9.9 4.3 2.4
Samoa 5.6 0.4 –1.9 1.2 1.4 2.0 0.5
Solomon Islands 7.4 2.3 2.8 2.0 3.2 3.0 2.8
Timor–Leste 9.5 6.4 2.8 6.0 4.1 4.5 5.5
Tonga 2.9 0.8 –3.1 2.0 3.4 2.8 2.7
Tuvalu 8.5 0.2 1.3 2.0 2.0 3.5 3.0
Vanuatu 1.2 1.8 2.0 2.3 –1.0 2.5 3.8
Average 7.4 6.3 6.4 6.3 5.9 5.7 5.7
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Table A2 Growth rate of per capita GDP (% per year)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Per capita GNI ($) 
2014
Central Asia 5.2 4.1 5.1 3.8 1.2 0.6 1.2
Armenia 5.3 7.6 3.1 3.9 3.2 2.4 –0.7 4,020
Azerbaijan –1.1 0.9 4.5 1.5 –0.1 –2.2 –0.1 7,590
Georgia 6.4 5.7 3.7 4.5 2.6 2.5 3.5 3,720
Kazakhstan 5.9 3.6 4.5 2.8 –1.2 –1.1 –0.6 11,850
Kyrgyz Republic 4.8 –1.4 8.7 2.0 –0.5 –0.6 1.0 1,250
Tajikistan 6.9 6.1 3.4 2.8 4.2 2.2 1.8 1,080
Turkmenistan 13.1 9.5 8.6 8.7 4.9 4.9 5.4 8,020
Uzbekistan 5.3 5.6 6.3 6.3 7.0 5.2 5.6 2,090
East Asia 7.7 6.1 6.3 6.1 5.5 5.3 5.1
China, People’s Rep. of 9.0 7.2 7.2 6.7 6.3 6.0 5.7 7,400
Hong Kong, China 4.1 0.5 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.4 40,320
Korea, Rep. of 2.9 1.8 2.5 2.9 2.2 2.2 2.4 27,090
Mongolia 15.3 10.2 9.4 5.6 0.1 –1.9 –1.5 4,280
Taipei,China 3.5 1.7 1.9 3.8 0.6 1.5 1.7 22,610
South Asia 5.0 4.3 4.7 5.3 5.6 5.7 6.1
Afghanistan 5.2 9.7 1.2 –0.6 –0.4 0.0 1.0 680
Bangladesh 5.1 5.2 4.6 4.6 5.1 5.3 5.5 1,080
Bhutan 7.8 4.6 1.8 2.1 4.2 4.8 4.6 2,370
India 5.3 4.3 5.3 5.9 6.2 6.1 6.5 1,570
Maldives 5.8 0.4 2.6 4.1 –0.7 1.2 1.7 6,410
Nepal 3.1 3.1 2.3 3.6 1.6 0.1 3.4 730
Pakistan 1.5 1.8 1.6 2.0 2.2 4.5 4.6 1,400
Sri Lanka 7.4 11.5 2.6 3.9 3.8 5.1 3.3 3,460
Southeast Asia 3.4 4.4 3.6 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.3
Brunei Darussalam 2.0 –0.7 –3.7 –3.7 –3.7 –0.3 1.2 34,210
Cambodia 5.5 5.6 6.2 5.8 5.7 5.5 5.7 1,020
Indonesia 4.3 4.5 4.1 3.6 3.4 3.9 3.6 3,630
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 5.7 6.5 5.7 5.4 2.5 3.8 4.4 1,660
Malaysia 3.9 4.1 2.7 3.6 3.6 2.9 2.8 11,120
Myanmar 4.5 6.2 7.3 8.0 6.3 7.6 7.5 1,270
Philippines 2.8 4.8 5.2 4.3 4.1 5.3 4.5 3,500
Singapore 4.0 1.2 3.0 1.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 55,150
Thailand 0.4 6.7 2.2 0.3 2.3 2.5 3.0 5,780
Viet Nam 5.1 4.1 4.3 4.9 5.5 5.7 5.5 1,890
The Pacific 7.8 3.4 1.5 6.8 4.6 1.2 0.7
Cook Islands –21.1 7.0 –0.3 2.5 3.3 –14.7 –0.2 21,864
Fiji 18.9 0.9 4.4 4.8 3.5 2.2 4.0 4,870
Kiribati 0.6 1.3 0.3 1.7 0.9 –0.3 –0.1 2,950
Marshall Islands 0.8 3.6 1.5 –1.4 –2.5 1.0 1.5 4,390
Micronesia, Fed. States of 2.4 –1.1 –3.6 –3.4 –1.4 2.7 3.7 3,200
Nauru 45.3 22.2 12.1 16.0 –12.5 0.1 11.8 ...
Palau 6.4 5.1 –1.3 3.7 5.7 1.9 6.0 11,110
Papua New Guinea 7.1 4.8 1.8 9.9 6.6 1.2 –0.7 2,240
Samoa 4.8 –0.3 –2.7 0.5 0.6 1.3 –0.2 4,060
Solomon Islands 4.9 0.0 0.5 –0.3 1.7 0.5 0.3 1,830
Timor–Leste 6.7 3.6 0.0 3.2 1.3 1.7 3.0 2,680
Tonga 3.2 0.7 –3.2 2.0 3.4 2.9 2.8 4,260
Tuvalu 7.1 –1.0 0.0 –0.4 0.2 1.7 3.9 5,720
Vanuatu –1.4 –0.8 –0.5 –0.1 –3.3 0.2 1.5 3,160
Average 6.6 5.5 5.6 5.5 5.1 5.0 4.9
... = data not available, GNI = gross national income.
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Table A3 Growth rate of value added in agriculture (% per year)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Sector share (%), 2014
Central Asia
Armenia 14.0 9.5 7.6 7.8 11.4 20.3
Azerbaijan –8.0 5.8 4.9 –2.6 6.6 5.7
Georgia 8.5 –3.8 11.3 1.6 2.8 9.3
Kazakhstan 23.0 –17.6 10.9 0.7 ... 4.7
Kyrgyz Republic 1.9 1.2 2.6 –0.5 6.2 17.1
Tajikistan 7.9 10.4 7.6 4.5 3.2 30.7
Turkmenistan 0.1 8.1 10.0 4.2 7.9 8.5
Uzbekistan 6.6 7.0 6.8 6.9 6.8 18.8
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 4.2 4.5 3.8 4.1 3.9 9.2
Hong Kong, China 0.8 –3.2 4.9 –6.0 –3.2 0.1
Korea, Rep. of –2.0 –0.9 3.1 2.6 –1.6 2.3
Mongolia –0.3 21.1 19.2 13.7 10.7 13.3
Taipei,China 4.5 –3.2 1.3 0.5 –3.1 1.9
South Asia
Afghanistan –7.9 31.5 0.0 –0.1 –2.0 23.5
Bangladesh 4.5 3.0 2.5 4.4 3.3 16.1
Bhutan 1.6 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 17.4
India 0.0 1.5 4.2 –0.2 1.1 17.4
Maldives 1.1 0.0 5.1 0.2 –1.4 3.4
Nepal 4.5 4.6 1.1 2.9 1.9 32.5
Pakistan 2.0 3.6 2.7 2.7 2.9 25.0
Sri Lanka 4.6 3.9 3.2 4.9 5.5 8.0
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam –2.6 8.1 –1.2 4.8 ... 0.8
Cambodia 3.1 4.3 1.6 0.3 0.2 29.0
Indonesia 3.9 4.6 4.2 4.2 4.0 13.7
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 1.8 2.5 3.5 2.9 2.0 24.3
Malaysia 6.8 1.0 1.9 2.1 1.0 9.0
Myanmar –0.7 1.7 3.6 3.3 ... 27.9
Philippines 2.6 2.8 1.1 1.6 0.2 11.3
Singapore 2.1 3.6 14.5 1.9 –3.6 0.0
Thailand 6.3 2.7 0.8 0.7 –4.2 10.2
Viet Nam 4.2 2.9 2.6 3.4 2.4 18.9
The Pacific
Cook Islands –7.3 7.7 2.3 18.0 3.6 8.5
Fiji 16.1 –2.0 6.8 –0.4 ... 11.5
Kiribati 5.7 ... ... ... ... ...
Marshall Islands 6.2 12.4 –0.8 –2.4 1.6 19.6
Micronesia, Fed. States of 3.2 4.3 –4.8 0.7 –2.3 26.5
Nauru 12.9 8.4 –2.8 2.9 ... 4.4
Palau 9.5 1.5 –8.0 –1.7 6.2 4.1
Papua New Guinea 6.9 –1.6 1.8 3.3 2.1 23.9
Samoa 2.4 –7.2 –2.4 9.6 –1.8 9.3
Solomon Islands 2.3 –0.5 –0.8 7.1 2.1 28.0
Timor–Leste –19.9 23.5 0.5 ... ... ...
Tonga 2.0 0.5 3.7 3.1 –2.4 ...
Tuvalu ... ... ... ... ... ...
Vanuatu 6.1 2.2 4.8 4.2 ... 26.8
... = data not available.
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Table A4 Growth rate of value added in industry (% per year)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Sector share (%), 2014
Central Asia
Armenia 0.0 5.7 0.5 –2.3 2.5 28.0
Azerbaijan 3.4 –0.6 4.9 0.5 –1.9 57.9
Georgia 9.2 9.6 2.4 4.6 3.3 24.0
Kazakhstan 0.7 1.7 2.9 1.2 ... 35.9
Kyrgyz Republic 7.0 –11.7 30.5 5.7 1.4 27.8
Tajikistan 5.7 10.4 3.9 13.3 11.2 15.7
Turkmenistan 26.5 8.6 7.3 11.4 3.1 47.3
Uzbekistan 7.5 8.0 9.0 8.6 8.0 33.7
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 10.6 8.2 7.9 7.3 6.0 42.7
Hong Kong, China 9.3 4.6 1.6 7.4 0.8 7.2
Korea, Rep. of 4.5 1.9 3.3 3.5 1.8 38.2
Mongolia 8.8 14.8 14.6 12.7 8.8 31.5
Taipei,China 6.0 3.3 1.7 7.0 –0.8 35.6
South Asia
Afghanistan 9.8 7.2 3.1 2.4 1.4 22.3
Bangladesh 9.0 9.4 9.6 8.2 9.7 27.6
Bhutan 8.0 5.4 5.3 3.5 4.8 43.7
India 0.0 3.6 5.0 5.9 7.3 30.0
Maldives 12.1 0.8 –7.6 12.9 27.3 18.5
Nepal 4.3 3.0 2.7 6.2 2.6 15.1
Pakistan 4.5 2.5 0.6 4.5 3.6 20.9
Sri Lanka 9.3 9.0 4.1 3.5 3.0 28.6
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 3.2 –1.4 –5.6 –4.4 ... 66.8
Cambodia 14.5 9.3 10.7 10.1 11.7 27.2
Indonesia 6.3 5.3 4.3 4.3 2.7 43.0
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 14.2 13.7 9.7 8.5 8.0 32.4
Malaysia 2.4 4.9 3.6 6.1 5.2 37.6
Myanmar 10.2 8.0 11.4 12.4 ... 34.4
Philippines 1.9 7.3 9.2 7.9 6.0 31.4
Singapore 7.1 2.1 2.5 2.8 –3.4 25.5
Thailand –4.1 7.3 1.4 –0.3 2.2 36.8
Viet Nam 7.6 7.4 5.1 6.4 9.6 37.6
The Pacific
Cook Islands –8.1 21.8 –16.4 –14.8 –3.1 6.4
Fiji 21.2 –2.2 4.4 2.7 ... 18.7
Kiribati 11.8 ... ... ... ... ...
Marshall Islands –2.5 2.4 3.7 –12.0 –6.6 10.1
Micronesia, Fed. States of 11.9 –1.6 –20.5 –28.5 –8.8 6.1
Nauru 85.6 79.2 –22.1 –22.9 ... 24.2
Palau 5.3 –5.4 –15.5 1.7 16.4 7.5
Papua New Guinea 13.0 14.6 9.3 28.6 19.2 52.4
Samoa 8.0 0.2 –3.2 3.8 –6.2 26.2
Solomon Islands 38.2 –1.4 –2.0 –13.2 1.3 15.0
Timor–Leste 49.4 –4.0 –8.0 ... ... ...
Tonga 5.5 1.2 –14.5 1.3 5.2 ...
Tuvalu ... ... ... ... ... ...
Vanuatu –19.4 –22.2 9.8 3.2 ... 8.7
... = data not available.
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Table A5 Growth rate of value added in services (% per year)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Sector share (%), 2014
Central Asia
Armenia 6.1 6.9 2.8 5.8 1.1 51.7
Azerbaijan –2.1 6.9 7.2 7.4 4.5 36.3
Georgia 5.6 6.2 3.5 4.7 3.1 66.7
Kazakhstan 6.0 10.6 7.0 6.0 ... 59.4
Kyrgyz Republic 6.9 6.5 4.7 4.6 3.7 55.1
Tajikistan 11.0 14.5 19.3 1.0 –7.0 53.6
Turkmenistan 8.3 14.7 12.7 10.6 10.0 44.2
Uzbekistan 11.8 10.4 8.8 9.4 9.8 47.5
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 9.5 8.0 8.3 7.8 8.3 48.1
Hong Kong, China 5.2 1.8 2.7 2.4 1.9 92.7
Korea, Rep. of 3.1 2.8 2.9 3.1 2.8 59.4
Mongolia 17.8 10.3 7.8 7.8 1.1 55.2
Taipei,China 3.1 1.5 2.1 2.8 0.5 62.5
South Asia
Afghanistan 12.7 7.3 5.3 2.2 2.8 54.2
Bangladesh 6.2 6.6 5.5 5.6 5.8 56.3
Bhutan 12.7 6.6 1.1 5.0 8.5 38.9
India 0.0 8.1 7.8 10.3 9.2 52.6
Maldives 5.8 1.5 6.4 5.0 –1.0 78.1
Nepal 3.4 5.0 5.7 6.3 3.9 52.4
Pakistan 3.9 4.4 5.1 4.4 5.0 54.1
Sri Lanka 8.9 11.2 3.8 5.2 5.3 56.7
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 4.9 5.5 4.7 1.1 ... 32.4
Cambodia 5.0 8.1 8.7 8.7 7.1 41.6
Indonesia 8.4 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.5 43.3
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 8.5 8.0 9.7 9.0 8.5 43.3
Malaysia 7.0 6.5 6.0 6.5 5.1 53.5
Myanmar 8.5 12.0 10.3 10.4 ... 37.7
Philippines 4.9 7.1 7.0 5.9 6.7 57.3
Singapore 6.6 4.3 6.3 3.7 3.5 74.5
Thailand 3.8 8.4 4.1 1.7 5.0 53.0
Viet Nam 7.5 6.7 6.7 6.2 6.3 43.5
The Pacific
Cook Islands –1.7 1.6 –0.3 –2.4 –0.6 85.1
Fiji 19.5 3.0 4.5 6.9 ... 69.9
Kiribati –1.2 ... ... ... ... ...
Marshall Islands 1.3 2.0 2.0 1.8 0.1 70.3
Micronesia, Fed. States of 0.1 –1.7 –0.7 –1.3 –0.2 67.3
Nauru 50.2 –10.6 50.9 35.9 ... 71.4
Palau 4.3 2.8 –0.4 6.0 6.0 88.5
Papua New Guinea 12.9 11.2 4.7 4.2 3.2 23.7
Samoa 4.8 1.6 –1.1 –1.1 5.0 64.5
Solomon Islands 2.5 5.3 7.2 3.6 4.3 57.0
Timor–Leste 10.6 8.5 1.4 ... ... ...
Tonga 1.8 0.5 –0.4 1.6 3.0 ...
Tuvalu ... ... ... ... ... ...
Vanuatu 3.2 4.4 0.1 2.4 ... 64.5
... = data not available.
Statistical appendix  281
Table A6 Inflation (% per year)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Central Asia 8.9 5.1 5.8 5.7 6.2 10.8 5.9
Armenia 7.7 2.6 5.8 3.0 3.7 3.8 4.0
Azerbaijan 7.9 1.1 2.4 1.4 4.0 12.0 5.2
Georgia 8.6 –0.9 –0.5 3.1 4.0 5.0 4.0
Kazakhstan 8.3 5.1 5.8 6.7 6.6 12.6 4.6
Kyrgyz Republic 16.6 2.8 6.6 7.5 6.5 10.0 8.0
Tajikistan 12.5 5.8 5.0 6.1 5.1 8.5 7.5
Turkmenistan 5.3 5.3 6.8 6.0 6.0 6.6 6.0
Uzbekistan 12.8 12.1 11.2 8.4 9.0 10.0 11.0
East Asia 5.0 2.6 2.4 1.9 1.3 1.6 2.0
China, People’s Rep. of 5.4 2.6 2.6 2.0 1.4 1.7 2.0
Hong Kong, China 5.3 4.1 4.4 4.4 3.0 2.5 2.7
Korea, Rep. of 4.0 2.2 1.3 1.3 0.7 1.4 2.0
Mongolia 9.2 14.3 9.9 12.8 6.6 3.0 7.0
Taipei,China 1.4 1.9 0.8 1.2 –0.3 0.7 1.2
South Asia 9.4 9.3 9.3 6.8 5.0 5.2 5.7
Afghanistan 11.8 6.2 7.4 4.6 –1.5 3.0 3.5
Bangladesh 10.9 8.7 6.8 7.3 6.4 6.2 6.5
Bhutan 8.6 10.2 8.8 9.6 6.6 4.0 5.0
India 8.9 9.3 9.8 6.7 5.0 5.4 5.8
Maldives 11.3 10.9 2.3 2.1 1.0 1.2 1.4
Nepal 9.6 8.3 9.8 9.1 7.2 10.5 8.2
Pakistan 13.7 11.0 7.4 8.6 4.5 3.2 4.5
Sri Lanka 6.8 7.5 6.9 3.2 3.8 4.5 5.0
Southeast Asia 5.5 3.8 4.2 4.1 2.7 2.6 2.9
Brunei Darussalam 0.1 0.1 0.4 –0.2 –0.4 0.2 0.4
Cambodia 5.5 2.9 3.0 3.9 1.2 2.5 3.0
Indonesia 5.3 4.0 6.4 6.4 6.4 4.5 4.2
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 7.6 4.3 6.4 4.2 1.3 1.8 2.5
Malaysia 3.2 1.7 2.1 3.1 2.1 2.7 2.5
Myanmar 2.8 2.8 5.7 5.9 11.0 9.5 8.5
Philippines 4.6 3.2 3.0 4.1 1.4 2.3 2.7
Singapore 5.2 4.6 2.4 1.0 –0.5 –0.6 0.4
Thailand 3.8 3.0 2.2 1.9 –0.9 0.6 2.0
Viet Nam 18.7 9.1 6.6 4.1 0.6 3.0 4.0
The Pacific 6.4 5.5 4.9 3.5 3.4 4.5 4.7
Cook Islands 0.6 2.8 2.6 1.6 3.0 1.8 2.0
Fiji 7.3 3.4 2.9 0.6 1.4 3.0 3.0
Kiribati 1.5 –3.0 –1.5 2.1 1.4 0.3 0.8
Marshall Islands 5.4 4.3 1.9 1.1 0.5 2.0 2.5
Micronesia, Fed. States of 4.0 6.3 2.2 0.7 –1.1 –0.3 0.3
Nauru 0.7 –0.1 0.5 3.0 11.4 6.6 1.7
Palau 2.6 5.4 2.8 4.0 2.2 1.5 2.5
Papua New Guinea 4.4 4.6 5.0 5.2 5.1 6.0 6.0
Samoa 2.9 6.2 –0.2 –1.2 1.9 2.0 2.0
Solomon Islands 7.4 5.9 5.4 5.2 –0.3 4.4 5.7
Timor–Leste 13.2 10.9 9.5 0.7 0.6 2.0 3.0
Tonga 6.0 3.3 0.8 2.1 –0.7 –0.3 0.5
Tuvalu 0.5 1.4 2.0 1.1 2.0 3.5 2.0
Vanuatu 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.0 2.5 1.9 2.4
Average 5.9 3.9 3.8 3.0 2.2 2.5 2.7
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Table A7 Change in money supply (% per year)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Central Asia
Armenia 23.7 19.5 14.8 8.3 10.8
Azerbaijan 32.1 20.7 15.4 11.1 –0.9
Georgia 14.5 11.4 24.5 13.8 19.3
Kazakhstan 15.0 7.9 10.2 10.5 34.3
Kyrgyz Republic 14.9 23.8 22.8 3.0 14.9
Tajikistan 33.1 19.6 19.7 7.1 18.7
Turkmenistan 36.3 35.6 31.2 11.4 8.4
Uzbekistan 32.3 27.5 22.4 18.0 20.7
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 17.3 14.4 13.6 11.0 13.3
Hong Kong, China 12.9 11.1 12.4 9.5 5.5
Korea, Rep. of 5.5 4.8 4.6 8.1 8.2
Mongolia 37.0 18.7 24.2 12.5 –5.5
Taipei,China 4.8 3.5 5.8 6.1 5.8
South Asia
Afghanistan 21.3 8.8 9.4 8.3 5.7
Bangladesh 21.3 17.4 16.7 16.1 12.4
Bhutan 21.2 –1.0 18.6 6.6 7.8
India 13.5 13.6 13.4 10.8 9.8
Maldives 20.0 5.0 18.4 14.7 13.6
Nepal 12.3 22.6 16.4 19.1 19.9
Pakistan 15.9 14.1 15.9 12.5 13.2
Sri Lanka 19.1 17.6 16.7 6.2 0.0
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 10.1 0.9 1.5 3.2 –1.8
Cambodia 21.4 20.9 14.6 29.9 14.7
Indonesia 16.4 15.0 12.8 11.9 8.9
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 28.7 31.0 18.6 23.5 14.7
Malaysia 14.3 9.0 7.3 7.0 2.7
Myanmar 26.3 46.6 32.7 21.7 31.7
Philippines 7.1 9.4 31.8 11.2 9.4
Singapore 10.0 7.2 4.3 3.3 1.5
Thailand 15.1 10.4 7.3 4.7 4.4
Viet Nam 12.1 18.5 18.8 17.7 14.0
The Pacific
Cook Islands –13.4 19.3 –25.6 3.0 9.6
Fiji 14.8 6.3 21.2 10.6 11.2
Kiribati ... ... ... ... ...
Marshall Islands ... ... ... ... ...
Micronesia, Fed. States of 7.1 24.1 –4.9 5.1 –5.1
Nauru ... ... ... ... ...
Palau 9.0 22.7 4.5 24.7 2.6
Papua New Guinea 16.2 11.0 6.7 3.4 –3.3
Samoa –0.8 –4.0 –0.8 18.7 ...
Solomon Islands 25.8 17.4 12.5 5.5 15.0
Timor–Leste 9.3 26.2 22.9 19.9 7.1
Tonga 2.7 –1.6 7.0 7.9 2.4
Tuvalu ... ... ... ... ...
Vanuatu 1.3 –0.6 –5.5 8.6 ...
... = data not available.
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Table A8 Central government revenues (% of GDP)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Central Asia
Armenia 23.3 22.2 23.5 23.6 22.7
Azerbaijan 30.1 31.6 33.5 31.2 31.5
Georgia 28.2 28.9 27.7 27.9 28.4
Kazakhstan 18.3 18.1 17.2 18.0 18.4
Kyrgyz Republic 31.8 34.9 34.4 35.9 37.4
Tajikistan 24.9 25.2 26.9 28.4 30.1
Turkmenistan 18.3 21.0 17.4 16.3 13.8
Uzbekistan 32.0 32.8 32.8 33.1 33.3
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 21.5 22.0 22.0 22.1 22.5
Hong Kong, China 22.6 21.7 21.3 21.2 19.0
Korea, Rep. of 19.0 19.4 18.8 18.3 21.5
Mongolia 28.5 26.2 27.8 25.8 23.9
Taipei,China 11.7 11.4 11.4 10.7 10.6
South Asia
Afghanistan 21.4 25.4 26.6 24.5 29.2
Bangladesh 10.2 10.9 10.7 10.4 9.6
Bhutan 35.8 35.8 30.2 33.6 28.4
India 19.9 20.1 21.1 21.2 20.5
Maldives 27.7 26.2 27.7 32.2 36.3
Nepal 17.9 18.6 19.5 20.8 20.2
Pakistan 12.4 12.8 13.3 14.5 14.4
Sri Lanka 13.6 12.2 12.0 11.5 14.5
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 55.5 49.4 41.8 32.8 16.5
Cambodia 12.4 14.4 13.5 17.4 17.1
Indonesia 15.5 15.5 15.1 14.7 13.0
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 16.4 17.7 18.1 17.2 19.3
Malaysia 20.3 21.4 20.9 19.9 18.9
Myanmar 11.3 21.8 22.0 25.3 20.9
Philippines 14.0 14.5 14.9 15.1 15.9
Singapore 14.7 15.4 15.2 15.8 16.0
Thailand 16.7 16.0 16.8 15.8 16.3
Viet Nam 26.1 22.7 23.1 21.5 22.1
The Pacific
Cook Islands 32.4 33.9 34.4 41.8 42.7
Fiji 26.7 27.2 27.2 27.0 36.0
Kiribati 59.7 84.2 94.4 128.7 105.4
Marshall Islands 57.0 50.7 53.3 52.0 55.6
Micronesia, Fed. States of 63.1 64.3 60.4 55.9 63.1
Nauru 58.5 67.6 82.9 95.3 ...
Palau 43.7 44.4 40.7 43.2 43.0
Papua New Guinea 15.3 29.4 28.8 27.4 23.1
Samoa 32.2 30.2 33.8 38.1 35.1
Solomon Islands 59.0 54.4 54.3 46.2 ...
Timor–Leste 356.7 336.0 327.4 195.8 86.3
Tonga 26.1 27.4 25.2 37.5 40.7
Tuvalu 69.1 85.2 109.8 122.7 118.5
Vanuatu 22.3 21.8 21.4 23.2 23.6
... = data not available.
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Table A9 Central government expenditures (% of GDP)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Central Asia
Armenia 26.1 23.6 25.1 25.5 27.3
Azerbaijan 29.6 31.8 32.8 31.7 32.7
Georgia 31.8 31.7 30.3 30.7 32.1
Kazakhstan 20.2 20.8 19.1 20.7 20.6
Kyrgyz Republic 36.3 39.8 38.2 39.8 40.4
Tajikistan 27.0 25.1 28.2 29.0 32.4
Turkmenistan 14.6 14.7 16.1 15.4 14.8
Uzbekistan 31.9 32.3 32.8 32.6 34.2
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 22.6 23.6 23.8 23.9 26.0
Hong Kong, China 18.8 18.5 20.3 18.0 17.8
Korea, Rep. of 20.1 20.7 20.3 20.3 24.5
Mongolia 33.7 32.3 28.9 28.9 28.5
Taipei,China 13.4 12.9 12.2 11.5 11.6
South Asia
Afghanistan 22.0 24.3 24.5 26.4 28.6
Bangladesh 14.0 14.4 14.5 14.0 13.9
Bhutan 37.9 36.9 34.4 29.8 30.6
India 27.7 27.0 28.2 28.3 27.8
Maldives 34.3 33.9 31.5 34.8 43.7
Nepal 20.2 20.9 18.8 20.2 21.5
Pakistan 18.9 21.6 21.5 20.0 19.7
Sri Lanka 19.9 17.8 17.4 17.2 19.0
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 30.8 31.4 34.1 33.5 30.5
Cambodia 20.2 21.0 20.4 20.7 19.5
Indonesia 16.5 17.3 17.3 16.8 15.6
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 24.4 24.6 29.4 27.6 26.9
Malaysia 25.0 25.7 24.7 23.3 22.2
Myanmar 15.6 23.3 23.7 28.1 25.7
Philippines 16.0 16.8 16.3 15.7 16.8
Singapore 13.4 13.6 13.8 14.7 17.0
Thailand 15.9 16.0 16.3 16.4 16.0
Viet Nam 25.4 28.2 26.0 25.9 27.7
The Pacific
Cook Islands 37.1 36.9 34.2 41.9 44.4
Fiji 28.0 28.3 27.6 31.2 38.5
Kiribati 81.8 80.8 84.9 107.7 106.5
Marshall Islands 54.9 51.4 52.6 47.7 53.5
Micronesia, Fed. States of 64.4 64.2 59.0 53.6 58.0
Nauru 57.9 68.5 82.5 95.3 ...
Palau 42.5 43.4 40.0 39.8 38.1
Papua New Guinea 15.6 31.0 38.4 35.7 26.2
Samoa 36.7 37.3 37.6 43.3 39.0
Solomon Islands 50.2 50.6 49.9 44.2 ...
Timor–Leste 121.4 112.1 101.7 115.9 100.5
Tonga 32.0 29.1 26.4 34.8 40.6
Tuvalu 78.0 84.5 86.6 104.7 112.8
Vanuatu 24.5 23.3 21.6 22.0 30.7
... = data not available.
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Table A10 Fiscal balance of central government (% of GDP)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Central Asia
Armenia –2.8 –1.4 –1.6 –1.9 –4.6
Azerbaijan 0.6 –0.2 0.7 –0.5 –1.1
Georgia –3.6 –2.8 –2.6 –2.9 –3.7
Kazakhstan –1.9 –2.8 –1.9 –2.7 –2.2
Kyrgyz Republic –4.5 –4.9 –3.8 –3.9 –3.0
Tajikistan –2.5 0.1 –1.3 –0.6 –2.3
Turkmenistan 3.2 6.3 1.3 0.8 –1.0
Uzbekistan 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.5 –0.9
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of –1.1 –1.6 –1.9 –1.8 –3.5
Hong Kong, China 3.8 3.2 1.0 3.2 1.3
Korea, Rep. of –1.1 –1.3 –1.5 –2.0 –3.0
Mongolia –3.6 –5.6 –0.9 –3.2 –3.1
Taipei,China –1.7 –1.6 –0.9 –0.8 –1.0
South Asia
Afghanistan –0.6 1.1 2.1 –1.9 0.7
Bangladesh –3.9 –3.6 –3.8 –3.6 –4.3
Bhutan –2.1 –1.1 –4.2 3.8 –2.2
India –7.6 –6.6 –6.9 –4.1 –3.9
Maldives –6.6 –7.7 –3.8 –2.7 –7.4
Nepal –2.4 –2.2 0.7 0.6 –1.3
Pakistan –6.5 –8.8 –8.2 –5.5 –5.3
Sri Lanka –6.2 –5.6 –5.4 –5.7 –4.5
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 24.7 18.0 7.7 –0.7 –14.0
Cambodia –7.8 –6.6 –6.9 –3.6 –2.4
Indonesia –1.1 –1.8 –2.2 –2.1 –2.5
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. –7.9 –6.9 –5.6 –4.2 –4.7
Malaysia –4.7 –4.3 –3.8 –3.4 –3.2
Myanmar –4.3 –1.6 –1.7 –2.9 –4.8
Philippines –2.0 –2.3 –1.4 –0.6 –0.9
Singapore 1.2 1.6 1.3 0.0 –1.7
Thailand –1.4 –2.3 –1.6 –2.5 –2.5
Viet Nam –4.0 –4.6 –6.0 –5.7 –5.4
The Pacific
Cook Islands –4.8 –3.0 0.2 –0.1 –1.7
Fiji –1.4 –1.1 –0.5 –4.1 –2.5
Kiribati –22.1 3.5 9.5 21.0 –1.1
Marshall Islands 2.1 –0.7 0.7 4.3 2.1
Micronesia, Fed. States of –1.2 0.1 1.4 2.3 5.1
Nauru 0.6 –0.9 0.3 0.0 –5.7
Palau 1.2 1.0 0.7 3.5 4.9
Papua New Guinea –0.3 –1.6 –9.6 –8.3 –3.2
Samoa –4.5 –7.2 –3.8 –5.3 –3.9
Solomon Islands 8.8 3.8 4.4 2.0 –2.2
Timor–Leste 235.3 223.9 225.6 79.9 –14.2
Tonga –5.9 –1.6 –1.3 2.7 –0.2
Tuvalu –8.9 0.6 23.1 17.9 5.7
Vanuatu –2.2 –1.5 –0.2 1.2 –7.1
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Table A11 Growth rate of merchandise exports (% per year)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Central Asia 35.4 1.6 0.6 –6.9 –33.7 –14.9 9.3
Armenia 19.5 5.9 7.9 3.8 –0.2 0.2 1.0
Azerbaijan 30.3 –5.4 –2.6 –11.1 –41.9 –12.2 7
Georgia 32.2 7.6 21.2 –4.1 –20.9 7.7 16.6
Kazakhstan 38.8 2.0 –1.5 –6.2 –42.4 –24.5 10.4
Kyrgyz Republic 27.7 –13.1 16.3 –13.5 –11.0 5.0 9.0
Tajikistan 5.2 41.0 –3.1 10.6 –8.9 5.0 7.0
Turkmenistan 73.0 18.9 –4.7 2.0 –33.9 –19.8 15.9
Uzbekistan 20.3 –7.6 6.5 –14.8 –12.3 2.0 4.0
East Asia 21.5 7.8 7.8 3.7 –5.3 0.0 1.9
China, People’s Rep. of 21.6 9.2 8.9 4.4 –4.4 0.0 2.0
Hong Kong, China 12.5 7.0 8.1 1.9 –1.9 0.9 2.1
Korea, Rep. of 26.6 2.8 2.4 –0.8 –10.5 2.0 4.0
Mongolia 65.6 –9.0 –2.6 35.3 –19.1 –10.0 –15.0
Taipei,China 11.7 –0.6 1.6 2.8 –10.4 –5.0 –4.2
South Asia 24.8 –0.8 3.3 0.7 –14.5 0.3 6.0
Afghanistan –5.1 2.7 –74.1 8.5 4.6 26.9 23.9
Bangladesh 39.2 6.2 10.7 12.1 3.3 8.0 9.0
Bhutan 26.8 –7.3 –11.5 –2.0 8.2 7.0 5.0
India 23.6 –1.1 3.9 –0.6 –18.0 –1.5 5.0
Maldives 75.4 –9.2 5.3 –9.1 –19.6 5.3 5.0
Nepal 11.7 5.7 –2.9 5.1 –3.9 –15.0 15.0
Pakistan 28.9 –2.5 0.3 1.1 –4.0 9.0 8.5
Sri Lanka 23.2 –7.4 6.3 7.1 –5.6 –2.0 10.0
Southeast Asia 20.0 3.3 –1.0 1.6 –11.7 –3.0 2.7
Brunei Darussalam 40.6 4.1 –8.1 –6.1 –42.9 –23.8 16.3
Cambodia 28.9 11.9 15.9 13.4 14.1 10.5 13.0
Indonesia 27.4 –2.0 –2.8 –3.7 –15.4 –7.0 –2.5
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 43.2 6.1 9.5 10.0 7.1 ... ...
Malaysia 15.0 –3.0 –3.1 2.6 –15.5 –0.4 7.9
Myanmar 15.9 1.1 8.9 9.9 0.4 16.9 18.8
Philippines 4.1 21.2 –4.0 11.9 –13.1 –2.3 7.5
Singapore 17.7 0.4 0.0 0.1 –13.9 –3.5 2.0
Thailand 14.3 3.0 –0.1 –0.3 –5.6 –1.0 1.0
Viet Nam 34.2 18.2 15.3 13.8 7.9 10.0 14.0
The Pacific 20.4 1.3 –14.8 23.6 34.4 –2.8 5.8
Cook Islands –3.5 –21.6 138.7 142.6 –7.7 –13.7 0.0
Fiji 29.9 12.6 –5.5 5.9 –9.1 –11.2 13.6
Kiribati 70.7 –11.4 1.1 –1.7 –21.0 2.2 15.1
Marshall Islands 58.6 14.8 –8.1 –11.3 –12.2 –15.7 5.3
Micronesia, Fed. States of 27.7 42.9 –13.2 –20.4 0.8 3.9 4.2
Nauru 52.8 80.8 –13.7 –12.8 ... ... ...
Palau 10.2 17.0 –4.2 32.7 –46.8 –2.7 16.0
Papua New Guinea 17.9 –9.3 –13.1 35.6 24.3 8.6 1.7
Samoa 33.1 25.8 –6.3 –9.5 10.9 –16.1 –4.1
Solomon Islands 86.1 19.9 –10.3 1.6 –10.2 –7.4 –4.5
Timor–Leste 5.9 16.0 –46.9 –12.4 193.5 –45.0 20.0
Tonga 2.7 –15.0 38.4 22.4 –7.8 ... ...
Tuvalu 5.2 95.1 –3.0 –4.5 –13.4 1.7 39.8
Vanuatu 24.9 –13.9 –31.2 68.6 ... ... ...
Average 22.1 5.6 5.6 2.8 –8.1 –0.7 2.8
... = data not available.
Statistical appendix  287
Table A12 Growth rate of merchandise imports (% per year)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Central Asia 29.3 15.5 6.1 –7.4 –16.7 –16.5 3.9
Armenia 8.5 2.4 2.8 0.7 –15.5 –1.5 2.0
Azerbaijan 50.7 2.5 7.1 –16.3 0.3 –21.0 –1.5
Georgia 33.6 14.4 0.3 8.0 –15.2 3.8 12.5
Kazakhstan 22.7 20.9 4.1 –14.2 –22.9 –23.3 3.5
Kyrgyz Republic 32.0 26.2 9.2 –3.0 –29.0 5.0 5.0
Tajikistan 19.9 16.8 12.0 0.1 –20.1 –7.0 5.0
Turkmenistan 40.6 27.6 11.7 1.8 –22.4 –22.2 13.5
Uzbekistan 23.4 8.2 9.0 11.0 –11.0 2.0 2.5
East Asia 27.2 4.3 6.1 0.7 –13.8 –3.9 3.3
China, People’s Rep. of 27.3 5.2 7.7 1.1 –13.4 –4.9 3.5
Hong Kong, China 15.4 9.5 9.6 2.6 –3.5 1.1 2.4
Korea, Rep. of 34.2 –0.7 –3.4 –2.1 –18.2 4.0 6.0
Mongolia 88.1 2.2 –5.9 –14.4 –27.5 –15.0 10.0
Taipei,China 13.0 –1.2 0.0 0.7 –16.6 –7.0 –7.7
South Asia 31.0 1.8 –5.9 0.5 –11.5 4.3 9.2
Afghanistan 3.3 11.2 –18.7 –3.9 –1.5 5.5 7.5
Bangladesh 52.1 2.4 0.8 8.9 11.2 9.0 11.0
Bhutan 41.7 –10.0 –8.8 0.5 7.5 8.0 7.0
India 31.1 0.5 –7.2 –1.0 –15.5 3.5 9.0
Maldives 36.6 –8.2 8.1 15.1 9.1 10.1 8.0
Nepal 8.9 4.7 10.9 13.9 8.0 –8.0 18.0
Pakistan 14.9 12.5 –0.5 3.8 –0.9 10.2 9.7
Sri Lanka 50.7 –5.3 –6.2 7.9 –2.5 –1.0 7.0
Southeast Asia 23.7 9.2 0.0 –1.2 –12.5 0.2 2.4
Brunei Darussalam 46.3 9.6 19.3 –25.3 –17.1 2.6 10.1
Cambodia 24.7 13.4 19.7 8.9 11.9 9.5 10.5
Indonesia 32.2 13.6 –1.3 –4.5 –19.8 –3.0 –2.1
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 31.7 34.5 17.4 5.0 5.8 ... ...
Malaysia 13.9 1.7 –0.3 0.8 –14.7 2.5 6.3
Myanmar 27.2 19.5 11.5 26.7 14.4 11.8 12.1
Philippines 9.5 11.3 –4.8 8.0 –3.2 2.4 4.3
Singapore 18.4 0.8 –1.5 –1.0 –17.8 –5.0 1.5
Thailand 24.9 8.4 –0.1 –8.5 –11.3 0.8 4.0
Viet Nam 25.8 8.7 16.5 12.0 15.1 15.0 12.0
The Pacific 34.0 25.7 –12.0 –12.4 –3.4 5.6 3.5
Cook Islands 17.2 –0.5 –3.2 7.4 –6.4 –11.6 –2.6
Fiji 23.1 3.1 16.8 –3.2 –13.6 1.8 3.1
Kiribati 23.1 14.9 –7.5 10.5 –14.4 –3.3 3.2
Marshall Islands –11.2 3.7 9.7 –7.4 –16.5 –10.8 4.6
Micronesia, Fed. States of 9.0 5.0 –2.3 –13.7 –22.4 –1.0 10.4
Nauru 61.8 17.5 59.3 59.1 ... ... ...
Palau 21.7 11.1 5.5 21.3 –14.5 4.6 8.4
Papua New Guinea 46.2 22.7 –28.4 –20.3 2.6 6.9 2.8
Samoa 10.3 19.0 –8.0 8.1 –3.2 –13.5 –1.7
Solomon Islands 16.9 3.0 7.0 –1.0 –3.6 –3.0 5.4
Timor–Leste 30.7 67.1 3.7 10.9 –18.4 15.9 6.8
Tonga 15.3 18.2 3.0 –4.4 10.7 ... ...
Tuvalu 14.3 –5.1 7.7 8.3 34.0 –23.6 22.1
Vanuatu 1.7 2.8 3.8 –57.5 ... ... ...
Average 27.3 4.9 3.4 0.2 –13.4 –2.4 4.0
... = data not available.
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Table A13 Trade balance ($ million)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Central Asia 68,778 56,710 49,393 45,342 8,717 5,200 8,874
Armenia –2,110 –2,112 –2,092 –2,055 –1,477 –1,426 –1,471
Azerbaijan 24,328 22,217 20,621 18,928 7,070 7,038 8,156
Georgia –3,494 –4,216 –3,493 –4,280 –3,862 –3,881 –4,219
Kazakhstan 44,844 38,145 34,792 36,699 12,633 9,113 11,828
Kyrgyz Republic –1,665 –2,993 –2,909 –2,935 –2,357 –2,692 –2,873
Tajikistan –2,765 –2,420 –2,958 –3,361 –2,544 –2,259 –2,354
Turkmenistan 6,272 6,527 4,032 4,143 996 1,084 1,479
Uzbekistan 3,367 1,561 1,400 –1,795 –1,742 –1,777 –1,673
East Asia 275,866 368,800 445,840 532,651 730,087 801,223 789,432
China, People’s Rep. of 228,701 311,570 358,981 435,042 578,100 654,647 645,025
Hong Kong, China –7,477 –18,918 –27,926 –32,373 –22,850 –24,113 –26,223
Korea, Rep. of 29,090 49,406 82,781 88,885 120,290 114,125 109,776
Mongolia –993 –1,553 –1,321 994 1,206 1,259 333
Taipei,China 26,545 28,296 33,324 40,103 53,341 55,306 60,521
South Asia –233,643 –244,932 –193,122 –192,848 –182,897 –203,746 –233,448
Afghanistan –7,539 –8,609 –8,528 –8,106 –7,935 –8,195 –8,637
Bangladesh –9,935 –9,320 –7,009 –6,794 –9,917 –11,117 –13,005
Bhutan –460 –395 –377 –393 –419 –459 –503
India –189,690 –195,656 –147,609 –144,940 –130,388 –147,930 –171,470
Maldives –1,370 –1,261 –1,372 –1,660 –1,897 –2,099 –2,275
Nepal –4,422 –4,623 –5,263 –6,079 –6,689 –6,223 –7,369
Pakistan –10,516 –15,652 –15,355 –16,590 –17,222 –19,272 –21,456
Sri Lanka –9,710 –9,416 –7,609 –8,287 –8,430 –8,450 –8,733
Southeast Asia 152,728 115,828 110,263 141,615 140,863 119,718 125,679
Brunei Darussalam 8,620 8,766 6,924 7,443 3,299 1,710 2,181
Cambodia –2,145 –2,506 –3,214 –3,208 –3,426 –3,667 –3,819
Indonesia 33,825 8,680 5,833 6,983 13,281 6,949 6,251
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. –1,185 –2,567 –3,299 –3,265 –3,002 ... ...
Malaysia 45,924 36,593 30,642 34,653 27,881 23,455 27,846
Myanmar –175 –2,095 –2,596 –5,174 –7,652 –7,917 –7,902
Philippines –20,429 –18,926 –17,662 –17,330 –21,698 –24,248 –23,938
Singapore 71,580 70,404 75,665 79,630 82,538 84,068 87,148
Thailand 16,989 6,670 6,661 24,583 34,593 31,052 25,994
Viet Nam –450 8,714 8,713 12,126 7,396 400 4,014
The Pacific –1,648 –3,925 –3,095 180 2,312 2,703 2,704
Cook Islands –99 –99 –91 –88 –83 –73 –71
Fiji –845 –770 –1,168 –1,027 –832 –989 –917
Kiribati –75 –89 –82 –91 –79 –76 –77
Marshall Islands –66 –63 –79 –76 –61 –57 –59
Micronesia, Fed. States of –134 –125 –129 –115 –80 –77 –87
Nauru 7 26 4 –27 ... ... ...
Palau –112 –124 –132 –159 –142 –149 –161
Papua New Guinea 628 –1,439 –70 2,990 4,665 5,141 5,173
Samoa –259 –307 –281 –309 –296 –256 –252
Solomon Islands –5 66 –16 –5 –35 –52 –92
Timor–Leste –373 –638 –679 –756 –585 –705 –750
Tonga –118 –141 –144 –135 –151 ... ...
Tuvalu –8 3 1 –1 –10 –4 –2
Vanuatu –183 –198 –225 –48 ... ... ...
Total 262,080 292,481 409,279 526,940 699,081 725,098 693,240
... = data not available.
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Table A14 Current account balance (% of GDP)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Central Asia 6.8 3.2 1.8 2.1 –3.4 –3.9 –3.0
Armenia –10.4 –10.0 –7.6 –7.3 –4.6 –5.2 –5.0
Azerbaijan 26.0 21.4 16.6 13.9 0.4 –0.6 1.5
Georgia –12.8 –11.7 –5.8 –10.6 –10.5 –9.5 –9.2
Kazakhstan 5.1 0.5 0.4 2.6 –2.8 –3.5 –3.1
Kyrgyz Republic –9.6 –15.6 –15.0 –16.8 –17.0 –17.0 –15.0
Tajikistan –4.8 –2.5 –2.9 –9.1 –5.9 –4.8 –5.5
Turkmenistan 2.0 0.0 –7.3 –5.8 –11.8 –12.3 –10.0
Uzbekistan 5.8 1.2 1.6 1.4 0.3 0.2 0.8
East Asia 2.2 3.0 2.5 2.9 3.8 3.6 3.3
China, People’s Rep. of 1.8 2.5 1.6 2.1 2.7 2.7 2.5
Hong Kong, China 5.6 1.6 1.5 1.3 3.1 2.0 1.8
Korea, Rep. of 1.6 4.2 6.2 6.0 7.8 6.5 5.5
Mongolia –26.5 –27.4 –25.4 –11.5 –4.8 –8.0 –15.0
Taipei,China 8.2 9.5 10.4 12.0 14.5 14.8 15.3
South Asia –3.7 –4.2 –1.4 –1.3 –1.2 –1.4 –1.6
Afghanistan 3.2 3.9 7.3 6.4 4.5 2.0 –0.7
Bangladesh –1.3 –0.3 1.6 0.8 –0.8 –0.5 –1.0
Bhutan –30.0 –21.5 –25.4 –26.4 –28.2 –28.8 –27.0
India –4.3 –4.8 –1.7 –1.5 –1.3 –1.6 –1.8
Maldives –15.6 –7.3 –4.6 –4.1 –12.6 –12.6 –10.5
Nepal –0.9 5.0 3.4 4.6 5.1 10.3 6.4
Pakistan 0.1 –2.1 –1.1 –1.3 –1.0 –1.0 –1.2
Sri Lanka –7.1 –5.8 –3.4 –2.5 –2.0 –2.0 –1.8
Southeast Asia 5.2 2.5 1.9 3.0 3.7 2.8 2.7
Brunei Darussalam 34.7 29.8 20.9 27.8 6.5 –1.3 2.0
Cambodia –9.0 –10.2 –14.9 –11.7 –11.1 –11.1 –10.0
Indonesia 0.2 –2.7 –3.2 –3.1 –2.1 –2.6 –2.8
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. –15.8 –28.5 –30.6 –25.0 –20.3 –17.0 –20.0
Malaysia 10.9 5.2 3.5 4.3 2.9 1.2 2.3
Myanmar –1.9 –3.9 –4.9 –5.9 –8.9 –8.3 –7.7
Philippines 2.5 2.8 4.2 3.8 2.9 2.7 2.8
Singapore 22.0 17.9 17.6 17.4 19.7 18.8 19.5
Thailand 2.4 –0.4 –1.2 3.8 8.8 7.5 4.0
Viet Nam 0.2 5.9 4.5 4.9 0.3 –0.2 0.0
The Pacific 25.4 9.4 9.1 5.3 3.8 4.1 4.8
Cook Islands 26.8 30.3 34.7 38.6 33.1 37.3 41.3
Fiji –4.9 –1.3 –9.8 –7.2 –4.0 –7.0 –4.4
Kiribati –11.9 0.5 15.7 17.9 25.0 15.0 –10.0
Marshall Islands –5.5 –9.1 –14.5 –7.2 6.9 11.1 8.9
Micronesia, Fed. States of –18.1 –12.8 –9.7 6.7 17.2 19.5 30.1
Nauru 20.0 30.3 15.7 –7.3 ... ... ...
Palau –10.4 –16.8 –10.2 –12.6 2.1 –2.3 –1.3
Papua New Guinea –23.3 –54.1 –32.9 –5.1 4.6 3.8 7.2
Samoa –3.1 –7.7 –2.5 –7.0 –4.8 –4.3 –5.1
Solomon Islands –9.7 1.5 –4.3 –5.4 –4.5 –5.9 –7.2
Timor–Leste 204.0 211.3 181.3 75.9 14.3 26.1 11.8
Tonga –11.7 –6.9 –8.5 –5.0 –8.3 –1.9 –3.2
Tuvalu –36.5 24.9 26.4 27.3 –37.4 –21.4 –18.7
Vanuatu –7.5 –6.1 –0.8 22.7 –10.4 –15.0 –11.0
Average 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.3 2.9 2.6 2.4
... = data not available.
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Table A15 Exchange rates to the United States dollar (annual average)
Currency Symbol 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Central Asia
Armenia dram AMD 372.5 401.8 409.6 415.9 477.9
Azerbaijan Azerbaijan new manat AZN 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0
Georgia lari GEL 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.3
Kazakhstan tenge T 146.6 149.1 152.1 179.2 221.7
Kyrgyz Republic som Som 46.1 47.0 48.4 53.7 64.5
Tajikistan somoni TJS 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.9 6.2
Turkmenistan Turkmen manat TMM 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.5
Uzbekistan sum SUM 1,710.9 1,885.4 2,095.0 2,311.2 2,573.5
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of yuan CNY 6.5 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.2
Hong Kong, China Hong Kong dollar HK$ 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8
Korea, Rep. of won W 1,107.4 1,125.7 1,094.2 1,053.1 1,130.7
Mongolia togrog MNT 1,265.5 1,359.2 1,523.9 1,817.9 1,970.3
Taipei,China NT dollar NT$ 29.5 29.6 29.8 30.4 31.9
South Asia
Afghanistan afghani AF 47.7 51.0 55.3 57.6 61.4
Bangladesh taka Tk 71.2 79.1 79.9 77.7 77.7
Bhutan ngultrum Nu 45.3 50.3 54.9 61.5 62.1
India Indian rupee/s Re/Rs 47.9 54.4 60.5 61.0 64.2
Maldives rufiyaa Rf 14.6 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.4
Nepal Nepalese rupee/s NRe/NRs 72.1 80.7 87.7 98.0 99.2
Pakistan Pakistan rupee/s PRe/PRs 85.5 89.2 96.7 102.9 101.3
Sri Lanka Sri Lanka rupee/s SLRe/SLRs 110.6 127.6 129.1 130.6 136.0
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam Brunei dollar B$ 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4
Cambodia riel KR 4,016.0 4,033.0 4,027.0 4,030.0 4,030.0
Indonesia rupiah Rp 8,770.4 9,386.6 10,461.2 11,865.2 13,389.4
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. kip KN 8,011.4 7,994.0 7,818.0 8,150.0 8,147.9
Malaysia ringgit RM 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.9
Myanmar kyat MK 5.4 856.9 964.4 995.0 1,165.1
Philippines peso P 43.3 42.2 42.4 44.4 45.5
Singapore Singapore dollar S$ 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4
Thailand baht B 30.5 31.1 30.7 32.5 34.3
Viet Nam dong D 20,489.6 20,828.0 20,934.6 21,148.8 21,675.6
The Pacific
Cook Islands New Zealand dollar NZ$ 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3
Fiji Fiji dollar F$ 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1
Kiribati Australian dollar A$ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3
Marshall Islands US dollar $ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Micronesia, Fed. States of US dollar $ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Nauru Australian dollar A$ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3
Palau US dollar $ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Papua New Guinea kina K 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.8
Samoa tala ST 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4
Solomon Islands Sol. Islands dollar SI$ 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.4 7.9
Timor–Leste US dollar $ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Tonga pa'anga T$ 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9
Tuvalu Australian dollar A$ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3
Vanuatu vatu Vt 94.6 92.6 96.9 102.4 108.6
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Table A16 Gross international reserves ($ million)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Central Asia
Armenia 1,933 1,799 2,252 1,489 1,771
Azerbaijan 10,274 11,277 15,014 15,549 7910
Georgia 2,818 2,873 2,823 2,699 2,521
Kazakhstan 29,328 28,269 24,715 29,209 27,876
Kyrgyz Republic 1,835 2,067 2,238 1,958 1,778
Tajikistan 572 650 636 511 494
Turkmenistan 22,400 26,400 29,300 32,400 ...
Uzbekistan 18,049 22,133 22,515 24,140 24,400
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 3,255,786 3,387,863 3,880,383 3,899,285 3,386,629
Hong Kong, China 285,402 317,362 311,209 328,516 358,823
Korea, Rep. of 306,402 326,968 346,460 363,593 367,962
Mongolia 2,258 3,630 1,193 1,627 1,300
Taipei,China 385,547 403,169 416,811 418,980 426,031
South Asia
Afghanistan 6,208 6,867 6,886 7,248 7,000
Bangladesh 10,912 10,364 15,315 21,508 25,020
Bhutan 796 674 917 998 959
India 294,397 292,046 304,223 330,213 346,788
Maldives 335 305 368 615 564
Nepal 3,836 4,960 5,614 6,939 8,146
Pakistan 14,784 10,803 6,008 9,098 13,526
Sri Lanka 5,958 6,877 7,495 8,208 6,480
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 2,490 3,291 3,406 3,479 2,892
Cambodia 3,032 3,397 3,643 4,391 5,093
Indonesia 110,123 112,781 99,387 111,862 105,931
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 679 740 666 816 987
Malaysia 133,642 139,724 134,911 115,937 95,290
Myanmar 922 3,062 4,546 5,070 5,075
Philippines 75,302 83,831 83,187 79,541 80,667
Singapore 237,737 259,307 273,065 256,860 247,747
Thailand 175,124 181,608 167,289 157,108 156,514
Viet Nam 13,531 25,399 25,745 34,120 28,000
The Pacific
Cook Islands ... ... ... ... ...
Fiji 831 915 755 750 764
Kiribati ... ... ... ... ...
Marshall Islands ... ... ... ... ...
Micronesia, Fed. States of ... ... ... ... ...
Nauru ... ... ... ... ...
Palau ... ... ... ... ...
Papua New Guinea 4,323 4,001 2,826 2,305 2,105
Samoa ... 157 137 155 167
Solomon Islands 412 499 532 507 527
Timor–Leste ... ... ... ... ...
Tonga 110 145 152 151 151
Tuvalu ... ... ... ... ...
Vanuatu 172 180 180 185 ...
... = data not available.
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Table A17 External debt outstanding ($ million)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Central Asia
Armenia 3,568 3,739 3,899 3,785 4,310
Azerbaijan 4,841 5,470 6,059 6,478 6,894
Georgia 8,706 10,057 10,542 10,718 11,386
Kazakhstan 125,321 136,918 150,033 157,423 155,577
Kyrgyz Republic 4,754 5,190 5,929 6,359 6,167
Tajikistan 2,159 2,173 2,149 2,100 2,183
Turkmenistan 2,923 6,365 8,654 8,053 8,296
Uzbekistan 6,090 6,660 7,500 8,399 10,521
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 694,997 736,986 863,167 895,460 ...
Hong Kong, China 982,701 1,029,853 1,160,364 1,301,233 1,303,869
Korea, Rep. of 400,034 408,928 423,505 424,391 396,559
Mongolia 9,628 15,386 19,022 20,942 21,603
Taipei,China 122,528 130,821 170,134 177,945 158,954
South Asia
Afghanistan 1,242 1,320 1,230 1,360 1,360
Bangladesh 22,086 22,095 22,381 24,388 23,489
Bhutan 1,289 1,334 1,607 1,759 1,855
India 360,766 409,484 446,300 474,400 482,900
Maldives 900 811 792 742 688
Nepal 3,658 3,491 3,510 3,617 3,391
Pakistan 66,366 65,478 60,899 65,365 65,103
Sri Lanka 32,748 37,098 39,905 43,035 43,747
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam ... ... ... ... ...
Cambodia 3,645 4,274 4,828 5,264 5,674
Indonesia 225,375 252,364 266,109 293,770 310,722
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 2,990 3,037 4,611 ... ...
Malaysia 169,171 196,861 212,279 213,873 194,256
Myanmar 15,300 13,700 10,200 8,800 9,700
Philippines 75,569 79,949 78,489 77,674 77,474
Singapore 1,415,335 1,437,268 1,527,241 1,708,393 1,855,549
Thailand 104,334 130,747 141,933 140,135 133,745
Viet Nam 37,644 42,158 45,243 ... ...
The Pacific
Cook Islands 26 38 59 61 67
Fiji 465 523 595 664 642
Kiribati 14 14 14 14 21
Marshall Islands 100 97 98 93 103
Micronesia, Fed. States of 91 91 91 95 ...
Nauru ... ... ... ... ...
Palau 63 69 65 71 64
Papua New Guinea 1,068 1,126 1,252 1,465 2,293
Samoa 311 376 415 415 442
Solomon Islands 258 228 204 ... ...
Timor–Leste ... ... 6 22 46
Tonga 148 190 198 185 198
Tuvalu 10 10 9 8 ...
Vanuatu 63 69 65 71 64
... = data not available.
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Table A18 Debt service ratio (% of exports of goods and services)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Central Asia
Armenia 3.7 8.2 27.3 6.8 4.2
Azerbaijan ... ... ... ... ...
Georgia 9.1 22.5 18.1 13.5 15.6
Kazakhstan 33.1 34.8 35.1 36.6 ...
Kyrgyz Republic 10.7 18.9 20.8 27.2 26.1
Tajikistan 4.3 7.6 10.6 14.3 ...
Turkmenistan 1.6 1.8 2.3 ... ...
Uzbekistan 3.6 6.4 3.5 5.1 7.0
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.9 ...
Hong Kong, China 50.5 49.1 48.9 59.9 65.5
Korea, Rep. of 7.9 7.5 7.1 7.3 ...
Mongolia 31.7 33.0 46.4 44.6 45.9
Taipei,China 2.1 1.2 2.0 1.7 1.8
South Asia
Afghanistan 1.3 1.0 6.8 ... ...
Bangladesh 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.3
Bhutan 51.7 127.1 229.2 27.1 19.9
India 6.0 5.9 5.9 7.5 7.5
Maldives 2.6 2.9 2.1 2.3 2.2
Nepal 11.1 10.6 9.5 8.9 8.1
Pakistan 12.7 15.2 20.6 23.0 18.1
Sri Lanka 12.7 19.7 23.5 20.2 ...
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam ... ... ... ... ...
Cambodia ... ... ... ... ...
Indonesia 12.5 17.3 20.7 23.1 29.1
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 4.4 4.3 5.0 ... ...
Malaysia 10.4 10.3 9.6 11.3 15.6
Myanmar 10.5 2.2 3.3 2.9 4.1
Philippines 9.9 7.3 8.2 6.3 5.3
Singapore ... ... ... ... ...
Thailand 3.5 4.2 4.0 4.9 4.6
Viet Nam 3.5 4.3 ... ... ...
The Pacific
Cook Islands ... 7.5 6.6 5.6 5.5
Fiji 8.3 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9
Kiribati 3.1 3.9 3.8 2.4 2.9
Marshall Islands 23.2 9.6 8.9 9.5 11.8
Micronesia, Fed. States of 7.5 6.0 7.2 11.2 ...
Nauru ... ... ... ... ...
Palau 4.9 5.1 4.2 4.2 5.3
Papua New Guinea 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 0.9
Samoa 0.1 ... ... ... ...
Solomon Islands 2.4 3.5 6.8 2.8 ...
Timor–Leste ... ... ... ... ...
Tonga 9.3 6.9 8.7 13.0 12.0
Tuvalu 3.5 0.8 2.4 2.3 ...
Vanuatu 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.8 ...
... = data not available.
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Asia’s Potential Growth
The annual Asian Development Outlook analyzes economic performance in the past year and offers forecasts 
for the next 2 years for the 45 economies in Asia and the Pacific that make up developing Asia.
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